THE MIDDLEBY CORPORATION (MIDD): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $135.61, THE MIDDLEBY CORPORATION (MIDD) is priced for +5.7% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-27.
Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/MIDD
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | MIDD |
| Company | THE MIDDLEBY CORPORATION |
| Current price | $135.61/sh |
| Composition | Commercial Foodservice 73% / Food Processing 27% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Implied growth | 5.7% |
| Multiple paid | 15x mid-cycle operating income |
Solve inputs: computed at a 9.1% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~6pp.
How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.31σ |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 2.87x | 3 | expensive |
| Earnings | 1.69x | 3 | expensive |
| Relative | — | 0 | — |
| Growth | 0.86x | 3 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=9)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $254.10 | 0.53x | yes | FCF base $0.5B, growth 6% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.0%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $158.34 | 0.86x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 9.8x / 11.8x / 13.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | — | — | no | P/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 2.5x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $52.53 | 2.58x | yes | Reference only (book value floor): BV/sh $52.53, ROE negative |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $47.27 | 2.87x | yes | Reference only (book value with convergence): BV/sh $52.53, ROE converges to ke |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $103.76 | 1.31x | yes | Rev $3.3B, growth 6% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.5x / 1.9x / 2.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0 |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $121.49 | 1.12x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.78B × (1−24%) / WACC 8.0% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Graham Number | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | EBITDA $0.67B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $80.14 | 1.69x | yes | FCF $494.1M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $75.01 | 1.81x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.47B (FCF $0.49B − SBC $0.02B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $16.24 | 8.35x | yes | BV $52.53 × (ROIC 2.5% / WACC 8.0%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | — | — | no | Revenue $3.31B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)
One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.
| Unit | Role | Valuation basis | Revenue | Reported profit | Value evidence | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Commercial Foodservice | operating | enterprise | $2.4b | $626.7m operating-income | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
| Food Processing | operating | enterprise | $850.2m | $171.5m operating-income | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $2.2b |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -4.3% |
| Burning cash | no |
Operating profit is negative or near zero and the company has no demonstrated through-cycle (mid-cycle) operating margin to normalize against, so years-to-repay cannot be computed honestly.
Operating profit is negative or near zero and there is no demonstrated through-cycle (mid-cycle) operating margin to normalize against, so interest coverage cannot be computed honestly.
Bullet Takeaways
- Middleby builds commercial kitchen and food-processing equipment across a wide brand portfolio, and the model carries through-cycle operating margins around 17% on roughly $3.3 billion of revenue, with a high-margin aftermarket-parts stream layered on the installed base.
- The defining near-term event is the planned spin-off of the Food Processing segment as a separate public company, Midera, targeted for early July 2026, a breakup meant to let the market value two cleaner businesses separately.
- The biggest risk is the debt: net debt sits near $2.2 billion, about four times trailing operating income, and management's own post-spin plan targets delevering toward 2.5 times, so the balance sheet is the constraint the equity has to clear.
Bull Case
The balance sheet tells you what management actually believes about its own business. Net debt of roughly $2.2 billion against trailing operating income near $579 million is real leverage, about four times, but the more telling number is the share count, which has been shrinking around 4% a year. A company carrying meaningful debt that still chooses to retire its own stock is signaling that it views the equity as cheaper than paying down the next dollar of debt. That is a confidence statement, and the upcoming breakup is the structural version of the same bet: Middleby is splitting into two public companies precisely because management thinks the parts are worth more than the conglomerate.
The operating engine supports that confidence. Gross margin ran at 39.1% in fiscal 2025, and the business throws off substantial free cash, roughly half a billion dollars on a trailing basis, because equipment sales pull along a recurring stream of aftermarket parts and service tied to the installed base. The first quarter showed both segments accelerating: Food Processing grew 25% organically with record orders and a fifth straight quarter of book-to-bill above one, while Commercial Foodservice grew 8.1% organically. Order momentum that strong is the leading edge of revenue, and it is why management raised full-year guidance to adjusted EPS of $9.54 to $9.70 for fiscal 2026.
The spin-off is the catalyst the bull case has been waiting for. Splitting Food Processing into a separately listed company, Midera, targeted for early July 2026, lets each business carry the multiple its growth and margin profile deserves rather than a blended one that satisfies neither. The remaining Middleby keeps the larger, steadier commercial-foodservice franchise; the spun business takes a faster-growing food-processing order book into its own currency. The company has paired the breakup with an asset sale and a delevering plan, so the equity story is not just a financial-engineering reshuffle. It is a cleaner, less-levered pair of businesses that the market can value on their own terms.
