MARTIN MARIETTA MATERIALS INC (MLM): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $531.05, MARTIN MARIETTA MATERIALS INC (MLM) is priced for +24.1% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-27.
Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/MLM
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | MLM |
| Company | MARTIN MARIETTA MATERIALS INC |
| Current price | $531.05/sh |
| Composition | Aggregates 81% / Other Building Materials 16% / Less: interproduct revenues -5% / Specialties 7% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 20.7% |
| Operating margin today | 20.6% |
| Margin expansion (value-band) | +0.1pp |
| Implied growth | 24.1% |
| Multiple paid | 28x operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 8.9% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.
How unusual the bet is: elevated (limited comparison data)
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +0.41σ |
| cohort percentile (of 78 peers) | 78 |
Valuation X-Ray
Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 2.45x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 3.10x | 4 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.52x | 2 | expensive |
| Growth | 0.99x | 3 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.7%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=14)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $368.07 | 1.44x | yes | FCF base $0.8B, growth 15% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.7%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $656.41 | 0.81x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 21.2x / 26.2x / 31.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | — | — | no | P/E 18.06x (blended: static sector reference 14x + trailing (TTM) 28x), scenarios: 13.5x / 18.1x / 21.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13.47x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $208.42 | 2.55x | yes | BV/sh $192.22, ROE (TTM) 10.0%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $216.78 | 2.45x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $533.88 | 0.99x | yes | Rev $6.7B, growth 15% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.6x / 4.8x / 5.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 6x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $229.84 | 2.31x | yes | EPS $19.15, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=13.78 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $145.89 | 3.64x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.50B × (1−20%) / WACC 7.7% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $218.30 | 2.43x | yes | BV $192.22 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 10.0% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 6.5%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $287.81 | 1.85x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $19.15 × BVPS $192.22) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | EBITDA $1.49B × sector EV/EBITDA 8.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $27.70 | 19.17x | yes | FCF $810.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $18.70 | 28.40x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.76B (FCF $0.81B − SBC $0.05B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median) |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $618.00 | 0.86x | yes | EPS $19.15 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $40.03 | 13.27x | yes | BV $192.22 × (ROIC 1.6% / WACC 7.7%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | — | — | no | Revenue $6.69B × sector P/S 1.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $718.24 | 0.74x | yes | EPS $19.15 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $207.06 | 2.56x | yes | EPS $19.15 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)
One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.
| Unit | Role | Valuation basis | Revenue | Reported profit | Value evidence | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| East Group | operating | enterprise | $3.2b | $992.0m operating-income | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
| West Group | operating | enterprise | $2.5b | $455.0m operating-income | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
| Specialties | operating | enterprise | $441.0m | $110.0m operating-income | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $6.1b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 5.57x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 4.45x |
| Interest coverage | 5.9x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -0.9% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
- Martin Marietta is primarily an aggregates company, crushed stone, sand, and gravel that is cheap per ton but expensive to ship, so each quarry is effectively a local franchise with pricing power, and aggregates make up roughly four-fifths of revenue.
- The defining feature is pricing-led growth on top of volume: first-quarter revenue rose 17% to a record $1.4 billion with organic aggregates shipments up 7.2%, helped by infrastructure and heavy nonresidential demand from data centers and power projects.
- The biggest risk is the price paid for the quality: at about thirty-five times operating income the stock sits at the very top of its peer group, a premium only a long run of continued pricing and volume can justify.
Bull Case
Where the price sits against the methods tells you what kind of bet this is. Only the growth-based cash-flow method reaches $609.13 (June 27, 2026); the asset-value, earnings-power, and peer-multiple lenses all say the stock is richly valued. That pattern is the signature of a durability premium, the kind of value the static frames cannot price because they capitalize this year's profit rather than the decades of pricing power an aggregates franchise compounds. For Martin Marietta, that premium is more defensible than for most companies the market prices this way, because the moat is physical and local.
Aggregates are the cheapest material in construction by the ton and among the most expensive to transport, so a quarry sells mostly to customers within a short haul. That gives each pit something close to local pricing power: a competitor cannot economically truck stone across the state to undercut it. The company describes the economics directly, noting that low-capacity utilization hurts results while high utilization provides "a high degree of operating leverage," and that management expects "future organic profit growth to result from increased pricing, commercialization of new products." Pricing-led growth is the holy grail of a materials business, because it drops to the bottom line without the volume risk, and Martin Marietta has demonstrated it year after year.
The first quarter showed the model firing on both cylinders. Revenue rose 17% to a record $1.4 billion, adjusted EBITDA and adjusted EPS each climbed 14%, and organic aggregates shipments grew 7.2%, meaningfully ahead of guidance, on an early construction season and strength in infrastructure and heavy nonresidential work. The demand drivers are unusually durable for a cyclical: federally funded infrastructure, plus the aggregates-intensive build-out of data centers, power generation, and Gulf Coast LNG. The bull case is that these structural tailwinds keep volumes firm while local pricing power keeps lifting the per-ton margin, and that the combination, applied to a finite, hard-to-permit reserve base, is exactly the durable compounding the price is paying for.
