Moderna, Inc. (MRNA): what the price requires
At today's price, Moderna, Inc. (MRNA) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~15.6 years. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/MRNA
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | MRNA |
| Company | Moderna, Inc. |
| Current price | $66.95/sh |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | revenue-multiple |
| EV / sales paid | 15.7x |
| Steady-state operating margin assumed | 22.1% |
| Must persist for | 15.6y |
The company earns no operating profit yet; the inversion runs on the revenue multiple and an assumed steady-state margin.
Solve inputs: computed at a 10.6% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~2.4 years.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~12.4 years; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: elevated
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.49σ |
| sustained it ~10 years at this level | 14% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore requires assumptions beyond what those standard frames encode.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 3.77x | 2 | expensive |
| Earnings | 1.64x | 1 | expensive |
| Relative | 2.97x | 2 | expensive |
| Growth | 2.54x | 2 | expensive |
Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=7)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero FCF — equity value floored at $0 |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0 |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $22.53 | 2.97x | yes | P/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 4.0x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $18.75 | 3.57x | yes | Book value floor: BV/sh $18.75, ROE negative |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $16.88 | 3.97x | yes | Book value with convergence: BV/sh $18.75, ROE converges to ke |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $97.14 | 0.69x | yes | Rev $2.2B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 9.5x / 11.9x / 14.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0 |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | $15.27 | 4.38x | yes | Margin ramp: -50% → 12% over 7yr, rev growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered) |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $40.74 | 1.64x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.76B × (1−21%) / WACC 9.0% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Graham Number | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $22.53 | 2.97x | yes | Revenue $2.23B × sector P/S 4.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net cash | $4.6b |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -1.9% |
| Burning cash | yes |
Operating profit is negative or near zero and the company has no demonstrated through-cycle (mid-cycle) operating margin to normalize against, so years-to-repay cannot be computed honestly.
Operating profit is negative or near zero and there is no demonstrated through-cycle (mid-cycle) operating margin to normalize against, so interest coverage cannot be computed honestly.
Bullet Takeaways
At $63.93 (as of June 27, 2026) Moderna trades around 11.6x revenue while losing money at scale, with a current operating margin near negative 153%. The price implies the business eventually earns a roughly 22% operating margin and grows at its self-funding ceiling for about 13 years, an elevated bet on a future not yet visible in the numbers.
The counterintuitive strength is the runway. Moderna ended Q1 2026 with about $7.5 billion in cash and investments and cut roughly $2.2 billion of annual operating expenses in 2025, so a money-losing company is not a forced seller. It has years to let the pipeline prove out.
The structural problem is what the multiple assumes. COVID vaccine demand is declining, and paying a double-digit revenue multiple on a deeply unprofitable base prices a margin and a pipeline that have to arrive on schedule.
Bull Case
The surprising thing about a company losing billions is how much control it has over its own runway. Moderna ended Q1 2026 with about $7.5 billion in cash and investments and, crucially, spent 2025 cutting roughly $2.2 billion of annual operating expenses, well beyond its own targets, with adjusted cash costs down 26% year over year in Q1 and a full-year cost target near $4.2 billion. Its 2026 guidance does not even assume drawing the remaining $0.9 billion credit facility, and it projects ending the year with $4.5 to $5 billion still in the bank. A loss-making biotech that can self-fund for years is a fundamentally different risk than one facing a financing cliff, and the market often conflates the two.
The pipeline is where that runway is being spent, and it is broad. Recent progress includes EU approvals for mCOMBRIAX and mNEXSPIKE, a U.S. PDUFA date of August 5 for the flu vaccine mRNA-1010, a new Phase III start for Intismeran in high-risk Stage I lung cancer, and a fully enrolled Phase III norovirus study with data expected in 2026. The cancer and rare-disease programs matter because they would move Moderna beyond seasonal respiratory vaccines into durable, higher-value therapeutic areas, exactly the diversification a one-product narrative needs.
The platform and balance sheet underwrite the optionality. The mRNA technology is a repeatable manufacturing and design system rather than a single drug, and Moderna carries net cash of about $4.6 billion with only $634 million of gross debt, so dilution pressure is limited and the share count has actually shrunk slightly. The forward-growth method that credits the revenue ramp, Discounted Future Market Cap, lands at $93, above the current price. For a buyer who believes one or two pipeline programs convert and the cost base holds, the bull case is a well-capitalized platform priced for a turn it has the time and money to attempt.
