Vail Resorts, Inc. (MTN): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $151.06, Vail Resorts, Inc. (MTN) is priced for +2.6% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-27.
Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/MTN
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | MTN |
| Company | Vail Resorts, Inc. |
| Current price | $151.06/sh |
| Composition | Mountain - Lift 51% / Mountain - Ski School 10% / Mountain - Dining 8% / Mountain - Retail/Rental 10% / Mountain - Other 9% / Lodging 11% / Real Estate 0% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 5.3% |
| Operating margin today | 15.2% |
| Margin compression (value-band) | -9.9pp |
| Implied growth | 2.6% |
| Multiple paid | 21x operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 7.2% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~8pp.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~17.7%/yr; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.40σ |
| cohort percentile (of 34 peers) | 56 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 3.28x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 2.33x | 2 | expensive |
| Relative | — | 0 | — |
| Growth | 1.67x | 3 | expensive |
Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=10)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $0.00 | — | no | FCF base $0.2B, growth -1% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.5%, WACC 6.2%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $122.36 | 1.23x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 9.4x / 11.4x / 13.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | — | — | no | P/E 20.42x (blended: static sector reference 14x + trailing (TTM) 35x), scenarios: 17.4x / 20.4x / 23.5x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 9x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | $80.27 | 1.88x | yes | Stage 1: -12% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $46.12 | 3.28x | yes | BV/sh $15.46, ROE (TTM) 27.6%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $81.07 | 1.86x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $90.36 | 1.67x | yes | Rev $2.8B, growth -1% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.6x / 1.9x / 2.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Growth-Adjusted P/E | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $96.40 | 1.57x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.52B × (1−24%) / WACC 6.2% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $69.38 | 2.18x | yes | BV $15.46 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 27.6% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $39.65 | 3.81x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $4.52 × BVPS $15.46) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | EBITDA $0.73B × sector EV/EBITDA 9.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $0.01 | 15106.00x | yes | FCF $175.4M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median) |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $0.01 | 15106.00x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.14B (FCF $0.18B − SBC $0.03B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median) |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $3.79 | 39.86x | yes | EPS $4.52 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $27.27 | 5.54x | yes | BV $15.46 × (ROIC 11.0% / WACC 6.2%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | — | — | no | Revenue $2.83B × sector P/S 2.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $48.86 | 3.09x | yes | EPS $4.52 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)
One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.
| Unit | Role | Valuation basis | Revenue | Reported profit | Value evidence | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mountain | operating | enterprise | $2.6b | — | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
| Lodging | operating | enterprise | $334.0m | — | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
| Real Estate | operating | enterprise | $435k | — | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $3.3b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 10.20x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 7.78x |
| Interest coverage | 2.2x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -3.2% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
- Vail Resorts sells the Epic Pass before the snow falls, locking in revenue and, as the 10-K puts it, mitigating "exposure to more weather sensitive guests", which is the heart of why a ski operator can be a stable business.
- The biggest risk is showing up now: skier visits fell 15.5% last quarter after a poor snow year, the company cut its fiscal 2026 guidance, and pass sales for next season are down about 10% in units.
- Watch the early pass-sales numbers and the $106 million cost-efficiency plan, the two levers that determine whether next season stabilizes the depressed earnings base.
Bull Case
Read Vail at its current stage, which is a mature, cash-generative business going through a cyclical trough, and the bull case is about the model rather than the moment. The Epic Pass is the structural advantage: skiers commit and pay before the season starts, which converts a weather-dependent, walk-up business into something closer to a subscription. The 10-K describes the value directly, saying the pass program "drives strong customer loyalty and mitigates exposure to more weather sensitive guests, leading to greater revenue stability and allowing us to capture valuable guest data". That advance commitment is why Vail can earn high returns on capital, with trailing return on equity near 28%, even in a bad snow year.
The asset base behind the pass is genuinely irreplaceable. Vail owns or operates a portfolio of premier destination resorts across North America, Australia, and Europe, and new ski mountains in desirable locations essentially cannot be built. That scarcity, combined with the network effect of a single pass good across dozens of mountains, is a moat competitors have struggled to replicate. The international footprint also diversifies the weather risk: even as North American pass sales softened, Epic Australia Pass sales rose roughly 26% in units and 31% in dollars through late May, a reminder that the global portfolio smooths the local snow lottery.
The trough is the opportunity if you believe in normalization. Current operating income is depressed by a weak ski season, which makes trailing multiples look full, but the earnings-power lens built on five-year-average operating income lands near $99, well above where the trough numbers would suggest. Management is responding to the downturn with discipline, targeting $106 million of annualized cost efficiencies, and continuing to pay a substantial dividend, declaring $2.22 per share for the quarter. The bull case is a scarce-asset, subscription-anchored franchise priced near the bottom of its earnings cycle, with self-help on costs and a maintained payout while it waits for snow and visitation to normalize.
