LIGHTSPEED COMMERCE INC. (LSPD): what the price requires
The current priced-in claim for LIGHTSPEED COMMERCE INC. (LSPD) is temporarily suppressed because the live engine record is unavailable. The dated report remains a snapshot, not a current market read.
Generated: 2026-07-19 · Exported: 2026-07-20 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/LSPD
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | LSPD |
| Company | LIGHTSPEED COMMERCE INC. |
| Sector / Industry | Technology |
| Current price | $10.40/sh |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | revenue-multiple |
| EV / sales paid | 0.9x |
| Steady-state operating margin assumed | 16.7% |
The price sits below what even a 5%/yr revenue decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.
The company earns no operating profit yet; the inversion runs on the revenue multiple and an assumed steady-state margin.
Solve inputs: computed at a 12.8% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage, holding a 16.7% terminal operating margin (41.8% gross margin x the 40% mature-conversion prior).
How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -1.56σ |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.01x | 2 | expensive |
| Earnings | — | 0 | — |
| Relative | 0.19x | 2 | justifies |
| Growth | 0.45x | 2 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.3%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=6)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero FCF — equity value floored at $0 |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0 |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $56.06 | 0.19x | yes | P/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 8.0x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $10.83 | 0.96x | yes | Book value floor: BV/sh $10.83, ROE negative |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $9.74 | 1.07x | yes | Book value with convergence: BV/sh $10.83, ROE converges to ke |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $15.08 | 0.69x | yes | Rev $1.1B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.2x / 1.5x / 1.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0 |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | $48.14 | 0.22x | yes | Margin ramp: -50% → 22% over 7yr, rev growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered) |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Graham Number | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $56.06 | 0.19x | yes | Revenue $1.08B × sector P/S 8.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net cash | $558.5m |
| Interest coverage | -470.0x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 9.9% |
| Burning cash | yes |
Operating profit is negative or near zero and the company has no demonstrated through-cycle (mid-cycle) operating margin to normalize against, so years-to-repay cannot be computed honestly.
Bullet Takeaways
- Lightspeed has crossed into self-funding territory: fiscal 2026 revenue reached $1.227 billion, up 14 percent, and adjusted free cash flow turned positive at $18.2 million after years of losses.
- The risk is in the revenue mix: fast-growing, low-margin payments revenue is outpacing software subscriptions, and the share count has grown about 10 percent a year over the past four years, so the value case leans on a profit ramp rather than trailing earnings.
- The next read is close: fiscal first-quarter 2027 results land on July 30, and the tell is whether the two flagship markets, retail in North America and hospitality in Europe, can carry the adjusted EBITDA guide of $75 million to $95 million.
Bull Case
Watch the direction, not just the level. Fiscal 2026 revenue landed at $1.227 billion, up 14 percent, and the shape of the profit-and-loss statement changed underneath it. Adjusted EBITDA and adjusted free cash flow both turned positive, with free cash flow at $18.2 million for the year, the first time the business generated cash rather than consuming it. The fourth quarter carried the same signal, revenue up 15 percent and adjusted EBITDA up 17 percent year over year. For a company that spent years buying growth at a loss, crossing into self-funding is the pivot the whole case rests on.
The engine of that turn is a deliberate narrowing. Management under Dax Dasilva pointed the company at the two markets where it has a real right to win, retail in North America and hospitality in Europe, and let the rest run for cash. Those two engines grew fiscal 2026 revenue about 24 percent and lifted payments penetration into the mid-40s from the low 40s a year earlier. Payments is the lever: every point of penetration turns a software subscriber into a higher-revenue transaction customer, which is why transaction revenue grew 17 percent while subscriptions grew 8 percent. The strategy is less about finding new customers than earning more from the ones already on the platform.
Here is the unusual part for a growth-software name. The price is not asking for a heroic outcome. Today's price sits below one times sales, under what even a modest revenue decline would warrant, and the value methods anchored on book land right around it rather than far above. No lens calls the stock expensive. The balance sheet backs the patience, about $558.5 million in net cash and no meaningful debt, enough to fund the profit ramp for a long time. And after years of issuing stock, the board authorized a share repurchase of up to $400 million, roughly a tenth of the public float. Management is now buying the shares it used to print. If the fiscal 2027 profit guide lands, the buyer at today's price is paying a sales multiple below one for a business that has finally turned cash-positive.
