LENNAR CORP /NEW/ (LEN): what the price requires
The current priced-in claim for LENNAR CORP /NEW/ (LEN) is temporarily suppressed because the live engine record is unavailable. The dated report remains a snapshot, not a current market read.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/LEN
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | LEN |
| Company | LENNAR CORP /NEW/ |
| Current price | $82.48/sh |
| Composition | Sales of homes 94% / Sales of land 0% / Other revenues 6% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Multiple paid | 4x operating income |
The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.
Solve inputs: computed at a 8.3% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -1.31σ |
| cohort percentile (of 210 peers) | 1 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and relative-multiple value, while earnings-power/growth-DCF land below the price. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.08x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 7.63x | 2 | expensive |
| Relative | 0.45x | 2 | justifies |
| Growth | 2.02x | 1 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Relative Families that call it expensive: Earnings, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.9%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=9)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $0.00 | — | no | Reference only (OCF-based, capex excluded): OCF $0.1B |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0 |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $125.10 | 0.66x | yes | P/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 15.3x / 18.0x / 20.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $79.08 | 1.04x | yes | BV/sh $89.51, ROE (TTM) 8.2%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $74.27 | 1.11x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $40.86 | 2.02x | yes | Rev $33.2B, growth -7% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.5x / 0.6x / 0.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Growth-Adjusted P/E | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $3.95 | 20.88x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.79B × (1−23%) / WACC 7.9% → EPV (no growth) (excluded from median) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $73.51 | 1.12x | yes | BV $89.51 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 8.2% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 5.3%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $118.31 | 0.70x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $6.95 × BVPS $89.51) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $5.82 | 14.17x | yes | EPS $6.95 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $339.30 | 0.24x | yes | Revenue $33.17B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $75.14 | 1.10x | yes | EPS $6.95 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -5.3% |
| Burning cash | no |
Operating profit is negative or near zero and the company has no demonstrated through-cycle (mid-cycle) operating margin to normalize against, so years-to-repay cannot be computed honestly.
Operating profit is negative or near zero and there is no demonstrated through-cycle (mid-cycle) operating margin to normalize against, so interest coverage cannot be computed honestly.
Bullet Takeaways
- Lennar is one of the largest U.S. homebuilders, run on a land-light, high-volume model that prioritizes selling homes and turning inventory fast over holding land on its balance sheet.
- Volume is holding while profitability is compressing: the most recent quarter delivered over 20,500 homes near the high end of guidance, but homebuilding gross margin fell to 15.6% from 17.8% as the company used incentives to keep sales moving.
- The stock trades at a low multiple, around 4 times operating income, with a strong balance sheet, and the next reads are gross-margin recovery and the level of sales incentives needed to clear inventory.
Bull Case
Lennar's structural advantage is its operating model, and you can see it in the margin and balance-sheet data. The company runs a land-light strategy: rather than tying up capital in large land banks, it controls lots through options and turns inventory quickly, which lowers the capital at risk in a downturn and lets it generate cash even when margins compress. That model is paired with what the company calls an "operating structure gives us the flexibility to make operating decisions based on local homebuilding conditions and customer preferences, while our centralized management structure provides strategic" scale. Local responsiveness plus national purchasing scale is how the largest builders out-earn the smaller ones through a cycle.
Scale shows up directly in cost. Lennar improved construction cost per square foot to $81, down 7% from a year earlier, and reached a record-low cycle time, the speed at which it builds and delivers a home. Faster cycle times and lower per-foot costs are the levers a high-volume builder pulls to protect returns when pricing is soft, and Lennar is pulling both. Delivering over 20,500 homes near the high end of guidance while cutting costs is the volume machine working as designed.
The balance sheet is the quiet anchor of the bull case. Net debt sits at well under half a year of operating income, with liquid assets of roughly $3.8 billion, an unusually strong position for a cyclical homebuilder. The share count has fallen about 4.5% a year, so the company is returning capital while staying conservatively financed. A builder this large, this low-cost, and this lightly levered can keep buying back stock and self-funding through a housing slowdown, then take share as smaller, more leveraged competitors retrench. The price values it at roughly 4 times operating income, and the asset-and-profitability methods say that is too cheap for a franchise with this balance sheet.
Bear Case
The bear case for Lennar is that today's earnings are near a cyclical high and the margin is already rolling over. Homebuilding gross margin compressed to 15.6% from 17.8% year over year, and the company is leaning on sales incentives to keep volume up, with the filing noting that gross margin fell on "lower revenue per square foot and higher land costs year over year, partially offset by a decrease in construction costs". Net earnings fell to $305 million from $477 million a year earlier. A homebuilder selling the same number of houses for less profit each is the early signature of a demand problem, and the price has to reckon with earnings that may be closer to the top of the cycle than the bottom.
