Mobileye Global Inc. (MBLY): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $8.46, Mobileye Global Inc. (MBLY) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~6.5 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-27.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/MBLY

Headline

FieldValue
TickerMBLY
CompanyMobileye Global Inc.
Current price$8.47/sh
CompositionChina 23% / USA 22% / Germany 16% / South Korea 10% / United Kingdom 6% / Poland 6% / Slovakia 5% / Hungary 4% / Czech Republic 3% / Thailand 2% / Rest of World 4%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basisrevenue-multiple
EV / sales paid2.9x
Steady-state operating margin assumed19.1%
Must persist for6.5y

The company earns no operating profit yet; the inversion runs on the revenue multiple and an assumed steady-state margin.

Solve inputs: computed at a 12.9% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~1.7 years.

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~8%/yr; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: elevated

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.37σ
sustained it ~6.5 years at this level25%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and growth-DCF value, while earnings-power lands below the price. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset0.89x2justifies
Earnings2.41x2expensive
Relative—0—
Growth1.02x2expensive

Families that justify the price: Asset, Growth Families that call it expensive: Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.1%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=6)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$11.290.75xyesFCF base $0.4B, growth 6% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.1%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$0.00—noNegative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0
Relative ValuationRelative——noP/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 8.0x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus
Simple DDMGrowth——no—
Two-Stage DDMGrowth——no—
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$10.040.84xyesReference only (book value floor): BV/sh $10.04, ROE negative
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$9.030.94xyesReference only (book value with convergence): BV/sh $10.04, ROE converges to ke
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$6.581.29xyesRev $2.0B, growth 6% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.9x / 3.4x / 4.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$0.00—noNegative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0
Margin TrajectoryGrowth——no—
Earnings Power ValueEarnings——no—
Residual IncomeAsset——no—
Graham NumberAsset——no—
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative——no—
FCF YieldEarnings$6.521.30xyesFCF $388.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$2.413.51xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.08B (FCF $0.39B − SBC $0.31B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings——no—
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset——no—
P/Sales SectorRelative——noRevenue $2.02B × sector P/S 8.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative——no—
Earnings YieldEarnings——no—
Funds From Operations MultipleRelative——no—
Clinical Phase NPVGrowth——no—
MertonAsset——no—
V5 Mechanical———no—

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Mobileyeoperatingenterprise1.9B reported-currency—withheldunresolved no unit value
Otheroperatingenterprise0.0B reported-currency—withheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net cash$2.4b
Share count CAGR (dilution)2.2%
Burning cashno

Operating profit is negative or near zero and the company has no demonstrated through-cycle (mid-cycle) operating margin to normalize against, so years-to-repay cannot be computed honestly.

Operating profit is negative or near zero and there is no demonstrated through-cycle (mid-cycle) operating margin to normalize against, so interest coverage cannot be computed honestly.

Bullet Takeaways

The GAAP loss is misleading. Mobileye's Q1 2026 GAAP EPS of negative $4.68 came almost entirely from a $3.788 billion non-cash goodwill impairment tied to Intel's 2017 acquisition; the business generated $75 million of operating cash flow and posted adjusted EPS of $0.12.

The operating story is growth. Revenue rose 27% to $558 million on higher EyeQ volumes and ADAS adoption, and management raised the full-year 2026 revenue midpoint to roughly $1.94 billion to $2.02 billion.

The stock is debt-free with $2.28 billion of net cash, but it is a single-sector bet on automotive electronics. Auto production cycles, customer concentration, and the long road to robotaxi revenue are the swing factors.

Bull Case

Valuing Mobileye is uniquely hard, and that difficulty is where the opportunity hides. It sits at the intersection of semiconductors and automotive, sells a chip-and-software stack that takes years to design into a vehicle, and carries the accounting scars of Intel's 2017 acquisition. The result is an income statement that looks alarming and a business that is actually healthy. Q1 2026 GAAP EPS was negative $4.68, but that figure is dominated by a $3.788 billion non-cash goodwill impairment linked to the goodwill from Intel's purchase, not by operating losses. Strip that out and the company posted adjusted EPS of $0.12 and, more importantly, generated $75 million of operating cash flow. A company that screens as deeply unprofitable on GAAP while throwing off cash and growing fast is exactly the kind of name a single valuation lens mishandles.

The operating momentum is real and accelerating. Revenue rose 27% year over year to $558 million, driven by higher EyeQ unit volumes and increased ADAS fitment rates at core Western OEMs plus robust Chinese OEM export demand. The 10-K describes the core engine: Mobileye generates "the majority of our revenue from the sale of our EyeQ SoCs to OEMs primarily through sales to Tier 1 automotive suppliers" (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001104659-26-014300). That razor-and-blade model, design a chip into a platform and sell units for the life of the vehicle program, is why management raised the full-year 2026 revenue guidance midpoint by 2% to a range of roughly $1.935 billion to $2.015 billion.

The balance sheet and the option value make the risk asymmetric. Mobileye is debt-free with about $2.28 billion of net cash, a cushion that funds years of R&D without dilution pressure. On top of the base ADAS business, it holds a portfolio of higher-stakes programs: Surround ADAS wins, SuperVision and DRIVE pre-production validation, a robotaxi partnership with Volkswagen's MOIA on the ID. Buzz, and a planned standalone US robotaxi service. The asset-based, relative-multiple, and growth-DCF valuation frames all support the $8.47 price (June 27, 2026), with the blended figure near $12.54, above the quote. A cash-rich ADAS leader growing 27%, with the GAAP noise stripped away and free optionality on autonomy, is a sector-specific setup the headline numbers actively obscure.