Bear Case
The bear case is the variable Vail cannot control and the price cannot escape: the weather, and the consumer behind it. The most recent quarter laid the exposure bare. After one of the worst snowfall years on record, skier visits fell 15.5% in the three months ended April, resort net revenue dropped 7%, and the company cut its fiscal 2026 guidance, now expecting net income of just $128 to $162 million and resort reported EBITDA of $735 to $755 million. This is not a one-quarter blip in a stable business; it is the demand side of the model breaking down when conditions turn against it, and it feeds directly into next year. Pass sales for the 2026/2027 North American season are down about 10% in units, 8% in days, and 5% in dollars, which means the advance commitment that smooths revenue is itself shrinking.
The structural concern beneath the bad year is whether skiing's customer base is contracting. The Epic Pass strategy of selling more passes at lower prices was supposed to grow the committed base; a 10% unit decline raises the question of whether the model has hit a ceiling, with frequent skiers already locked in and casual visitation eroding under high prices and inconsistent snow. Climate variability makes good snow years less reliable over time, and Vail's revenue, even with the pass cushion, ultimately depends on people choosing to ski. Discretionary consumer spending on a premium vacation is the first thing to go when budgets tighten.
The leverage turns this cyclical risk into a financial one. Net debt sits near $3.35 billion, about 3.5 times trailing EBITDA, with operating income covering interest only 2.2 times, the thinnest coverage among the names in this batch. A leveraged business with declining earnings has a shrinking margin for error: the same debt that was comfortable at peak EBITDA looks heavier as EBITDA falls toward the reduced guidance. The company maintained its $2.22 dividend through the downturn, which is shareholder-friendly but also consumes cash that could deleverage. None of the valuation families reaches the price on trailing economics, which means the stock is pricing a recovery to normalized earnings. If the snow stays poor and pass sales keep sliding, the recovery the price assumes does not arrive, and the leverage makes the wait expensive.
Valuation
Vail's valuation carries a tension worth naming up front: the stock trades at about 16x operating income, a multiple so low it sits below what even a 5%-a-year decline in operating profit would warrant, yet none of the valuation families reaches the price on trailing earnings. The resolution is that current operating income is depressed by a poor ski season. On the trailing trough numbers the price looks rich; against normalized through-cycle earnings, the multiple looks undemanding. A buyer is choosing which of those two readings the next few seasons will validate.
The methods split along exactly that line. The lenses built on a single weak year land below the price: the asset-value methods cluster low, with Simple Excess Return near $48 against a thin book value, and the relative P/E method near $97 on a blended multiple inflated by depressed trailing earnings. The lens that normalizes, Earnings Power Value, built on five-year-average operating income, lands near $99, and the exit-multiple DCF reaches $118 by holding a mid-cycle EBITDA multiple. Even those normalized methods sit below the current price, which is the honest signal: the price is paying for a recovery beyond even mid-cycle earnings, or for the scarcity and subscription premium the standard frames structurally cannot capture. The dividend-discount method, with a stage-one decline reflecting the cut to expectations, lands near $83.
The peer cohort, experience-and-leisure names like United Parks, Sirius XM, and the sister venue operator MSG Entertainment, is a loose comparison, because there is no clean public comp for a global ski portfolio. The decisive input is leverage. Net debt at roughly 3.5 times trailing EBITDA with interest covered only 2.2 times is the constraint that matters most: it leaves little room if EBITDA keeps falling toward the reduced guidance. Total liquidity near $1.1 billion provides a cushion, and the $106 million cost-efficiency program helps protect the earnings base, but the balance sheet is the reason this trough is riskier than a debt-free version of the same story. The price rests on normalization, snow, visitation, and pass sales recovering, against a debt load that does not wait.
Catalysts
The third-quarter fiscal 2026 results, reported in early June, were the dominant recent event and they were weak. After one of the worst snowfall years on record, skier visits fell 15.5% in the quarter, resort net revenue dropped 7%, and net income and resort EBITDA both came in below the prior year. The company cut its fiscal 2026 guidance to net income of $128 to $162 million and resort reported EBITDA of $735 to $755 million. A guidance cut driven by conditions is the clearest signal that the trough is real and ongoing.
The forward read is the early pass-sales data, which is the leading indicator for the next ski season. For 2026/2027, North American pass units are down about 10%, days sold down 8%, and dollars down 5%. The one bright spot was international: Epic Australia Pass sales rose roughly 26% in units and 31% in dollars through late May, showing the global portfolio can offset some of the North American softness.
