Nasdaq, Inc. (NDAQ): what the price requires
At today's price, Nasdaq, Inc. (NDAQ) is priced for +7.4% growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/NDAQ
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | NDAQ |
| Company | Nasdaq, Inc. |
| Current price | $89.08/sh |
| Composition | Data & Listing Services 15% / Index 16% / Workflow & Insights 10% / Financial Crime Management Technology 6% / Regulatory Technology 8% / Capital Markets Technology 21% / Market Services, net 23% / Other revenues 1% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | segment |
| Implied growth | 7.4% |
Solve inputs: computed at a 8.2% cost of capital with 6.2% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~12.7pp.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~19.3%/yr; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| cohort percentile (of 16 peers) | 100 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 2.25x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 4.02x | 5 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.15x | 4 | expensive |
| Growth | 1.12x | 3 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.9%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=17)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $79.43 | 1.12x | yes | FCF base $2.1B, growth 7% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.9%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $84.08 | 1.06x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 17.4x / 19.4x / 21.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $58.35 | 1.53x | yes | P/E 16.39x (blended: static sector reference 12x + trailing (TTM) 27x), scenarios: 13.8x / 16.4x / 19.0x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA N/Ax |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $36.15 | 2.46x | yes | BV/sh $21.05, ROE (TTM) 15.9%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $46.78 | 1.90x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $66.06 | 1.35x | yes | Rev $8.3B, growth 7% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 5.1x / 6.1x / 7.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $116.20 | 0.77x | yes | EPS $3.32, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.76 (Undervalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $14.68 | 6.07x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.86B × (1−23%) / WACC 7.9% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $47.62 | 1.87x | yes | BV $21.05 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 15.9% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $39.65 | 2.25x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $3.32 × BVPS $21.05) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $22.15 | 4.02x | yes | FCF $2004.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $18.97 | 4.70x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $1.84B (FCF $2.00B − SBC $0.17B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $107.13 | 0.83x | yes | EPS $3.32 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $6.38 | 13.96x | yes | BV $21.05 × (ROIC 2.4% / WACC 7.9%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $43.60 | 2.04x | yes | Revenue $8.31B × sector P/S 3.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $124.50 | 0.72x | yes | EPS $3.32 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $35.89 | 2.48x | yes | EPS $3.32 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $8.4b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 4.67x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 3.58x |
| Interest coverage | 6.5x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 3.3% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
Nasdaq is no longer just an exchange; it is a recurring-revenue financial-technology and data company with market services as one piece. At $82.23 (June 27, 2026) the price decomposes onto its Capital Access Platforms segment, where it implies operating growth of about 5% per year for five years, a multiple that sits at the very top of the peer distribution.
The moat shows in the numbers: the most recent quarter put net revenue at $1.4 billion, up 14%, annualized recurring revenue at $3.2 billion, up 13%, and operating income up 17% with diluted EPS up 21%. The static valuation families call it expensive on assets and earnings power, while the relative-multiple and growth methods support the price.
The balance sheet carries the Adenza acquisition: net debt around $8.4 billion with interest coverage near 6.8x, but the company is deleveraging ahead of plan and still returned over $700 million to shareholders in the quarter. Leverage is the swing factor against a high-quality, sticky franchise.
Bull Case
Nasdaq's moat is one of the most durable in finance, and the margin and return data show why. The company owns a set of businesses that are structurally hard to dislodge: a leading listings venue, a fast-growing index franchise, market-data feeds that every participant needs, and a financial-technology stack embedded in clients' compliance and trading workflows. The filing describes that technology layer directly, with the Financial Technology segment spanning Verafin financial-crime management, regulatory technology, and capital-markets technology (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001628280-26-007703). Software that sits inside a bank's surveillance and regulatory plumbing is mission-critical and expensive to rip out, which is why the company earns high returns on capital and commands a multiple at the top of its peer group.
The results show the moat compounding. In the most recent quarter net revenue rose 14% to $1.4 billion, annualized recurring revenue reached $3.2 billion, up 13%, and annualized SaaS revenue grew 13% and now represents 38% of ARR. Solutions revenue grew 14% to $1.1 billion, led by 18% growth in Financial Technology. Operating income rose 17% and diluted EPS climbed 21%. Double-digit growth across every division, increasingly from recurring and SaaS revenue rather than transaction volumes, is the transformation from a cyclical exchange into a steadier subscription-like business, and it is exactly the durability the static frames cannot price.
Capital returns and deleveraging round out the case. Nasdaq returned over $700 million to shareholders in the quarter, including nearly $550 million of buybacks, while still paying down the debt taken on for the Adenza acquisition ahead of its deleveraging schedule. A company that can buy back stock, raise its dividend over time, and deleverage simultaneously is generating cash well in excess of what it needs to run, and management is signaling that it sees its own shares as worth more than the market is paying even at a premium multiple.
