Invitation Homes Inc. (INVH): what the price requires
At today's price, Invitation Homes Inc. (INVH) is priced for -4.7% FFO growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/INVH
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | INVH |
| Company | Invitation Homes Inc. |
| Current price | $30.03/sh |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | reit |
| Implied FFO growth | -4.7% |
| Price-to-FFO | 13.4x |
| FFO yield | 7.5% |
Solve inputs: computed at a 9.1% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -1.75σ |
| cohort percentile (of 88 peers) | 32 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 3.21x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 2.76x | 4 | expensive |
| Relative | 0.99x | 6 | justifies |
| Growth | 0.85x | 5 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.5%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=19)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $49.20 | 0.61x | yes | FCF base $1.2B, growth 5% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.5%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $35.44 | 0.85x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 33.5x / 35.5x / 37.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $41.31 | 0.73x | yes | P/E 26.46x (blended: static sector reference 35x + trailing (TTM) 14x), scenarios: 22.1x / 26.5x / 30.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 24.66x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | $45.61 | 0.66x | yes | DPS $1.22, g=6.4% (sustainable: ROE (TTM) × retention; not the terminal-growth assumption), ke=9.3% |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | $33.14 | 0.91x | yes | Stage 1: 13% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $10.39 | 2.89x | yes | BV/sh $15.00, ROE (TTM) 6.4%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $8.50 | 3.53x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $25.37 | 1.18x | yes | Rev $2.8B, growth 5% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 5.5x / 6.5x / 7.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $29.35 | 1.02x | yes | FFO/share $2.20, growth 13% (input: historical FFO/share growth, 7y median), PEG=2.34 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | $8.25 | 3.64x | yes | BV $15.00 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 6.4% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 4.2%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $27.25 | 1.10x | yes | √(22.5 × FFO/share $2.20 × BVPS $15.00) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $10.64 | 2.82x | yes | EBITDA $0.76B × sector EV/EBITDA 20.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $7.05 | 4.26x | yes | FCF $1198.8M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $6.54 | 4.59x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $1.17B (FCF $1.20B − SBC $0.03B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $64.86 | 0.46x | yes | FFO/share $2.20 × (8.5 + 2×13.3%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $27.60 | 1.09x | yes | Revenue $2.79B × sector P/S 6.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $44.02 | 0.68x | yes | FFO/share $2.20 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 13.3% (input: historical FFO/share growth, 7y median)) → PE 20.0x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $23.78 | 1.26x | yes | FFO/share $2.20 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | $31.21 | 0.96x | yes | FFO/share $2.20 × 14.2x P/FFO (route cohort median, n=85); FFO $1.33B (FFO incl. D&A + impairments, FY2025, companyfacts), shares 606M |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Funds from operations (trailing) | $1.3b |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -0.1% |
| Burning cash | no |
REIT basis: leverage is read against funds from operations (FFO), not depreciation-gutted operating income. The header's implied growth runs on ADJUSTED FFO — FFO minus recurring maintenance capex — so the header's multiple and this leverage ratio use bases that differ by that capex; neither substitutes for the other. Net debt could not be resolved from the corporate debt tags in the filings (REIT notes and mortgage debt are often tagged outside the corporate ladder), so the leverage ratio is withheld rather than rendered from incomplete tags. Interest expense is not separately reported in the cached statements, so fixed-charge coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
- Invitation Homes is the largest owner of single-family rental houses in the U.S., a landlord at institutional scale whose results turn on occupancy and rent growth rather than on any one property.
- The near-term risk is decelerating rent: blended rent growth fell to 1.6% in the most recent quarter as new-lease rents went negative 3.0%, and Core FFO per share was flat year over year.
- Watch the full-year 2026 guidance the company reaffirmed, a Core FFO per share midpoint of $1.94 and same-store NOI growth of just 1.15%, the slowest growth profile the company has guided to in years.
Bull Case
Start with what the market is paying for, then test it against the prints. At today's price the stock is valued where the methods that credit forward growth and peer multiples reach it, and the bet embedded there is straightforward: that the structural shortage of American housing keeps a floor under single-family rents and occupancy for years. The bull case is that this is a defensible bet, because the supply problem is real and Invitation Homes sits on the right side of it.
The operating model has genuine advantages of scale. Owning tens of thousands of houses across high-growth Sun Belt markets lets the company spread fixed costs, negotiate better on maintenance and insurance, and keep homes occupied. Occupancy ran a high 96.3% in the most recent quarter and improved to 97.1% in April, which is the number that matters most for a rental business: an occupied house earns; an empty one bleeds. Renewal rent growth of 3.7% shows the existing residents are accepting increases, which is the stickiest and most reliable part of the rent roll. Total revenue still grew 8.8% year over year to $734 million, so the top line is expanding even in a soft leasing environment.
