Gartner, Inc. (IT): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $198.39, Gartner, Inc. (IT) is priced for +1.5% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-24.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Exported: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/IT

Headline

FieldValue
TickerIT
CompanyGartner, Inc.
Sector / IndustryIndustrials
Current price$198.39/sh
CompositionInsights 78% / Conferences 10% / Consulting 9% / Other 4%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)3.6%
Operating margin today16.4%
Margin compression (value-band)-12.8pp
Implied growth1.5%
Multiple paid14x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 8.6% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.56σ
cohort percentile (of 225 peers)21

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.30x4expensive
Earnings1.27x4expensive
Relative0
Growth0.88x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.5%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=11)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$356.790.56xyesFCF base $1.4B, growth 2% (input: historical growth), terminal g 2.3%, WACC 7.5%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$225.670.88xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 9.9x / 11.9x / 13.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 15.2x / 18.0x / 20.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$119.591.66xyesBV/sh $0.95, ROE (TTM) 1168.5%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$3967.800.05xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$135.031.47xyesRev $6.5B, growth 2% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.7x / 2.1x / 2.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$143.581.38xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.14B × (1−24%) / WACC 7.5% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$209.620.95xyesBV $0.95 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 1168.5% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$14.6813.51xyes√(22.5 × EPS $10.12 × BVPS $0.95) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $1.26B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$195.661.01xyesFCF $1367.9M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$171.181.16xyesSBC-adj FCF $1.22B (FCF $1.37B − SBC $0.15B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$8.4823.40xyesEPS $10.12 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$1.74114.02xyesBV $0.95 × (ROIC 13.7% / WACC 7.5%) (excluded from median)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $6.47B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$109.411.81xyesEPS $10.12 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Research and Advisory (Insights)operatingenterprise$5.1bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Conferencesoperatingenterprise$645.0mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Consultingoperatingenterprise$552.0mwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$1.3b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)1.63x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)1.24x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-4.2%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Subscription research is an unusual business to own, because the cash arrives before the work does. Clients commit annually, pay up front, and the obligation to serve them sits on the balance sheet as deferred revenue while the money sits in the bank. That is why a company whose revenue slipped 2% in the first quarter still converted the quarter into $371 million of free cash flow, a gain of 29% on the prior-year quarter, and carries rolling four-quarter free cash flow of $1.3 billion on a business guided to at or above $6.405 billion of revenue for the year. Roughly a fifth of every revenue dollar reaches free cash flow. Very few businesses of this size do that.

The economics under it have been improving even as the top line has not. Insights, the research subscription engine and about 78% of the annual mix, produced $1,294.2 million of first-quarter revenue at a 78% gross contribution margin, up 120 basis points on the year before. Conferences, the part most exposed to whether people still want to be in a room together, grew 8% to $78.3 million. Those are not the numbers of a business being abandoned. They are the numbers of a business whose renewals are holding while new commitments slow.

Capital allocation is where the bull case gets concrete. In the first quarter alone the company retired 3,310,253 shares for $534.6 million at an average of $158.49 each, and the count outstanding stood at 66,951,889 by the start of May. Over the past four years the share count has fallen at about 4.2% a year. Today's quote is below the average price paid for that first-quarter block, which means every dollar spent from here retires more of the earnings stream than the same dollar did three months ago. Management is not signalling with a token authorisation; it is spending more than a third of a year's free cash flow in a single quarter.

The balance sheet supports the pace. Cash stood at $1,666.9 million against $3,005.0 million of senior-note principal at the end of March. Net borrowings run at roughly 1.3 times a year of operating profit, and operating income covers the interest bill about 16.1 times over. That is a company with room to keep buying, keep investing, and absorb a bad year without renegotiating anything.

What makes the bull case interesting rather than merely defensive is the shape of what has actually changed. Global technology sales contract value grew 0.4% on a currency-neutral basis to $4.0 billion while global business sales, the non-IT side selling to finance, HR, supply chain and legal functions, grew 3.2% to $1.3 billion. The part of the franchise closest to technology budgets is the part that stalled. The part serving the rest of the enterprise is still growing. If the correct diagnosis is a spending reallocation inside IT departments rather than the obsolescence of paid analysis, then a business that renews most of its clients every year, prices in advance, and buys back a twentieth of itself annually does not need growth to reward an owner. It needs the base to hold.

Bear Case

The unusual feature of this situation is that there is no valuation gap to argue about. Every family of method lands at or above today's quote: peer multiples at 0.72 times, the cash-flow methods at 0.76, and capitalised earnings power at 0.94. The market is already pricing this business for decline. At roughly 11 times operating income, the quote sits below what even a steady annual contraction in operating profit would warrant. So the bear case cannot be that the shares are expensive. It has to be that the market is right.

The evidence it is right sits in the one number that leads everything else. Contract value, the annualised book of subscriptions, reached $5,268.0 million at the end of the first quarter, up about 1% on a currency-neutral basis. Within it, the technology-focused book grew 0.4%. Contract value leads revenue by roughly a year, because it is what gets recognised over the following twelve months. A book growing at 0.4% does not produce a revenue line growing at 5%, and the first quarter showed it: revenue of $1,511.0 million, down 2%, with consulting down 15%.

