KENON HOLDINGS LTD. (KEN): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $66.54, KENON HOLDINGS LTD. (KEN) is priced for +14.2% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-27.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/KEN

Headline

FieldValue
TickerKEN
CompanyKENON HOLDINGS LTD.
Current price$66.54/sh
CompositionRevenue from sale of electricity and infrastructure services in Israel 75% / Revenue from sale of electricity in US 16% / Revenue from sale of steam in Israel 2% / Revenue from provision of services and other revenue in US 7% / Other revenue in Israel 0%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)3.1%
Operating margin today7.2%
Margin compression (value-band)-4.1pp
Implied growth14.2%
Multiple paid34x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 10: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~9.7pp (computed at the 7% minimum rate; the CAPM rate 6.4% sits below it).

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~7.1 years; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.01σ
sustained it ~5 years at this level50%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset3.24x5expensive
Earnings2.97x3expensive
Relative2.60x5expensive
Growth0.60x5justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.4%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=18)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$188.350.35xyesFCF base $0.2B, growth 16% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.4%, 7yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$110.620.60xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 27.5x / 29.5x / 31.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 7yr
Relative ValuationRelative$51.831.28xyesP/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.2x / 20.0x / 23.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 17.94x
Simple DDMGrowth$117.040.57xyesDPS $5.14, g=4.7% (sustainable: ROE (TTM) × retention; not the terminal-growth assumption), ke=9.3%
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$104.270.64xyesStage 1: 6% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$30.742.16xyesBV/sh $61.07, ROE (TTM) 4.7%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$20.543.24xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$66.811.00xyesRev $0.9B, growth 16% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.2x / 4.0x / 4.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$15.244.37xyesEPS $1.27, growth 6% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=3.72 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$0.9669.31xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.04B × (1−16%) / WACC 7.4% → EPV (no growth) (excluded from median)
Residual IncomeAsset$18.613.58xyesBV $61.07 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 4.7% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 3.0%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$41.781.59xyes√(22.5 × EPS $1.27 × BVPS $61.07) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$25.572.60xyesEBITDA $0.13B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$27.952.38xyesFCF $167.4M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$22.432.97xyesEPS $1.27 × (8.5 + 2×6.3%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$12.175.47xyesBV $61.07 × (ROIC 1.5% / WACC 7.4%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$41.801.59xyesRevenue $0.87B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$11.975.56xyesEPS $1.27 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 6.3% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 9.4x
Earnings YieldEarnings$13.734.85xyesEPS $1.27 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$290.8m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)5.55x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)4.66x
Interest coverage0.7x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-0.8%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The number that matters for Kenon is not an earnings multiple; it is the value of what it owns, and what it owns is a controlling-sized stake in a growing power business. Kenon holds roughly 46% of OPC Energy, and OPC is in an expansion phase across two markets: first-quarter revenue grew to $317 million from $183 million a year earlier on higher electricity sales in Israel and the US, including the consolidation of CPV Shore and expansion of US retail activities. For the full prior year, OPC's adjusted EBITDA including associates climbed to $457 million from $332 million, with associate income rising sharply. A holding company is worth the sum of its parts, and the central part here is a power platform that is materially larger than it was a year ago.

Management has also simplified the story and returned cash, which is what makes a holding-company discount narrow. Kenon fully exited its ZIM exposure by settling a capped call, generating about $34 million of gross proceeds and removing a volatile shipping asset from the picture. That leaves a cleaner structure centered on OPC, which is easier for the market to value. At the same time, Kenon distributed about $200 million in dividends in April 2026, a large return relative to its market value that hands shareholders cash directly rather than leaving it trapped behind a holding-company structure.

The balance sheet at the parent level is sound even though the consolidated figures look levered. Kenon itself holds substantial liquid assets, roughly $1.5 billion, against modest parent-level net debt, with most of the debt sitting inside OPC against its power projects rather than at the holding company. That distinction matters: project debt is serviced by the contracted cash flows of the power assets, not by the parent, so the holding company has the flexibility to keep returning cash and to fund its share of OPC's growth. A clean holding company, anchored to a growing power platform, holding large liquidity and paying out sizable dividends, is a NAV story where the underlying asset is compounding.