Bear Case

Mobileye's fortunes are chained to the automotive production cycle, and that cycle is the bear's first point. The company sells into new-vehicle builds, so its volumes rise and fall with global auto production, OEM model launches, and the health of the car market, none of which it controls. ADAS fitment rates are climbing, which helps, but the underlying unit base is cyclical, and a downturn in auto production or a pullback by a few large OEM platforms would hit revenue directly. Peak ADAS-adoption enthusiasm and sustainable through-cycle demand are not the same thing, and a single-sector supplier feels every swing in the industry it serves.

Customer concentration and the design-win treadmill are the structural pressures. Because Mobileye sells primarily through Tier 1 suppliers into OEM platforms, a handful of large programs drive a large share of revenue, and losing or delaying a major design win matters disproportionately. The 10-K is explicit that the edge must be continuously re-earned: "to achieve program design wins, we must maintain our technological leadership and continue to deliver differentiated solutions versus our competition, including in-house technologies developed by our customers" (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001104659-26-014300). That last clause is the real threat: automakers increasingly build their own ADAS and self-driving stacks, and every OEM that insources is a customer that becomes a competitor. The same filing notes that "the time necessary to achieve a design win can vary significantly" (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001104659-26-014300), so the pipeline is long and uncertain.

The robotaxi optionality is more distant and more expensive than the bull case implies, and the governance is a flag. The standalone US robotaxi service is now targeted for 2027, the Lyft Dallas launch once expected in 2026 has slipped, and scaling a fleet is hardware-heavy and margin-dilutive, the opposite of the high-margin chip model. The earnings-power frame already reads the stock as expensive, a signal that the market is paying for autonomy outcomes that remain years out and unproven. Overhanging all of it, Intel controls roughly 99.4% of the voting power, so public shareholders have essentially no governance say over strategy or capital allocation. Jefferies initiated at Underperform with an $8 target, below the current price, calling the valuation stretched against execution risk. A cyclical, concentration-exposed supplier facing customer insourcing, with distant robotaxi economics and no shareholder voting power, is a thesis where the optionality may take far longer to pay than the price assumes.

Valuation

Mobileye is valued on its revenue rather than its earnings, the right choice for a company whose GAAP profit is distorted by acquisition accounting and ongoing heavy R&D. Against the $8.47 price, the asset-based, relative-multiple, and growth-DCF families all support the price, while the earnings-power family reads it as expensive, and the blended X-ray figure across four methods lands near $12.54, above the quote. The priced-in characterization is within range and value and asset-supported, which fits a cash-rich growth company priced on sales.

The priced-in math sets a meaningful growth bar. Because the company is not yet earning a normal operating profit, the price is set against sales, with an embedded assumption around 23% growth and an implied terminal operating margin near 19%. The current GAAP margin of negative 209.5% is an accounting artifact of the goodwill impairment and amortization, not the cash economics, which is why the revenue-multiple lens is the honest one. The 23% growth assumption is consistent with the 27% Q1 revenue gain but requires that ADAS adoption and design-win conversion keep compounding.

The balance sheet removes financial risk and reframes the bet as pure execution. Mobileye is debt-free with about $2.28 billion of net cash, so there is no solvency question and the company can self-fund years of development. The honest read is that the price is supported by sales-based and asset methods but is paying for a margin the company has not yet demonstrated through a cycle, since there is no proven mid-cycle operating margin to normalize against. An investor here is underwriting that ADAS volume growth converts into the implied roughly 19% operating margin over time, and that the robotaxi and SuperVision optionality eventually adds value, against the risks of auto cyclicality, customer insourcing, and Intel's near-total voting control.

Catalysts

Q1 2026 results (reported April 2026) beat on revenue and were noisy on GAAP. Revenue rose 27% to $558 million on higher EyeQ volumes and ADAS fitment at Western and Chinese OEMs, adjusted EPS was $0.12, and operating cash flow was positive at $75 million, while GAAP EPS of negative $4.68 reflected a $3.788 billion non-cash goodwill impairment tied to Intel's 2017 acquisition. Management raised the full-year 2026 revenue guidance midpoint by 2% to a range of roughly $1.935 billion to $2.015 billion. The trajectory of EyeQ volumes and ADAS adoption rates is the key near-term catalyst.

The design-win and autonomy pipeline is the multi-year catalyst set. Recent milestones include three Surround ADAS wins, validation progress on SuperVision and DRIVE pre-production programs, and positioning for regulatory-driven ADAS adoption in markets like India. On autonomy, Mobileye is developing a robotaxi with Volkswagen's MOIA on the ID. Buzz and plans a vertically integrated standalone US robotaxi service, now targeted for 2027 with an initial fleet of about 100 vehicles scaling toward roughly 17,000 over five years if successful. Each design win and each robotaxi milestone is a discrete event the market can mark, though the Lyft Dallas launch once expected in 2026 has slipped.

Sentiment is genuinely split, which sets up catalyst sensitivity. The analyst consensus runs roughly 15 Buys against 11 Holds, while Jefferies initiated at Underperform with an $8 target, citing a stretched valuation against execution risk. Intel's control of about 99.4% of voting power is a standing governance factor. The catalysts that would re-rate the stock are sustained ADAS revenue growth above guidance, new high-volume design wins, and tangible progress on the robotaxi rollout; the risks are an auto-production downturn, OEM insourcing of ADAS, and continued slippage in the autonomy timeline.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Mobileye (reported)

Other (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

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