MOHAWK INDUSTRIES INC (MHK): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $135.69, MOHAWK INDUSTRIES INC (MHK) is priced for +13.5% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-27.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/MHK

Headline

FieldValue
TickerMHK
CompanyMOHAWK INDUSTRIES INC
Current price$135.69/sh
CompositionCeramic & Stone 39% / Carpet & Resilient 35% / Laminate & Wood 16% / Other 10%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)5.1%
Operating margin today5.1%
Margin expansion (value-band)+0.0pp
Implied growth13.5%
Multiple paid15x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 10.2% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~6.1pp.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.11σ
cohort percentile (of 214 peers)36
sustained it ~5 years at this level47%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.51x5expensive
Earnings1.32x5expensive
Relative1.98x2expensive
Growth0.76x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.4%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$367.520.37xyesFCF base $0.8B, growth 5% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.4%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$178.090.76xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 6.5x / 8.5x / 10.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 15.2x / 18.0x / 20.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$74.051.83xyesBV/sh $126.08, ROE (TTM) 5.4%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$54.162.51xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$112.801.20xyesRev $11.2B, growth 5% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.7x / 0.8x / 1.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$90.721.50xyesEPS $7.56, growth 5% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=4.09 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$66.872.03xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.53B × (1−21%) / WACC 7.4% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$51.752.62xyesBV $126.08 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 5.4% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 3.5%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$146.450.93xyes√(22.5 × EPS $7.56 × BVPS $126.08) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $1.26B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$107.231.27xyesFCF $811.5M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$102.621.32xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.78B (FCF $0.81B − SBC $0.03B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$115.211.18xyesEPS $7.56 × (8.5 + 2×4.8%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$33.993.99xyesBV $126.08 × (ROIC 2.0% / WACC 7.4%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $11.18B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$54.912.47xyesEPS $7.56 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 4.8% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 7.3x
Earnings YieldEarnings$81.731.66xyesEPS $7.56 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Global Ceramicoperatingenterprise$4.3b$266.7m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Flooring NAoperatingenterprise$3.6b$113.6m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Flooring ROWoperatingenterprise$2.9b$212.9m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$1.3b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)2.82x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)2.23x
Interest coverage42.6x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-1.2%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The structural advantage here is scale across a fragmented industry, and the 10-K describes it plainly: Mohawk runs three large flooring segments, with Global Ceramic, Flooring North America, and Flooring Rest of the World accounting for "40%, 34% and 26%, respectively, of the Company's total revenue", spanning "broadloom carpet, carpet tile, rugs and mats, carpet pad, laminate, medium-density fiberboard ('MDF'), wood flooring, LVT, hybrid flooring and sheet vinyl". No single competitor matches that product breadth and manufacturing footprint. The advantage is not glamorous, but in a commodity-adjacent business it is what lets the company push higher-value products through the same distribution network and absorb cost shocks better than smaller rivals.

The case rests on what the current returns are NOT showing. Trailing operating margin of about 4.6% and return on equity near 4.9% are trough numbers, set by a residential market sitting on its hands while mortgage rates stay high. Management is not waiting passively: the company describes "action to optimize the Company's manufacturing and distribution footprint to reduce complexity", alongside new product introductions and promotional programs aimed at "both residential and commercial channels". Restructuring and productivity gains drop straight to margin when volume returns. The bull case is operating leverage in reverse, waiting to unwind: fixed-cost factories running below capacity today become high-incremental-margin factories when residential demand recovers.

The balance sheet gives the company time to wait. Interest coverage runs above thirty times trailing operating income, net debt sits at roughly 2.6 times operating income, and the share count has been shrinking, with 607,000 shares repurchased for $64 million in the first quarter alone. That is a company buying its own stock at trough earnings rather than issuing equity to survive them. The book value per share of about $136 sits above the $112.53 price (June 27, 2026), so a buyer today pays less than stated net worth for a business earning depressed but positive profits. If margins mean-revert toward their through-cycle level, both the earnings and the multiple the market is willing to pay can move at once.

Bear Case

The fragility is not in the debt load, which is modest, but in how completely the business depends on a cycle it does not control. The 10-K names the exposure directly: demand turns on "consumer confidence, income and spending, corporate and government spending, interest rate levels, availability of credit and demand for housing", and the company warns that "significant or prolonged declines in the U.S. or global economies could have a material adverse effect on the Company's business". A capital structure carrying about $1.3 billion of net debt is comfortable at mid-cycle margins. The question is what it looks like if the residential downturn extends for years rather than quarters, because the leverage ratio is calculated on operating income that is already depressed, and it rises mechanically if that income falls further.

