NEBIUS GROUP N.V. (NBIS): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $147.56, NEBIUS GROUP N.V. (NBIS) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~38.1 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-27.
Generated: 2026-08-01 · Exported: 2026-08-03 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/NBIS
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | NBIS |
| Company | NEBIUS GROUP N.V. |
| Current price | $147.56/sh |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Trailing margin (depressed year) | -115.5% |
| Must persist for | 38.1y |
| Multiple paid | 510x mid-cycle operating income |
Solve inputs: computed at a 12.3% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~4.2 years.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~27.1 years; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: elevated
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +0.72σ |
| sustained it ~10 years at this level | 15% |
| implied end-window share | 1% |
Valuation X-Ray
Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 12.57x | 1 | expensive |
| Earnings | — | 0 | — |
| Relative | 9.32x | 1 | expensive |
| Growth | 3.07x | 2 | expensive |
Families that call it expensive: Asset, Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.3%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=4)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $67.73 | 2.18x | yes | Reference only (OCF-based, capex excluded): OCF $0.4B |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0 |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $15.84 | 9.32x | yes | P/E 39.6x (blended: static sector reference 18x + trailing (TTM) 443x), scenarios: 31.7x / 39.6x / 47.5x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $3.60 | 40.99x | yes | BV/sh $18.55, ROE (TTM) 1.8%, ke 9.3% (excluded from median) |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $1.99 | 74.15x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% (excluded from median) |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $37.24 | 3.96x | yes | Rev $0.5B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 9.6x / 12.0x / 14.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x) |
| Growth-Adjusted P/E | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | $1.44 | 102.47x | yes | BV $18.55 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 1.8% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 1.2%/yr (excluded from median) |
| Graham Number | Asset | $11.74 | 12.57x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $0.33 × BVPS $18.55) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $2.22 | 66.47x | yes | EPS $0.33 × (8.5 + 2×-0.2%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $5.35 | 27.58x | yes | Revenue $0.53B × sector P/S 2.5x (excluded from median) |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $3.57 | 41.33x | yes | EPS $0.33 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) (excluded from median) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $449.6m |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 8.48x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 6.03x |
| Interest coverage | 1.2x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -9.1% |
| Burning cash | no |
Leverage and coverage are computed on normalized mid-cycle operating income (mid-cycle margin 14.1%); the trailing year was depressed.
Bullet Takeaways
Nebius Group is an AI cloud and GPU infrastructure company, and the market is pricing it as one of the fastest-growing businesses in the world. At $287.14 (June 27, 2026) the price works out to roughly 984x company-wide mid-cycle operating income, a level that requires operating-profit growth beyond 25% per year sustained for decades, which is not resolvable as an ordinary profit bet.
The fundamentals behind that price are genuinely extraordinary: the most recent quarter showed revenue up nearly 700% year over year, core AI cloud annualized run-rate near $1.9 billion, sold-out capacity, and a multi-year, multi-billion-dollar partnership with Meta. The business is real and scaling fast; the question is the price, not the growth.
The model is enormously capital-hungry. Trailing operating income is deeply negative, the company carries gross debt above $4 billion against $3.7 billion of liquid assets, and full-year capital spending is guided to $20 billion or more. This is a business that must keep raising money to grow, and how it raises that money is the central risk.
Bull Case
What the market is pricing in is hyperscale-level growth, and for once the fundamentals are running with the price rather than behind it. In the most recent quarter Nebius reported revenue of $399 million, up about 684% year over year, with the core AI cloud business at roughly 94% of the total and annualized run-rate revenue reaching $1.92 billion, up 54% quarter over quarter. The company said it sold out its capacity as demand kept exceeding supply. When a business is capacity-constrained at nearly 700% growth, the binding limit is how fast it can build, not whether customers will come, and that is the rarest kind of demand signal.
The contracted backlog turns that demand into something durable. Management announced a $27 billion, five-year contractual partnership with Meta and raised contracted-capacity guidance to 4 gigawatts, anchored by a new 1.2 GW proprietary facility in Philadelphia and an expansion in Finland. Full-year 2026 guidance calls for revenue of $3.0 billion to $3.4 billion at an adjusted EBITDA margin around 40%, with annualized run-rate revenue exiting the year between $7 billion and $9 billion. A hyperscale anchor contract plus a path to a 40% EBITDA margin is what separates a real AI infrastructure platform from a speculative buildout.
The financing to fund it has shown up on favorable terms, which is itself a vote of confidence. The company raised over $6 billion, including $4.3 billion from convertible senior notes and a $2 billion equity investment from NVIDIA. An equity check from the company that makes the GPUs is a strategic endorsement of Nebius as a preferred deployment partner, and access to convertible financing at this scale means the capital markets are willing to fund the buildout that the sold-out demand requires. For the bull, the price is high because the opportunity is, and the funding and contracts are arriving fast enough to chase it.
