MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL INC /MD/ (MAR): what the price requires
At today's price, MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL INC /MD/ (MAR) is priced for +24.0% growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/MAR
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | MAR |
| Company | MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL INC /MD/ |
| Current price | $363.30/sh |
| Composition | Franchise fees 13% / Base management fees 5% / Incentive management fees 3% / Contract investment amortization -1% / Owned, leased, and other revenue 6% / Cost reimbursement revenue 73% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 9.9% |
| Operating margin today | 16.9% |
| Margin compression implied | -7.0pp |
| Implied growth | 24.0% |
| Multiple paid | 25x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 12, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 9.3% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~7.3pp.
How unusual the bet is: elevated
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +0.29σ |
| cohort percentile (of 210 peers) | 71 |
| sustained it ~5 years at this level | 32% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore requires assumptions beyond what those standard frames encode.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | — | 0 | — |
| Earnings | 3.22x | 3 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.71x | 2 | expensive |
| Growth | — | 0 | — |
Families that call it expensive: Earnings, Relative
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.3%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=5)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $198.40 | 1.83x | no | FCF base $2.8B, growth 5% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.3%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $311.11 | 1.17x | no | Exit EV/EBITDA: 20.9x / 22.9x / 24.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $241.83 | 1.50x | yes | P/E 23.85x (blended: static sector reference 18x + trailing (TTM) 38x), scenarios: 20.0x / 23.9x / 27.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 15.26x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $274.52 | 1.32x | no | Rev $26.6B, growth 5% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.1x / 3.6x / 4.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $114.60 | 3.17x | no | EPS $9.55, growth 9% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=4.19 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $107.34 | 3.38x | no | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $3.59B × (1−24%) / WACC 9.3% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Graham Number | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $189.80 | 1.91x | yes | EBITDA $4.26B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $112.76 | 3.22x | yes | FCF $2824.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $103.00 | 3.53x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $2.58B (FCF $2.82B − SBC $0.24B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $211.44 | 1.72x | yes | EPS $9.55 × (8.5 + 2×9.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $249.03 | 1.46x | no | Revenue $26.58B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $128.33 | 2.83x | no | EPS $9.55 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 9.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 13.4x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $103.24 | 3.52x | no | EPS $9.55 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $16.2b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 4.84x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 3.66x |
| Interest coverage | 5.4x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -5.2% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
The market is pricing Marriott as a high-quality fee machine, and the fundamentals largely back it: Q1 2026 adjusted EBITDA rose 15% on RevPAR up 4.2%, net rooms grew 4.5%, and the development pipeline hit a record 618,000 rooms.
The valuation leaves no cushion. At $396.11 (as of June 27, 2026) no standard method reaches the price, and the embedded bet runs about five years out, so the buyer is paying ahead of every conventional frame.
The capital structure is the watch item. Marriott carries about $16.2 billion of net debt and is buying back stock aggressively, with over $4.4 billion of returns planned for 2026, a strategy that lifts per-share numbers but funds itself partly with debt.
Bull Case
Start with what the market is actually paying for, then check it against the numbers. The market prices Marriott not as a hotel owner but as an asset-light fee engine: it collects franchise and management fees on rooms it does not own, so its economics scale with the global hotel footprint while someone else carries the real estate and the capital intensity. The reported revenue line is misleading on this point, because cost-reimbursement revenue is roughly 73% of the total and is essentially a pass-through; the real profit lives in the fee streams. The fundamentals confirm the market's read. Q1 2026 adjusted EBITDA rose 15% to $1.40 billion on worldwide RevPAR growth of 4.2%, ahead of guidance, with adjusted EPS up 17% to $2.72, beating the $2.58 consensus.
The growth engine is the room pipeline, and it is at a record. Net rooms grew 4.5% year over year, the company added roughly 15,900 net rooms in the quarter, and the development pipeline reached over 618,000 rooms, with 43% under construction or pending conversion. Because Marriott earns fees as those rooms open under its brands, the pipeline is a visible, multi-year forward earnings stream that does not require Marriott to fund the buildings. The 10-K describes the diversified fee architecture, including licensed-IP revenue from co-branded credit cards recognized "as the credit cards are used" (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001048286-26-000007), a high-margin annuity layered on top of the lodging fees.
The per-share compounding is the third leg. Marriott is shrinking its share count aggressively, about 5.2% a year, repurchasing 2.1 million shares for $0.7 billion in Q1 alone and planning to return over $4.4 billion to shareholders in 2026. It raised full-year 2026 adjusted EPS guidance to $11.38 to $11.63. A capital-light brand franchisor with a record pipeline, mid-teens EBITDA growth, a loyalty and credit-card flywheel, and relentless buybacks is exactly the business the market is pricing, and Q1 showed the model delivering.