Bear Case
Strip out the story and look at what Lightspeed has actually earned, and the picture gets harder. The company explored a sale, then chose to stay public and run a turnaround instead. That decision put the full weight of the stock on management executing a profitability narrative, because there is no acquirer's premium underneath it anymore. The narrative is specific and appealing, the two flagship markets, the payments attach, the path to real margins, but it is still a narrative. Fiscal 2026 closed with a GAAP net loss of about $144 million. The adjusted numbers turned positive; the audited bottom line has not.
The mix that drives the growth also caps the quality of it. Transaction and payments revenue, the fastest-growing line, is structurally lower-margin than software subscriptions, and it now makes up the bulk of the top line. That is why gross margin runs around 41.8 percent, well under what a pure software company earns, and why a premium software multiple is the wrong yardstick here. The more successful the payments strategy is, the more the revenue base tilts toward its lowest-quality component. Growth and margin quality pull in opposite directions, and the market has noticed: the shares change hands at less than one times sales, not the multiple software investors are used to paying.
Then there is the record of how this business has funded itself. The share count has grown about 10 percent a year over the last four years, heavy dilution that the new buyback is only beginning to offset. The company is still burning cash on a trailing basis, and the profit guide, adjusted EBITDA of $75 million to $95 million for fiscal 2027, is a forecast, not a result. If growth in the two flagship markets slows, or payments penetration stalls, the turnaround thesis loses its engine, and there is no cushion of trailing earnings to fall back on, only book value and a cash pile. The value methods sit near the price precisely because the market is already pricing a show-me story, not a proven one.
Valuation
At $10.40 on July 19, 2026, the engine declines to put a single number on Lightspeed, and the reason is itself the finding. The company does not yet earn a normal operating profit, so the price is read against its sales rather than its earnings. At roughly 0.9x sales, that price already sits below what even a modest revenue decline would warrant. This is a bound, not a solved target: the read is that the price is value-supported, sitting under the floor a shrinking business would support, rather than a stretched bet on rapid growth. The engine rates the embedded assumption within its normal range.
The methods agree more than usual, which is what a value-supported read looks like. The asset methods, book value plus profitability, land right around today's price. The sales-multiple lens and the forward-growth methods both land well above it. None of the families call the price expensive. What the price still leans on is not spectacular growth but a margin recovery: for the business to grow into its valuation the ordinary way, it has to reach an operating margin near 16.7 percent, against a deeply negative figure today. That turn, from cash-consuming to durably profitable, is the real assumption embedded in the price.
The balance sheet is why the downside has a floor. Lightspeed holds about $558.5 million in net cash and carries no meaningful debt, a cushion that funds the profit ramp for a long time even if the timeline slips. The offsetting mark is dilution: the share count has grown roughly 10 percent a year over the last four years, so per-share value has been leaking out even as the enterprise grew. The renewed buyback, up to $400 million, is the first real move to reverse that. The bet at today's price is not that Lightspeed grows quickly. It is that the profit finally arrives before the patience, or the cash, runs out.
Catalysts
The next hard data point is close. Lightspeed reports fiscal first-quarter 2027 results on July 30, 2026, the first read on whether the fiscal 2027 guide holds. Management framed that year as revenue between $1.225 billion and $1.265 billion, gross profit between $565 million and $585 million, and adjusted EBITDA of $75 million to $95 million. The step up in the EBITDA range is the number the whole profitability thesis turns on.
Analysts are split and generally cautious. The consensus rating sits at Hold, with price targets scattered wide. Benchmark trimmed its target to $16 while keeping a Buy, and BTIG cut its target to $12, also staying at Buy; Truist held its Hold rating in late May. The spread reflects the core disagreement: whether the payments-led model can produce durable profit, or whether it just trades growth for lower-margin revenue.
The capital-return story is the other thread to watch. The renewed repurchase authorization, up to $400 million and about a tenth of the public float, gives management a lever to offset years of dilution and to signal confidence. How aggressively it buys against the coming quarters, set beside the EBITDA ramp, will show whether the pivot to profitable, self-funded growth is real or rhetorical.
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Lightspeed FY2026 results, May 21 2026 · Lightspeed FY2027 outlook · Lightspeed Q4 FY2026 results · Lightspeed FY2026 earnings call · Lightspeed FY2026 results · Lightspeed strategic review coverage · Lightspeed IR, July 2026 · analyst consensus, June 2026 · Benchmark research note, June 2026 · BTIG research note, June 2026 · Truist research note, May 28 2026