Illumina, Inc. (ILMN): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $191.76, Illumina, Inc. (ILMN) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~9.9 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-27.

Generated: 2026-07-29 · Exported: 2026-08-01 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ILMN

Headline

FieldValue
TickerILMN
CompanyIllumina, Inc.
Current price$191.77/sh
CompositionConsumables 74% / Instruments 11% / Service and other revenue 15%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)32.0%
Operating margin today19.4%
Margin expansion (value-band)+12.6pp
Must persist for9.9y
Multiple paid35x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 10.7% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~2 years.

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~7.1 years; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: elevated

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.38σ
cohort percentile (of 190 peers)63
sustained it ~9.9 years at this level14%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset3.20x5expensive
Earnings3.09x4expensive
Relative1.57x5expensive
Growth1.48x3expensive

Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=17)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$77.422.48xyesFCF base $1.0B, growth 1% (input: historical growth), terminal g 1.3%, WACC 9.1%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$157.671.22xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 25.3x / 27.3x / 29.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelative$122.121.57xyesP/E 22.99x (blended: static sector reference 18x + trailing (TTM) 35x), scenarios: 19.5x / 23.0x / 26.5x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 16.58x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$59.883.20xyesBV/sh $17.38, ROE (TTM) 31.9%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$116.111.65xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$129.451.48xyesRev $4.4B, growth 1% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 5.7x / 6.7x / 7.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$173.821.10xyesEPS $5.50, growth 32% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.10 (Fair)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$0.0119176.50xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.06B × (1−15%) / WACC 9.1% → EPV (no growth) (excluded from median)
Residual IncomeAsset$92.132.08xyesBV $17.38 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 31.9% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$46.374.14xyes√(22.5 × EPS $5.50 × BVPS $17.38) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$82.422.33xyesEBITDA $1.10B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$64.772.96xyesFCF $974.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$46.384.13xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.71B (FCF $0.97B − SBC $0.26B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$177.471.08xyesEPS $5.50 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$10.4918.28xyesBV $17.38 × (ROIC 5.5% / WACC 9.1%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$71.312.69xyesRevenue $4.39B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$206.250.93xyesEPS $5.50 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$59.463.23xyesEPS $5.50 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$433.0m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)0.60x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)0.51x
Interest coverage8.5x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-0.8%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The counterintuitive fact about Illumina is that the flat top line hides an accelerating business. Total revenue has been roughly flat to slightly down, which reads like a company in decline, but underneath that, clinical consumables grew 20% ex-China in the fourth quarter of 2025. The flat headline is the average of a research market in retreat and a clinical market compounding fast, and the clinical side is the one that monetizes the installed base for decades. Management guides the clinical business to double-digit to mid-teens growth in 2026 while acknowledging the research segment stays muted. A company whose fastest-growing, highest-recurring segment is being masked by a cyclical drag in a different segment is exactly the kind of mispricing the headline number invites.

The model is why that clinical growth is so valuable. Illumina sells the sequencers, but the money is in the consumables that customers buy every time they run a sample. Its 10-K describes an ecosystem where "A large and dynamic Illumina user community has published hundreds of thousands of customer-authored scientific papers using our technologies", which is the switching cost in plain sight: a lab that has built its protocols, its published results, and its staff training around Illumina chemistry does not casually move to a competitor's platform. Once a NovaSeq X is installed, it pulls a stream of consumables revenue for years, and the transition to the higher-throughput X system, which drove Q1 2026 results through stronger-than-expected placements, expands that razor base.

The balance sheet and capital discipline round out the case. Net debt is only about $433 million, roughly half a year's operating income, with interest covered more than eight times over, so this is a financially sound company, not a turnaround leaning on leverage. The share count has edged lower, and management has been clear about the trajectory: the CEO has said the company expects 2026 to look better than 2025 and 2027 to look better than 2026. Layered on top is the multiomics expansion through the SomaLogic acquisition, broadening what the installed base can be sold. The bull case is that the dominant platform in genomics is being valued on a depressed research cycle while its clinical engine quietly compounds.

Bear Case

The question for Illumina is whether the current earnings are a base to grow from or a level to defend, and the demand cycle argues for caution. The research market, a large share of Illumina's customers, has been pulling back: the 10-K notes that "some customers, specifically research customers, continue to manage inventory and capital more conservatively", and that softness sits against NIH funding uncertainty that pressures the academic and government labs that buy sequencing capacity. When a meaningful slice of demand is tied to public research budgets, the company does not control its own volume, and a funding squeeze becomes a revenue squeeze. China compounds the problem, where export restrictions and local competition have weighed on what was once a growth market. Flat total revenue is the symptom: the demand cycle has turned against the research and China pieces at the same time.