Bear Case
The structural truth a holder has to face is that the multiple is paying for what has not happened. At $63.93 Moderna trades around 11.6x revenue while running a current operating margin near negative 153%, and the price only makes sense if the business eventually earns roughly a 22% operating margin and grows at its self-funding ceiling for about 13 years. That is the assumption embedded in the quote, and the model flags it as elevated: only about 14% of comparable fast-growers have sustained that kind of pace for a decade. The methods that price what Moderna actually is today are far below the price, with the book-value floor at $18.75, the margin-trajectory method at $15, and the sector P/S at $22. The gap between those and $63.93 is pure pipeline-and-margin optimism.
The core revenue is shrinking, not growing. Moderna's commercial base is still dominated by COVID vaccines, and the filing is direct about the trajectory, warning that "if demand for COVID vaccines continues to decline, we lose significant market share, or our products are subject to significant competitive pricing pressure, our product sal"es will fall (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001682852-26-000033). It attributes recent declines to "lower overall demand in these markets" and lost customers (accession 0001682852-26-000033). A 22%-margin future has to be built on products that are mostly still in trials while the product that funds the company today is in decline.
The pipeline is real but inherently uncertain, and the losses are large. Q1 2026 was a $1.3 billion net loss, and even excluding an $878 million legal settlement charge the loss was about $0.5 billion. The filing cautions the company may not replicate "the same levels of success with clinical trials in the future" and may face "unforeseen events during, or as a result of, clinical trials that could delay or prevent" approvals (accession 0001682852-26-000033). The cash cushion buys time, but it does not change the odds that any single program succeeds. The bear case is straightforward: the price assumes the platform turns profitable on a defined schedule, the cash burn is real today, and the demand for the one product paying the bills is falling.
Valuation
Moderna is not earning a normal operating profit, so the price is read against sales. At $63.93 the stock trades around 11.6x revenue, which inverts into an assumption that the business eventually earns roughly a 22% operating margin and grows revenue at its self-funding ceiling for about 13 years, computed at a 10.6% cost of capital. The model labels that elevated, and history is the reason: only about 14% of comparable fast-growers have sustained this pace for a decade. The current operating margin is near negative 153%, so essentially the entire valuation is a bet on a future margin that does not yet exist.
The X-ray methods are sharply split between the present and the projected. The methods anchored to current reality are low: the book-value floor at $18.75, Relative and P/Sales at $22.53, and the margin-trajectory method (which models a ramp from negative 50% to 12% over seven years) at $15. The one method that fully credits a 30% revenue ramp, Discounted Future Market Cap, lands at $93, above the price. Earnings Power Value on a five-year average sits at $41. The reverse-DCF reasonable band lands at roughly $12 to $21 with a base near $17, and its reliability is flagged low because normalizing a deeply unprofitable company is inherently uncertain.
The synthesis is that the price sits far above the methods that describe what Moderna is and below only the single method that assumes the ramp works. The cash position is real and the runway is long, which is what keeps this from being a distress case. But the valuation is a forward bet, not a value case: it pays today for a margin and a pipeline that have to materialize, against a core product in decline. The discount that would compensate for that uncertainty is not in the price.
Catalysts
The Q1 2026 print, reported May 1, 2026, framed the year: revenue of $400 million above guidance, a net loss of $1.3 billion driven largely by an $878 million Arbutus and Genevant settlement charge (about $0.5 billion excluding it), and roughly $7.5 billion of cash and investments. Moderna reiterated its full-year cost target near $4.2 billion and guided to year-end cash of $4.5 to $5 billion, with up to 10% revenue growth from 2025 (BioSpace; Motley Fool transcript).
The forward catalysts are clinical and regulatory. The dated items are the August 5 U.S. PDUFA decision for flu vaccine mRNA-1010, Phase III norovirus data expected in 2026, the new Phase III start for Intismeran in early-stage lung cancer, and EU launches of mCOMBRIAX and mNEXSPIKE. The swing factors are whether these programs read out positively, the continued trajectory of COVID vaccine demand, and whether the cost cuts hold so the runway extends as guided. Each pipeline readout is a binary that can move the stock far more than a revenue quarter, given how much of the price rests on future products.
Sources: Moderna Q1 2026 results (BioSpace; MRNA 8-K, 2026); Motley Fool and Globe and Mail earnings transcripts; Tickeron pipeline preview (2026).
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Moderna (consolidated) (reported)
- BNTX (BioNTech SE)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- IMCR (Immunocore Holdings plc)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ALNY (ALNYLAM PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- INSM (INSMED INCORPORATED)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- NBIX (NEUROCRINE BIOSCIENCES, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- PTCT (PTC Therapeutics, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- BBIO (BridgeBio Pharma, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TVTX (TRAVERE THERAPEUTICS, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.