The demand backdrop is the durable part of the thesis. The barrier to buying a home, high prices and high mortgage rates, is precisely what keeps would-be buyers renting, and single-family rentals capture households that want a yard and a school district but cannot or will not buy. Invitation Homes monetizes that gap at the largest scale in the industry. For a buyer who believes the housing shortage persists, a leading landlord trading at a REIT multiple, collecting rent on a near-fully-occupied portfolio, is a way to own the rental side of a market most people can only access by buying a house.
Bear Case
The bear case worth taking seriously here is not about leverage or occupancy; it is about the political and regulatory target painted on the company's back, and the capital-allocation box that target creates. Invitation Homes exists because it buys single-family homes at scale and rents them, and that exact activity has become a lightning rod. The 10-K names the risk directly: legislation "aimed at limiting institutional ownership and acquisition of single-family homes, may affect the competitive dynamics in our markets by imposing requirements or restrictions that apply differently to various categories of market participants". An institutional landlord whose growth model is buying more houses faces a real prospect that lawmakers make buying more houses harder, more expensive, or, in some jurisdictions, prohibited. That constrains the very lever the growth case relies on.
Underneath the politics, the fundamentals are slowing in a way that strains the multiple. New-lease rent growth turned negative 3.0% in the most recent quarter, blended rent growth fell to 1.6%, and same-store NOI is guided to grow just 1.15% for the full year. Core FFO per share was flat year over year and AFFO per share actually declined 2.6%. The price is reached only by the methods that credit growth and peer multiples; the asset-based and earnings-power lenses say the stock is expensive. So the buyer is paying a growth-supported price for a portfolio whose growth has decelerated to barely above flat. If rent growth stays soft, the multiple has nothing to grow into.
The balance sheet carries meaningful debt, roughly $8.7 billion net, which is normal for a REIT but means the equity is geared to property values and rates. The bear thesis is not a collapse. It is a squeeze: a company facing regulatory headwinds on its acquisition engine, soft new-lease pricing, and a flat FFO trajectory, priced as though the growth will reaccelerate. The risk factors the company lists, from "inability to lease or re-lease homes to residents on a timely basis, on attractive terms or at all" to "macroeconomic shifts in demand for rental homes", are exactly the pressures showing up in the new-lease numbers now.
Valuation
For a residential REIT the right lens is funds from operations and net operating income, not net income or book value, and read that way the price is paying for growth that has thinned out. Core FFO per share is running around the $1.94 midpoint the company guides for the full year, essentially flat against the prior year, while same-store NOI is set to grow just over 1%. The price assumes that flatness is a trough, not a new normal.
The methods divide along that assumption. The relative-multiple and forward-growth families reach the current price; the asset-based and earnings-power families sit below it, calling the stock expensive against what the portfolio earns and is worth on a static basis. That split is the tell: the price is supported only if you credit a reacceleration in rent growth, because on today's flat FFO the conservative methods do not get there. The premium over the asset value is a bet that the housing shortage tightens the rental market again and pushes blended rent growth back above the 1.6% it printed most recently. Among residential and diversified REIT peers, this is a name priced closer to a growth REIT than its current same-store numbers justify.
Solvency is the ordinary REIT picture rather than a red flag. Net debt of roughly $8.7 billion funds a large, occupied portfolio, and the share count has been essentially stable, so there is no dilution drag. The leverage is the amplifier on the downside if property values or rates move against the company, but it is not unusual for the sector. The decisive number is not on the balance sheet; it is the new-lease rent line. At negative 3.0% it is signaling a soft leasing market, and the price is waiting for that to turn.
Catalysts
The most recent quarter, the first of 2026, set the slowing tone. Total revenue rose 8.8% year over year to $734 million, but net income available to common stockholders fell 3.5% to $160 million, or $0.26 per diluted share, and Core FFO per share was flat at $0.48 while AFFO per share declined 2.6% to $0.41. The leasing detail carried the message: renewal rent growth of 3.7%, new-lease rent growth of negative 3.0%, and blended growth of just 1.6%, against occupancy of 96.3% that improved to 97.1% in April.
The company reaffirmed its full-year 2026 guidance, with a Core FFO per share midpoint of $1.94 and an AFFO per share midpoint of $1.64, same-store core revenue growth of 1.9%, operating-expense growth of 3.5%, and NOI growth of 1.15%. The expense line growing faster than revenue is the squeeze that holds FFO flat, and it is the dynamic each subsequent quarter will test.
The overhang to watch is legislative. Management flagged uncertainty around laws aimed at institutional single-family ownership as a factor that could affect future growth, the same risk the 10-K describes. Because the company's growth depends on acquiring more homes, any tightening of the rules on institutional buyers bears directly on the path of FFO per share beyond this year.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Single-family residential (single segment) (reported)
- AMH (American Homes 4 Rent)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- EQR (EQUITY RESIDENTIAL)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ESS (ESSEX PROPERTY TRUST, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- AVB (AVALONBAY COMMUNITIES, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MAA (MID-AMERICA APARTMENT COMMUNITIES, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- UDR (UDR, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CPT (CAMDEN PROPERTY TRUST)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ELS (EQUITY LIFESTYLE PROPERTIES, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Invitation Homes Q1 2026 earnings release