LifeStance Health Group, Inc. (LFST): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $11.08, LifeStance Health Group, Inc. (LFST) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~19.8 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-27.
Generated: 2026-07-29 · Exported: 2026-08-01 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/LFST
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | LFST |
| Company | LifeStance Health Group, Inc. |
| Current price | $11.08/sh |
| Composition | Patient service revenue - Commercial payors 90% / Patient service revenue - Government payors 5% / Patient service revenue - Self-pay 4% / Nonpatient service revenue 1% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Must persist for | 19.8y |
| Multiple paid | 102x operating income |
Solve inputs: computed at a 11.1% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~2.7 years.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~15.2 years; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: elevated (limited comparison data)
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| sustained it ~10 years at this level | 14% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 11.29x | 2 | expensive |
| Earnings | 7.59x | 4 | expensive |
| Relative | 4.92x | 5 | expensive |
| Growth | 0.90x | 3 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.3%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=14)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $12.33 | 0.90x | yes | FCF base $0.2B, growth 16% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.3%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $14.09 | 0.79x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 45.2x / 47.2x / 49.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $3.84 | 2.89x | yes | P/E 39.6x (blended: static sector reference 18x + trailing (TTM) 189x), scenarios: 32.4x / 39.6x / 46.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 22.56x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $0.63 | 17.59x | yes | BV/sh $3.74, ROE (TTM) 1.6%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $0.35 | 31.66x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% (excluded from median) |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $11.32 | 0.98x | yes | Rev $1.5B, growth 16% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.4x / 2.9x / 3.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $0.70 | 15.83x | yes | EPS $0.06, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=94.36 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | $0.25 | 44.32x | yes | BV $3.74 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 1.6% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 1.0%/yr (excluded from median) |
| Graham Number | Asset | $2.22 | 4.99x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $0.06 × BVPS $3.74) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $2.25 | 4.92x | yes | EBITDA $0.10B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $3.14 | 3.53x | yes | FCF $142.6M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $1.19 | 9.31x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.07B (FCF $0.14B − SBC $0.07B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $1.89 | 5.86x | yes | EPS $0.06 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $0.41 | 27.02x | yes | BV $3.74 × (ROIC 0.9% / WACC 8.3%) (excluded from median) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $9.46 | 1.17x | yes | Revenue $1.49B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $2.20 | 5.04x | yes | EPS $0.06 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $0.63 | 17.59x | yes | EPS $0.06 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $88.0m |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 2.72x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 1.96x |
| Interest coverage | 4.3x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 3.0% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
- LifeStance runs a national network of outpatient mental-health clinicians employed as W-2 staff, a model built to grow by adding therapists and visits in existing and new centers.
- The business is scaling fast, revenue up 21% on an 11% larger clinician base and 18% more visits, but it earns only a thin operating margin today, so the value sits in the growth, not the current profit.
- The next reads are clinician hiring and visit volume, the two levers that drive revenue, plus payor reimbursement and any changes to Medicaid that touch its patient base.
Bull Case
Outpatient mental health is a hard sector to value because the economics are all about throughput, and that is where LifeStance fits the pattern well. A behavioral-health provider does not own factories or inventory; its capacity is clinicians and the hours they bill, so the business grows almost linearly with how many therapists it employs and how full their schedules are. LifeStance has built its model precisely around that, employing clinicians as W-2 staff and freeing them from the administrative burden they face in independent practice so they can "dedicate their time to patient care". The growth lever is clean and visible: more clinicians, more visits, more revenue.
The recent results show the lever pulling hard. Revenue rose 21% to $403.5 million, driven by 18% more visits and an 11% larger clinician base that reached 8,349 providers, a sequential net add of 309 in a single quarter. Critically, the company is now turning that growth into profit: center margin reached $135.9 million, about 34% of revenue, and adjusted EBITDA climbed 48%. A growth-stage provider crossing into profitability while still adding capacity is the inflection the bull case needs, because it shows the model scales rather than just spends.
The demand backdrop and the specialty push extend the runway. Mental-health demand has outstripped supply for years, and LifeStance is expanding higher-value specialty services, projecting that line to grow from about $50 million toward $70 million with TMS and Spravato treatments accelerating. Management raised full-year revenue guidance to $1.64 to $1.68 billion and adjusted EBITDA to $200 to $220 million. A scaled, profitable, still-growing national platform in a chronically undersupplied category is the structural bet behind the bull case.
Bear Case
The advantage LifeStance is supposed to defend, being the clinician's employer of choice, is easier to erode than it looks, and the erosion would hit at the core. The entire model depends on recruiting and retaining therapists, who are in short supply and have abundant alternatives, including pure telehealth platforms and independent practice. LifeStance competes by offering a "competitive compensation package" and employing clinicians as W-2 staff, but that compensation is also its largest cost, and the moment a competitor pays more or offers more flexibility, the providers, and the revenue attached to them, can walk. A people-based moat that has to be continually re-bought is a thin one.
Reimbursement is the second pressure, and it is largely outside the company's control. LifeStance's revenue depends on what payors pay per visit, and the company flags risk from changes to government programs, noting potential impact "as a result of the changes to the Medicaid programs." Mental-health reimbursement rates can be cut, and the shift toward value-based and risk-sharing payment models can squeeze a fee-per-visit provider. Because the operating margin is already thin, a modest cut to reimbursement or a rise in clinician compensation flows almost directly to the bottom line.
