LIVE NATION ENTERTAINMENT, INC. (LYV): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $181.50, LIVE NATION ENTERTAINMENT, INC. (LYV) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~9.2 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-27.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/LYV

Headline

FieldValue
TickerLYV
CompanyLIVE NATION ENTERTAINMENT, INC.
Current price$181.50/sh
CompositionConcerts 83% / Ticketing 12% / Sponsorship & Advertising 5% / Other & Eliminations 0%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)1.2%
Operating margin today3.0%
Margin compression (value-band)-1.8pp
Must persist for9.2y
Multiple paid56x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 7: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 26.7% self-funding ceiling.

How unusual the bet is: elevated (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.23σ
cohort percentile (of 34 peers)91

Valuation X-Ray

Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset9.38x2expensive
Earnings2.90x2expensive
Relative—0—
Growth—0—

Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.9%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=4)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$197.990.92xnoFCF base $1.5B, growth 11% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.9%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$210.260.86xnoExit EV/EBITDA: 26.2x / 28.2x / 30.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelative——noP/E 30.8x (blended: static sector reference 14x + trailing (TTM) 318x), scenarios: 25.6x / 30.8x / 36.0x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 14.76x
Simple DDMGrowth——no—
Two-Stage DDMGrowth——no—
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$6.1829.37xyesBV/sh $0.35, ROE (TTM) 163.6%, ke 9.3% (excluded from median)
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$111.061.63xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$163.371.11xnoRev $26.3B, growth 11% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.4x / 1.6x / 1.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelative——no—
Margin TrajectoryGrowth——no—
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$37.024.90xnoNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.81B × (1−22%) / WACC 7.9% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$10.6017.12xyesBV $0.35 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 163.6% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$2.0887.26xyes√(22.5 × EPS $0.55 × BVPS $0.35) — Graham's conservative floor (excluded from median)
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative——noEBITDA $1.49B × sector EV/EBITDA 9.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$66.652.72xyesFCF $1382.7M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$59.133.07xyesSBC-adj FCF $1.22B (FCF $1.38B − SBC $0.16B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$0.46394.57xyesEPS $0.55 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset——no—
P/Sales SectorRelative——noRevenue $26.27B × sector P/S 2.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative——no—
Earnings YieldEarnings$5.9730.40xnoEPS $0.55 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelative——no—
Clinical Phase NPVGrowth——no—
MertonAsset——no—
V5 Mechanical———no—

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Concertsoperatingenterprise$20.9b—withheldunresolved no unit value
Ticketingoperatingenterprise$3.1b—withheldunresolved no unit value
Sponsorship & Advertisingoperatingenterprise$1.3b—withheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$129.5m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)0.21x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)0.16x
Interest coverage2.3x
Share count CAGR (dilution)0.0%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

At $171.15 the price requires roughly 34% operating-income growth to justify itself, a high bar set against a company that turns only a thin slice of its $20-billion-plus gross flow into reported operating profit. The bet here is on operating leverage, not on the ticket counter.

The demand signal is unusually strong: record deferred revenue of $6.6 billion entering 2026 and Q1 revenue up 12% to $3.79 billion, with all three segments growing double digits.

The overhang is legal, not operational. A state-court jury found Live Nation and Ticketmaster liable on every antitrust count in April 2026, and the remedy, which could include a structural breakup, is still in the judge's hands.

Bull Case

Start with where the price sits against the valuation families, because the disagreement is the whole story. At $171.15 (June 27, 2026), the relative-multiple family and the growth-DCF family both land at or above the price, while the earnings-power family says the stock is expensive. The blend across applicable methods lands near $225, above the current quote. That pattern, peer multiples and forward growth supporting the price while a zero-growth earnings anchor lags, is exactly what you expect from a business whose value lives in a deferred pipeline and operating leverage rather than in trailing GAAP profit. The price is paying for the flywheel, and the methods that capture the flywheel agree with it.

The flywheel is real and it is growing. Live Nation's FY2025 10-K reports that "Our Concerts segment revenue for the year increased by $1.8 billion" (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001335258-26-000009), and Q1 2026 carried the momentum forward with total revenue up 12% to $3.79 billion: Concerts up 12% to $2.78 billion, Ticketing up 10% to $765 million, and Sponsorship and Advertising up 20% to $259 million. Adjusted operating income rose 9% to $371 million. The highest-margin pieces of the business, sponsorship and ticketing, are growing fastest, which is how a low-margin concerts engine converts into rising consolidated profit over time.

The forward book is the cleanest tell. Deferred revenue hit a record $6.6 billion, and the 10-K explains the mechanics: revenue is "collected in installment payments during the year, typically in advance of providing the benefit or the event," and amounts received before the event are "recorded as deferred revenue" (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001335258-26-000009). That is cash already in hand for shows and sponsorships not yet staged. Net debt is negative at roughly $568 million, liquid assets exceed $9 billion, and the balance sheet can carry the gross debt load of $8.5 billion at current coverage. A business pre-collecting a record book of demand, with three segments compounding and the rich segments leading, is a defensible reason for the price to look ahead of trailing earnings.

