NCR ATLEOS CORPORATION (NATL): what the price requires

The current priced-in claim for NCR ATLEOS CORPORATION (NATL) is temporarily suppressed because the live engine record is unavailable. The dated report remains a snapshot, not a current market read.

Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/NATL

Headline

Field	Value
Ticker	NATL
Company	NCR ATLEOS CORPORATION
Current price	$45.45/sh
Composition	Product revenue 24% / Service revenue 76%

What The Price Requires (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

Field	Value
Inversion basis	whole-company
Operating margin needed	7.5%
Operating margin today	10.6%
Margin compression implied	-3.1pp
Multiple paid	13x operating income

The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 12, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.

The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7.4% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~2.2%/yr; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

Reference	Value
vs own history	-1.11σ
cohort percentile (of 177 peers)	15
implied end-window share	0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

Family	Median price/FV	Models	Reads
Asset	1.47x	4	expensive
Earnings	1.75x	3	expensive
Relative	0.51x	5	justifies
Growth	1.21x	2	expensive

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.7%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=14)

Model	Family	FV	Price/FV	Applicable	Methodology
DCF Perpetual Growth	Growth	—	—	no	—
DCF Exit Multiple	Growth	$42.57	1.07x	yes	Exit EV/EBITDA: 9.0x / 11.0x / 13.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative Valuation	Relative	$88.80	0.51x	yes	P/E 28x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 23.5x / 28.0x / 32.5x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 20x
Simple DDM	Growth	—	—	no	—
Two-Stage DDM	Growth	—	—	no	—
Simple Excess Return	Asset	$25.17	1.81x	yes	BV/sh $5.24, ROE (TTM) 44.4%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess Return	Asset	$63.79	0.71x	yes	5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market Cap	Growth	$33.73	1.35x	yes	Rev $4.4B, growth 4% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.7x / 0.8x / 0.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair Value	Relative	$81.20	0.56x	yes	EPS $2.32, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.56 (Undervalued)
Margin Trajectory	Growth	—	—	no	—
Earnings Power Value	Earnings	$25.99	1.75x	yes	Normalized EBIT (4y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.38B × (1−33%) / WACC 5.7% → EPV (no growth)
Residual Income	Asset	$40.29	1.13x	yes	BV $5.24 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 44.4% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham Number	Asset	$16.54	2.75x	yes	√(22.5 × EPS $2.32 × BVPS $5.24) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA Relative	Relative	$109.84	0.41x	yes	EBITDA $0.54B × sector EV/EBITDA 20.0x
FCF Yield	Earnings	$0.01	4545.00x	yes	FCF $109.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median)
SBC-Adj FCF Yield	Earnings	$0.01	4545.00x	yes	SBC-adj FCF $0.08B (FCF $0.11B − SBC $0.03B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median)
Ben Graham Formula	Earnings	$74.86	0.61x	yes	EPS $2.32 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/B	Asset	$1.79	25.39x	yes	BV $5.24 × (ROIC 1.9% / WACC 5.7%) (excluded from median)
P/Sales Sector	Relative	$350.79	0.13x	yes	Revenue $4.42B × sector P/S 6.0x
PEG Fair Value	Relative	$87.00	0.52x	yes	EPS $2.32 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings Yield	Earnings	$25.08	1.81x	yes	EPS $2.32 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations Multiple	Relative	—	—	no	—
Clinical Phase NPV	Growth	—	—	no	—
Merton	Asset	—	—	no	—
V5 Mechanical	—	—	—	no	—

Solvency

Field	Value
Net debt	$2.4b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)	7.56x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)	5.04x
Interest coverage	1.8x
Share count CAGR (dilution)	2.0%
Burning cash	no

Bullet Takeaways

NCR Atleos is the ATM and self-service banking company spun out of NCR, and the dominant fact today is that it has agreed to be acquired by Brink's for $30.00 in cash plus 0.1574 Brink's shares per Atleos share, a deal valued around $6.6 billion and expected to close in early 2027. At $43.69 the stock now trades largely as a function of that consideration and the odds the deal closes, not as a standalone going concern.

On the standalone numbers the price pays about 12x company-wide operating income, low enough to sit below what even a 5%-per-year operating-profit decline would justify. Most valuation families read within range, with only the earnings-power frame calling it expensive, so the standalone business was already priced cheaply before the bid.

The one number that complicates everything is leverage. The company carries net debt around $2.36 billion against trailing operating income near $469 million, with interest coverage of about 1.8x. That debt load is why a cash-and-stock takeout matters so much, and why deal-break risk is the central question rather than a footnote.

Bull Case

Start with how far the price sits from the methods, because it explains why a buyer stepped in. A business priced at roughly 12x operating income, below what even a modest profit decline would warrant, was a classic case of the market discounting a cheap, cash-generative franchise for its leverage. That gap between a low price and a defensible business is exactly what an acquirer monetizes, and Brink's agreed to pay $30.00 in cash plus 0.1574 of its own shares per Atleos share, a transaction worth about $6.6 billion.

The underlying business gives the bid its logic. Atleos runs leading self-service banking operations through ATMs supported by a shared set of tools, systems, and platforms, alongside a network business and a telecommunications and technology segment serving enterprise clients (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001628280-26-012576). Service revenue is about 76% of the mix, and in the most recent quarter recurring revenue was around 72% of a top line that grew 7% to $1.04 billion. Self-Service Banking revenue grew about 12%, led by roughly 30% growth in ATM-as-a-Service. Recurring, contracted revenue at that scale is what makes the cash flows predictable enough for a leveraged buyer to underwrite.