Management's response is the catalyst within its control: a resource-efficiency plan targeting $106 million of annualized cost savings, plus a continued capital plan and a maintained quarterly dividend of $2.22. Total liquidity stood near $1.1 billion at quarter-end. The combination of cost discipline and the international pass strength is what could stabilize the earnings base, but the swing factor remains next winter's snow and whether the pass-sales decline reverses.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Mountain (reported)
- PRKS (United Parks & Resorts Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …Human Capital Management We have a diverse and mission-driven team of employee ambassadors. Our team makes it possible each day to provide our guests with experiences that matter and to inspire them to protect animals and the wild wonders of our world. As of December 31, 2025, we employed approximately 3,300…
- FY2025 10-K: …hire employees; • a decline in discretionary consumer spending or consumer confidence, including any unfavorable impacts from Federal Reserve interest rate actions and inflation which may influence discretionary spending, unemployment or the overall economy; • the ability of Hill Path Capital LP and its affiliates to…
- FUN (Six Flags Entertainment Corporation/NEW)
- FY2025 10-K: Company ("Canada's Wonderland") is respondent to an application filed by the Commissioner of Competition (the "Commissioner") on May 5, 2025 with the Competition Tribunal of Canada. In the application, the Commissioner alleges that Canada's Wonderland is in violation of the Competition Act, RSC 1985, c C-34 (the…
- FY2025 10-K: …the estimated useful lives of the remaining property and equipment at this property were updated to depreciate through October 2025, or the end of the 2025 operating season resulting in an approximate $ 19 million increase in depreciation expense in 2025. As the property and equipment will be disposed significantly…
- CHDN (Churchill Downs Inc)
- FY2025 10-K: …chdn:LiveAndHistoricalRacingMember 2023-01-01 2023-12-31 0000020212 us-gaap:OperatingSegmentsMember chdn:LouisvillePropertyMember chdn:LiveAndHistoricalRacingMember 2025-01-01 2025-12-31 0000020212 us-gaap:OperatingSegmentsMember chdn:LouisvillePropertyMember chdn:LiveAndHistoricalRacingMember 2024-01-01 2024-12-31…
- FY2025 10-K: …0000020212 2025 FY false P7Y P2Y P2Y http://www.churchilldowns.com/20251231#PropertyPlantAndEquipmentNetAndOperatingLeaseRightOfUseAsset http://www.churchilldowns.com/20251231#PropertyPlantAndEquipmentNetAndOperatingLeaseRightOfUseAsset http://fasb.org/us-gaap/2025#AssetImpairmentCharges…
- MSGE (MADISON SQUARE GARDEN ENTERTAINMENT CORP.)
- FY2025 10-K: …content and other content that is material to our business. Theft of our intellectual property, including content, could have a material negative effect on our business and results of operations because it may reduce the revenue that we are able to receive from the legitimate exploitation of such intellectual…
- FY2025 10-K: …the majority of our concession revenues, we also generate revenue from catering for our suites at The Garden. Pursuant to the Arena License Agreements related to the use of The Garden by MSG Sports, the Company shares with MSG Sports revenues and related expenses associated with sales of food and beverages (including…
- LTH (Life Time Group Holdings, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …expect will generate higher average dues, higher in-center revenue per membership and higher revenue per square foot. We believe we have significant whitespace opportunity for our premium athletic country clubs across the United States and Canada, as well as internationally. Since 2015, we have introduced more…
- FY2025 10-K: …seven million of outdoor square feet in the aggregate. Our footprint of athletic country clubs as of December 31, 2025: 4 Table of Contents Our Membership Offering We offer a variety of convenient month-to-month memberships with no long-term contracts, including: • base memberships that provide general access (with…
Lodging (reported)
- HLT (Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …capabilities as a multi-branded manager, franchisor and lessee of hotels with an associated global, system-wide guest loyalty program and commercial platform help us continue to maintain our position as one of the largest and most geographically diverse hospitality companies in the world. Our principal competitors…
- FY2025 10-K: …brands that operate throughout the hospitality industry chain scales; (iii) our dedicated and collaborative workforce, built to focus on providing exceptional customer experiences; and (iv) our commercial service offerings. We believe that satisfied customers will generate additional business at our properties,…
- MAR (MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL INC /MD/)
- FY2025 10-K: Relating to Our Industry Our industry is highly competitive, which may impact our ability to compete successfully for guests . We operate in markets that contain many competitors. Our hotel brands and other lodging offerings generally compete with regional, national, and international chains that operate lodging…
- FY2025 10-K: …Hilton, IHG Hotels & Resorts, Hyatt, Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Accor, Choice Hotels, Best Western Hotels & Resorts, and others. Our direct digital channels also compete for guests with online travel 8 Table of Contents services platforms, such as Expedia.com, Priceline.com, Booking.com, Travelocity.com, Orbitz.com,…
