LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP (LVS): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $45.04, LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP (LVS) is priced for -0.2% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-27.
Generated: 2026-08-30 · Exported: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/LVS
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | LVS |
| Company | LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP |
| Current price | $45.04/sh |
| Composition | The Venetian Macao 21% / The Londoner Macao 20% / The Parisian Macao 7% / The Plaza Macao and Four Seasons Macao 7% / Sands Macao 2% / Ferry Operations and Other 1% / Marina Bay Sands 43% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 3.4% |
| Operating margin today | 21.5% |
| Margin compression (value-band) | -18.1pp |
| Implied growth | -0.2% |
| Multiple paid | 14x operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 7: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 8.3% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.
How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +0.13σ |
| cohort percentile (of 212 peers) | 34 |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value, while earnings-power lands below the price. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.23x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 1.62x | 5 | expensive |
| Relative | 0.48x | 2 | justifies |
| Growth | 0.58x | 4 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.7%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=15)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $244.90 | 0.18x | yes | FCF base $3.0B, growth 19% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 6.7%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $83.97 | 0.54x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 7.0x / 9.0x / 11.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | — | — | no | P/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 14.7x / 18.0x / 21.3x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | $71.84 | 0.63x | yes | Stage 1: 20% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $28.83 | 1.56x | yes | BV/sh $0.90, ROE (TTM) 297.2%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $900.80 | 0.05x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $48.55 | 0.93x | yes | Rev $13.7B, growth 19% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.7x / 2.1x / 2.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $89.95 | 0.50x | yes | EPS $2.57, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.48 (Undervalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $13.28 | 3.39x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.56B × (1−19%) / WACC 6.7% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $50.02 | 0.90x | yes | BV $0.90 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 297.2% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $7.20 | 6.26x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $2.57 × BVPS $0.90) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | EBITDA $4.39B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $29.19 | 1.54x | yes | FCF $2703.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $27.80 | 1.62x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $2.62B (FCF $2.70B − SBC $0.08B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $82.93 | 0.54x | yes | EPS $2.57 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $0.62 | 72.65x | yes | BV $0.90 × (ROIC 4.6% / WACC 6.7%) (excluded from median) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | — | — | no | Revenue $13.72B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $96.38 | 0.47x | yes | EPS $2.57 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $27.78 | 1.62x | yes | EPS $2.57 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)
One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.
| Unit | Role | Valuation basis | Revenue | Reported profit | Value evidence | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Venetian Macao | operating | enterprise | $2.7b | — | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
| The Londoner Macao | operating | enterprise | $2.6b | — | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
| The Parisian Macao | operating | enterprise | $872.0m | — | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
| The Plaza Macao and Four Seasons Macao | operating | enterprise | $872.0m | — | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
| Sands Macao | operating | enterprise | $294.0m | — | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
| Ferry Operations and Other | operating | enterprise | $103.0m | — | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
| Marina Bay Sands | operating | enterprise | $5.6b | — | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $12.4b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 5.20x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 4.20x |
| Interest coverage | 3.9x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -3.7% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
- Las Vegas Sands is a pure Macau-and-Singapore franchise built on scarce government-protected licenses, with Marina Bay Sands alone generating more EBITDA ($788 million, up 30%) than the entire Macau portfolio in the first quarter.
- The biggest risk is policy and consumer concentration: the majority of profit comes from a single Chinese region where Beijing controls the gaming environment and the 10-K warns tax arrangements may not be extended favorably.
- Watch Macau mass-market trends and capital return: management targets $700 million-plus quarterly Macau EBITDA, and the company has retired about 14.3% of its shares over ten quarters while reinvesting in both markets.