The valuation lenses that look at assets agree the price is full on what the company actually earns today. Return on equity of 4.9% sits well below the roughly 9% cost of equity, which is why the book-value-plus-profitability methods land far under the price: a business earning less than its cost of capital is destroying value at the margin each year it persists, and the asset-based lens prices that honestly. The price holds up only on multiples and on a cash-flow read that assumes today's economics hold or improve. In other words, the price is paying for normalization that has not yet shown up in the returns. If margins stay where they are, the multiple is the only thing holding the stock, and multiples compress when earnings disappoint.

Competition compounds the cyclicality. The company concedes it "faces competition from a number of manufacturers and independent distributors" and from rivals "introducing new products or technologies that better meet customers' needs, whether through pricing, sustainability, quality, versatility or other characteristics." Flooring is replaceable and substitutable, imports press on price, and the residential customer can simply defer the purchase. The first-quarter print showed the shape of the risk: sales of $2.73 billion missed estimates even as EPS beat, and Q2 guidance at a $2.55 midpoint came in below the consensus near $2.73. The bull is right that operating leverage cuts both ways. The bear's point is that it is currently cutting the wrong way, and the timing of the turn is a housing-market call, not a company one.

Valuation

At $112.53 the market is paying roughly thirteen times trailing operating income, which inverts to about 4.5% annual operating growth sustained over five years. For a flooring business, that is not a demanding rate in isolation; it is within what Mohawk has delivered in better years. The stretch is in the persistence and in the assumption that margins recover from today's trough, not in the headline growth number.

The methods split along a clean line, and the split is the information. Peer multiples and the cash-flow methods reach the price comfortably: on a sector earnings multiple near eighteen times and a sector EV/EBITDA of twelve times, the implied values sit above $112.53. The asset-value lenses land well below it. The reason is the same in every case: return on equity of about 4.9% against a roughly 9% cost of equity. When a company earns less than its cost of capital, book-value-plus-profitability math discounts the equity below stated book, while multiple-based math, which looks at the price others pay for a dollar of sales or EBITDA, says the business is cheap. Both are correct about different things. The multiple says the franchise is worth more than its trough earnings imply; the asset lens says the trough earnings are real and currently value-destructive.

The balance sheet is the floor under the bet, and here it is genuinely supportive. Net debt of about $1.3 billion against trailing operating income of roughly $506 million is around 2.6 times, interest coverage runs above thirty times, and the company holds more than $870 million of liquid assets. This is not a company that has to be rescued by a recovery; it can fund the wait. The share count is falling, which means management is returning capital at trough prices rather than diluting. The whole case, then, reduces to one normalization question: book value per share of about $136 exceeds the price, so a buyer is paying below stated net worth for a profitable, well-financed, cyclically-depressed business. Whether that is cheap or fair depends on whether the residential cycle turns before the value-destructive trough returns become the permanent reality the asset lens currently prices.

Catalysts

Mohawk reported first-quarter 2026 results on April 30, with adjusted EPS of $1.90 beating consensus by roughly 5%, while net sales of $2.73 billion rose 8% as reported but fell about 2.6% on a constant-days, constant-currency basis and came in just short of estimates. The split inside the quarter is the story: Global Ceramic and Flooring Rest of the World showed higher operating income, while Flooring North America carried a lower margin, with management pointing to soft residential volumes and inflation as the drags and to commercial demand and restructuring savings as the offsets.

The near-term swing factor is guidance against demand. The company guided second-quarter 2026 adjusted EPS to a range of $2.50 to $2.60, a midpoint below the roughly $2.73 the street was modeling, which is the cautious-but-improving signal the market is weighing. Analyst opinion is mixed, clustering at a Hold consensus with price targets broadly in the $123 to $140 range. The capital-return cadence is also worth tracking: the company repurchased 607,000 shares for $64 million in the first quarter, a modest pace that some observers read as conservative given the trough valuation. The clearest forward catalyst remains the residential cycle, where any easing in mortgage rates or improvement in housing turnover would lift the segment that is currently holding the consolidated margin down.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Global Ceramic (reported)

Flooring NA (reported)

Flooring ROW (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Mohawk Q1 2026 earnings release, April 30 2026 · Mohawk FY2025 10-K

View the full interactive MHK report on boothcheck