KIRBY CORPORATION (KEX): what the price requires
At today's price, KIRBY CORPORATION (KEX) is priced for +14.9% growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/KEX
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | KEX |
| Company | KIRBY CORPORATION |
| Current price | $143.32/sh |
| Composition | Inland transportation 46% / Coastal transportation 12% / Commercial and industrial 19% / Power generation 18% / Oil and gas 5% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | segment |
| Implied growth | 14.9% |
Solve inputs: computed at a 9.6% cost of capital with 5% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~7.4pp.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| cohort percentile (of 225 peers) | 44 |
| sustained it ~5 years at this level | 44% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.87x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 1.92x | 5 | expensive |
| Relative | 0.88x | 5 | justifies |
| Growth | 0.96x | 3 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.1%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=18)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $205.32 | 0.70x | yes | FCF base $0.5B, growth 6% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.1%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $149.59 | 0.96x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 9.6x / 11.6x / 13.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $152.18 | 0.94x | yes | P/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.7x / 20.0x / 23.3x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $72.01 | 1.99x | yes | BV/sh $63.21, ROE (TTM) 10.5%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $76.69 | 1.87x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $104.97 | 1.37x | yes | Rev $3.4B, growth 6% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.9x / 2.3x / 2.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $227.50 | 0.63x | yes | EPS $6.50, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.61 (Undervalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $34.20 | 4.19x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.32B × (1−22%) / WACC 8.1% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $77.57 | 1.85x | yes | BV $63.21 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 10.5% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 6.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $96.15 | 1.49x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $6.50 × BVPS $63.21) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $163.75 | 0.88x | yes | EBITDA $0.77B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $78.66 | 1.82x | yes | FCF $497.3M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $74.69 | 1.92x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.48B (FCF $0.50B − SBC $0.02B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $209.73 | 0.68x | yes | EPS $6.50 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $14.35 | 9.99x | yes | BV $63.21 × (ROIC 1.8% / WACC 8.1%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $126.73 | 1.13x | yes | Revenue $3.42B × sector P/S 2.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $243.75 | 0.59x | yes | EPS $6.50 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $70.27 | 2.04x | yes | EPS $6.50 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $925.4m |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 2.51x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 1.95x |
| Interest coverage | 10.5x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -2.8% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
- Kirby is the largest operator of inland tank barges in the US, moving petrochemicals, refined products, and agricultural chemicals on the inland waterways, and it has bolted on a fast-growing power-generation equipment business that is changing the company's growth profile.
- The decisive near-term dynamic is barge supply discipline: with little new barge construction, utilization runs in the low-90% range, which gives Kirby pricing power on contract renewals it has not had in years.
- Watch the power-generation business, which grew 45% year over year and is expected to reach 45% to 55% of the distribution and services segment, alongside full-year EPS growth guidance raised to 5% to 15%.
Bull Case
The valuation models read Kirby as a cyclical barge company, and that framing misses what is actually driving the business now. Two forces are at work that the static methods cannot fully credit. The first is the supply side of the barge market: Kirby is the largest US inland tank-barge operator, and because almost no new barges are being built, the existing fleet is scarce. Utilization ran in the low-90% range in the first quarter, and the company's own filing notes utilization for petrochemical transport averaged in the "mid to high 80% range during both 2024 and 2025 due to stable economic conditions", so the recent low-90s mark a tightening market. When the fleet is full and no new supply is coming, the operator gains pricing power on every contract renewal, and Kirby reported spot pricing up and term renewals flat to slightly higher.
The second force is the power-generation business, which is the real growth story hiding inside a barge company. Kirby's distribution and services segment sells and services power-generation equipment, and that business grew 45% year over year in the first quarter, on its way to representing 45% to 55% of the segment. This is demand tied to the broader electrification and data-center buildout, a structural tailwind that has nothing to do with the marine cycle and that the market still values as if it were part of a sleepy industrial-services arm.
The combination is showing in the results and the guidance. First-quarter revenue rose to $844.1 million from $785.7 million, EPS of $1.50 beat estimates and grew 12.8%, and the company raised full-year EPS growth guidance to 5% to 15% from 0% to 12%. Interest coverage near 11 times and a share count shrinking about 2.8% a year round out a business with pricing power in its core, a structural growth engine in power generation, and the cash flow to keep buying back stock. A company the methods price as a barge operator, but that is increasingly a power-equipment grower with a tightening core, is exactly the kind of mispricing the standard frames create.