The valuation is where the thin margin becomes dangerous. At roughly 133 times operating income, the price assumes growth held at the self-funding ceiling for about two decades, and the asset-value and earnings-power methods say the stock is dramatically expensive, sitting far below the price; only the relative-multiple and forward-growth methods reach it. That means the entire valuation rests on the company sustaining rapid clinician and visit growth while expanding margins, for a very long time. If hiring slows, reimbursement tightens, or competition for therapists intensifies, the growth premium has almost nothing underneath it. Net debt near two times operating income is manageable, but the bear case is not about solvency; it is that the price has already paid for a long, smooth growth path in a business whose growth depends on a scarce and mobile workforce.
Valuation
LifeStance is priced for growth, and the multiple is steep. At today's quote the shares trade around 133 times company-wide operating income, which inverts to an assumption that operating profit grows at its self-funding ceiling for roughly two decades. For a provider earning only a low-single-digit operating margin today, that is a long runway of compounding to assume, and it tells you the price is paying for the clinician-and-visit growth engine to run for a very long time, not for current profitability.
The methods split sharply. The relative-multiple and forward-growth methods reach the price, crediting the rapid revenue growth and the path to higher margins. But the asset-value and earnings-power methods sit far below it, because there is little book value or current earnings power to capitalize in an asset-light, thin-margin provider. That divergence is the signal: the value of LifeStance is almost entirely in the forward growth, and the static methods structurally cannot frame it. The spread between the methods and the price is the size of the growth premium, and here it is large, which is appropriate to engage honestly rather than treat as a method failure: the static frames are not wrong, they simply do not credit the growth the price is paying for.
Solvency is adequate and bounds the downside reasonably for a growth-stage company. Net debt sits at about two times operating income, with interest covered roughly four times and liquid assets near $195 million, so the company is not dependent on raising capital to keep operating. The share count is rising modestly, around 3% a year. The genuine downside variable is not the balance sheet; it is the durability of the growth and margin assumptions baked into the multiple. The price assumes a long, smooth ascent, and the conservative methods are a reminder of how little is underneath that assumption if the clinician-driven growth slows.
Catalysts
The first quarter of 2026 was a growth-and-profitability inflection. Revenue rose 21% year over year to $403.5 million, driven by 18% higher visits and an 11% larger clinician base of 8,349 providers, a sequential net add of 309. Earnings per share came in at $0.04, well ahead of consensus, with center margin of $135.9 million, about 34% of revenue, and adjusted EBITDA up 48% to $51.1 million.
Management raised the full-year outlook across the board, lifting revenue guidance to $1.64 to $1.68 billion, center margin to $547 to $571 million, and adjusted EBITDA to $200 to $220 million. It also highlighted the specialty business, projecting growth from about $50 million toward $70 million, with TMS and Spravato treatments cited as accelerating segments.
The near-term watch items are clinician hiring and visit volume, the two drivers of revenue, and the pace of margin expansion as the company scales. The external risk to monitor is reimbursement, including any changes to Medicaid that affect the patient base, since payor rates set the revenue per visit that the entire model depends on.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
LifeStance Health (single segment) (reported)
- PRVA (Privia Health Group, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: S-1 (File No. 333-255086), filed with the SEC on April 22, 2021) S-1 10.7+ 333-255086 04/22/2021 10.21+ § Second Amended and Restated PH Group Parent Corp. Stock Option Plan S-8 99.2 333-255598 04/29/2021 10.22+ § Form of Non-Qualified Stock Option Agreement under the Second Amended and Restated PH Group Parent Corp.…
- FY2025 10-K: …herein by referen ce to exhibit 10.1 to the re gistrant ' s Current Report on 8-K filed on March 7, 2025) 8-K 10.1 001-40365 03/07/2025 10.13+ § Employment Agreement, between Privia Health Group, Inc. and David Mountcastle dated as of March 21, 2022 8-K 10.2 001-40365 03/22/2022 10.14+ § Employment Agreement first…
- HIMS (HIMS & HERS HEALTH, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …to consolidated financial statements. 89 Table of Contents Hims & Hers Health, Inc. Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements 1. Organization Hims & Hers Health, Inc. (the "Company" or "Hims & Hers"), incorporated in Delaware, is a consumer-first platform transforming the way customers fulfill their health and…
- FY2025 10-K: …proactive care We are pursuing a roadmap of rapid specialty expansion into new conditions that can be appropriately addressed via telehealth, require ongoing and recurring customer relationships, and generally for which generic medication has been established as an effective means of treatment. For example, in 2025,…
- ACHC (Acadia Healthcare Company, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …compared to 30% in 2013. Further, in 2023, 20% of high school students seriously considered attempting suicide and 9% of high school students attempted suicide one or more times. Management believes the market for behavioral healthcare services will continue to grow due to increased awareness of mental health and…
- FY2025 10-K: 60,101 1.9 % 67,583 2.3 % Other 48,536 1.4 % 44,341 1.4 % 20,175 0.7 % Revenue $ 3,312,769 100.0 % $ 3,153,963 100.0 % $ 2,928,738 100.0 % The following tables present a summary of our aging of accounts receivable at December 31, 2025 and 2024: December 31, 2025 Current 30-90 90-150 >150 Total Commercial 14.7 % 4.8 %…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
LifeStance Q1 2026 earnings release, May 2026 · LifeStance Q1 2026 earnings call, May 2026