MOOG Inc. (MOG-A): what the price requires
At today's price, MOOG Inc. (MOG-A) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~6.2 years. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/MOG-A
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | MOG-A |
| Company | MOOG Inc. |
| Current price | $392.09/sh |
| Composition | Space and Defense 29% / Military Aircraft 23% / Commercial Aircraft 23% / Industrial 25% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 10.3% |
| Operating margin today | 12.2% |
| Margin compression implied | -1.9pp |
| Must persist for | 6.2y |
| Multiple paid | 28x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 12, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 9.7% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~1.8 years.
How unusual the bet is: elevated
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +1.26σ |
| cohort percentile (of 225 peers) | 64 |
| sustained it ~6.2 years at this level | 25% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 3.41x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 5.09x | 5 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.25x | 5 | expensive |
| Growth | 1.04x | 3 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.5%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=18)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $280.72 | 1.40x | yes | FCF base $0.3B, growth 14% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.5%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $455.56 | 0.86x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 21.9x / 23.9x / 25.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $253.11 | 1.55x | yes | P/E 25.76x (blended: static sector reference 18x + trailing (TTM) 44x), scenarios: 21.3x / 25.8x / 30.2x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 15.57x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $96.60 | 4.06x | yes | BV/sh $65.49, ROE (TTM) 13.6%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $116.19 | 3.37x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $375.50 | 1.04x | yes | Rev $4.2B, growth 14% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.5x / 3.0x / 3.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $313.25 | 1.25x | yes | EPS $8.95, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.25 (Fair) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $77.06 | 5.09x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.39B × (1−25%) / WACC 8.5% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $120.20 | 3.26x | yes | BV $65.49 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 13.6% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $114.84 | 3.41x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $8.95 × BVPS $65.49) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $181.32 | 2.16x | yes | EBITDA $0.57B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $73.42 | 5.34x | yes | FCF $310.2M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $67.22 | 5.83x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.29B (FCF $0.31B − SBC $0.02B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $288.79 | 1.36x | yes | EPS $8.95 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $25.89 | 15.14x | yes | BV $65.49 × (ROIC 3.3% / WACC 8.5%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $324.57 | 1.21x | yes | Revenue $4.17B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $335.63 | 1.17x | yes | EPS $8.95 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $96.76 | 4.05x | yes | EPS $8.95 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $1.1b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 2.92x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 2.20x |
| Interest coverage | 7.1x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 0.0% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
At $408.88 the market pays a price that only the forward-growth methods reach. Asset and earnings-power frames land near $77 to $118, peer multiples near $180 to $325, and only the DCF and future-market-cap models touch the current quote. The bet is on durable compounding the static frames cannot price.
The operating momentum is real and recent. Fiscal Q2 2026 sales rose 13% to $1.05 billion, adjusted EPS jumped to $2.64 from $1.88, free cash flow swung to $97.8 million from near zero, and the twelve-month backlog hit a record $3.3 billion, up 33%. Management raised full-year adjusted EPS guidance to $10.60.
The two structural cautions are leverage and control. Net debt sits near $1.09 billion at about 2.1x operating income, and the dual-class share structure keeps voting power concentrated, so an outside Class A holder owns the cash flows without the votes.
Bull Case
The trajectory is the story. In fiscal Q2 2026 Moog grew net sales 13% to $1.05 billion, lifted diluted EPS to $2.55 from $1.71, and converted that into $97.8 million of free cash flow against a barely positive $2.4 million a year earlier. The growth was broad rather than a single hot line: Space and Defense up 16%, Commercial Aircraft up 15%, Military Aircraft up 10%, Industrial up 9%. On the back of it management raised full-year adjusted EPS guidance to $10.60 and held targets of 13.4% adjusted operating margin and 60% free-cash-flow conversion on roughly $4.3 billion of sales. This is a business whose earnings power is being revalued upward in real time.
The backlog says the momentum is not a one-quarter beat. The twelve-month backlog rose 33% to a record $3.3 billion, which is most of a year of revenue already committed. Moog sits in defense and aerospace niches that are hard to displace: its filing describes its defense market specialty in "thrust vector controls and spacecraft engines, mechanisms, avionics and structure systems and components" (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001628280-25-054103). These are flight-critical motion-control parts qualified onto specific platforms, which is exactly the kind of position that produces pricing power and long program life rather than commodity competition.
The cash conversion finally matches the order book. Trailing operating income is about $510 million, interest coverage runs near 7.4x, and the company carries roughly $925 million of unused credit capacity, "including $901 million from the U.S. revolving credit facility" (accession 0001628280-25-054103). With a defense and aerospace upcycle pulling demand, a record committed backlog, and free cash flow stepping up sharply, the bull case is that Moog has reached the point where rising volume drops through to margin and cash rather than getting absorbed by working capital, and that the static valuation methods built on five-year-average earnings simply have not caught up.