That cyclical pressure runs into competition that is closing the gap. Illumina's filing warns plainly that "Some of our competitors have, or will have, substantially greater financial resources", and the sequencing market has drawn well-funded rivals offering instruments aimed at the same biological questions. The installed-base moat is real, but it erodes at the edges every time a competitor wins a new placement, because that placement pulls a decade of consumables to a rival platform instead of to Illumina. In China specifically, domestic sequencing companies have taken share that may not come back even if export rules ease. A dominant franchise facing better-capitalized competitors in a slowing market is the classic setup for margin and growth disappointment.

The valuation leaves no room for any of that to go wrong. At about $162 (June 27, 2026) the market pays roughly 31 times operating income, embedding growth at the company's self-funding ceiling for about nine years, a persistence only about one in five comparable fast-growers has achieved. Every family of valuation method lands below the price: asset, earnings-power, peer-multiple, and even forward-growth approaches all say richly valued. When no method reaches the price, the market is paying for an outcome beyond what any standard frame supports. Current operating margin is about 19%, and the price implies that climbing toward 27% and holding for years. The balance sheet is sound, so this is not a solvency bear; it is a valuation-against-the-cycle bear. If the research recovery is slower than the bulls hope, or competition keeps taking placements, the multiple compresses toward where the methods sit, and the de-rating is the loss even before earnings fall.

Valuation

What the price assumes is a long runway. At about $162 Illumina trades near 31 times operating income, and inverting that says the market is paying for operating growth held at the company's self-funding ceiling for roughly nine years. The near-term rate is within what Illumina has delivered in good years; the stretch is the duration, because only about one in five comparable fast-growers has sustained that pace for nine years. The reason the bar is so high is the current margin: operating margin sits near 19%, and the price implies it expanding toward 27% and staying there, a doubling-down on both growth and profitability at the same time.

The methods we use to triangulate are unanimous, and they all say expensive. Asset-based methods land well below the price because book value does not capture the franchise. Earnings-power approaches, which capitalize current profit, sit low because reported operating income against a large enterprise value implies a rich multiple. Peer multiples, drawn from precision-instrument and life-science tools companies, put it below the price too. Even the forward-growth methods, which usually justify a premium franchise, do not reach the current level. When every family lands below the price, the market is paying for an outcome beyond what any standard method can frame, which here means the durability of the genomics franchise far past what the visible numbers support. The peer cohort, instrument and tools makers, is a useful adjacency but an imperfect comp, because none of them has Illumina's consumables-pull economics, so the premium is partly the market crediting a better business model and partly crediting growth that has not yet appeared in the consolidated line.

Solvency is the one place there is no concern. Net debt of about $433 million is roughly half a year's operating income, interest coverage runs above eight times, and the share count has been falling. That removes balance-sheet risk from the equation entirely; nothing forces Illumina's hand in a downturn. What bounds the downside is not the balance sheet but the distance between the price and where every valuation method lands. The buyer at this price is underwriting a market leader whose clinical engine is strong and whose research and China exposure is weak, at a multiple that requires the strong part to carry the whole company at an unusual pace for the better part of a decade.

Catalysts

The recent results show the two-speed business. For fiscal 2025, Illumina guided to roughly flat constant-currency revenue, 0% to 2%, and in the fourth quarter the CEO highlighted 20% growth in clinical consumables revenue ex-China even as total growth stayed muted. Q1 fiscal 2026 was stronger, with revenue up 4.8% driven by better-than-expected NovaSeq X placements and clinical consumables demand, and the company lifted its 2026 EPS outlook. Total revenue guidance for 2026 is $4.52 billion to $4.62 billion, with the clinical business guided to double-digit to mid-teens growth and the research segment expected to stay soft.

Two external developments frame the next few quarters. China is the swing factor: export restrictions and NIH funding uncertainty have pressured demand, and any easing of China trade tensions would directly help a business that has lost share there. On strategy, the GRAIL spin-off completed in Q2 2024 simplified the company, and the SomaLogic acquisition expanded the multiomics portfolio, broadening the menu sold into the installed base. The events to watch are each quarter's clinical-versus-research split and any concrete change in China access, because together they decide whether the clinical strength can outrun the research and China drag.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Core Illumina (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Illumina FY2025 results, 8-K · Illumina 2026 guidance commentary · Illumina Q1 FY2026 results, 8-K · Illumina 2025 corporate activity · Illumina 2026 commentary

View the full interactive ILMN report on boothcheck