Bear Case
The competitive frame is where the premium gets tested. Martin Marietta is not alone at the top of the aggregates market; Vulcan Materials is the other scaled national producer, and the two compete for the same large acquisitions, the same permits, and the same blue-chip infrastructure and data-center projects. The local-monopoly story is real for any single quarry, but at the corporate level the growth strategy depends on buying more reserves, and the 10-K is candid that the business "depends on identifying, acquiring, permitting and developing quality aggregates reserves." When two well-capitalized buyers chase a finite supply of permittable quarries, prices for those assets rise, and a growth model built on acquisitions gets more expensive to sustain precisely as the stock prices it as a sure thing.
Then there is the cyclicality the premium tends to wave away. A meaningful share of demand is tied to residential and broader construction, and the 10-K warns that the business "may experience declines from sustained high or rising interest rates and cost increases," singling out residential as rate-sensitive. Aggregates volumes are also exposed to weather and to the timing of public budgets, which can "reduce, defer, cap, suspend, or reprioritize transportation spending." The current strength leans heavily on infrastructure funding and a data-center build-out; both are policy- and capital-cycle dependent, and both can slow.
The valuation magnifies every one of these risks. At roughly thirty-five times operating income, the multiple sits at the very top of the peer distribution, well beyond the upper quartile, and to grow into it the company must hold a near-ceiling growth rate for about seven years, something only about 22% of comparable fast-growers have done. Net debt of around $5.3 billion at nearly four times operating income is manageable but not trivial, and it tightens if a downcycle compresses the earnings the multiple rests on. The bear case is not that the aggregates moat is fake; it is that a great business priced for seven years of uninterrupted, top-of-peer execution leaves no margin for the cyclical, competitive, and funding frictions that the industry has always had.
Valuation
The bet in the price is demanding and specific. At $609.13 the market is paying about thirty-five times trailing operating income, which inverts to the company holding a near-ceiling growth rate for roughly seven years. The growth rate is within what Martin Marietta has recently delivered; the stretch is the duration and the fact that the multiple sits at the very top of the aggregates peer group, well past the upper quartile. The price is not betting on a recovery or a turnaround. It is betting that a premium franchise stays premium and keeps executing at the high end for the better part of a decade.
The methods make the shape of that bet clear. Only the growth-based cash-flow lens reaches the price; asset value, earnings power, and peer multiples all land well below it. This is the durability-premium pattern, and the reason the static frames cannot capture it is structural: they value the current profit, while the price values the irreplaceable, hard-to-permit reserve base and the local pricing power that compounds over decades. The honest reading is that the premium is partly earned, the aggregates moat is one of the most durable in industrials, and partly a function of the market crowding into a high-quality cyclical at a cyclical and thematic high, with infrastructure and data-center demand pulling the multiple to its ceiling.
Solvency is sound but is not a free option here. Net debt of about $5.3 billion sits at roughly four times trailing operating income on a pre-tax basis, with interest coverage above six times, comfortable for a company generating over a billion dollars of free cash flow, but real leverage that the acquisition-led growth strategy keeps utilizing. The dividend is modest and the share count is roughly flat, so the capital story is reinvestment and acquisition rather than heavy return. The decisive question for the valuation is duration, not solvency: whether the structural demand from infrastructure, data centers, and energy keeps aggregates volumes firm long enough, and whether local pricing power keeps lifting the per-ton margin, for the seven-year run the price already assumes. At a top-of-peer multiple, that question carries little room to be answered the wrong way.
Catalysts
Martin Marietta's first quarter of 2026 was a record and the stock responded, rising on the print. Revenue grew 17% to $1.4 billion, adjusted EBITDA and adjusted diluted EPS each rose 14%, and organic aggregates shipments climbed 7.2%, meaningfully ahead of guidance, on an early construction season in the Midwest and Colorado and continued strength in infrastructure and heavy nonresidential demand. The company reaffirmed full-year 2026 revenue guidance of $7.0 billion to $7.32 billion and continued to reshape its portfolio through aggregates acquisitions.