The structural exposure is to mortgage rates and affordability, neither of which Lennar controls. Demand for new homes is acutely sensitive to financing costs, and the incentives Lennar is using, rate buydowns and price concessions, are themselves a margin cost that masks how soft underlying demand is. Sales incentives did improve to 12.9% of deliveries from 14.1% in the prior quarter, but that is still a heavy promotional level, and it points to a market where the builder, not the buyer, is absorbing the affordability gap. If rates stay high or the economy weakens, volume and margin can fall together.
Where the valuation is concerned, the methods split in a way that flatters the asset case and warns on the earnings case. The asset-value and relative-multiple methods land near or above the price, but the earnings-power and forward-growth methods sit far below it, with the zero-growth earnings read implying the current profit level is not durable. That divergence is the bear's point: if homebuilding earnings normalize to a mid-cycle level, the price looks much less cheap than 4 times trailing operating income suggests. The balance sheet is genuinely strong, so this is not a solvency bear; it is a cyclical-earnings bear, and the risk is that the market is anchoring on peak profitability that a higher-for-longer rate environment erodes.
Valuation
Lennar screens cheap, and the question is whether the earnings behind the multiple are durable. At today's price the shares trade around 4 times company-wide operating income, low enough that the price sits below what even a 5%-a-year decline in operating profit would warrant. That is a bound rather than a precise solve, and the read frames Lennar as a value and asset-supported name. The catch is that homebuilder earnings are cyclical, so a 4-times multiple on trailing profit can be deceptive if that profit is near a peak.
The methods disagree in a revealing pattern. The asset-value methods, anchored on book value and the company's return on equity, land near or above the price, and the relative-multiple lens against the homebuilder cohort reaches above it too. But the earnings-power methods, which capitalize normalized operating profit with no growth, sit far below the price, and the forward-growth methods also fall short. That split says the value case rests on the assets and the cohort multiple, while the earnings-based methods are warning that today's margin is unlikely to hold. The honest read is that the cheapness is real on an asset basis and contingent on a non-collapsing market on an earnings basis; the gross-margin compression this quarter is the evidence the earnings methods are pricing.
Solvency is the clean part and it bounds the downside well. Net debt is well under half a year of operating income, with liquid assets near $3.8 billion and interest expense not separately broken out but coverage clearly ample given the modest leverage. The share count is falling about 4.5% a year. This is a homebuilder built to survive a downturn, which is exactly why it can take share when weaker builders cannot. The downside is bounded less by the balance sheet than by how far housing margins fall; the price assumes a soft-but-not-broken market, and the methods that lean on assets agree that is a reasonable bet.
Catalysts
The second quarter of 2026 showed volume holding and margin under pressure. Lennar delivered 20,519 homes, in line with guidance, and generated 21,749 new orders near the high end of expectations, but net earnings fell to $305 million, or $1.24 per diluted share, from $477 million a year earlier. Homebuilding gross margin compressed to 15.6% from 17.8% and SG&A rose to 9.2% from 8.8%, though sales incentives on deliveries eased to 12.9% from 14.1% in the prior quarter, a tentative sign of stabilization.
Cost control was the bright spot. Construction cost per square foot improved to $81, down 7% year over year, alongside a record-low cycle time, both evidence of the operating model working through a tough demand environment.
Management guided the third quarter to 20,500 to 21,500 deliveries, gross margin of approximately 16%, SG&A of 8.8% to 9.0%, and an average sales price of $375,000 to $380,000, while moderating the full-year delivery target to roughly 82,000 to 83,000 homes. The near-term watch items are whether gross margin recovers toward that 16% guide and whether the easing in incentives continues, since the level of incentives is the cleanest read on how much affordability support the market still requires.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Homebuilding (reported)
- DHI (D.R. Horton, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- PHM (PULTEGROUP, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- NVR (NVR, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TOL (Toll Brothers, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- KBH (KB HOME)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TMHC (Taylor Morrison Home Corp)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MHO (M/I HOMES, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TPH (Tri Pointe Homes, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Financial Services (reported)
- RKT (Rocket Companies, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- UWMC (UWM HOLDINGS CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- PFSI (PennyMac Financial Services, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- WD (Walker & Dunlop, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Multifamily (reported)
- AVB (AVALONBAY COMMUNITIES, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- EQR (EQUITY RESIDENTIAL)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MAA (MID-AMERICA APARTMENT COMMUNITIES, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- UDR (UDR, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CPT (CAMDEN PROPERTY TRUST)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ESS (ESSEX PROPERTY TRUST, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- IRT (INDEPENDENCE REALTY TRUST, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Lennar Other (reported)
- DHI (D.R. Horton, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- PHM (PULTEGROUP, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- KBH (KB HOME)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TMHC (Taylor Morrison Home Corp)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TOL (Toll Brothers, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- NVR (NVR, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MHO (M/I HOMES, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TPH (Tri Pointe Homes, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Lennar Q2 2026 earnings call, June 2026 · Lennar Q2 2026 earnings release, June 2026 · Lennar Q2 2026 results, June 2026