For a holder today, the bull case is the merger spread itself. The stock trades below the headline deal value, so if the transaction closes on the announced terms the cash component alone delivers a defined floor and the Brink's share component adds upside tied to the combined company. The deal converts a leveraged, cheaply priced standalone into a claim with a fixed cash leg and a strategic acquirer motivated to complete, which is a different risk profile from owning the equity outright and waiting for the multiple to re-rate on its own.

Bear Case

The honest bear observation is that the price no longer reflects the business, it reflects a deal that has not closed, and the gap between the $43.69 quote and the headline consideration is the market's estimate of everything that can still go wrong. The Brink's acquisition is subject to shareholder approvals at both companies, antitrust waiting periods, and a range of domestic and foreign regulatory and money-transmitter clearances, with completion not expected until early 2027. That is a long window and a wide set of conditions. If any of them fail, the stock reprices to the standalone, and the standalone is a leveraged business.

That leverage is the fundamentals disconnect underneath the spread. Atleos carries net debt of roughly $2.36 billion against trailing operating income near $469 million, with interest coverage of only about 1.8x, and in the most recent quarter adjusted free cash flow on an unrestricted basis was negative and operating cash flow was a small outflow. A business that converts a single-digit share of its operating income into interest coverage that thin has little room for error, and the company has even sought bondholder consent tied to the merger terms. A standalone Atleos without a buyer is a deleveraging story with limited margin for a demand stumble.

The earnings-power frame already flags the tension. Among the valuation families it is the one calling the price expensive, which is the methods' way of saying the current profit base does not comfortably support the quote without the deal premium. So the bear case is specific: the downside is not a slow erosion, it is a binary. Hold the stock and the central question is deal completion, not next quarter's ATMaaS growth. If the merger breaks, a cheap-looking multiple becomes a leveraged orphan, and the very factors that made the company an attractive target, predictable cash flows pledged against $2.8 billion of gross debt, become the constraint.

Valuation

On a standalone basis the market is paying about 12x company-wide operating income, a multiple low enough that the price sits below what even a 5%-per-year operating-profit decline would warrant. That is a bound, not a solved point: computed at a cost of capital near 7.4% with 4% terminal growth, the price does not require growth, only that profit not erode faster than a modest decline. By that frame the standalone business was already cheap before the bid.

The family pattern is mostly within range. The asset, relative-multiple, and growth methods land at or near the price, the relative-multiple frame sits well below it (peers would justify more), and only the earnings-power method calls the stock expensive, reflecting the heavy interest burden that eats into normalized earnings. The reverse-DCF range centers at the current price with an acceptable reliability flag, which is consistent with a stable franchise whose equity value is held down by debt rather than by weak operations.

But the standalone analysis is now secondary to the deal math. The announced consideration is $30.00 in cash plus 0.1574 Brink's shares per Atleos share, in a transaction valued around $6.6 billion. The cash leg is a fixed floor; the stock leg moves with Brink's price. The current $43.69 trades at a discount to the headline value, and that discount is the market pricing time to a 2027 close plus the probability the regulatory and shareholder conditions are met. The valuation question for a holder is therefore not what the standalone is worth, it is whether the spread compensates for deal-break risk and the leverage that would resurface if it broke.

Catalysts

The defining catalyst is the pending acquisition by Brink's, announced in 2026: $30.00 per share in cash plus 0.1574 Brink's shares, a roughly $6.6 billion deal completed through a two-step merger structure and expected to close in the first quarter of 2027. Completion depends on shareholder approvals at both companies, expiration of antitrust waiting periods, and various domestic and foreign regulatory and money-transmitter clearances. The company has also sought bondholder consent tied to the merger terms. Each approval milestone between now and close is a discrete event that moves the spread.

The most recent standalone print supports the deal logic: Q1 2026 revenue of $1.04 billion, up 7%, with recurring revenue around 72% of the total, Self-Service Banking up about 12%, ATM-as-a-Service up roughly 30% with new expansion in Europe and Latin America, and net income attributable to Atleos of $22 million, up 57%. Adjusted EBITDA was about $172 million, roughly flat, and unrestricted adjusted free cash flow was modestly negative in the quarter, a seasonal cash pattern worth watching.

The watch items are all deal-related: antitrust and money-transmitter clearances across multiple jurisdictions, the shareholder votes, and Brink's share price (which sets the value of the stock portion of the consideration). A clean path through the approvals would narrow the spread toward the headline value; any regulatory snag or a material drop in Brink's stock would widen it and reintroduce the standalone leverage profile. Sources: NCR Atleos Q1 2026 results and merger disclosures (investor.ncratleos.com; stocktitan.net; theglobeandmail.com; investing.com), 2026.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Self-Service Banking (reported)

ACIW (ACI WORLDWIDE, INC.)
(no filing in the citation store)
JKHY (JACK HENRY & ASSOCIATES, INC.)
(no filing in the citation store)
NCNO (nCino, Inc.)
(no filing in the citation store)

Telecommunications & Technology (T&T) (reported)

NTCT (NETSCOUT SYSTEMS, INC.)
(no filing in the citation store)
SAIC (Science Applications International Corporation)
(no filing in the citation store)
LDOS (Leidos Holdings, Inc.)
(no filing in the citation store)
DXC (DXC Technology Co)
(no filing in the citation store)
CSGS (CSG SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL, INC.)
(no filing in the citation store)

Methodology Note

Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.