Bear Case
The structural truth a holder has to face is that the price is paying for a normalization and a re-rating that have not happened yet. Strip the trailing year of its one-time charges and the business earns a healthy through-cycle margin near 17%, but at $172.46 (June 27, 2026) the market is paying about seventeen times that normalized operating income, which inverts to roughly 14% annual operating growth sustained for five years. That is not an impossible rate for Middleby in a good stretch, but history is sobering: only about 46% of comparable fast-growers have held that pace for even five years. The price assumes Middleby lands in the better half, and it assumes the breakup unlocks the value rather than merely rearranging it.
Leverage is the amplifier on every other risk. Net debt of roughly $2.2 billion is about four times trailing operating income, and the company's own post-spin plan calls for the remaining business to start near 2.8 times and work down toward 2.5 times. In a benign environment that is manageable; the concern is the combination of debt with the acquisitive history that built it. Middleby grew by buying brands, and the goodwill and intangibles that come with that strategy are valued against "comparable publicly traded companies with similar operating and investment characteristics of the reporting units", which means a softer end-market or a lower peer multiple can force impairment charges, the same kind of non-cash hit that depressed the trailing earnings in the first place. A levered roll-up is most exposed precisely when its acquired assets are worth less than their carrying value.
Competition and cyclicality round out the bear. The company concedes that "some competitors have different pricing structures and may be able to deliver their products at lower prices," and capital-equipment demand swings with restaurant and food-processor capital budgets, which tighten when financing costs rise. The spin-off itself carries execution risk: separation costs, two new cost structures, and the possibility that the sum of the parts trades no higher than the whole if either business stumbles in its first independent quarters. The bull sees the breakup unlocking value; the bear notes that the value is unlocked only if both businesses grow into the multiples the price already assigns them, while servicing the debt that financed the empire.
Valuation
Because the trailing year was depressed by one-time charges, the cleanest read of the price uses Middleby's own through-cycle economics, not the trough. On that basis the market is paying about seventeen times normalized operating income, which inverts to roughly 14% annual operating growth held for five years. That is a demanding but not absurd expectation for a company whose two segments grew 25% and 8% organically last quarter, with the caveat that sustaining mid-teens growth for half a decade is something fewer than half of comparable fast-growers have managed.
The methods split the way they usually do for a leveraged, acquisition-built compounder. The peer-multiple and growth-cash-flow lenses sit close to the price: a sector EV/EBITDA near twelve times and the exit-multiple cash-flow method both land within striking distance of $172.46. The asset-value and earnings-power lenses say expensive, and the reason is mechanical: the trailing earnings are negative on a reported basis, so book-value-plus-profitability math, which keys off return on equity, produces a low figure, and the earnings-power method capitalizes a normalized operating profit that does not credit the growth the price is paying for. The honest reading is that this is a growth-and-quality bet, not a value one. The static asset lenses cannot frame a business whose worth is in its franchise and its order book, not its balance-sheet equity.
Solvency is where the discipline has to live. Net debt of about $2.2 billion against trailing operating income near $579 million is roughly four times, with only modest liquid assets against it, and interest expense is not separately broken out in the latest filings. The company generates strong free cash, near half a billion dollars trailing, which is what services the debt and funds the buybacks. The decisive number going forward is the post-spin leverage path: management targets the remaining business around 2.8 times moving toward 2.5 times, and the food-processing spin at roughly 1.25 times. If those targets hold, the equity in each piece sits on a cleaner balance sheet and a clearer growth profile. The price is already paying for that outcome, which is why the execution of the breakup, not the quarter-to-quarter print, is what the valuation rests on.
Catalysts
The dominant catalyst is the Food Processing spin-off. Middleby plans to separate the segment into an independent public company, Midera Food Processing, targeted for July 6, 2026, pending customary conditions and regulatory approval, creating two listed businesses with distinct growth and margin profiles. Oppenheimer initiated coverage at Outperform ahead of the separation, framing the breakup as a potential closer of the valuation gap. The mechanics matter for the equity: post-spin, the remaining Middleby is targeted near 2.8 times net leverage with a goal of reaching 2.5 times by year-end, while the spun food-processing business starts near 1.25 times.