Bull Case
The loudest knock on Las Vegas Sands is that it is a bet on two governments: nearly every dollar of profit comes from Macau and Singapore, and a company with that concentration is hostage to Chinese policy and Singaporean regulation. That is a real risk, and it is also why the assets are nearly impossible to replicate. Macau and Singapore both limit casino licenses to a tiny number of concessionaires, and Sands holds the largest integrated-resort footprint in Macau plus one of only two licenses in Singapore. The data shows the franchise working: in the first quarter Macau EBITDA rose 18% to $633 million with mass-market share at 25.7%, the strongest since early 2024, while Marina Bay Sands in Singapore grew EBITDA 30% to $788 million. The concentration that looks like fragility is the flip side of holding scarce, government-protected licenses in two of the most lucrative gaming markets on earth.
Marina Bay Sands is the crown jewel and increasingly the larger profit center. At 43% of the company by composition, the single Singapore property now generates more quarterly EBITDA than the entire Macau portfolio combined, and it operates in a near-duopoly with pricing power, high-end Asian tourism, and a long expansion pipeline. The mass-market focus across both markets is the durable kind of gaming revenue, less volatile than the high-roller junket business that once defined Macau and far harder for a competitor to take. Consolidated first-quarter net revenue rose 25.3% to $3.585 billion and diluted earnings per share climbed 73.5% to $0.85.
The capital allocation is the part that compounds for shareholders. Sands repurchased $746 million of stock and paid $202 million in dividends in the quarter, and it has retired about 14.3% of its shares over the last ten quarters. The 10-K describes continued reinvestment in the properties, including the Londoner Macao Phase II conversion that "included the conversion of the Sheraton Grand Macao into the Londoner Grand, an upgrade of the gaming areas and the addition of attractions, dining, retail and entertainment." A business that throws off over $2 billion of free cash flow, reinvests in its scarce assets, and aggressively buys back stock is concentrating ownership in the highest-quality gaming franchise in Asia, which is why the relative and growth methods support the price while the trailing earnings lens lags.
Bear Case
The price depends on a narrative that two specific bets keep paying: that Macau's recovery continues and that the Chinese government keeps the gaming environment favorable. Both are outside the company's control. The 10-K states the risks plainly: "governments could grant additional rights to conduct gaming in the future and increase competition," and "conducting business in Macao and Singapore has certain political and economic risks," including that the company's "tax arrangements with the Macao government may not be extended on terms favorable to us or at all" beyond their current terms. Macau gaming is licensed at Beijing's pleasure, and Chinese policy toward gaming, capital outflows, and the broader economy can shift the demand picture overnight. A company earning the majority of its profit in a single Chinese special administrative region carries a tail risk no amount of operational excellence can hedge.
The second narrative dependency is the Chinese consumer. Macau mass-market gaming tracks the health and confidence of mainland visitors, and that consumer has been cautious amid a sluggish Chinese property market and uneven economic recovery. The strong first quarter reflects a favorable demand environment; a renewed slowdown in Chinese consumer spending would compress the same Macau EBITDA that just grew 18%. Singapore is more stable but is a single asset, which concentrates operational risk, and the planned expansion there requires large capital outlays years before the returns arrive. The growth the price assumes rests on both Asian gaming markets staying healthy simultaneously.
The balance sheet and the valuation leave less cushion than the buyback enthusiasm suggests. Sands carries roughly $12.6 billion of net debt, and the aggressive repurchase program, while accretive when the franchise performs, is being funded alongside heavy reinvestment in Macau and Singapore. The earnings-power methods read the stock as expensive: capitalizing the company's normalized cash flow lands well below the price, because the business is asset-heavy and exposed to a cyclical, policy-driven demand base. The bull case requires Macau and Singapore to keep growing and Beijing to stay accommodative; if either assumption breaks, the leverage amplifies the downside, and the methods that already say the stock is expensive become the relevant frame. The concentration is the moat and the risk at once.
Valuation
The methods divide between what Sands earns today and what its scarce franchise is expected to keep earning, and that division frames the price. The relative-multiple and growth methods justify the current level, while the earnings-power methods call it expensive. The earnings-power gap is partly structural: capitalizing normalized cash flow at no growth ignores the value of two government-protected licenses with long reinvestment pipelines, so it understates a business whose worth lies in scarce, durable positions. The relative and growth lenses, which credit the continued recovery and expansion, reach the price. The inversion frames the bet as modest, roughly low-single-digit operating-profit growth with current margins held, which is a plausible bar only if the two Asian markets stay healthy.
