MADISON SQUARE GARDEN SPORTS CORP. (MSGS): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $393.90, MADISON SQUARE GARDEN SPORTS CORP. (MSGS) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~9.1 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-27.
Generated: 2026-07-29 · Exported: 2026-08-01 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/MSGS
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | MSGS |
| Company | MADISON SQUARE GARDEN SPORTS CORP. |
| Current price | $393.90/sh |
| Composition | Event-related 45% / Media rights 27% / Sponsorship, signage and suite licenses 22% / League distributions and other 6% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | revenue-multiple |
| EV / sales paid | 9.8x |
| Steady-state operating margin assumed | 14.2% |
| Must persist for | 9.1y |
The company earns no operating profit yet; the inversion runs on the revenue multiple and an assumed steady-state margin.
Solve inputs: computed at a 7.9% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~2.3 years.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~12.2 years; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: elevated
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +0.92σ |
| sustained it ~9.1 years at this level | 16% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | — | 0 | — |
| Earnings | — | 0 | — |
| Relative | 4.41x | 1 | expensive |
| Growth | — | 0 | — |
Families that call it expensive: Relative
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.3%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=1)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $0.00 | — | no | FCF base $0.1B, growth -5% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.5%, WACC 8.3%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $281.51 | 1.40x | no | Exit EV/EBITDA: 1997.3x / 1999.3x / 2001.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $89.30 | 4.41x | yes | P/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 2.0x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $189.45 | 2.08x | no | Rev $1.1B, growth -5% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 6.8x / 8.0x / 9.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0 |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $0.01 | 39390.00x | no | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.06B × (1−21%) / WACC 8.3% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Graham Number | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $0.01 | 39390.00x | yes | EBITDA $0.01B × sector EV/EBITDA 9.0x (excluded from median) |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $0.01 | 39390.00x | yes | FCF $53.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median) |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $0.01 | 39390.00x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.03B (FCF $0.05B − SBC $0.02B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median) |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $89.30 | 4.41x | no | Revenue $1.08B × sector P/S 2.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $151.5m |
| Interest coverage | -1.2x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -0.2% |
| Burning cash | no |
Operating profit is negative or near zero and the company has no demonstrated through-cycle (mid-cycle) operating margin to normalize against, so years-to-repay cannot be computed honestly.
Bullet Takeaways
- MSG Sports owns two of the most valuable franchises in professional sports, the New York Knicks and the New York Rangers, and the stock trades less on its income statement than on the scarcity value of those teams.
- The biggest risk is that the teams lose money on a reported basis, a combined $22 million after taxes and interest in fiscal 2025, so the price has no earnings cushion and rests entirely on private-market franchise values holding.
- Watch the proposed split of the Knicks and Rangers into separate public companies, advancing through a Form 10 registration filed with the SEC, which is the catalyst the market is positioning around.
Bull Case
The bull case is a story about what management is doing with two irreplaceable assets, not about quarterly profit. MSG Sports owns the New York Knicks and the New York Rangers outright, and the company has moved to unlock that value directly: in early 2026 the board approved exploring a split of the two teams into separate publicly traded companies, and the company has since filed a Form 10 registration statement with the SEC. That is the clearest possible signal of how management sees value sitting trapped inside the current structure. Two trophy franchises bundled in one ticker trade at a discount that two standalone, cleanly-comparable franchise stocks plausibly would not.
The numbers behind the assets dwarf the income statement. Sportico values the Knicks at roughly $9.85 billion and the Rangers at roughly $3.65 billion, a combined $13.5 billion, against an enterprise value near $9.6 billion, which implies the stock trades at close to a 29% discount to estimated combined team value. Professional sports franchises are among the scarcest assets in the world; there are thirty NBA teams and thirty-two NHL teams, and the New York market commands a premium within both. The 10-K makes clear the engine is the teams themselves: results are "largely dependent on the continued popularity and/or on-court or on-ice competitiveness of our Knicks and Rangers teams", with home-game ticket sales each team's largest single revenue source.