The forward catalysts are unusually thematic for a materials company. Heavy nonresidential demand is being driven by data-center and power-generation construction, with aggregates-intensive LNG work along the Gulf Coast adding momentum, and federally funded infrastructure provides a multi-year base of public demand. The watch items on the other side are the timing and stability of public transportation budgets, the rate-sensitive residential end market, and weather, all of which can defer volumes. The pricing trajectory in aggregates is the single most important number to track, since pricing-led margin gains are what justify the premium multiple, and any deceleration there would weigh directly on the thesis.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
East Group / West Group (reported)
- VMC (VULCAN MATERIALS COMPANY)
- FY2025 10-K: …certain members of the CPG, including Vulcan and others, that it planned to use the services of a third-party allocator with the expectation of offering cash-out settlements to some parties in connection with the bank-to-bank remedy identified in the ROD. This voluntary allocation process established an impartial…
- FY2025 10-K: East Region 55 Jerry F. Perkins Jr. Chief Administrative Officer 56 Randy L. Pigg Vice President, Controller and Principal Accounting Officer 53 James T. Polomsky Senior Vice President, West Region 49 The principal occupations of the executive officers during the past five years are set forth below: J. Thomas Hill was…
- KNF (Knife River Corporation)
- FY2025 10-K: Company designed to improve margins and to execute on other strategic initiatives aimed at generating long-term profitable growth. The EDGE acronym stands for EBITDA Margin Improvement, Discipline, Growth and Excellence. EEO Federal Equal Employment Opportunity laws in the United States EIN Employer Identification…
- FY2025 10-K: …value. In 2023, we began implementing EDGE initiatives and established teams to deliver training, assist with targeting higher-margin bidding opportunities across the regions and pursue growth opportunities, as well as identifying ways to 36 Index increase efficiencies and reduce costs. The Materials Process…
- USLM (UNITED STATES LIME & MINERALS INC)
- FY2025 10-K: …and four facilities to serve the Dallas-Ft. Worth Metroplex. The Company established U.S. Lime Company-Transportation to deliver the Company's products to some of its customers and facilities, primarily in Texas. U.S. Lime Company-Shreveport operates a distribution terminal in Shreveport, Louisiana, which is…
- FY2025 10-K: …Disclosures - In December 2023, the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") issued guidance that expands income tax disclosures for public entities, including requiring enhanced disclosures related to the rate reconciliation and income taxes paid information ("ASU 2023-09"). ASU 2023-09 is effective for annual…
- EXP (EAGLE MATERIALS INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …70 facilities spanning 21 states. Demand for our products is generally cyclical and seasonal, depending on economic and geographic conditions. The Company was founded in 1963 as a subsidiary of Centex Corporation (Centex). It operated as a public company under the name Centex Construction Products, Inc. from April…
- FY2025 10-K: 1, filed with the Commission on June 27, 2001 (File No. 001-12984) and incorporated herein by reference. 123 10.1(a) Amendment No. 1 to Agreement of Limited Partnership by and among Texas Cement Company; TLCC LP LLC; TLCC GP LLC; Lehigh Portland Cement Company; Lehigh Portland Investments, LLC; and Lehigh Portland…
Specialties (reported)
- USLM (UNITED STATES LIME & MINERALS INC)
- FY2025 10-K: Employee Development and Training . The Company encourages and supports the growth and development of its employees. It advances continual learning and career development through ongoing performance and development conversations or evaluations with employees and internally and externally developed training programs.…
- FY2025 10-K: 2025-01-01 2025-12-31 xbrli:shares iso4217:USD iso4217:USD xbrli:shares xbrli:pure uslm:segment Table of Contents UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 FORM 10-K (Mark One) ☒ ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 For the fiscal…
- MTX (MINERALS TECHNOLOGIES INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …we managed our operations, assessed performance, and reported earnings: Consumer & Specialties and Engineered Solutions. The Consumer & Specialties segment serves consumer end markets directly with mineral-to-market finished products and also provides specialty mineral-based solutions and technologies that are an…
- FY2025 10-K: …gas services companies. In building materials applications, the Company competes in a highly fragmented market comprised of a wide variety of alternative technologies. A number of integrated bentonite companies compete with the Company's drilling products. Seasonality Some of our products within the Environmental &…
- MTRN (MATERION CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: …corporate costs. OTHER GENERAL INFORMATION Products We are committed to providing high-quality, innovative, and reliable products that will enable our customers' technologies and fuel their own technological breakthroughs and growth. Our products include precious and non-precious specialty metals, inorganic chemicals…
- FY2025 10-K: , electrical, or mechanical properties from a surface area or particular section of the material. Our precision cladding and plating capabilities allow for precious metal or other base metals to be applied in continuous strip form, only where it is needed, reducing the material cost to our customers as well as…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Economic-unit decomposition (SOTP): each disclosed business unit is assigned its native valuation basis before any multiple is applied. Operating units are valued on enterprise value; funded financial units are valued on their own common equity, because their borrowings fund earning assets rather than levering the parent. A company total is stated only once every material unit carries a supported value and the parent capital bridge reconciles.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Martin Marietta Q1 2026 results, 2026 · Martin Marietta FY2025 10-K