LKQ CORPORATION (LKQ): what the price requires
The current priced-in claim for LKQ CORPORATION (LKQ) is temporarily suppressed because the live engine record is unavailable. The dated report remains a snapshot, not a current market read.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/LKQ
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | LKQ |
| Company | LKQ CORPORATION |
| Current price | $25.45/sh |
| Composition | Parts and services 97% / Other 3% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 4.9% |
| Operating margin today | 7.7% |
| Margin compression implied | -2.8pp |
| Multiple paid | 11x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 12, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.
Solve inputs: computed at a 7% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage (computed at the 7% minimum rate; the CAPM rate 3.9% sits below it).
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~-2.8%/yr; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -1.15σ |
| cohort percentile (of 225 peers) | 8 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; earnings-power land below the price.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.25x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 1.71x | 5 | expensive |
| Relative | 0.58x | 3 | justifies |
| Growth | 0.82x | 5 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.5%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=18)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $35.56 | 0.72x | yes | FCF base $0.8B, growth -3% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.5%, WACC 5.5%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $30.85 | 0.82x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 6.5x / 8.5x / 10.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $37.09 | 0.69x | yes | P/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 15.2x / 18.0x / 20.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | $104.94 | 0.24x | yes | DPS $1.20, g=8.0% (sustainable: ROE (TTM) × retention; not the terminal-growth assumption), ke=9.3% |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | $2.64 | 9.64x | yes | Stage 1: -39% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $21.88 | 1.16x | yes | BV/sh $25.27, ROE (TTM) 8.0%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $20.34 | 1.25x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $14.10 | 1.80x | yes | Rev $13.7B, growth -3% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.4x / 0.5x / 0.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Growth-Adjusted P/E | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $54.74 | 0.46x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.34B × (1−21%) / WACC 5.5% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $20.10 | 1.27x | yes | BV $25.27 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 8.0% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 5.2%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $31.09 | 0.82x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $1.70 × BVPS $25.27) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $43.57 | 0.58x | yes | EBITDA $1.34B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $14.87 | 1.71x | yes | FCF $808.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $13.39 | 1.90x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.77B (FCF $0.81B − SBC $0.04B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $1.42 | 17.92x | yes | EPS $1.70 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $6.95 | 3.66x | yes | BV $25.27 × (ROIC 1.5% / WACC 5.5%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $133.42 | 0.19x | yes | Revenue $13.66B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $18.38 | 1.38x | yes | EPS $1.70 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $3.6b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 4.31x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 3.41x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -2.8% |
| Burning cash | no |
Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
- LKQ is the largest distributor of alternative and recycled vehicle parts for collision and mechanical repair, with the 10-K describing "the largest distribution network of alternative vehicle parts and accessories" in North America plus a pan-European parts business.
- What the price misses is that the market is paying about 11 times operating income, a multiple low enough that it prices in an operating-profit decline rather than growth, which makes this a value-and-recovery read, not a growth bet.
- Watch the strategic review and the regional recovery: management is running a formal strategic review and North American repairable claims are recovering with a record 40% alternative-parts utilization rate, so the markers are whether that recovery holds and what the review produces.
Bull Case
What the headline valuation methods miss about LKQ is how unusual it is for a profitable, cash-generative market leader to trade where this one does. The market is paying roughly 11 times operating income, a multiple so low that, inverted, it sits below what even a 5%-a-year decline in operating profit would warrant. Translated: the price is not asking LKQ to grow at all; it is pricing in shrinkage. For a company that generates substantial free cash flow and guides to $700 million to $850 million of it this year, that is a market expectation the business does not have to beat by much to reward the buyer. The gap between a price that assumes decline and a business that is merely growing slowly is the entire bull case.
The asset underneath that cheap multiple is a genuine distribution moat. The 10-K describes LKQ's North American operation as "the largest distribution network of alternative vehicle parts and accessories for the vehicle collision and mechanical repair market in North America," built on "a distribution network of warehouses and cross dock facilities" that holds service levels with local repair shops. Parts distribution is a scale-and-density business: the player with the most locations and the broadest catalog can fill an order faster and cheaper than anyone else, and that advantage compounds because insurers and repair shops route volume to whoever is reliable. The recent quarter showed the model working, with a record 40% alternative-parts utilization rate in North America as repairable claims recovered. Higher used-car values make repairs more economical than total-loss write-offs, which steers more claims into LKQ's parts.
The recovery is broadening, and management is acting to surface value. European performance improved month over month, particularly in Germany and Eastern Europe, with private-label penetration reaching 25.3%, a higher-margin product mix the company controls. Private label is the European version of the density advantage: as scale lets LKQ substitute its own brands for third-party parts, margin accrues to LKQ rather than to a supplier. On top of the operating recovery, management announced a formal strategic review in January 2026 aimed at enhancing shareholder value, and is using cash flow to shrink the share count, down about 2.8% a year, while paying a dividend that yields well above the market on a $1.20 annual rate. A market-leading distributor trading at a decline multiple, buying back stock, paying a real dividend, and actively reviewing its structure is the classic setup the relative-value methods reward.
Bear Case
The cleanest bear case is to read the methods against each other and ask which one is telling the truth. They do not all agree that LKQ is cheap. The earnings-power family, which capitalizes the company's normalized operating profit, reads the stock as expensive, landing below the price, and that disagreement matters because the earnings-power lens is the one least seduced by optimistic growth or peer-multiple assumptions. When the conservative earnings-power read says expensive while the relative and growth methods say cheap, the honest interpretation is that the cheapness depends on the business at least holding its profitability, and the earnings-power method is signaling that the profitability itself is under pressure.