The operating story has been improving on the court and the ice, which feeds the asset value. The Knicks reached the Eastern Conference finals, and a deep playoff run lifts both revenue and the brand that underpins the franchise price; the company recognizes playoff revenue sharing in the periods the playoffs occur, per the 10-K, so postseason success shows up directly in results. League structures also socialize some of the downside: the NBA and NHL both run revenue-sharing plans, and for fiscal 2025 the Knicks and Rangers recorded league-related amounts the filing details. The bull case does not need the teams to turn a GAAP profit. It needs franchise values to keep rising and the split to surface the discount.
Bear Case
The bear case starts with the gap between peak attention and sustainable economics. The Knicks just had their best season in a generation, reaching the Eastern Conference finals, and the stock is up sharply over the past year. That is precisely the moment to ask whether the enthusiasm reflects a durable change or a cyclical high. Sports results are streaky by nature; the 10-K warns that the business is "largely dependent on the continued popularity and/or on-court or on-ice competitiveness of our Knicks and Rangers teams", and competitive position can reverse from one season to the next. A price built on a deep playoff run is exposed to the years when the run does not come.
The reported economics are the harder problem. The Knicks and Rangers lost a combined $22 million after taxes and interest in fiscal 2025, despite the Knicks' deep playoff run. Trailing operating income is negative, which means none of the standard valuation methods that work from profit or cash flow even apply here; the only multiple that can be computed is a price-to-sales fallback, and it reads the stock as expensive on revenue. The cost base is structural and rising: player salaries sit inside an NBA luxury-tax and escrow system and an NHL escrow system, both of which the 10-K describes in detail, and the company also carries substantial arena operating-lease costs, with cash lease expense exceeding $44 million in fiscal 2025. Winning is expensive, and the league rules make it more so.
The valuation rests entirely on private-market franchise marks rather than anything the company earns. Sportico's $13.5 billion combined value is an estimate informed by comparable team sales, not a realized price, and the analyst consensus target sits well below the current share price, near $264 against a price around $370, reflecting the earnings shortfall and the ownership structure. No valuation family reaches the current price on the company's own fundamentals; the price is a bet on asset values the income statement does not generate. The split could surface the discount, but it could also reveal that public-market investors apply their own haircut to teams that lose money, leaving the trophy premium smaller than the private comps imply.
Valuation
This is a company whose price cannot be read off its income statement, and the valuation has to start there. Trailing operating income is negative, around $26 million in the red, so the inversion that prices operating profit produces a figure with no real meaning, and most of the standard methods are simply inapplicable. What the price actually reflects is the private-market value of two sports franchises, which sits outside the reach of cash-flow and earnings models. That is the honest frame: MSG Sports is a net-asset-value story wearing the form of an operating company.
On the methods that can run, the picture is uniform. No valuation family reaches the price. The only computable multiple is a price-to-sales fallback at the sector's 2x revenue multiple, which lands near $89, far below the $370 share price, because team revenue does not support the price the way franchise value does. The market is paying for the asset, not the operations. The relevant external anchor is the private-market estimate: Sportico's roughly $9.85 billion Knicks and $3.65 billion Rangers sum to about $13.5 billion, against an enterprise value near $9.6 billion, putting the stock at roughly a 29% discount to estimated combined team value. The bet the price makes is that those franchise marks are real and that a corporate structure currently bundling them resolves toward the asset value rather than away from it.
Solvency is modest but not the binding question here. Gross debt sits near $259 million against $107 million of liquid assets, a net debt position of about $151 million, and the company itself notes that with operating profit negative and no demonstrated through-cycle margin, a years-to-repay figure cannot be computed honestly. The peer set, scarce-experience and team-adjacent names like Churchill Downs, Vail Resorts, and the sister company MSG Entertainment, is a loose comparison at best, because there is no clean public comp for a New York NBA and NHL franchise pair. The decisive variable is not a multiple. It is whether the proposed split converts the discount-to-private-value into a realized public-market price.