The right frame is a sum of two regional franchises, not a single blended multiple. Macau is a portfolio of integrated resorts in a recovering, policy-sensitive market, while Marina Bay Sands is a near-duopoly Singapore asset now generating more EBITDA than all of Macau combined and carrying its own expansion runway. The growth methods credit both: Macau EBITDA rising toward management's $700 million-plus quarterly target and Singapore compounding from a high base. The decisive variable is whether both markets sustain their trajectories at once, because the price is paying for the combined recovery-and-expansion story, and a stumble in either, a Chinese consumer slowdown or a Macau policy shift, would undercut the growth the static methods cannot price.
Solvency sets the boundary and shapes the risk. Net debt of about $12.6 billion against EBITDA of roughly $4.6 billion is meaningful leverage for a cyclical operator, though the franchise generates over $2 billion of free cash flow and is not under financial strain. The capital return is real, $746 million of buybacks and $202 million of dividends in a single quarter, and the share count is falling fast. The leverage is the amplifier: in a strong Asian gaming environment it magnifies the per-share returns from buybacks, and in a downturn it magnifies the downside. For this name the question is not the quality of the assets, which is exceptional, but the durability of the two markets and the policy backdrop the entire valuation rests on.
Catalysts
The first-quarter 2026 report on April 22 beat expectations across both markets. Net revenue rose 25.3% to $3.585 billion, net income increased 57.1% to $641 million, and diluted earnings per share climbed 73.5% to $0.85. Macau EBITDA grew 18% to $633 million with mass-market share reaching 25.7%, the strongest since early 2024, while Marina Bay Sands in Singapore lifted EBITDA 30% to $788 million. The company also repurchased $746 million of stock and paid $202 million in dividends, ending the quarter with $3.33 billion of cash against $13.9 billion of debt.
The forward catalysts center on the Macau ramp and the Singapore expansion. Management is targeting $700 million-plus in quarterly Macau EBITDA as it executes its operating strategies and the market grows, building on the Londoner Macao Phase II upgrades. The catalysts that matter are the trajectory of Macau mass-market revenue, which depends on the Chinese consumer and policy backdrop, and the pace of the Marina Bay Sands expansion in Singapore, which represents the next leg of high-value growth. The continued buyback cadence is the third lever, since at the current pace it meaningfully concentrates ownership of the franchise.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
The Venetian Macao / The Londoner Macao +5 more (reported)
- WYNN (WYNN RESORTS LTD)
- FY2025 10-K: …is highly competitive. We compete with other high-quality resorts on the basis of the range of amenities, level of service, price, location, entertainment, themes and size, among other factors. We seek to differentiate our integrated resorts by delivering superior design and customer service. Macau Macau, located in…
- FY2025 10-K: …competition, which may increase in the future. General. The casino resort and hotel industry is highly competitive. Increased competition could result in a loss of customers which may negatively affect our cash flows and results of operations. Macau Operations. We hold one of six gaming concessions authorized by the…
- MLCO (MELCO RESORTS & ENTERTAINMENT LIMITED)
- FY2025 20-F: …Altira Macau amounted to US$107.0 million, US$125.1 million and US$110.8 million, representing 2.1%, 2.7% and 2.9% of our total operating revenues, respectively. Mocha and Other The Mocha and Other segment included the operations of the Grand Dragon Casino before its closure in September 2025. This segment has been…
- FY2025 20-F: …China or offer our securities to foreign investors or take other actions that could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, results of operations and prospects, as well as the trading price of our securities. We face intense competition in Macau, the Philippines and elsewhere in Asia and…
- MGM (MGM Resorts International)
- FY2025 10-K: …Nevada, our properties primarily compete with other hotel casinos in their markets and for customers in surrounding regional gaming markets, where location is a critical factor to success. In addition, we compete with gaming operations in surrounding jurisdictions and other leisure destinations in each region. MGM…
