Magna International Inc. (MGA): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $69.03, Magna International Inc. (MGA) is priced for +8.4% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-27.
Generated: 2026-07-29 · Exported: 2026-08-01 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/MGA
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | MGA |
| Company | Magna International Inc. |
| Current price | $69.04/sh |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 2.5% |
| Operating margin today | 3.1% |
| Margin compression (value-band) | -0.6pp |
| Implied growth | 8.4% |
| Multiple paid | 15x operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 9.4% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~6.1pp.
How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +0.72σ |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 2.39x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 1.73x | 3 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.30x | 5 | expensive |
| Growth | 0.88x | 5 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.6%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=17)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $199.88 | 0.35x | yes | FCF base $2.3B, growth 4% (input: historical growth), terminal g 3.9%, WACC 7.6%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $86.98 | 0.79x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 13.9x / 15.9x / 17.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $57.06 | 1.21x | yes | P/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.9x / 20.0x / 23.1x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | $78.55 | 0.88x | yes | DPS $1.93, g=6.6% (sustainable: ROE (TTM) × retention; not the terminal-growth assumption), ke=9.3% |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | $35.20 | 1.96x | yes | Stage 1: 4% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $31.72 | 2.18x | yes | BV/sh $44.22, ROE (TTM) 6.6%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $26.52 | 2.60x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $50.88 | 1.36x | yes | Rev $42.0B, growth 4% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.4x / 0.5x / 0.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $35.16 | 1.96x | yes | EPS $2.93, growth 4% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=6.10 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | $25.80 | 2.68x | yes | BV $44.22 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 6.6% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 4.3%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $53.99 | 1.28x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $2.93 × BVPS $44.22) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $53.12 | 1.30x | yes | EBITDA $1.55B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $69.38 | 1.00x | yes | FCF $2285.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $39.82 | 1.73x | yes | EPS $2.93 × (8.5 + 2×3.9%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $223.06 | 0.31x | yes | Revenue $42.01B × sector P/S 1.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $16.95 | 4.07x | yes | EPS $2.93 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 3.9% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 5.8x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $31.68 | 2.18x | yes | EPS $2.93 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $3.1b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 3.51x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 2.37x |
| Interest coverage | 4.8x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -1.7% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
Magna is one of the largest auto-parts suppliers in the world, selling everything from body and chassis systems to seating, powertrain, and driver-assistance technology to global automakers. It is a cyclical business whose margins rise and fall with vehicle production, and production is currently soft: global light-vehicle output fell about 7% in Q1 2026.
What the static models miss is the gap between trough and normal. Trailing operating margin is barely positive, which makes the earnings-power frames read near zero, but Q1 adjusted EBIT margin expanded 190 basis points to 5.4% and adjusted EPS jumped 77% to $1.38 as self-help took hold.
At about $65 the price sits near the inversion base (about $67) and near the average analyst target. The dividend yields roughly 3.2%, and management guides full-year 2026 adjusted EPS of $6.25 to $7.25 with $1.6 billion to $1.8 billion of free cash flow.
Bull Case
The thing a generic valuation model misses about Magna is that it is being measured at the bottom of its cycle. The trailing operating margin is barely above zero, which is why the earnings-power frame computes a fair value near zero, an obviously wrong number that simply reflects depressed cyclical earnings rather than the business's normal capacity. The reality is a supplier whose self-help program is already working: in Q1 2026 adjusted EBIT rose 58%, the adjusted EBIT margin expanded 190 basis points to 5.4%, and adjusted EPS jumped 77% to $1.38, all achieved while global light-vehicle production fell about 7%. Growing margins and earnings into a production decline is the signature of a company taking cost out and improving execution, not riding a tailwind.
The forward earnings power is real and management is committed to it. Magna maintained full-year 2026 adjusted EPS guidance of $6.25 to $7.25 even after trimming its sales outlook on lower production assumptions, and it guides to $1.6 billion to $1.8 billion of free cash flow. That free-cash-flow line is what funds the capital return: the dividend yields about 3.2% and the share count is shrinking about 1.7% a year. A business that can generate well over a billion dollars of free cash flow at a trough in its end market has the earnings power the static frames cannot see at a single point in time.
