Kodiak Gas Services, Inc. (KGS): what the price requires
At today's price, Kodiak Gas Services, Inc. (KGS) is priced for +23.4% growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/KGS
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | KGS |
| Company | Kodiak Gas Services, Inc. |
| Current price | $66.16/sh |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 8.8% |
| Operating margin today | 27.2% |
| Margin compression implied | -18.4pp |
| Implied growth | 23.4% |
| Multiple paid | 24x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 6, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 9.4% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~7.5pp.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +0.79σ |
| cohort percentile (of 70 peers) | 67 |
| sustained it ~5 years at this level | 37% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 10.29x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 2.70x | 1 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.23x | 2 | expensive |
| Growth | 1.03x | 2 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.6%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=10)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $31.06 | 2.13x | no | FCF base $0.2B, growth 4% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.6%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $56.49 | 1.17x | no | Exit EV/EBITDA: 11.5x / 13.5x / 15.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $47.35 | 1.40x | yes | P/E 39.57x (blended: static sector reference 20x + trailing (TTM) 85x), scenarios: 33.3x / 39.6x / 45.9x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | $59.69 | 1.11x | yes | DPS $1.95, g=5.8% (sustainable: ROE (TTM) × retention; not the terminal-growth assumption), ke=9.3% |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | $69.07 | 0.96x | yes | Stage 1: 20% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $8.39 | 7.89x | yes | BV/sh $13.39, ROE (TTM) 5.8%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $6.43 | 10.29x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $48.93 | 1.35x | no | Rev $1.3B, growth 4% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.7x / 4.4x / 5.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $9.12 | 7.25x | no | EPS $0.76, growth 1% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=68.04 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $3.12 | 21.21x | no | Normalized EBIT (4y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.27B × (1−13%) / WACC 7.6% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $6.18 | 10.71x | yes | BV $13.39 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 5.8% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 3.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $15.13 | 4.37x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $0.76 × BVPS $13.39) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $62.64 | 1.06x | yes | EBITDA $0.63B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $0.01 | 6616.00x | yes | FCF $200.3M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median) |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $0.01 | 6616.00x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.18B (FCF $0.20B − SBC $0.02B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median) |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $24.52 | 2.70x | yes | EPS $0.76 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $4.15 | 15.94x | yes | BV $13.39 × (ROIC 2.4% / WACC 7.6%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $37.83 | 1.75x | no | Revenue $1.32B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $28.50 | 2.32x | no | EPS $0.76 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $8.22 | 8.05x | no | EPS $0.76 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $2.7b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 8.66x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 7.50x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 11.1% |
| Burning cash | no |
Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
At $69.15 the market pays roughly 25x company-wide operating income for Kodiak, which implies operating growth holding near its self-funding ceiling for about five years. Only about a third of comparable fast-growers have sustained that pace over a similar horizon.
Q1 2026 set a record with adjusted EBITDA of $190.1 million, up 7%, on 98% fleet utilization, and management raised 2026 guidance to $820 to $860 million of adjusted EBITDA. The new Power Infrastructure segment, from the DPS acquisition, targets 300 to 500 MW of annual additions for data centers and microgrids.
The asset-based and earnings-power models price the stock far below where it trades, weighed down by net debt near $2.7 billion and a thin book return. The price is a bet on durable compounding the static balance-sheet frames cannot capture.
Bull Case
Traditional valuation models look at Kodiak and see a problem. The asset frames mark it at single digits: simple excess return near $8, residual income near $6, ROIC-justified book near $4, all crushed by a trailing return on equity near 6% and net debt of roughly $2.7 billion. By those lenses the stock at $69 looks absurd. The lenses are missing what the business actually does. Kodiak rents large-horsepower compression equipment under long-term contracts to move natural gas, and the accounting book value of steel iron understates the cash those contracts throw off when utilization sits at 98%.
The gap between the numbers and the business is the whole thesis. Compression is a high-utilization, contracted, capital-heavy service where the economics show up in EBITDA and free cash flow, not in book equity. Q1 2026 made that concrete: record adjusted EBITDA of $190.1 million, up 7% year over year, revenue up about 5% to $345.8 million, and adjusted EPS of $0.59 against a $0.54 expectation. Fleet utilization held at an industry-leading 98% with average horsepower per unit rising to 977. The industry tailwind is real and visible in peer disclosure: Archrock describes favorable long-term fundamentals for U.S. natural gas compression and notes customers increasingly outsource compression to free their own capital for core operations (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001389050-26-000009). Kodiak is the larger-horsepower beneficiary of exactly that trend.
Then there is the option the static models cannot see at all. Kodiak closed the DPS acquisition and launched a Power Infrastructure segment aimed at data centers and microgrids, guiding to 300 to 500 MW of annual additions. That pivot takes the same operational competence, deploying and servicing large rotating equipment under contract, and points it at the fastest-growing power-demand market in the country. Management raised 2026 adjusted EBITDA guidance to a range of $820 to $860 million on the strength of compression margins plus this new leg. The reverse-DCF says the price embeds operating growth at the self-funding ceiling for about five years; the contracted backlog, the 98% utilization, and a power business just getting started are the case for why that compounding can actually hold.