Bear Case
Start with the governance fact a buyer of the Class A shares accepts up front: this is a dual-class company. The capital structure keeps voting control concentrated and Class A holders own the economics with limited say over them, and the charter explicitly lets the board issue additional preferred stock "without further shareholder action" that "ranks senior to both classes of our common stock with respect to the payment of dividends" (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001628280-25-054103). For a company whose entire premium rests on management compounding capital well, the holder is trusting that judgment with little structural recourse.
That matters because the balance sheet has been levered to fund the growth. Net debt is about $1.09 billion against $510 million of trailing operating income, roughly 2.1x, with gross debt near $1.39 billion and only $308 million of liquid assets. Interest coverage near 7.4x is comfortable today, but it is comfortable in an upcycle. The price assumes continued acquisition-and-organic compounding, and the model's asset and earnings-power families are blunt about how far ahead of current fundamentals the quote sits: Earnings Power Value lands near $77, the FCF-yield frames near $67 to $73, and book-value approaches near $95 to $118, all a fraction of the $409 price (June 27, 2026).
The customer base adds a second fragility. Moog's own risk language is direct: "The loss of The Boeing Company as a customer or a significant reduction in the sales to The Boeing Company could adversely impact our operating results," and it warns that if defense "contracts are rescheduled or terminated, we may incur substantial costs redeploying those resources" (accession 0001628280-25-054103). The price embeds operating income compounding for roughly six to seven years near its self-funding ceiling. A defense budget pause, a commercial-aerospace build-rate cut, or a Boeing program slip would not break the company, but it would puncture the durability assumption that is doing all the work at this multiple.
Valuation
The four valuation families disagree sharply, and the disagreement is the signal. The asset family (excess-return, residual income, Graham) centers near $95 to $118. The earnings-power family (Earnings Power Value $77, FCF yield $73, earnings yield $96) centers near $77 to $96. The peer-multiple family is higher and wider, from EV/EBITDA near $180 to P/Sales and PEG approaches near $310 to $332. Against a $408.88 price, only the forward-growth methods reach it: DCF Perpetual Growth at $277 on a 14% growth input, DCF Exit Multiple at $470, and Discounted Future Market Cap at $390.
The pattern is consistent. Every frame that prices what the business has already earned lands below the quote; only the frames that extrapolate growth and hold premium multiples flat reach it. That is the definition of a durability premium: the market is paying for compounding the static models cannot see, not for a discount to demonstrated earnings.
Inverting the price sharpens the read. At $408.88 the implied bet is company-wide operating income compounding near its self-funding ceiling for roughly six to seven years, with the implied margin close to the current 12.2%, computed at a 9.7% cost of capital where each additional point of growth shifts the implied horizon about 1.8 years. The reverse-DCF reasonable-growth band lands at roughly $157 to $258, base near $193. Notably this implied duration is shorter and more reachable than the multi-decade bet some richer names require, which is consistent with the record backlog.
Catalysts
The April 2026 fiscal Q2 print is the load-bearing recent event: net sales up 13% to $1.05 billion, adjusted EPS of $2.64 versus a $2.38 estimate (an 11% beat), free cash flow of $97.8 million, and a record $3.3 billion backlog up 33%. Management raised full-year adjusted EPS guidance to $10.60 (Businesswire, April 24, 2026; StockTitan). The forward watch items are conversion of that backlog into shipments, the 13.4% adjusted operating-margin target, and the 60% free-cash-flow conversion goal on about $4.3 billion of sales.
Analyst sentiment moved up with the results. Following the beat, analysts raised price targets, with one widely cited target lifted by $54 and an intrinsic-value estimate near $324.50, reflecting updated assumptions for growth, margin, and future multiple (Simply Wall St; TIKR). The key swing factors into the next print are defense and space program timing, commercial-aerospace build rates at Moog's airframe customers, and whether the margin and cash-conversion targets hold as volume scales.
Sources: Moog Q2 FY2026 results (Businesswire, April 2026); StockTitan 8-K coverage; Simply Wall St and TIKR analyst commentary (2026).
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Space and Defense (reported)
- CW (CURTISS-WRIGHT CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- HEI (HEICO CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TDG (TransDigm Group Incorporated)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- AVAV (AEROVIRONMENT, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- KTOS (Kratos Defense & Security Solutions, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- BWXT (BWX Technologies Inc)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- DRS (Leonardo DRS, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MRCY (MERCURY SYSTEMS, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Military Aircraft (reported)
- CW (CURTISS-WRIGHT CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- HEI (HEICO CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TDG (TransDigm Group Incorporated)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TXT (Textron Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- DRS (Leonardo DRS, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- LOAR (Loar Holdings Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Commercial Aircraft (reported)
- HEI (HEICO CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TDG (TransDigm Group Incorporated)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CW (CURTISS-WRIGHT CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- HWM (HOWMET AEROSPACE INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- LOAR (Loar Holdings Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CR (CRANE COMPANY)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Industrial (reported)
- PH (PARKER-HANNIFIN CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ITT (ITT INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CR (CRANE COMPANY)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- DCI (DONALDSON COMPANY, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- HLIO (HELIOS TECHNOLOGIES, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- NDSN (NORDSON CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.