The mix shift adds a growth angle to a mature business. Magna is divesting lower-margin units (lighting, rooftop systems) and refocusing on higher-content, higher-margin areas like EV powertrains and advanced driver-assistance systems, which raises the dollar value of Magna content per vehicle even when total vehicle volumes are flat. The inversion base sits near $67, essentially at the roughly $65 price, so the market is not demanding much: about 6.6% operating-profit growth, well within reach as margins normalize toward management's targets. Analysts see fair value around the same level (an average target near $68, with Scotiabank at $72 and TD at $76). The bull case is a cyclical supplier at the bottom of its cycle, with self-help margin gains, a covered 3%-plus dividend, and a mix shifting toward content that grows faster than the car market.
Bear Case
The honest entry point is the model disagreement, because for Magna the conservative frames and the optimistic frames are saying very different things and the conservative ones rest on what the company actually earns today. The earnings-power frame reads essentially zero, simple excess return lands near $32, residual income near $26, the two-stage excess return near $27, all far below the roughly $65 price (June 27, 2026), with a blended X-ray near $46. Only the relative-multiple and growth-DCF frames reach the price, and the perpetual-growth DCF near $204 only gets there by extrapolating a recovery. When the methods grounded in current profitability say the stock is worth a fraction of the price and only the recovery-dependent methods justify it, the conservative read is that you are paying a normalized multiple for a business still earning trough returns, and the recovery has to actually arrive.
The cyclicality and the balance sheet make that recovery less certain. Global light-vehicle production fell about 7% in the quarter, and Magna trimmed its production assumptions to roughly 14.9 million North American units and 16.6 million European units, so the volume backdrop is weakening, not strengthening. The leverage compounds the risk: net debt of about $3.1 billion sits at roughly 2.4 times trailing operating income, but interest coverage is only about 1.4 times, which is thin for a cyclical, and a trough that deepens would pressure both the dividend and the deleveraging. A supplier with low single-digit margins and 1.4-times coverage has little cushion if production falls further or a key program is delayed.
The structural risks sit on top. Tariffs cost about 15 basis points of margin in Q1, and while management expects the 2026 net impact to be roughly neutral, that depends on ongoing recovery negotiations with most automakers going its way. The EV transition is a double-edged sword: it raises content per vehicle on the products Magna is investing in, but it also strands investment in legacy internal-combustion components and exposes the company to the volatile, slower-than-hoped EV adoption curve. The bear conclusion is that at about $65, near the high end of where the recovery-dependent models land and far above the trough-earnings frames, the stock prices in a margin recovery that a soft, tariff-exposed, leveraged cyclical may not deliver on schedule.
Valuation
Magna is valued as a cyclical at a low point, and the models disagree exactly the way they do for a trough-earning business. The price is justified by the relative-multiple and growth-DCF frames while the asset-based and earnings-power models say expensive. The conservative frames are far below the price (earnings power value near zero, simple excess return $32, residual income $26, two-stage excess return $27), the recovery-dependent frames are far above (perpetual-growth DCF $204, P/Sales $223), and the more grounded relative and FCF frames bracket the price (relative valuation $57, FCF yield $69). The blended X-ray is near $46.
The reason the earnings-power frame reads near zero is the trough margin: the trailing operating margin is barely positive, so capitalizing it produces almost nothing. That is the legitimate case for not anchoring on it, but it is also the central risk, because the price assumes a recovery toward the mid-single-digit-and-rising margins management targets. The sensitivity is about 5.9 points of implied growth per point of cost of capital, and the reliability of the solve is rated ok.
The practical read: Magna at $65 is priced near its inversion base and near the average analyst target, which means the market is paying a roughly fair price for a normalized version of the business, not a discounted one. The upside requires the margin recovery (Q1's 190-basis-point expansion is the early evidence) to continue and the ADAS and EV-powertrain mix shift to lift content per vehicle. The downside is the trough-earnings frames near $26 to $32 if production stays weak and the recovery stalls. The 3%-plus dividend, backed by $1.6 billion to $1.8 billion of guided free cash flow, is the return collected while that plays out.
Catalysts
Q1 2026 was a self-help quarter against a weak market. Sales rose 3% to $10.38 billion on favorable currency and new program launches, even as global light-vehicle production fell about 7%. Adjusted EBIT rose 58%, the adjusted EBIT margin expanded 190 basis points to 5.4%, and adjusted EPS jumped 77% to $1.38, evidence the cost program is working.
Management maintained full-year 2026 adjusted EPS guidance of $6.25 to $7.25 while trimming the sales outlook to $41.5 billion to $43.1 billion on lower production assumptions (about 14.9 million North American units, 16.6 million European), and guided to $1.6 billion to $1.8 billion of free cash flow.
Tariffs cut about 15 basis points from Q1 margin; management expects the 2026 net impact to be similar to 2025 and roughly neutral to full-year EBIT margin, pending recovery negotiations with most automakers.