Catalysts
The dominant catalyst is the proposed separation of the Knicks and Rangers into two distinct publicly traded companies. The board approved exploring the split in February 2026, and the company has since filed a Form 10 registration statement with the SEC, moving the plan from idea to process. The investment logic is the discount: with the combined entity trading at roughly 29% below estimated combined franchise value, separating the teams could let each trade closer to its private-market comp. The split is the single event most likely to re-rate the stock in either direction.
Franchise values have been the other moving piece. Independent estimates value the Knicks near $9.85 billion and the Rangers near $3.65 billion, and the trajectory of those marks, driven by comparable team sales across the leagues, feeds directly into the bull thesis. On-court results add a near-term wrinkle: the Knicks reached the Eastern Conference finals, and a deep series can push playoff-related revenue meaningfully higher, with one estimate putting a series win's playoff revenue at $140 million or more. The stock has already run hard, up roughly 89% over the trailing year.
Analyst sentiment frames the tension cleanly. The consensus price target sits near $264, well below the recent share price, with the gap explained by the earnings shortfall and the ownership structure even as franchise values climb. The market is pricing the asset; the analysts are pricing the earnings; the split is the event that decides which view wins.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- BATRA (ATLANTA BRAVES HOLDINGS, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …includes retail, office, hotel and entertainment operations primarily within The Battery Atlanta and the surrounding area. The Mixed-Use Development segment derives revenue primarily from office and retail rental income (including overage rent and tenant reimbursements) and, to a lesser extent, parking and…
- FY2025 10-K: …separately reported litigation settlements, restructuring, acquisition and impairment charges that are included in the measurement of operating income pursuant to GAAP. Accordingly, Adjusted OIBDA should be considered in addition to, but not as a substitute for, operating income, net earnings (loss), cash flow…
- TKO (TKO GROUP HOLDINGS, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …buildout of WWE's leased corporate headquarters and media production facilities. These incentives are recorded as an offset to property, buildings and equipment, net in the consolidated balance sheets. 19. SEGMENT INFORMATION Prior to the Endeavor Asset Acquisition, the Company identified two reportable segments: UFC…
- FY2025 10-K: …consulting, digital services, and event management. • On Location is a premium experiential hospitality business, offering ticketing, curated guest experiences, live event production and travel management services. 49 Table of Contents Revenue from our IMG segment principally consists of media rights sales,…
- MSGE (MADISON SQUARE GARDEN ENTERTAINMENT CORP.)
- FY2025 10-K: …alternative uses for the public's entertainment dollars. The primary geographic area in which we operate, New York City, is among the most competitive entertainment markets in the world, with extensive performing arts venues, numerous major professional sports teams, and countless museums, galleries, movie theaters,…
- FY2025 10-K: …financial information that is available and regularly reviewed by its CODM. The Company's CODM is the Company's Executive Chairman and CEO. The Company's MSG Entertainment segment derives revenues primarily from entertainment offerings held at its venues that drive ticket sales and other ticket-related revenues,…
- CHDN (Churchill Downs Inc)
- FY2025 10-K: …be impacted. Competition for the type of talent we seek to hire continues to be a challenge in the geographic areas in which we operate. As a result, we may incur significant costs to attract and retain highly skilled employees. We may be unable to attract and retain the personnel necessary to sustain our business or…
- FY2025 10-K: …racing, gaming, and other services. • For the Gaming segment, revenue is disaggregated by location given the geographic economic factors that affect the revenue of Gaming service offerings. Within the Gaming segment, revenue is further disaggregated between live and simulcast racing, racing event-related services,…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Sportico, 2026 · MSGS FY2025 10-K · Sportico, 2026; Sportico, March 2026