Bear Case
The bear case starts with how the growth is being financed, because the capital structure is where this story can break. To fund the buildout the company raised over $6 billion in a single stretch, $4.3 billion in convertible senior notes and $2 billion in NVIDIA equity, on top of guided full-year capital spending of $20 billion to $25 billion against current revenue near $400 million a quarter. Capital expenditure of that magnitude cannot be funded from operations, so the equation only closes through continued debt and equity issuance. Convertibles dilute if the stock stays high and become a debt problem if it falls, and a strategic supplier taking an equity stake while also selling you the GPUs is the kind of intertwined relationship where the customer, the financier, and the vendor blur together. The peer disclosures in this space warn directly that if such capital is not available on satisfactory terms, the ability to support growth could be significantly impaired, forcing a company to delay, reduce, or eliminate operations (CoreWeave FY2025 10-K, accession 0001769628-26-000104).
The profitability picture underneath is not yet a business that funds itself. Trailing operating margin is around negative 226%, trailing operating income is a loss exceeding $1.4 billion, and interest coverage is below 1x. The model leans on through-the-cycle normalized margins to even attempt a valuation, and even then no asset, earnings-power, or peer-multiple family reaches the price. The single relative-multiple read puts the price at roughly 18x the relevant frame and the growth frame at over 6x, meaning the equity is valued far above what any standard method supports.
The valuation leaves no room for the buildout to disappoint. At about 984x normalized operating income, the price embeds profit growth beyond 25% per year for around 40 years, and history says only about a third of comparable fast-growers sustained their pace even five years. The same factors that make the platform exciting, GPU lead times, the race to deploy new chip generations, dependence on a few enormous customer contracts, are the ones the peer filings list as the central risks (CoreWeave FY2025 10-K, accession 0001769628-26-000104). If the Meta-scale contracts slow, if GPU supply or power timing slips, or if the capital markets tighten, the financing-dependent model and the extreme multiple amplify each other on the way down.
Valuation
At the current price the market is paying roughly 984x company-wide mid-cycle operating income, which implies a path of operating-profit growth beyond 25% per year sustained for around 40 years. That is a bound, not a solved point, and it is effectively not resolvable as an ordinary profit bet. The solve runs at a cost of capital near 13.1% with growth searched up to a 25% self-funding ceiling, and because trailing earnings are deeply negative it uses the company's own through-the-cycle margins on current revenue rather than the trough quarter. Treat every figure here as directional.
No valuation family reaches the price. The asset and earnings-power frames cannot be computed meaningfully on a deeply loss-making, capital-intensive base, the growth-DCF frame sits at more than 6x the price, and the single peer-multiple read is over 18x. The reverse-DCF range carries a low reliability flag and centers far below the current quote. When the methods land this far under the price across the board, the quote is not leaning on one optimistic frame, it is a bet beyond what any standard approach can support, anchored entirely on continued hypergrowth and the eventual conversion to the guided 40% EBITDA margin.
The only grounded anchors are the contracted backlog and the liquidity. The Meta partnership and the raised capacity guidance give the revenue ramp real visibility, and $3.7 billion of liquid assets plus recent raises fund the next leg of the buildout. But liquidity is not the same as profitability, and gross debt above $4 billion with sub-1x interest coverage means the balance sheet is a function of capital-markets access, not internal cash generation. The valuation is a venture-scale wager on execution, and it should be sized as one.
Catalysts
The most recent print, Q1 2026 (reported May 2026), was a blowout on the top line: revenue of $399 million, up about 684% year over year and ahead of consensus, with the core AI cloud business at roughly 94% of revenue and annualized run-rate revenue reaching $1.92 billion, up 54% quarter over quarter. The company sold out its capacity as demand exceeded supply.
The forward catalysts are large and concrete. Management announced a $27 billion, five-year partnership with Meta, raised contracted-capacity guidance to 4 gigawatts anchored by a 1.2 GW proprietary facility in Philadelphia plus a Finland expansion, and reiterated full-year 2026 revenue guidance of $3.0 billion to $3.4 billion at roughly a 40% adjusted EBITDA margin, with exit annualized run-rate revenue of $7 billion to $9 billion. It also raised over $6 billion, including $4.3 billion of convertible senior notes and a $2 billion NVIDIA equity investment, and lifted full-year capital spending guidance to $20 billion to $25 billion.
The watch items are execution and financing. Capacity deployment timing, power and GPU availability, and the pace of converting contracted gigawatts into live revenue are the operational catalysts; the funding cadence and any further dilution are the financial ones. Hitting the revenue and EBITDA-margin guidance while keeping the buildout funded on reasonable terms would validate the ramp; a slip in deployment or a tougher capital market would expose the financing dependence directly. Sources: Nebius Q1 2026 results and earnings coverage (sec.gov 6-K; fool.com; finance.yahoo.com; futurumgroup.com; seekingalpha.com), May 2026.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- CRWV (CoreWeave Inc)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- IREN (IREN Ltd)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CORZ (Core Scientific Inc)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- APLD (Applied Digital Corp)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ORCL (Oracle Corp)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.