Bear Case
The governance question to confront is how Marriott funds the per-share growth that supports its valuation. The company carries roughly $16.2 billion of net debt against just $454 million of cash, and it is returning over $4.4 billion to shareholders in 2026, having repurchased $0.7 billion of stock in Q1 alone. The 10-K shows the debt machine that partly funds this, detailing new note issuances including "our Series RR Notes and Series SS Notes ($1,960 million) and our Series TT Notes, Series UU Notes, and Series VV Notes ($1,477 million)" (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001048286-26-000007). Borrowing to buy back stock at a price above every valuation method's estimate is a capital-allocation choice that flatters EPS while loading the balance sheet, and it works only as long as the fee streams keep growing and credit stays cheap.
The valuation offers no margin for that bet to go wrong. No valuation family reaches the $396.11 price: the stock is rich on assets, earnings power, peer multiples, and even forward growth, which the priced-in read flags directly as a bet beyond what any standard frame supports, with an implied horizon of about five years. The aggressive buyback is part of why: shrinking the share count roughly 5.2% a year manufactures EPS growth even when underlying fee growth moderates, which can mask deceleration. Net debt at roughly five times operating income, with interest coverage near 5 times, is manageable today but leaves less room if RevPAR softens.
The cyclical exposure underneath the fee model is the structural risk. Lodging demand is economically sensitive, and Marriott's own raised full-year RevPAR guidance of 2.0% to 3.0% is well below the 4.2% Q1 print, an implicit admission that the company expects growth to slow through the year. If travel demand weakens, fee revenue falls, the debt stays fixed, and the buyback that supported the price becomes harder to sustain. The market is paying a price no method supports for a cyclical business whose per-share growth is partly financed, and that combination, full valuation plus debt-funded returns plus cyclical demand, is precisely the setup that punishes investors when the cycle turns.
Valuation
Marriott trades above every conventional valuation frame, and the X-ray is unusually blunt about it. Against the $396.11 price, no family reaches the price: it is rich on assets, on earnings power, on peer multiples, and even on forward growth, so only a single method is applicable and the blended figure does not resolve to a number below the price. The priced-in characterization states it plainly, that the price is a bet beyond what any standard frame supports, with an implied duration of about 5.1 years. This is a quality-premium valuation in its purest form: the market is paying for a fee model it believes compounds durably, and no present-tense method can justify the multiple.
The priced-in math holds a current operating margin of 16% and an implied terminal margin near 9.6%, with the embedded bet running roughly five years. Note the margin optics are distorted by the cost-reimbursement pass-through that makes up about 73% of revenue; on the fee base alone, Marriott's economics are far more profitable than the headline margin suggests, which is part of why the market awards a premium. The valuation does not lean on filing-sourced growth inputs; the franchise and licensed-IP fee structure documented in the 10-K (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001048286-26-000007) is what backs the quality, not the multiple.
The balance sheet is the honest caveat. Net debt of about $16.2 billion sits at roughly five times operating income with interest coverage near 5 times, a leverage profile that is sustainable while EBITDA grows but offers limited cushion. Because of years of debt-funded buybacks, book equity is negative, which is why the asset-based methods do not apply. The honest read is that this is a price paid entirely on franchise quality and durable fee growth, with no support from any standard method. An investor here is underwriting that the record pipeline and loyalty flywheel sustain mid-teens EBITDA growth long enough to justify a price the methods cannot reach, while the company keeps borrowing to shrink the share count.
Catalysts
Q1 2026 results (reported May 2026) beat and prompted a guidance raise. Adjusted EPS of $2.72 rose 17% and topped the $2.58 consensus, total revenue rose 6% to $6.65 billion, worldwide RevPAR grew 4.2% (ahead of guidance, with US and Canada up 4.0% and international up 4.6%), and adjusted EBITDA rose 15% to $1.40 billion. Net rooms grew 4.5%, the company added about 15,900 net rooms, and the development pipeline reached a record of over 618,000 rooms. Management raised full-year 2026 adjusted EPS guidance to $11.38 to $11.63 while setting full-year RevPAR growth at 2.0% to 3.0%, so the trajectory of RevPAR versus that guided slowdown is the key near-term catalyst.
Capital return is the steady catalyst and the central debate. Marriott repurchased 2.1 million shares for $0.7 billion in Q1, plans to return over $4.4 billion in 2026 through dividends and buybacks, and authorized an additional 25 million shares for repurchase. The pace of buybacks against the debt load is the swing factor: more aggressive returns lift EPS but add leverage, and any sign that capital return is moderating would signal management is prioritizing the balance sheet.
Analyst sentiment is moderately positive but close to the price. Across roughly 26 to 29 analysts the rating is Moderate Buy or Overweight with average price targets near $372 to $376, suggesting limited upside from the current level, and Bernstein's target sits lower at $327. Consensus expects full-year EPS near $11.60 with continued net room growth of 4.5% to 5%. The catalysts that would move the stock are RevPAR holding above the guided range, continued record pipeline conversion, and the sustainability of the buyback, while the risk is a cyclical softening in travel demand against a fully-valued, leveraged balance sheet.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- HLT (Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CHH (CHOICE HOTELS INTERNATIONAL INC /DE)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- WH (Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- HGV (Hilton Grand Vacations Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TNL (Travel & Leisure Co.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- WYNN (WYNN RESORTS LTD)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MGM (MGM Resorts International)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- LVS (LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.