INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP (IBM): what the price requires
At today's price, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP (IBM) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~5.1 years. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-13 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/IBM
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | IBM |
| Company | INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP |
| Current price | $291.03/sh |
| Composition | Hybrid Cloud 11% / Automation 11% / Data 9% / Transaction Processing 13% / Strategy and Technology 17% / Intelligent Operations 14% / Hybrid Infrastructure 16% / Infrastructure Support 8% / Financing 1% / Other 0% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 15.6% |
| Operating margin today | 11.9% |
| Margin expansion implied | +3.7pp |
| Must persist for | 5.1y |
| Multiple paid | 44x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 12, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 7.5% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~2.2 years.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~8.9 years; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: high
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +5.04σ |
| cohort percentile (of 177 peers) | 72 |
| sustained it ~5.1 years at this level | 33% |
| implied end-window share | 1% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 2.48x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 3.20x | 4 | expensive |
| Relative | 0.95x | 4 | justifies |
| Growth | 0.83x | 3 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.5%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=15)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $413.25 | 0.70x | yes | FCF base $13.5B, growth 10% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.5%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $349.91 | 0.83x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 603.6x / 605.6x / 607.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $278.32 | 1.05x | yes | P/E 28x (sector median), scenarios: 23.4x / 28.0x / 32.6x (bear / base = sector held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 44x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $98.03 | 2.97x | yes | BV/sh $34.63, ROE (TTM) 26.2%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $166.69 | 1.75x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $251.77 | 1.16x | yes | Rev $68.9B, growth 10% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.4x / 4.0x / 4.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $109.02 | 2.67x | yes | EPS $9.08, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=17.52 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | $146.13 | 1.99x | yes | BV $34.63 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 26.2% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $84.14 | 3.46x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $9.08 × BVPS $34.63) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $0.01 | 29103.00x | yes | EBITDA $0.56B × sector EV/EBITDA 20.0x (excluded from median) |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $84.67 | 3.44x | yes | FCF $12913.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $64.01 | 4.55x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $11.09B (FCF $12.91B − SBC $1.82B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $293.13 | 0.99x | yes | EPS $9.08 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $434.25 | 0.67x | yes | Revenue $68.91B × sector P/S 6.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $340.67 | 0.85x | yes | EPS $9.08 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $98.21 | 2.96x | yes | EPS $9.08 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $55.7b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 8.40x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 7.36x |
| Interest coverage | 3.9x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 1.2% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
- IBM has finished its long transition into a software-first company, and the proof is in the margin: its Software segment generated $29,962 million of revenue in fiscal 2025 at an 83.5% gross margin, the kind of economics that justify a higher multiple than its hardware-and-services past ever earned.
- The defining risk is debt and pace: net debt of about $56 billion sits at more than seven times trailing operating income, and IBM keeps spending on acquisitions, including the recent $11.6 billion Confluent deal, so the software growth has to outrun the interest and integration cost.
- Watch the software mix: first-quarter 2026 software revenue grew 11.3%, with Red Hat up 13% and Data up 19%, and the durability of that double-digit software growth is what the price is paying for.
Bull Case
Read where the price sits against the methods and IBM looks less stretched than its reputation suggests. At $249.01 (as of June 27, 2026), the price is defended by the peer-multiple and forward-growth lenses, which land near and above the price, while only the static asset and earnings-power lenses say expensive. That split is the signature of a business whose value lives in forward earnings power rather than book value, which is exactly what a software company should look like. The relative-valuation method, anchored on a sector earnings multiple, lands near $278, and the growth-adjusted earnings methods land in the $290-to-$340 range, all above today's price. The market is not paying a frothy multiple for IBM; it is paying a software multiple for a company that has become a software company.
