J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC. (JBHT): what the price requires

At today's price, J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC. (JBHT) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~7.9 years. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.

Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/JBHT

Headline

FieldValue
TickerJBHT
CompanyJ.B. HUNT TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC.
Current price$284.80/sh
CompositionJBI (Intermodal) 50% / DCS (Dedicated Contract Services) 28% / ICS (Integrated Capacity Solutions) 9% / FMS (Final Mile Services) 7% / JBT (Truckload) 6% / Intersegment Eliminations 0%

What The Price Requires (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin needed8.4%
Operating margin today6.9%
Margin expansion implied+1.5pp
Must persist for7.9y
Multiple paid34x operating income

The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 12, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.7% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~1.9 years.

How unusual the bet is: elevated

ReferenceValue
vs own history+1.05σ
cohort percentile (of 225 peers)76
sustained it ~7.9 years at this level19%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore requires assumptions beyond what those standard frames encode.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset3.42x4expensive
Earnings2.98x5expensive
Relative1.48x5expensive
Growth1.39x3expensive

Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.9%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=17)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$128.532.22xyesFCF base $1.0B, growth 1% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.6%, WACC 8.9%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$262.141.09xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 15.7x / 17.7x / 19.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelative$192.041.48xyesP/E 27.07x (blended: static sector reference 20x + trailing (TTM) 44x), scenarios: 22.8x / 27.1x / 31.3x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13x
Simple DDMGrowth——no—
Two-Stage DDMGrowth——no—
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$70.644.03xyesBV/sh $37.75, ROE (TTM) 17.3%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$95.382.99xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$204.241.39xyesRev $12.1B, growth 1% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.9x / 2.2x / 2.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$108.822.62xyesEPS $6.44, growth 17% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=2.58 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowth——no—
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$82.993.43xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.01B × (1−25%) / WACC 8.9% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$95.602.98xyesBV $37.75 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 17.3% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$73.963.85xyes√(22.5 × EPS $6.44 × BVPS $37.75) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$205.961.38xyesEBITDA $1.61B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$103.552.75xyesFCF $1032.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$95.452.98xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.96B (FCF $1.03B − SBC $0.07B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$207.801.37xyesEPS $6.44 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$13.4821.13xyesBV $37.75 × (ROIC 3.2% / WACC 8.9%) (excluded from median)
P/Sales SectorRelative$254.911.12xyesRevenue $12.13B × sector P/S 2.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$163.231.74xyesEPS $6.44 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 16.9% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 25.3x
Earnings YieldEarnings$69.624.09xyesEPS $6.44 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelative——no—
Clinical Phase NPVGrowth——no—
MertonAsset——no—
V5 Mechanical———no—

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$1.3b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)2.10x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)1.57x
Interest coverage10.9x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-2.7%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Reading J.B. Hunt correctly starts with recognizing what stage it is in: a mature, scaled transport franchise, not a young grower, and the numbers should be read through that lens. A mature business earns its keep through market position, customer retention, and disciplined capital allocation rather than rapid expansion, and on those measures J.B. Hunt is best in class. The 10-K reports customer retention rates of approximately 94%, the kind of stickiness that comes from being deeply integrated into shippers' supply chains across five reportable segments. Intermodal, its largest, pairs the cost advantage of rail with truck-like service, a structural cost position that is hard for smaller competitors to replicate.

The cyclical position is turning the right way, which matters more than the absolute growth rate for a company at this stage. The first quarter delivered the highest first-quarter intermodal volume in company history, with eastern-network loads up 7% and a record weekly volume above 46,000 loads in March, as a predominantly supply-driven freight recovery gained steam. Management noted pricing conditions felt quite a bit different by mid-April than in January, the early signal of a freight up-cycle. After years of an oversupplied, soft freight market, capacity has been leaving the industry, and when demand firms against a tighter supply backdrop, intermodal volumes and pricing both improve, exactly the leverage a recovery provides to the market leader.

The capital discipline is what compounds the recovery for shareholders. J.B. Hunt is shrinking its share count nearly 3% a year through buybacks, took out more than $30 million of costs in the quarter, and is targeting operating-margin expansion into the 10% to 12% range as volumes and pricing recover. The balance sheet is conservative, with net debt under two times operating income and interest coverage around twelve times, so the company can keep investing in equipment and repurchasing stock through the cycle. The bull case is that a dominant, high-retention transport franchise is entering a freight up-cycle with tightening capacity, disciplined costs, and a shrinking share count, the combination that turns a cyclical recovery into durable per-share earnings growth.