- FY2025 10-K: …which in turn affects the price we can charge for our hotel rooms and other amenities. Our casino operations feature a variety of slots and table games. In addition, we provide our premium players access to high-limit rooms and lounge experiences where players may enjoy an upscale atmosphere. MGM China As of December…
- CZR (CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …of Operations," and (iv) our Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows as our "Statements of Cash Flows." References to numbered "Notes" refer to Notes to our Consolidated Financial Statements included in Item 8 . The statements in this discussion regarding our expectations of our future performance, liquidity and…
- FY2025 10-K: …VICI under the following agreements: (i) for a portfolio of properties located throughout the United States (the "Regional Lease"), (ii) for Caesars Palace Las Vegas and Harrah's Las Vegas (the "Las Vegas Lease"), and (iii) for Harrah's Joliet (the "Joliet Lease"), (collectively, "VICI Leases"). The lease agreements,…
- BYD (BOYD GAMING CORP)
- FY2025 10-K: …consolidated in our financial statements. We also own a travel agency in Hawaii. Financial results for the travel agency are included in our Downtown Las Vegas segment, as our Downtown Las Vegas properties focus marketing efforts on gaming customers from Hawaii. 2 Table of Contents Las Vegas Locals Properties Our Las…
- FY2025 10-K: …Wilton Rancheria for the management of Sky River Casino in northern California and the operating results of Lattner Entertainment Group Illinois, LLC ("Lattner"), our Illinois distributed gaming operator. The table below lists the Reportable Segment classification of each of our gaming entertainment properties that…
- PENN (PENN Entertainment, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …revenues at our Interactive segment. This increase was due to iCasino and online sports betting growth driven by ongoing product enhancements and decreased promotional expense. Additionally, the recent openings of our new land-based Joliet facility and the second hotel tower at M Resort contributed to i ncreases in…
- FY2025 10-K: …Company entered into a triple net master lease with VICI Properties, Inc. (NYSE: VICI) ("VICI") which amended and restated the individual triple net leases for the real estate assets associated with the Margaritaville Resort Casino ("Margaritaville") and Hollywood Casino at Greektown ("Greektown") properties into a…
- MAR (MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL INC /MD/)
- FY2025 10-K: …policy, general accounting, consumer and technology accounting, finance and accounting governance, finance shared services, and financial contract compliance. Ms. Lee joined Marriott in May 2020, supporting the management of the Company's accounting operations. Prior to joining Marriott, Ms. Lee was the Senior Vice…
- FY2025 10-K: …and then "Documents & Charters." We intend to post on that website any future changes or amendments to our Code of Ethics, and any waiver of our Code of Ethics that applies to any of our executive officers or a member of our Board within four business days following the date of the amendment or waiver. PART IV Item…
- HLT (Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …travel. The increase in RevPAR in Europe was primarily driven by increases in leisure and group travel. The RevPAR increase in MEA was primarily driven by increased leisure travel, mostly attributable to special regional events, and increases in group and business demand. RevPAR in Asia Pacific increased due to…
- FY2025 10-K: …(ii) Europe, Middle East and Africa ("EMEA"); and (iii) Asia Pacific. The Americas region includes North America, South America and Central America, including all Caribbean nations. Although the U.S., which represented 64 percent of our system-wide hotel rooms as of December 31, 2025, is included in the Americas…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Economic-unit decomposition (SOTP): each disclosed business unit is assigned its native valuation basis before any multiple is applied. Operating units are valued on enterprise value; funded financial units are valued on their own common equity, because their borrowings fund earning assets rather than levering the parent. A company total is stated only once every material unit carries a supported value and the parent capital bridge reconciles.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Las Vegas Sands Q1 FY2026 results, April 2026 · Las Vegas Sands FY2025 10-K · Las Vegas Sands Q1 FY2026 earnings call, April 2026