The transformation is real in the numbers, not just the narrative. In fiscal 2025 the Software segment produced $29,962 million of revenue at an 83.5% gross margin. Software gross margins above 80% are the highest-quality revenue in technology, and they now anchor the portfolio. Total reportable-segment profit reached $16,364 million on $67,472 million of segment revenue, and the first quarter of 2026 carried the momentum forward: software revenue grew 11.3%, led by Red Hat up 13% and Data up 19%, while consulting grew 4% and total revenue rose 9.5% to $15.9 billion. The hybrid-cloud and AI franchises, Red Hat as the open-source layer and watsonx plus mainframe-based AI inferencing on top, give IBM a position in enterprise AI that sits alongside the hyperscalers rather than competing head-on with them.
Cash generation is the bull case's anchor, and it is improving. IBM produced about $12.9 billion of trailing free cash flow, and management reported its highest first-quarter free cash flow in a decade, reiterating full-year 2026 guidance for over 5% revenue growth at constant currency and roughly a $1 billion increase in free cash flow. Return on equity runs about 26% on a book of $34.63 per share, evidence that the software-weighted business earns well on its capital. That cash funds a substantial dividend and the acquisitions that keep the software portfolio current, including the $11.6 billion purchase of Confluent to add real-time data streaming, a deal IBM had signaled in its own 10-K. The bull case is that an 83%-gross-margin software engine throwing off record cash deserves the multiple the market is paying.
Bear Case
Name the competitors, because they are larger and faster. IBM's hybrid-cloud and AI strategy puts it in the same arena as the hyperscalers, Microsoft, Amazon, and Google, whose cloud platforms carry deeper balance sheets, faster organic growth, and a stronger gravitational pull on enterprise AI workloads. IBM's screened hardware peers, Cisco, Dell, and HP, are the legacy neighborhood it is trying to leave behind, but the company it most needs to outrun is not on that list. The bear case is that IBM is a credible enterprise-software player growing software at low double digits, while the platforms it competes with grow faster and define the AI roadmap. Red Hat and watsonx are genuine assets, but IBM is a participant in the AI buildout, not a leader of it, and the price increasingly assumes it can hold its ground against companies expanding theirs.
The balance sheet is where the transformation gets expensive. Net debt sits at about $56 billion, more than seven times trailing operating income, with interest coverage of roughly 3.9 times, and IBM keeps adding to the load through acquisitions: the $11.6 billion Confluent purchase is the latest in a string of deals used to refresh the software portfolio. A meaningful portion of that debt supports the Financing segment and is not pure corporate leverage, but the company is buying growth rather than generating all of it organically, and acquisition-led growth carries integration risk, intangible amortization that suppresses reported earnings, and the standing question of what happens when the deal pipeline pauses. The consulting business, $5.3 billion in the quarter, grew only 4%, a reminder that a large slice of IBM is still a services business with services-business growth.
The valuation methods that say expensive are the ones worth taking seriously here. The earnings-power and asset lenses, which capitalize current profit and read book value, land well below the price, near $84 to $166 per share on the credible models. The forward-growth and peer-multiple lenses that defend the price do so by crediting continued double-digit software growth for roughly seven years, and the priced-in assumption reads as high relative to history: the durability of that software growth is the entire bet. If software growth slows toward the consulting segment's mid-single-digit pace, or if the hyperscalers pull more enterprise AI spend onto their platforms, the multiple the relative methods rely on compresses toward the sector and the static methods become the relevant anchor. IBM has executed a genuine turnaround; the bear case is that the price now assumes the turnaround keeps accelerating rather than maturing.
Valuation
The price is best read on the segments, because IBM is a portfolio of businesses with very different economics. The embedded assumption is roughly seven years of continued elevated growth in the highest-margin parts of that portfolio, principally software. That is a durability bet on the software franchise rather than a margin-expansion bet, and it reads as high relative to what a company IBM's size and age typically sustains, but it is anchored on real, demonstrated software momentum rather than a speculative leap.
