Knife River Corporation (KNF): what the price requires
At today's price, Knife River Corporation (KNF) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~12.1 years. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/KNF
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | KNF |
| Company | Knife River Corporation |
| Current price | $78.25/sh |
| Composition | Aggregates 20% / Ready-mix concrete 25% / Asphalt 13% / Liquid asphalt 9% / Other 9% / Contracting services public-sector 36% / Contracting services private-sector 8% / Internal sales -20% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 4.1% |
| Operating margin today | 4.8% |
| Margin compression implied | -0.7pp |
| Must persist for | 12.1y |
| Multiple paid | 44x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 10, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 10.8% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~2.1 years.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~8.9 years; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: high
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +0.86σ |
| cohort percentile (of 76 peers) | 90 |
| sustained it ~10 years at this level | 15% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 2.78x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 3.14x | 2 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.46x | 3 | expensive |
| Growth | 0.75x | 2 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=11)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $200.49 | 0.39x | yes | Reference only (OCF-based, capex excluded): OCF $0.3B |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0 |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $53.77 | 1.46x | yes | P/E 18.88x (blended: static sector reference 14x + trailing (TTM) 30x), scenarios: 14.2x / 18.9x / 22.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 9.23x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $27.95 | 2.80x | yes | BV/sh $27.50, ROE (TTM) 9.4%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $28.17 | 2.78x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $70.16 | 1.12x | yes | Rev $3.2B, growth 11% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.0x / 1.4x / 1.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 6x) |
| Growth-Adjusted P/E | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $22.59 | 3.46x | yes | Normalized EBIT (4y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.25B × (1−21%) / WACC 7.2% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $28.21 | 2.77x | yes | BV $27.50 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 9.4% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 6.1%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $39.87 | 1.96x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $2.57 × BVPS $27.50) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $42.92 | 1.82x | yes | EBITDA $0.49B × sector EV/EBITDA 8.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $2.15 | 36.40x | yes | EPS $2.57 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $84.71 | 0.92x | yes | Revenue $3.20B × sector P/S 1.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $27.78 | 2.82x | yes | EPS $2.57 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $1.4b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 13.37x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 10.57x |
| Interest coverage | 1.7x |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
Knife River is a vertically integrated aggregates and construction-materials company with a large public-sector contracting arm, and the market values it richly: at $86.27 the price implies operating growth held near the self-funding ceiling for about 13 years, a pace only about 15% of comparable companies have sustained.
Full-year 2026 guidance calls for revenue of $3.3 billion to $3.5 billion and adjusted EBITDA of $520 million to $560 million, with mid-single-digit aggregates pricing gains and at least 200 basis points of margin expansion. Q1 is a seasonal loss quarter for the business.
The aggregates franchise is the durable core, supported by local-market pricing power and a record $1.2 billion first-quarter backlog. The risk is the leverage and contracting cyclicality, with net debt near $1.4 billion at roughly 5x operating income.
Bull Case
Aggregates are an unusual business, and valuing Knife River means understanding why. Crushed stone, sand, and gravel are heavy and cheap relative to their weight, so they cannot travel far economically, which makes every quarry a local quasi-monopoly. Reserves are hard to permit and harder to replace, so a well-positioned pit prices up year after year with little competitive threat. That is why aggregates companies trade at premium multiples and why the sector's leader frames the long-term demand and sustained pricing growth as firmly in place, with short-term cyclical declines historically followed by strong recoveries (VMC FY2025 10-K, accession 0001628280-26-009546). Knife River sits inside that favorable structure, and it adds a vertically integrated model, aggregates feeding its own ready-mix, asphalt, and contracting operations.
The integration is a real edge in a fragmented industry. Knife River's own filing makes the point: a vertically integrated business can access efficiencies that reduce product costs and improve reliability of supply, in an industry of thousands of fragmented construction participants (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001955520-26-000003). That fragmentation is also a consolidation runway, and the company completed three aggregates-based acquisitions in Q1 2026 alone, buying local pits and pulling their volume through its own downstream operations. The contracting arm is weighted to public-sector horizontal work, streets, highways, airports, and bridges (FY2025 10-K), the demand most insulated from the private cycle and most supported by federal and state infrastructure funding.
The numbers point up. Q1 2026 revenue rose 16% to $410.1 million, and while the quarter was a seasonal loss as construction always is in winter, the adjusted EBITDA loss narrowed to $31.8 million from $38.0 million on better margins. The company ended the quarter with a record first-quarter backlog of $1.2 billion. Full-year 2026 guidance is revenue of $3.3 billion to $3.5 billion and adjusted EBITDA of $520 million to $560 million, assuming mid-single-digit aggregates pricing gains and at least 200 basis points of margin expansion, with management expecting results toward the upper half of the ranges. A pricing-led, integrated, acquisitive aggregates franchise with a record backlog is the bull case for paying up.