Bear Case
The right way into the Kodiak bear case is to watch which valuation methods say what, because the disagreement is enormous and the conservative ones are usually the more honest read. Every asset and earnings-power method lands far below the price: earnings power value near $3, ROIC-justified book near $4, residual income near $6, two-stage excess return near $6. Several projection methods would not even run, gated off because the model flags three distress signals at once, negative retained earnings, an Altman distress reading, and working-capital bloat. Only the growth and dividend-discount methods, the ones that assume the recent pace persists, reach $69 (June 27, 2026). When the static frames and the growth frame disagree by an order of magnitude, the burden of proof sits squarely on the growth story, and the growth story is the fragile one.
The balance sheet is why the conservative methods deserve weight. Kodiak carries net debt of roughly $2.7 billion against trailing operating income near $358 million, a net-debt-to-operating-income ratio above 7x. That is the capital structure of a leveraged roll-up, and it is the structural truth the bull case prefers not to lead with. Compression is capital-hungry by nature; Archrock's own filing frames the business around continuous capital expenditure and equipment deployment (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001389050-26-000009), and Kodiak funds its fleet growth and its new power ambitions on top of that debt load. A higher-for-longer rate environment raises the cost of every refinancing and every new unit, and the dividend, recently $0.49 per quarter, competes with the same cash that services the debt and funds the growth capex the bull case is counting on.
The deepest risk is that the new Power Infrastructure segment is being priced as a sure thing before it has proven the economics. Entering data-center and microgrid power is a different competitive arena with different customers, different contract structures, and well-capitalized incumbents. The 300 to 500 MW target is a plan, not a track record. If compression demand softens with natural gas activity, or if the power buildout runs slower or at lower returns than guided, the growth methods that justify the price lose their footing, and the stock reverts toward the static frames that already say it is expensive. At above 7x net-debt-to-operating-income, there is little balance-sheet slack to absorb that disappointment.
Valuation
Kodiak is a textbook case of method disagreement, and the disagreement is the information. The asset and earnings-power family marks the stock deep below the price: earnings power value near $3, ROIC-justified book near $4, residual income near $6, two-stage excess return near $6, all reflecting a thin trailing return on equity near 6% and a leveraged book. Several projection methods are gated off entirely because the engine reads three distress signals, negative retained earnings, an Altman distress score, and working-capital bloat, so DCF and price-to-sales do not contribute. What is left reaching the price is the growth and income family: a two-stage dividend discount model right at $69, a simple DDM near $60, EV/EBITDA at the sector multiple near $63, and a blended relative valuation near $48.
The reverse-DCF reconciles the spread. At $69.15 the market pays roughly 25x company-wide operating income, which implies operating growth holding near the 25% self-funding ceiling for about five years, computed at a 9.5% cost of capital. The base rate is sobering: only about a third of comparable fast-growers have sustained that pace over a similar horizon, and each percentage point of growth shifts the required duration by roughly 1.7 years.
The honest synthesis is that this is a moat-or-bust valuation. The static frames cannot price contracted, high-utilization compression cash flow or a brand-new power segment, so they understate the business; the growth frame can price it but only by assuming the compounding is durable. The price clears the conservative methods only if you believe the contracted backlog and the power pivot deliver. Given net debt above 7x operating income, the margin for error is the balance sheet, not the multiple.
Catalysts
Q1 2026 (reported spring 2026) was a record quarter: adjusted EBITDA of $190.1 million, up 7% year over year, revenue up about 5% to $345.8 million, and adjusted EPS of $0.59 versus a $0.54 expectation. Fleet utilization held at 98% with average horsepower per unit rising to 977. On the strength of the print, management raised full-year 2026 adjusted EBITDA guidance to $820 to $860 million and lifted its compression margin outlook.
The defining catalyst is the new Power Infrastructure segment created by the closed DPS acquisition, aimed at data centers and microgrids with a target of 300 to 500 MW of annual additions. Milestones on contract wins, megawatts deployed, and segment margins over the next several quarters will determine whether the market is right to price this leg as a durable growth engine. Execution here moves the thesis more than anything in the core compression book.
Capital return and the balance sheet are the recurring swing factors. The board declared a $0.49 per share quarterly dividend, and with net debt near $2.7 billion, refinancing terms and the pace of growth capex are worth watching against the rate environment. Compression fundamentals stay tied to U.S. natural gas activity; track utilization and bookings alongside each quarterly update over the next 90 days.
Sources: StockTitan (KGS Q1 2026 8-K), Quartr, IndexBox/Yahoo Finance, MarketScreener, Public.com (Q1 2026 earnings).
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Contract Services / Other Services (reported)
- AROC (Archrock, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- USAC (USA Compression Partners, LP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- KMI (KINDER MORGAN, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- WMB (WILLIAMS COMPANIES, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- OKE (ONEOK INC /NEW/)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TRGP (TARGA RESOURCES CORP.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- DTM (DT Midstream, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.