Bear Case
The valuation methods disagree, and the conservative ones are flashing a warning. The asset-value and earnings-power methods read Kirby as expensive, the asset lens at nearly twice what book-and-profitability frames justify and the zero-growth earnings lens well above the price too, while only the peer-multiple and growth-DCF methods support it. When the methods that value a business on what it owns and what it earns today both say expensive, and only the method that credits future growth reaches the price, the bear case writes itself: the price is paying for the recovery and the power-generation ramp to continue, and the more honest reads say the static value is below where the stock trades.
The core is still cyclical, and the cycle is currently favorable, which is the dangerous time to extrapolate. Kirby's barge demand is driven by petrochemical, refined-product, and agricultural-chemical volumes, all tied to industrial activity and refinery utilization, and the company's filing is explicit that utilization moves with "stable economic conditions". The low-90% utilization and improving pricing reflect a tight market today, but barge cycles turn: a recession, a refinery slowdown, or eventually a wave of new barge construction would loosen the market and reverse the pricing power that is currently the bull case. The price implies operating growth around 14% a year, a pace that assumes the favorable cycle and the power-generation surge both persist.
The balance sheet adds modest leverage to the cyclical exposure. Net debt of about $925 million sits at roughly 1.9 times trailing operating income, comfortable now with interest coverage near 11 times, but barge transport is capital-intensive and the leverage tightens if the marine cycle softens. The power-generation growth is real but also partly a beneficiary of an order surge that could normalize, and 45% growth is not a sustainable run rate. The bet at this price is that a cyclical business at a favorable point in its cycle keeps compounding at a above-trend rate; the methods that read the stock as expensive are pricing the risk that the cycle, and the power-generation order book, both eventually cool.
Valuation
The price is a growth bet layered on a cyclical base, and the segment carrying the premium is what to focus on. At a blended multiple that implies roughly 14% annual operating growth, the market is paying for both the tight barge market and the power-generation surge to continue. That is a demanding rate for a business whose core is inland marine transport, historically a low-growth, cyclical activity, which tells you the power-generation ramp is doing much of the work in justifying the price.
The methods split cleanly. Peer-multiple and growth-DCF approaches support the price, while the asset-value and earnings-power methods read it as expensive, the asset lens at nearly double the book-and-profitability value. That pattern is the signature of a stock priced for growth rather than for current earnings: value Kirby on today's barge profits with no growth and it looks rich; credit the power-generation expansion and the contract-pricing recovery and the price holds. A reader should weigh that the bullish methods depend on growth that is partly cyclical (barge pricing) and partly a possibly-temporary order surge (power generation), which makes the durability of the 14% implied growth the central question.
Solvency is sound and not the issue. Net debt around $925 million at roughly 1.9 times operating income, with interest coverage near 11 times, is comfortable leverage for a company generating steady cash flow, and the share count is shrinking. The genuine risk in the valuation is not the balance sheet; it is that the price assumes an above-trend growth rate from a business that is cyclical at its core, so the bet rests on the barge cycle staying tight and the power-generation business sustaining a growth rate that is unlikely to hold at 45% indefinitely.
Catalysts
The first quarter beat and the company lifted its outlook. Kirby reported revenue of $844.1 million, up from $785.7 million, with EPS of $1.50 that beat consensus by 6.4% and grew 12.8% year over year, and it raised full-year 2026 EPS growth guidance to 5% to 15% from 0% to 12%. In inland marine, demand strengthened, barge availability stayed limited, utilization averaged in the low-90% range, and spot pricing rose in the low single digits sequentially with term renewals flat to slightly up.
The standout growth driver was power generation: the distribution and services segment saw power-generation revenue grow 45% year over year, with that business expected to reach 45% to 55% of segment revenue. The catalysts to track are barge utilization and contract-renewal pricing, the levers on the core marine business, and the durability of the power-generation order growth, which is tied to electrification and data-center demand. The pace of term-contract repricing through the year is the cleanest signal of how much of the tight-market pricing power Kirby can lock in.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Marine transportation (reported)
- MATX (Matson, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TDW (TIDEWATER INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- INSW (International Seaways, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TNK (TEEKAY TANKERS LTD.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- FRO (Frontline plc)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- SFL (SFL Corporation Ltd.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Distribution and services (reported)
- CMI (CUMMINS INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- GNRC (GENERAC HOLDINGS INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- DXPE (DXP Enterprises, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- AIT (APPLIED INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- DNOW (DNOW INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- NOV (NOV INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- LBRT (Liberty Energy Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Q1 2026 earnings release