Bear Case

Read on its consolidated face, Kenon looks expensive, and that disconnect is the place to start. The consolidated operating margin is thin at about 5.4%, and on a whole-company basis the price sits at a high multiple of operating income, with the asset-value, earnings-power, and peer-multiple methods all reading it as richly valued and only the growth-based method reaching the price. The reason is that consolidated accounting blends the parent with OPC and its project economics, producing a picture that does not cleanly represent either the holding company or the underlying power business. An investor who anchors on the consolidated earnings multiple is using the wrong tool, but an investor who relies on the NAV story has to trust an OPC valuation that is itself uncertain.

The structural drawbacks of a holding company are the real bear case. Holding companies routinely trade at a discount to the value of their parts because shareholders cannot directly control the underlying asset, the parent takes a layer of cost, and the value depends on management choosing to surface it rather than reinvest at lower returns. Kenon's value is now concentrated in a single asset, OPC, which removes the diversification the ZIM stake once provided and ties the whole thesis to one power platform's execution in Israel and the US. Concentration cuts both ways: it simplifies the story, but it also means a setback at OPC, a regulatory change in Israeli power, a financing problem on a US project, or a margin squeeze, flows straight through to Kenon with nothing to offset it.

The financing picture reinforces the caution. Consolidated interest coverage is very thin, a function of the heavy project debt OPC carries to build and operate power plants, and OPC's own first-quarter net profit actually fell to $14 million from $25 million as costs and financing expenses rose. Power generation is capital-intensive and rate-sensitive, and a rising-cost environment pressures the returns on the projects that constitute Kenon's value. The bet a buyer makes at this price is that OPC's expansion compounds value faster than its financing costs and the holding-company discount erode it, in a single-asset structure with little margin for a stumble.

Valuation

The standard valuation lens fails here, and saying so is the honest start. Kenon is a holding company, so its consolidated operating multiple, around 34 times operating income, is not a meaningful read; it blends the parent with OPC's consolidated power economics. The asset-value, earnings-power, and peer-multiple methods all read the consolidated entity as expensive, and only the growth method reaches the price, but for a holding company that pattern reflects the accounting structure more than the underlying value.

The right frame is net asset value: what is Kenon's roughly 46% stake in OPC worth, plus its parent-level cash, less parent debt, against the share price. OPC is growing, with adjusted EBITDA including associates up sharply year over year, so the underlying asset is appreciating; the question is whether the market values Kenon at a discount or premium to that NAV. The exit from ZIM and the large dividend both work to narrow any discount by simplifying the structure and returning cash. A reader should treat the consolidated multiples as noise and the trajectory of OPC's value, plus the parent's capital-return behavior, as the real valuation drivers.

On solvency, the key distinction is parent versus consolidated. The consolidated balance sheet carries heavy project debt at OPC, which is why interest coverage looks thin, but that debt is serviced by the power assets' contracted cash flows rather than by the holding company. At the parent level Kenon holds large liquidity against modest debt, which supports its dividends and its ability to fund OPC's growth. The genuine risk in the valuation is not parent insolvency; it is the single-asset concentration and the dependence on OPC's capital-intensive expansion delivering returns above its rising financing costs.

Catalysts

The recent results centered on OPC and on capital return. OPC reported first-quarter 2026 revenue of $317 million, up from $183 million a year earlier on higher electricity sales in Israel and the US, the consolidation of CPV Shore, and expanded US retail activity, though OPC net profit fell to $14 million from $25 million as costs and financing expenses rose. For full-year 2025, consolidated revenue rose to $872 million from $751 million and profit from continuing operations grew to $148 million from $53 million.

The two corporate catalysts were the dividend and the ZIM exit. Kenon distributed about $200 million in cash dividends in April 2026, and it settled a capped call over five million ZIM shares for about $34 million of gross proceeds, fully exiting its ZIM exposure. The signals to track are OPC's expansion in its US and Israeli markets, the financing costs on its power projects, and Kenon's ongoing capital-return policy, since for a holding company the pace at which it surfaces and distributes the value of its OPC stake is the clearest driver of shareholder return.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Core business (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 results · Kenon 2025 results · Kenon Q1 2026 release

View the full interactive KEN report on boothcheck