Bear Case
The disruption risk is not a startup, it is the scaled rivals that compete with Nasdaq segment by segment, and they are formidable before any valuation number is considered. In market services, Intercontinental Exchange, CME Group, and Cboe contest trading and clearing volumes; in index and data, S&P Global and MSCI dominate the most lucrative index franchises; and in the analytics and workflow tools, FactSet and Verisk press from adjacent directions. Each of Nasdaq's businesses faces a deep-pocketed specialist, and the index and data revenue that carries the premium is precisely where S&P and MSCI hold the strongest positions. A multiple at the very top of the peer distribution assumes Nasdaq keeps winning share against opponents who are at least as well capitalized.
That competitive intensity meets a balance sheet that is not pristine. The Adenza acquisition added roughly $8.4 billion of net debt, and while interest coverage near 6.8x is comfortable and deleveraging is ahead of plan, the company is still carrying acquisition leverage at the same time it returns over $700 million a quarter to shareholders. If revenue growth slows or a large client of the financial-technology stack switches vendors, the combination of debt service, buybacks, and a premium multiple leaves less cushion than the strong recent results imply.
The valuation itself is the bear's clearest point. The asset-based and earnings-power frames both call the stock expensive, and only the relative-multiple and growth-DCF methods reach the price. The premium segment trades well beyond the upper quartile of its peer multiple range. The implied roughly 5% operating growth is plausible, but the price is paying a top-of-group multiple to get it, which means any deceleration, a competitive loss in index or fintech, or a slowdown in listings tied to the IPO cycle, would compress the multiple from a stretched starting point. The bear case is not that Nasdaq is a bad business, it is that an excellent business is priced for continued, uninterrupted share gains against the strongest competitors in finance.
Valuation
The price decomposes onto the segment carrying the premium, Capital Access Platforms, where it implies operating growth of about 4.9% per year for five years. That solve runs at a cost of capital near 8.1% with 6.1% terminal growth, and the inversion is highly sensitive to the discount rate, with each point of cost of capital moving the implied growth by roughly 12 points. Keep the figure approximate; it is a single solve. The notable fact is where the multiple sits: at the very top of the peer distribution, well beyond the upper quartile.
The family pattern shows a quality premium. The asset-based and earnings-power methods both read expensive, reflecting the goodwill and debt from the Adenza deal and a price well above book and current earnings power, while the relative-multiple and growth-DCF methods support the quote. When the static frames say expensive and the forward frames justify the price, the market is paying for durable, recurring growth that the backward-looking methods structurally cannot capture. The reverse-DCF range centers below the current price but the high end runs above it, with an acceptable reliability flag, consistent with a premium franchise priced toward the optimistic end.
The read is that the implied growth is achievable but the multiple leaves little margin. About 5% segment operating growth is well within what a recurring-revenue franchise growing ARR at 13% can deliver, so the assumption is reasonable. The risk is the starting multiple, not the assumption: a top-of-group valuation means the return depends on Nasdaq sustaining its premium, which in turn depends on continued share gains against ICE, CME, S&P, and MSCI and on the deleveraging staying on track. The valuation rewards execution and punishes any stumble more than a mid-multiple peer would.
Catalysts
The most recent print, Q1 2026 (reported April 2026), was strong across the board: net revenue of $1.4 billion, up 14% (13% organic), annualized recurring revenue of $3.2 billion, up 13%, and annualized SaaS revenue up 13% to 38% of ARR. Solutions revenue grew 14% to $1.1 billion with Financial Technology up 18%, operating income rose 17% to $799 million, and diluted EPS climbed 21% to $0.96. Management said it is delivering ahead of plan on Adenza net expense synergies and on its deleveraging targets.
The forward catalysts are the recurring-revenue ramp and the IPO cycle. Continued ARR and SaaS growth in the financial-technology and index businesses is the durable driver, while a recovery in listings and capital-markets activity would lift the more cyclical market-services and listing lines. The pace of Adenza synergy capture and deleveraging is the balance-sheet catalyst that frees up further capital return.
The watch items are competitive share in index and data against S&P Global and MSCI, fintech client retention, the trajectory of leverage, and the volume environment in market services. Sustained double-digit ARR growth with on-schedule deleveraging would validate the premium multiple; a growth slowdown or a competitive loss in the premium segment would pressure it. Sources: Nasdaq Q1 2026 results and earnings coverage (ir.nasdaq.com; stocktitan.net; fool.com; theglobeandmail.com), April 2026.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Capital Access Platforms (reported)
- SPGI (S&P Global Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MSCI (MSCI INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- FDS (FACTSET RESEARCH SYSTEMS INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ICE (Intercontinental Exchange Inc)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- VRSK (Verisk Analytics, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Financial Technology (reported)
- ICE (Intercontinental Exchange Inc)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CME (CME Group Inc)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CBOE (Cboe Global Markets, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TW (Tradeweb Markets Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MKTX (MARKETAXESS HOLDINGS INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- SPGI (S&P Global Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MCO (Moody’s Corporation)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MSCI (MSCI INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Market Services (reported)
- CME (CME Group Inc)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ICE (Intercontinental Exchange Inc)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CBOE (Cboe Global Markets, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MKTX (MARKETAXESS HOLDINGS INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TW (Tradeweb Markets Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.