Bear Case

The variable with the most leverage over J.B. Hunt is the freight cycle, and the cycle is precisely the thing the current price refuses to acknowledge. Transport is one of the most cyclical industries there is: volumes and especially pricing swing with industrial production, retail inventories, and the balance of trucking capacity against demand. The first-quarter strength came from a supply-driven recovery, meaning it was capacity leaving the market as much as demand surging, and supply-driven recoveries can reverse when weak players stop exiting or new capacity returns. A business this exposed to a macro variable it cannot control should trade at a discount for that uncertainty, not a premium.

Yet the price embeds the opposite. At $271.31 no valuation family reaches the stock: the zero-growth earnings-power value is near $83, the excess-return and residual-income methods in the $70s to $90s, relative valuation near $190, and even the forward-growth methods fall short. The framework flags the name as high, with both the cohort and the fade signals tripped, because the price sits well above where its transport peers and its own through-cycle economics justify. Paying a premium multiple on the early innings of a freight recovery is a classic cyclical trap: if the recovery stalls, both earnings and the multiple compress at once, a double hit that has punished transport stocks repeatedly at cycle peaks.

The external sensitivities pile up beyond the freight cycle itself. J.B. Hunt's intermodal business depends on its rail partners' service and pricing, on port throughput that the 10-K notes can be disrupted by work stoppages, and on diesel and equipment costs that move with commodities and trade policy. Tariffs and trade tensions directly affect the import volumes that feed transcontinental intermodal lanes. The implied bet baked into the price is a long runway of margin expansion and durable compounding, with the inversion reading an implied duration near eight years, an extraordinary assumption for a company whose earnings have historically gyrated with a two-to-three-year freight cycle. The bear case is not that J.B. Hunt is a poor business; it is that the market is pricing a great cyclical as if its current upswing were a permanent growth trajectory.

Valuation

J.B. Hunt is the framework's strongest rich signal: at $271.31 no valuation family reaches the price. The zero-growth earnings-power value lands near $83, the excess-return and residual-income methods in the $70s to $90s, the perpetual-growth DCF near $129, relative valuation near $190, and EV/EBITDA near $206. Every standard approach, asset, earnings, peer-multiple, and even forward growth, says the stock is rich, which means the price is a bet beyond what any conventional frame supports.

The inversion translates that into a duration-and-margin assumption that is hard to defend for a cyclical. With the current operating margin around 7.4%, the price implies a margin near 8.2% sustained over an implied duration of roughly eight years, in effect asking the market to believe J.B. Hunt holds elevated through-cycle margins for the better part of a decade. For a company whose earnings rise and fall with a freight cycle that typically runs two to three years, that is an unusually long runway to underwrite.

Solvency is not the issue. J.B. Hunt carries about $1.3 billion of net debt, net debt under two times operating income, and interest coverage near twelve times, so the balance sheet is sound and supports continued buybacks that shrink the share count nearly 3% a year. The valuation verdict is that this is a high-quality transport franchise trading at a price that requires both a sustained freight up-cycle and a long durability premium to justify.

Catalysts

J.B. Hunt's first quarter of 2026 was a clear beat and signaled a freight up-cycle taking hold. EPS rose 27% year over year to $1.49, above expectations, on revenue of $3.06 billion, with the highest first-quarter intermodal volume in company history; eastern-network loads grew 7%, March volumes were up 8%, and the company set a record weekly volume above 46,000 loads. More than $30 million of cost reductions lifted profitability, and management said pricing conditions felt notably different by mid-April, with margin-expansion targets in the 10% to 12% range as truckload capacity and labor stayed tight.

The catalysts from here are cyclical and execution-driven. The dominant variable is the trajectory of the freight recovery: whether the supply-driven tightening converts into sustained demand-led volume and pricing gains, which would show up in intermodal load growth and in the contractual bid season pricing. Watch the rail partners' service levels, since intermodal economics depend on them, the pace of margin expansion toward the 10% to 12% target, and continued share repurchases. Trade policy and import volumes feed the transcontinental lanes, so tariff developments matter to the volume mix. The question that resolves the stock is whether the early up-cycle becomes a durable, multi-year recovery that the rich valuation requires, or whether it follows the historical pattern of a freight cycle that peaks and rolls over.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Intermodal (JBI) (reported)

Dedicated Contract Services (DCS) (reported)

Integrated Capacity Solutions (ICS) (reported)

Final Mile Services (FMS) (reported)

Truckload (JBT) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

J.B. Hunt Q1 2026 earnings, CCJ / Motley Fool, April 2026 · J.B. Hunt Q1 2026 earnings, CCJ, April 2026

View the full interactive JBHT report on boothcheck