- WH (Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …hotels and potential franchisees and developers. Any of these factors could increase our costs, reduce our revenues and otherwise adversely impact our profitability and/or opportunities for growth. Third-party internet travel intermediaries, peer-to-peer online networks and large language models may adversely affect…
- FY2025 10-K: …an independent, public company in May 2018 when it was spun-off from Wyndham Worldwide, now known as Travel + Leisure Co. ("Travel + Leisure"). COMPETITION We encounter competition among hotel franchisors and lodging operators. We believe franchisees make decisions based principally upon the perceived value and…
- CHH (CHOICE HOTELS INTERNATIONAL INC /DE)
- FY2025 10-K: …hotels to seek new brand affiliations. Furthermore, the Company's conversion brands generally benefit from lodging cycle downturns as our unit growth has been historically driven from the conversion of independent and other hotel chain affiliates into our system as these hotels endeavor to improve their performance,…
- FY2025 10-K: …goes. The properties have vibrant designs, encourage social sharing, and easily switch from work to play and back. Connected, trend-savvy travelers will love this unique opportunity to tailor their stay to their style. The principal competitor brands include Moxy, Citizen M, and Aloft Hotels. Radisson Individuals -…
- RHP (RYMAN HOSPITALITY PROPERTIES, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …are subject to various operating risks common to the lodging industry, many of which are beyond our or a manager's control, including the following: ● competition from other hotel properties and publicly-financed civic convention centers in our markets; ● over-building of hotels in our markets, which could adversely…
- FY2025 10-K: …21 CMBS Loan").The proceeds of the Incremental OEG Loan described above were used to defease the Block 21 CMBS Loan in full in April 2025. Additional Debt Limitations . Pursuant to the terms of the management agreements and pooling agreement with Marriott for our Gaylord Hotels properties, excluding Gaylord Rockies,…
- PK (Park Hotels & Resorts Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …become more sensitive to room rates. We also face competition from peer-to-peer inventory sources that allow travelers to stay at homes and apartments booked from owners, thereby providing an alternative to hotel rooms. We face competition for the acquisition of hotels from other REITs, private equity investors,…
- FY2025 10-K: …for the tax-related obligations and liabilities of each business with the appropriate company. Competition The lodging industry is highly competitive. Our hotels compete with other hotels for guests on the basis of several factors, including the attractiveness of the facility, location, level of service, quality of…
Real Estate (reported)
- JOE (The St. Joe Company)
- FY2025 10-K: …for the purposes of developing real estate and other business activities, which we believe allows us to complement our growth strategy, leverage industry expertise and diversify our business. We may partner with or explore the sale of discrete assets, such as our sale of a senior living community property in…
- FY2025 10-K: .6 Other revenue 10.0 9.6 10.1 Total real estate revenue 165.0 116.8 155.7 Leasing revenue 0.1 0.2 0.1 Total revenue 165.1 117.0 155.8 Expenses: Cost of real estate and other revenue (a) 83.5 62.0 77.9 Cost of leasing revenue (a) - 0.1 - Other operating expenses (a)…
- HHH (HOWARD HUGHES HOLDINGS INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …and financial condition. In addition, we compete with other major real estate investors with significant capital for attractive investment and development opportunities. These competitors include REITs and private institutional investors. The concentration of our properties in certain states may make our revenues and…
- FY2025 10-K: …to pricing power in lease and vendor negotiations; increased ability to attract, hire, and retain the best local leadership and leasing teams; flexibility to meet changing customer demands; and enhanced ability to identify and capitalize on emerging opportunities. Our MPCs, including Floreo, our unconsolidated joint…
- FOR (FORESTAR GROUP INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …than those included in the expense categories reported on the Company's Consolidated Statements of Operations. All revenues and real estate assets are attributable to operations in the United States. Segment assets that are reported as total assets and capital expenditures are reviewed by the CODM and are presented…
- FY2025 10-K: …Austin Tampa/Sarasota Dallas Volusia County Fort Worth Houston Georgia Atlanta San Antonio Augusta Savannah Utah Salt Lake City/Provo/Ogden Illinois Chicago Virginia Northern Virginia Richmond Indiana Indianapolis Virginia Beach/Williamsburg Maryland Suburban Washington, D.C. Washington Vancouver…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Economic-unit decomposition (SOTP): each disclosed business unit is assigned its native valuation basis before any multiple is applied. Operating units are valued on enterprise value; funded financial units are valued on their own common equity, because their borrowings fund earning assets rather than levering the parent. A company total is stated only once every material unit carries a supported value and the parent capital bridge reconciles.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
MTN FY2025 10-K · Vail Resorts Q3 FY2026 results, June 2026