The strategic story is the mix shift: divesting lighting and rooftop units to refocus on EV powertrains and ADAS, which raises content per vehicle. Analyst sentiment is a Hold on average with a target near $68 (Scotiabank at $72, TD at $76). The dividend yields about 3.2%. The swing factors are vehicle-production trends, the pace of margin recovery, tariff-recovery outcomes, and EV-adoption timing.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- F (Ford Motor Co)
- FY2025 10-K: …by our China joint venture, Jiangling Motors Corporation, Ltd. ("JMC"), that are sold to dealerships or others. Vehicles sold to daily rental car companies that are subject to a guaranteed repurchase option (i.e., rental repurchase), as well as other sales of finished vehicles for which the recognition of revenue is…
- FY2025 10-K: …for EVs leading to excess supply in that market segment. The decline in value of foreign currencies can also contribute significantly to competitive pressures in many of our markets. Competitive Position. The worldwide automotive industry consists of many producers, with no single dominant producer. Certain…
- GM (GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY)
- FY2025 10-K: We operate in a highly competitive industry that has historically had excess manufacturing capacity, and attempts by our competitors to sell more vehicles could have a significant negative effect on our vehicle pricing, market share, and results of operations. The global automotive industry is highly competitive in…
- FY2025 10-K: …our results of operations, financial condition, and growth prospects, and could negatively impact our brand and reputation. Our near-term profitability is dependent upon the success of our current line of vehicles, particularly our full-size ICE SUVs and full-size ICE pickup trucks. While we offer a broad portfolio…
- HMC (HONDA MOTOR CO., LTD.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TSLA (Tesla, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …and new competitors. The worldwide automotive market is highly competitive today and we expect it will become even more so in the future. A significant and growing number of established and new automobile manufacturers, as well as other companies, have entered, or are reported to have plans to enter, the market for…
- FY2025 10-K: …and an increase in tariffs compared to the prior year. Cost of services and other revenue increased $1.68 billion, or 17%, in the year ended December 31, 2025 as compared to the year ended December 31, 2024, primarily due to increases in used vehicle sales volume and cost, cost of paid Supercharging sessions, cost…
- RACE (Ferrari N.V.)
- FY2025 20-F: …than 500 hp and priced in excess of Euro 200,000 (Italian market price including VAT as reference), mostly sold by the same aforementioned competitors with the addition of Land Rover. With respect to the Enlarged perimeter, Ferrari maintains its leadership in Italy, France, Singapore and Japan among others. • Ferrari…
- FY2025 20-F: …and conflicts, including the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East region, and the related issues potentially impacting sourcing and transportation; • trading policies and tariffs; • competition in the luxury performance automobile industry; • changes in client preferences and automotive trends; • our…
- LI (Li Auto Inc.)
- FY2025 20-F: …marketing, sales, and support of their vehicles. For example, we believe that BYD has a dominant market share in the NEV market, in particular for NEVs priced under RMB200,000 (US$28,600), and Tesla holds a dominant position in the segment for NEVs priced above RMB 200,000 (US$28,600). Meanwhile, experienced entrants…
- FY2025 20-F: …currently sell vehicles in the United States. 25 Table of Contents New geographic markets may have competitive conditions, user preferences, and discretionary spending patterns that are more difficult to predict or satisfy than our existing markets. In certain markets, we have relatively little operating experience…
- NIO (NIO Inc.)
- FY2025 20-F: …globalization, and industry consolidation. Increased competition will place greater demands on, among others, product design and performance, technological innovation, pricing, product quality and safety, manufacturing efficiency, sales and marketing capabilities, service and charging options, and user satisfaction.…
- FY2025 20-F: …from sales of parts, accessories and after-sales vehicle services and provision of power solutions, as a result of continued growth in the number of our users, partially offset by (iii) the decrease in revenue from sales of used cars by RMB587.8 million. Cost of sales Our cost of sales increased by 12.7% from…
- PCAR (PACCAR Inc)
- FY2025 10-K: …losses based on specifically identified customer risks and an analysis of estimated losses inherent in the portfolio, considering the amount of past due accounts, the trends of used truck prices and the current and forecasted economic conditions of its geographic markets. Financial Services SG&A expenses consist…
- FY2025 10-K: . and Canada commercial truck market. The Company's share of the U.S. and Canadian Class 8 market was 29.9% of retail sales in 2025, and the Company's medium-duty market share was 15.9%. In Europe, there are six principal competitors in the commercial truck market, including parent companies to the four competitors of…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.