Bear Case

The competitive threat is not a startup, it is the legal system, and it is moving against the core bundle. In April 2026 a federal jury found Live Nation and its subsidiary Ticketmaster liable on every antitrust count submitted, including monopolization of primary ticketing and illegal bundling of promotions and venue lines, and assigned damages of $1.72 for each primary concert ticket sold under the anticompetitive conduct. The Department of Justice settled separately and Live Nation avoided a DOJ-driven breakup, but over thirty states, including California, New York, and Texas, kept litigating and won. The remedy, which could include a structural breakup of Live Nation and Ticketmaster, is now for the judge to decide. The thing that makes the model work, the ability to bundle promotion, venues, and ticketing, is the thing the verdict targets.

The company's own filing tells the reader this was coming. The FY2025 10-K discloses that "In May 2024, we were sued by the United States Department of Justice and state authorities for alleged violations of various laws pertaining to antitrust, competition, unlawful or unfair business practices, restraint of trade" (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001335258-26-000009). The first financial mark of that exposure already hit the income statement: Q1 2026 carried a $450 million legal accrual that flipped the quarter to a GAAP operating loss of $371 million and a net loss of $1.85 per share, even as the operating business grew.

The resale flank is the quieter wound. The 10-K notes that laws "place limitations on our ticketing resale practices" while "our competitors in the secondary ticket sales market are not, to our knowledge, bound by such limitations," leaving the company at "a competitive disadvantage" (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001335258-26-000009). Put the pieces together and the bear case is structural: a price demanding 34% operating-income growth sits on top of a business whose central bundle has been ruled illegal, whose remedy is undetermined, and whose secondary-market position is already constrained. Operating leverage is real, but so is the risk that the courts dismantle the thing generating it.

Valuation

The price embeds a demanding forward bet. Live Nation runs a low reported operating margin, around 3% on the record basis, because the Concerts engine is high-volume and thin-margin by design. To value the equity at $171.15, the market is underwriting roughly 34% operating-income growth, with the implied terminal margin sitting near 1.6% once the model holds the structure flat. That is a high reading on the priced-in scale: the price leans hard on the assumption that operating leverage pulls consolidated margin up as the richer ticketing and sponsorship lines scale.

The X-ray families explain why the bet is not crazy and not safe at the same time. Against the $171.15 price, the relative-multiple family lands close to the price and the growth-DCF family lands above it, so the blended X-ray figure sits near $225. The earnings-power family, which asks what the business is worth on zero-growth current profit, lands below the price, flagging it as expensive on a no-growth basis. A name supported by peer multiples and forward growth but not by static earnings power is precisely a name whose valuation depends on the forward pipeline converting, which is what the record deferred revenue is meant to deliver.

The balance sheet does not force the issue. Net debt is negative at about $568 million, liquid assets exceed $9 billion, and interest coverage of roughly 2.3 times on trailing operating income is adequate rather than comfortable, with gross debt at $8.5 billion. The honest tension in the valuation is not solvency, it is the gap between a price that needs 34% earnings growth and a legal remedy that could change the shape of the business delivering it. The numbers support the price only if the bundle that produces them survives intact.

Catalysts

The dominant catalyst is the antitrust remedy phase. On April 15, 2026, a federal jury found Live Nation and Ticketmaster liable on every antitrust count, including monopolization of primary ticketing and illegal bundling, with damages set at $1.72 per primary concert ticket sold under the conduct. The Department of Justice had settled in early March 2026 without forcing a breakup, but more than thirty states continued and prevailed. The judge will now rule on remedies, which could range from behavioral conditions to a structural separation of Live Nation and Ticketmaster. That decision is the single largest swing factor for the equity.

Q1 2026 results (reported in May 2026) showed the operating business holding up underneath the legal noise: revenue up 12% to $3.79 billion, beating consensus near $3.57 to $3.59 billion, with Concerts up 12%, Ticketing up 10%, and Sponsorship and Advertising up 20%. Adjusted operating income rose 9% to $371 million, but a $450 million legal accrual produced a GAAP operating loss of $371 million and a net loss of $1.85 per share. Management reaffirmed a double-digit full-year adjusted operating income growth outlook, and record deferred revenue of $6.6 billion points to a strong forward event calendar.

The near-term watch items are the size and timing of any additional legal accruals, the remedy ruling, and whether the deferred book continues to set records into the back half of the touring year. The stock rose modestly after the Q1 print, suggesting the market is, for now, separating operational strength from the legal overhang. The remedy ruling is the event that collapses that separation in one direction or the other.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Concerts (reported)

Ticketing (reported)

Sponsorship & Advertising (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

View the full interactive LYV report on boothcheck