The mechanism behind the stall is the part that should worry a holder. Gartner sells synthesis: an analyst reads the market, talks to vendors, and hands the client a defensible view. Large language models do a recognisable imitation of that for a fraction of the price, and enterprises now have budget lines for building their own. The company has answered with its own AI product, which is the correct response and also an admission that the interface between client and insight has changed. A low multiple protects an owner when the denominator is stable. It protects nobody when the denominator is the thing at risk, and a business earning less each year at a constant multiple still loses value every year.

The balance sheet is thinner than the cash balance suggests. Years of aggressive repurchase have taken book equity to essentially nothing: the reported book value per share is under a dollar, which is why the asset-based methods produce numbers ranging from absurd to meaningless for this company. There is no accounting floor here. Against that sits $3,005.0 million of senior-note principal. Coverage is comfortable today at about 16.1 times operating income, but coverage is a ratio, and the numerator is the item in question.

Capital allocation compounds the exposure rather than hedging it. Spending $534.6 million in a single quarter to retire 3,310,253 shares at an average of $158.49 concentrates the remaining owners' claim on the same uncertain earnings stream. The shares were bought above where they trade now. Buying back stock is the right call when the business is durable and mispriced; it is the wrong call when the business is repricing for a reason, and from inside the company those two situations look identical.

There is a smaller signal worth noting. The digital markets division was sold to G2 for $110 million. Divesting a non-core asset is ordinary housekeeping. Divesting it for that figure says something about what buyers will pay for a technology-content business right now, which is the same market that sets the price of the parent.

Valuation

Begin with what the quote is not doing. At $139.52, the market is paying roughly 11 times a year of operating profit for a business that generated $316.1 million of operating income in a single quarter and guides to at or above $1.545 billion of EBITDA for the year. That is not a price with growth in it. It is a price below the level even a persistent annual contraction in operating profit would support, which is a different statement entirely: the market has already written down the base, not just the trajectory.

Every family of method agrees, and that agreement is itself the finding. Peer multiples put the quote at 0.72 times where they land. The cash-flow methods, which project the current business forward and exit on today's own multiple held flat, land at 0.76 times. Capitalising current earnings power with no growth at all still lands at 0.94 times. There is no family here that needs an optimistic assumption to reach today's price, which is the opposite of the usual pattern and is what a market pricing structural decline looks like from the inside.

The asset-based lens deserves one sentence and no number. Book equity per share is under a dollar, because more than a decade of repurchases has retired most of the accounting capital, so methods anchored on book value produce results ranging from tiny to enormous depending on which end of the arithmetic they lean on. For a business whose assets are analyst relationships and a renewal book, that is the correct outcome and not a useful one.

What has to be true is straightforward, and it lives in one line. Contract value ended the quarter at $5,268.0 million, up about 1% currency-neutral, with the technology-focused book up 0.4% and the business-function book up 3.2%. Revenue follows that book with roughly a year's lag. Hold the book flat and the current earnings stream is roughly what an owner gets, indefinitely, at eleven times. Let it fall a few points a year and the multiple that looks cheap today expands on its own, without the shares moving at all. The peer set the research business is measured against, FactSet, Morningstar, S&P Global and Moody's, sells data and ratings embedded in workflows and contracts; Gartner sells written judgment. The distinction did not matter much when both were growing.

Solvency bounds the downside rather than driving it. Cash of $1,666.9 million sat against $3,005.0 million of senior-note principal at the end of March, leaving net borrowings around 1.3 times a year of operating profit and interest covered about 16.1 times over. Free cash flow guided to at or above $1.16 billion for the year exceeds the entire net borrowing position. Nothing about the capital structure forces an outcome here. The outcome will be decided by whether enterprises keep paying for someone else to read the market for them.

Catalysts

August 4, 2026 is the next scheduled information event, when second-quarter results are due before the open. The line to read first is contract value, not revenue. Revenue in any given quarter reflects a book that was written up to a year earlier; contract value reflects what clients are committing to now. It closed the first quarter at $5,268.0 million, up about 1% on a currency-neutral basis, with the technology-focused book up 0.4% and the business-function book up 3.2%. A second consecutive quarter near zero would confirm the trend; a reacceleration in the technology book would be the single most informative surprise available.

Guidance is the second item, and it has been moving in one direction. The full-year outlook stands at or above $6.405 billion of revenue, at or above $1.545 billion of EBITDA and at or above $1.16 billion of free cash flow. Against a 2025 revenue base near $6.5 billion, that outlook describes a year of decline rather than growth, and management has now revised it downward more than once. Whether the August print holds that line or trims it again will do more to the shares than the earnings figure attached to it.

The third item runs continuously rather than on a date. Repurchases consumed $534.6 million in the first quarter alone, retiring 3,310,253 shares, and roughly $0.7 billion of authorisation remained at the end of March. At the current quote that authorisation buys a meaningfully larger slice of the company than it did in the first quarter. Watch the pace, because it is the clearest available read on how management sees the durability of the renewal book from the inside.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Research and Advisory (Insights) (reported)

Conferences (reported)

Consulting (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Gartner Q1 2026 Form 10-Q · Gartner press release, Gartner to Report Second Quarter 2026 Financial Results on August 4, 2026 · Gartner Q1 2026 earnings release and Form 10-Q · Gartner Q1 2026 Form 10-Q and earnings release · Gartner Q1 2026 earnings release · reported divestiture, 2026

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