The first quarter set the stage. Middleby reported adjusted EPS of $2.16 against a $1.94 estimate, on revenue of $839.9 million that also beat, with Food Processing up 25% organically and a fifth straight quarter of book-to-bill above one, and Commercial Foodservice up 8.1% organically. Management raised full-year guidance to revenue of $3.36 billion to $3.44 billion and adjusted EPS of $9.54 to $9.70 for fiscal 2026. The watch items into the back half of the year are the clean execution of the separation, the pace of order conversion in both segments, and the delevering trajectory, all of which feed the thesis that two focused companies earn higher multiples than the combined one did.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Commercial Foodservice (reported)
- ITW (ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS INC)
- FY2025 10-K: …specifications and are sold under long-term supply agreements with OEM auto manufacturers and other top tier auto parts suppliers. The Company typically recognizes revenue for products in this segment at the time of shipment. Certain products may be produced utilizing tooling that is owned by the customer that the…
- FY2025 10-K: …prep tables; • food processing equipment, including slicers, mixers and scales; • kitchen exhaust, ventilation and pollution control systems; and • food equipment service, maintenance and repair. The results of operations for the Food Equipment segment for 2025, 2024 and 2023 were as follows: 2025 compared to 2024…
- DOV (DOVER Corp)
- FY2025 10-K: …of Contents Clean Energy & Fueling Our Clean Energy & Fueling segment provides components, equipment, software solutions and services enabling safe and reliable storage, transport, dispensing, and remote monitoring of traditional and clean fuels (including liquefied natural gas, hydrogen, and electric vehicle…
- FY2025 10-K: …and finance lease depreciation expense are recognized on a straight-line basis over the lease term. Supply Chain Financing The Company facilitates the opportunity for suppliers to participate in a voluntary supply chain financing ("SCF") program with a third-party financial institution. Participating suppliers are…
- JBTM (JBT Marel Corporation)
- FY2025 10-K: …technical personnel. In addition to helping our customers reduce their operating costs and improve efficiencies, our customer service focus also helps us maintain strong commercial relationships and provides us with ongoing access to information about our customers' requirements and strategies to foster continuing…
- FY2025 10-K: …under our financing arrangements; • impair the financial condition of some of our customers, thereby hindering our customers' ability to obtain financing to purchase our products and/or increasing customer bad debts; • cause customers to forgo or postpone new purchases in favor of repairing existing equipment and…
- NDSN (NORDSON CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: …if they are immaterial in the context of the contract and combine these with other performance obligations. While payment terms and conditions vary by contract type, we have determined that our contracts generally do not include a significant financing component. We have elected to apply the practical expedient to…
- FY2025 10-K: …2021 Stock Incentive and Award Plan, Form of Notice of Award - Executive Officers (incorporated herein by reference to Exhibit 10.2 to Registrant's Current Report on Form 8-K dated April 19, 2021)* 10-f Assurance Trust Agreement between Nordson Corporation and Key Trust Company of Ohio, N.A. amended and restated as…
Food Processing (reported)
- JBTM (JBT Marel Corporation)
- FY2025 10-K: …energy and water usage, lowering food waste, and enhancing food safety. In the secondary processing space, we supply a broad portfolio of processing solutions for customers producing protein products, such as meat, poultry, and seafood, and liquid food and beverage products, including products used standalone or as…
- FY2025 10-K: …technical personnel. In addition to helping our customers reduce their operating costs and improve efficiencies, our customer service focus also helps us maintain strong commercial relationships and provides us with ongoing access to information about our customers' requirements and strategies to foster continuing…
- ITW (ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS INC)
- FY2025 10-K: …prep tables; • food processing equipment, including slicers, mixers and scales; • kitchen exhaust, ventilation and pollution control systems; and • food equipment service, maintenance and repair. The results of operations for the Food Equipment segment for 2025, 2024 and 2023 were as follows: 2025 compared to 2024…
- FY2025 10-K: .4% compared to worldwide auto builds which decreased 1%. Product line simplification activities reduced organic revenue by 70 basis points. ◦ North American revenue decreased 5.1% compared to North American auto builds which declined 1% primarily due to customer mix and product line simplification activities. Auto…
- DOV (DOVER Corp)
- FY2025 10-K: …of traditional and clean fuels (including liquefied natural gas, hydrogen, and electric vehicle charging), cryogenic gases, and other hazardous substances along the supply chain, and safe and efficient operation of convenience retail, retail fueling and vehicle wash establishments. • Imaging & Identification segment…
- FY2025 10-K: , retail fueling and vehicle wash establishments. • Our Imaging & Identification segment supplies precision marking and coding, product traceability, brand protection and digital textile printing equipment, as well as related consumables, software and services to the global packaged and consumer goods, pharmaceutical,…
- NDSN (NORDSON CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: …drug infusion, IV & drug delivery, patient care, surgical and biopharma. • Surgical Solutions - Microplegia myocardial protection devices and related consumables used in cardiac surgical procedures. Advanced Technology Solutions This segment integrates our proprietary product technologies into the progressive stages…
- FY2025 10-K: …stages of an electronics customer's production and measurement and control processes, such as surface treatment, precisely controlled dispensing of material and test and inspection to ensure quality and reliability. Applications include, but are not limited to, semiconductors, printed circuit boards, electronic…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Economic-unit decomposition (SOTP): each disclosed business unit is assigned its native valuation basis before any multiple is applied. Operating units are valued on enterprise value; funded financial units are valued on their own common equity, because their borrowings fund earning assets rather than levering the parent. A company total is stated only once every material unit carries a supported value and the parent capital bridge reconciles.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Middleby Q1 2026 materials, June 2026 · Middleby FY2025 10-K