The pressure is real and structural. Adjusted diluted EPS fell 9.5% to $0.67 in the most recent quarter and management cut its GAAP EPS guidance, even while reaffirming the adjusted range. A declining earnings line is exactly what a low multiple is supposed to reflect, which means the "value" framing has to confront the possibility that LKQ is cheap for a reason rather than by oversight. The end markets are not growing structurally: collision-repair volume depends on miles driven and accident frequency, both of which trend down as vehicles get safer, and the long arc of the auto fleet, more advanced driver-assistance systems and eventually more electric vehicles with different parts profiles, is a slow headwind to the aftermarket parts thesis. A leader in a flat-to-shrinking market can hold share and still see profit erode.
The balance sheet narrows the margin for error. Net debt sits at roughly $3.6 billion, about 3.9 times trailing operating income, with only $335 million of liquid assets against nearly $4 billion of gross debt. That leverage is serviceable while cash flow holds, but it is the kind of load that turns a slow-growth distributor into a constrained one if a regional downturn or an integration stumble compresses cash generation. The European business has carried restructuring charges, and the ongoing ERP migration, while sensible, is the sort of large internal project that can disrupt operations before it delivers savings. The strategic review the bull cites as a catalyst cuts both ways: a company that needs a formal review to unlock value is implicitly conceding that the operating business alone is not closing the gap, and reviews can end in disappointment as easily as in a sale or spin. The bear does not need LKQ to collapse; it needs only the earnings-power method to be right that the profit base is eroding faster than the cheap multiple assumes.
Valuation
LKQ is priced for decline, and that single fact frames the whole valuation. At today's level the market pays roughly 11 times company-wide operating income, a multiple so low that, inverted, it sits below what even a 5%-a-year operating-profit decline would justify. The price is not betting on growth; it is betting that LKQ shrinks, and the question for the buyer is simply whether the business does worse than that low bar.
The methods split, and the split is the analysis. The relative-multiple lens and the forward-growth lens both read the stock as cheap: the peer-multiple method, anchored on a sector P/E near 18 times, lands well above the price, and the discounted-cash-flow methods, even on modest 3% growth, land far above it. Only the earnings-power family reads the stock as expensive, capitalizing the current operating profit with no growth credit and landing below the price. That is the configuration of a value or turnaround name: the methods that credit the future and the methods that credit the peer group say cheap, while the method that credits only today's pure earnings power says the profit base is thin. The honest read is that LKQ is cheap if its profitability holds and a value trap if it does not, and the static earnings-power read is the warning attached to the bargain.
The cohort comparison supports the value framing. The peer set, distributors like Genuine Parts, Reliance, MSC Industrial, Applied Industrial, and Henry Schein, trades at distribution multiples that reflect steady, scale-driven cash generation, and LKQ sits at the low end of that group, which is what makes the relative methods read it as cheap relative to its own kind. Solvency is the constraint to weigh against the cheapness: net debt near 3.9 times operating income with thin liquid assets means the value case rests on cash flow continuing to service the debt and fund the buyback, and the company's guidance for $700 million to $850 million of free cash flow is the figure that has to hold for the thesis to work. The decisive point is the strategic review: a market-leading distributor at a decline multiple is either a mispriced cash machine or a structurally challenged one, and the review management announced is, in effect, the company itself testing which it is.
Catalysts
The Q1 FY2026 print was the mixed kind that keeps a value debate alive. Total revenue rose 4.3% to $3.47 billion, but adjusted diluted EPS fell 9.5% to $0.67, narrowly missing expectations, and management cut its GAAP EPS guidance to $2.16 to $2.46 while reaffirming adjusted EPS of $2.90 to $3.20 and free cash flow of $700 million to $850 million. Revenue growing while earnings decline is the precise tension the low multiple reflects, and the guidance cut on the GAAP line is the kind of detail that keeps the earnings-power skeptics engaged.
The regional recovery is the operating catalyst. In North America, repairable claims recovered from 2025 lows, supported by a record 40% alternative-parts utilization rate, with management attributing the improvement to rising used-car values that make repairs more economical than total losses. In Europe, early-quarter softness gave way to month-over-month demand improvement, especially in Germany and Eastern Europe, and private-label penetration reached 25.3%, a margin-accretive mix shift. A European ERP migration in a key market, completed in April, is intended to enable process standardization and cost reduction, a self-help lever that could support margin if it executes cleanly.
The dominant catalyst is the formal strategic review management announced in January 2026 to enhance shareholder value. For a company trading at a decline multiple, the review is the event that could close the gap between price and value, whether through a portfolio change, a divestiture, or a capital-return acceleration, and its outcome is the single most important marker ahead. The concrete watch items are the trajectory of North American repairable claims and parts utilization, the pace of the European recovery and private-label gains, the cash-flow delivery against guidance, and any announcement from the strategic review, which is the catalyst with the widest range of outcomes.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Specialty (reported)
- GPC (GENUINE PARTS CO)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- POOL (POOL CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- SITE (SiteOne Landscape Supply, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CNM (Core & Main, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- WSO (WATSCO INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- FERG (Ferguson Enterprises Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- RS (RELIANCE, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- RYZ (Ryerson Holding Corp)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Q1 FY2026 earnings release · FY2024 10-K · company strategic review announcement, January 2026