How far the price sits from the methods depends entirely on which part of IBM you weight. The peer-multiple and forward-growth lenses defend the price: the relative-valuation method lands near $278 on a sector earnings multiple, and the growth-adjusted earnings methods land in the $290-to-$340 range, all at or above $249.01. The static lenses say expensive: the earnings-power and zero-growth cash-flow methods land near $64 to $98 per share, and the asset methods near $84 to $166. The pattern is clear and coherent, the price is justified by what IBM is becoming, a software-and-AI company worth a software multiple, and looks rich against what it earned as a legacy hardware-and-services company. The right comparison is the software-weighted forward lens, and on that lens the price is reasonable; the static lenses simply cannot value an 83%-gross-margin software engine on its trailing asset base.
Solvency is the place to temper the optimism. Net debt of about $56 billion is large, sitting at more than seven times trailing operating income with interest coverage near 3.9 times, though a meaningful share supports the Financing segment rather than the operating business. Free cash flow of roughly $12.9 billion comfortably covers the dividend and funds the acquisition cadence, and the share count has been roughly flat, with modest growth of about 1.2% a year. The decisive number for IBM is not a single valuation output; it is whether software keeps growing at double digits, because that growth is what makes the relative-multiple defense of the price hold and what services the debt the transformation has accumulated.
Catalysts
IBM reported first-quarter 2026 results on April 22, 2026, and beat on both lines. Revenue rose 9.5% year over year to $15.9 billion, ahead of consensus, and earnings per share of $1.91 exceeded the $1.81 forecast. Software was the engine, up 11.3% to $7.1 billion with Red Hat up 13% and Data up 19%, while consulting grew 4% to $5.3 billion. Free cash flow rose to its highest first-quarter level in a decade, and management emphasized mainframe-based AI inferencing as a driver of margin and cash-flow expansion.
The forward setup combines reaffirmed guidance with continued portfolio investment. Management reiterated its full-year 2026 view for over 5% revenue growth at constant currency and roughly a $1 billion increase in free cash flow. On the deal front, IBM completed its $11.6 billion acquisition of Confluent, adding real-time data streaming to its software stack, a transaction it had flagged in its annual filing. The watch items are the durability of double-digit software growth, the pace of Red Hat and Data, and whether the AI and hybrid-cloud positioning translates into share against faster-growing hyperscaler platforms, because that trajectory is what the price is paying for.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Software (reported)
- MSFT (MICROSOFT CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ORCL (Oracle Corp)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- SAP (SAP SE)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CRM (Salesforce, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- NOW (ServiceNow, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- DT (Dynatrace, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Consulting (reported)
- ACN (Accenture plc)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CTSH (COGNIZANT TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- DXC (DXC Technology Co)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- EPAM (EPAM SYSTEMS, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- IT (Gartner, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- INFY (INFY)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Infrastructure (reported)
- HPE (HEWLETT PACKARD ENTERPRISE COMPANY)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- DELL (Dell Technologies Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- NTAP (NetApp, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- STX (Seagate Technology Holdings plc)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- WDC (WESTERN DIGITAL CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CSCO (CISCO SYSTEMS, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Financing (reported)
- HPE (HEWLETT PACKARD ENTERPRISE COMPANY)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- DELL (Dell Technologies Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CSCO (CISCO SYSTEMS, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- HPQ (HP INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- NTAP (NetApp, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- STX (Seagate Technology Holdings plc)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- WDC (WESTERN DIGITAL CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- SNDK (Sandisk Corporation)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Article Insight (Recent News Sentiment)
Sentiment score: 65.00 (MEDIUM confidence) FUD/Hype: HYPE_DETECTED (The article frames the post-earnings slide as an overreaction and emphasizes the potential of IBM's quantum and AI initiatives, leaning towards optimistic speculation.) Claim alignment: MIXED
The article suggests IBM’s recent price decline is an overreaction, emphasizing the undervaluation of its quantum and AI potential.
247wallst.com
- Scope: Discusses IBM’s post-earnings performance and future prospects in AI and quantum computing.
- Data: IBM trades at 18.6x forward P/E, described as “obscenely cheap.”
- Verdict: Aligns with the bull case regarding optionality, but relies on speculative future value.
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
IBM FY2025 10-K, accession 0000051143-26-000010 · IBM Q1 2026 earnings release, April 2026