Bear Case
The aggregates moat is real, but the price assumes it compounds at a pace the business has rarely delivered, and that is where the moat thesis gets stretched. At $86.27 (June 27, 2026) the market pays about 47x company-wide operating income, which implies operating growth held near the self-funding ceiling for roughly 13 years. The engine flags that as elevated, above what fundamentals comfortably support, and notes only about 15% of comparable companies sustained such a pace for even a decade. The static methods underline how far the price has run: simple excess return near $28, residual income near $28, earnings power value near $22, all roughly a third of the price, because trailing return on equity near 9% barely clears the cost of capital and free cash flow is negative after the heavy capital spending the business requires. The premium-to-asset-value the market is paying is large for a cyclical materials company.
The contracting business is where the moat erodes. More than a third of revenue is contracting services, and that work is lumpy, lower-margin, and competitively bid, not the local-monopoly aggregates economics the bull case leans on. Knife River's contracting is mostly public-sector horizontal construction tied to government budgets and project timing (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001955520-26-000003), so it depends on infrastructure appropriations that can slow, and on winning competitive bids where pricing power is weak. A business that is part toll-road aggregates and part bid-it-out contracting should not be valued as if the whole thing has aggregates economics.
The cyclicality and leverage are the sharper risks. Construction materials demand swings with the economy, interest rates, and public budgets, the same cyclicality the sector leader acknowledges even while pointing to eventual recovery (VMC FY2025 10-K, accession 0001628280-26-009546). Knife River carries net debt near $1.4 billion, about 5x operating income, and is funding acquisitions on top of that load, so a downturn in construction activity or a stall in infrastructure funding would pressure both the volume and the balance sheet at once. The Q1 net loss of $79.2 million is seasonal and not alarming on its own, but it is a reminder that this is a capital-heavy, weather-and-cycle-exposed business carrying real leverage at a premium multiple. Pay 47x operating income for 13 years of ceiling-rate growth and you are underwriting a best case with little room for the cycle to disappoint.
Valuation
Knife River is priced as a durable compounder, and the methods say only the growth lens reaches the price. At $86.27 the reverse-DCF reads the market as paying about 47x company-wide operating income, implying operating growth held near the 25% self-funding ceiling for roughly 13 years, computed at an 11.1% cost of capital. The engine rates that elevated, with only about 15% of comparable companies sustaining the pace for ten years. The method families split sharply: the asset and earnings-power frames land far below, simple excess return near $28, residual income near $28, earnings power value near $22, because trailing return on equity near 9% and negative free cash flow do not support a premium. Only the growth and relative frames reach up, discounted future market cap near $77, relative valuation near $56, and they get there by extrapolating recent double-digit revenue growth and a high terminal multiple.
One measurement note matters here. The trailing operating income the engine reads diverges from the record basis, $282 million versus $149 million, because construction is highly seasonal and the company recently completed acquisitions, so any single multiple snapshot is noisy.
The honest synthesis is that the price embeds the aggregates premium and then some. The aggregates core deserves a premium to mechanical earnings power for its local-market pricing durability, so the low asset methods understate the business. But the magnitude, 47x operating income and a 13-year implied duration, plus a third of revenue in lower-quality contracting and net debt near 5x operating income, is a demanding combination. The 2026 guidance of mid-single-digit pricing and 200-plus basis points of margin expansion is solid, but it is not the ceiling-rate, decade-plus compounding the price requires. The value here depends on the durability of pricing-led margin expansion outrunning the cyclicality and the leverage.
Catalysts
Q1 2026 (reported May 2026) showed revenue up 16% to $410.1 million, beating estimates, with a seasonal net loss of $79.2 million, or $1.40 per share, and an adjusted EBITDA loss of $31.8 million that narrowed from $38.0 million a year earlier on better margins. The company completed three aggregates-based acquisitions and ended the quarter with a record first-quarter backlog of $1.2 billion. Because Q1 is seasonally weak for construction, the spring and summer quarters carry the year and are the key prints to watch.
The guidance frames the thesis. Full-year 2026 revenue is guided to $3.3 billion to $3.5 billion and adjusted EBITDA to $520 million to $560 million, assuming mid-single-digit aggregates pricing improvement and at least 200 basis points of margin expansion, with management expecting results toward the upper half of the ranges. The realized aggregates pricing and the margin trajectory are the metrics that validate or undercut the premium valuation.
The swing factors over the next 90 days are public-sector infrastructure funding and project timing, which drive the contracting backlog, the pace and pricing of bolt-on aggregates acquisitions, and construction demand against the broader economy and rates. Backlog conversion and the cadence of acquisition integration against net debt near $1.4 billion are the balance-sheet signals to track.
Sources: StockTitan (KNF Q1 2026 8-K and 10-Q), Investing.com (Q1 2026 presentation and transcript), Seeking Alpha, Quiver Quantitative, Simply Wall St, Yahoo Finance (Q1 2026 call).
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Mountain / Central / Energy Services (reported)
- VMC (VULCAN MATERIALS COMPANY)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MLM (MARTIN MARIETTA MATERIALS INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- EXP (EAGLE MATERIALS INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- AMRZ (Amrize Ltd)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CRH (CRH public limited company)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- USLM (UNITED STATES LIME & MINERALS INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.