HOME BANCSHARES, INC. (HOMB): what the price requires
At today's price, HOME BANCSHARES, INC. (HOMB) is priced for 12.2% return on equity. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/HOMB
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | HOMB |
| Company | HOME BANCSHARES, INC. |
| Current price | $29.13/sh |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | financials |
| Return on equity needed | 12.2% |
| Return on equity now | 11.1% |
| ROE gap | +1.1pp |
| Price-to-book | 1.35x |
Solve inputs: computed at a 10.1% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage, on common book equity (FY2026); each 1pp of cost of equity moves the implied ROE ~1.4pp.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +1.26σ |
| cohort percentile (of 119 peers) | 46 |
| sustained it ~10 years at this level | 69% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.02x | 3 | expensive |
| Earnings | 0.74x | 2 | justifies |
| Relative | 0.71x | 3 | justifies |
| Growth | 1.18x | 2 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.7%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=10)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Bank Fair Value (P/TBV) | — | $20.30 | 1.43x | yes | TBVPS $14.85 × 1.37x (ROE (TTM) 11.0% / CoE 9.3%, g=5.0% (sustainable: 65% retention × ROE, 5% cap; not the terminal-growth assumption), credit 1.94% allowance/loans → ×1.00, NPL 1.17% → ×0.97) |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $25.50 | 1.14x | yes | P/E 10x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 8.4x / 10.0x / 11.6x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA N/Ax |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | $26.23 | 1.11x | yes | Stage 1: 17% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $26.29 | 1.11x | yes | BV/sh $22.11, ROE (TTM) 11.0%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $28.57 | 1.02x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $23.47 | 1.24x | yes | Rev $0.9B, growth 5% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 5.3x / 6.4x / 7.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $40.76 | 0.71x | yes | EPS $2.43, growth 17% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.71 (Undervalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Graham Number | Asset | $34.77 | 0.84x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $2.43 × BVPS $22.11) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $78.41 | 0.37x | yes | EPS $2.43 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $61.14 | 0.48x | yes | EPS $2.43 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 16.8% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 25.2x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $26.27 | 1.11x | yes | EPS $2.43 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 4.6% |
Deposit/float-funded balance sheet: debt is funding, not corporate leverage, and GAAP operating cash flow follows loan flows. Net-debt, interest-coverage, and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The solvency frame for a financial is regulatory capital and payout capacity (CET1, stress buffer, dividends plus buybacks against earnings).
Bullet Takeaways
- Home BancShares, parent of Centennial Bank, is one of the most profitable banks of its size, posting a Q1 2026 return on average assets of 2.09% and an efficiency ratio of 41.6%, meaning it spends less than 42 cents to earn a dollar of revenue.
- The biggest specific risk is credit concentration: non-performing loans jumped to $182.1 million in the quarter, driven mostly by a single relationship of $92.1 million placed on non-accrual.
- The capital cushion is the comfort: CET1 of 16.7% sits far above regulatory minimums, giving the bank room to absorb credit losses, fund acquisitions, and return capital while book value per share rose to $22.15.
Bull Case
Banks are not valued like ordinary companies. The right lens is what return the bank earns on its capital and how cheaply it produces a dollar of revenue, and on both measures Home BancShares is exceptional. Its first-quarter 2026 return on average assets was 2.09%, roughly double what a typical community bank earns, and its efficiency ratio was 41.6%, meaning it converts revenue to profit with unusually little overhead. A net interest margin of 4.51% sits well above peers, the product of disciplined deposit pricing and a loan book that earns strong spreads.
The profitability is durable because it is built into how the company operates rather than borrowed from a favorable rate cycle. Net income held at $118.2 million with diluted EPS of $0.60, consistent with the prior quarter on stable revenue and tight cost control. The filing shows management actively tuning the margin, noting in its annual report that holding approximately $500 million in excess liquidity was dilutive to the net interest margin by 8 basis points, the kind of granular attention to spread that explains the sustained outperformance.
The capital position is what lets the bank play offense. CET1 stood at 16.7%, far above the level regulators require, with Tier 1 capital at the same mark and a leverage ratio of 14.3%. That excess capital is dry powder: it absorbs credit losses without threatening the dividend, funds the acquisitions that have built the franchise, and supports buybacks. Book value per share rose to $22.15, and the stock sits in the lower half of its peer group on price-to-book despite earning a return near the top of that group. The bull case is a best-in-class operator earning a premium return, priced at a discount to peers, with a fortress balance sheet behind it.
Bear Case
When the valuation methods disagree about a bank, the conservative ones usually deserve the benefit of the doubt, because a bank's reported profit is only as good as the loans behind it, and loan losses arrive suddenly. Home BancShares gave a live example this quarter: non-performing loans jumped to $182.1 million, driven mostly by a single relationship of $92.1 million placed on non-accrual. One borrower going bad is not a crisis for a bank this well-capitalized, but it is a reminder that the pristine 2.09% return on assets and the high net interest margin can be undercut by concentration in the loan book that does not show up until a credit sours.
The earnings-power and peer-multiple lenses read the stock as supported but not cheap, and that caution is well founded for a bank earning at a cyclical-best level. A 2.09% return on assets and a sub-42% efficiency ratio are extraordinary, which is precisely the problem with extrapolating them: returns this far above the industry norm tend to normalize as competition for deposits and loans intensifies and as the credit cycle turns. The company itself acknowledges in its 10-K that in an economic downturn it becomes more difficult for us to estimate the losses that we will experience in our loan portfolio, and that regulators may force a larger allowance for credit losses. An allowance build flows straight through to earnings.
The price already assumes the good times persist. At roughly 1.3 times book the market is paying for a sustained return on equity near 12%, modestly above the roughly 11% the bank has recently earned. That gap is not large, but it leaves little room if the net interest margin compresses in a falling-rate environment, if the single large non-accrual is the first of several, or if the bank's acquisitive growth, which has lifted the share count about 4.6% a year, dilutes the per-share return. The bear case is not that Home BancShares is a weak bank; it is the opposite. The risk is that a bank earning at the top of its cycle, with a fresh credit blemish, is priced for that peak to hold.
Valuation
A bank is worth the return it earns on its capital, so the valuation runs off price-to-book rather than an earnings multiple, and Home BancShares trades around 1.3 times book. That price embeds a sustained return on equity near 12%. The useful benchmark is what the bank has actually been earning: roughly 11.1% on equity, supported by a 2.09% return on average assets that is among the best for its size. The implied return sits just above the recent result, so the price is not demanding a leap, only that the current profitability holds.
The families of method line up supportively, which is what makes this a value-and-quality read rather than a growth bet. The asset-based, earnings-power, peer-multiple, and growth approaches all back the current price, and the stock sits in the lower half of its peer group on price-to-book even though it earns a return near the top of that group. That combination, premium profitability at a discounted multiple, is the heart of the valuation case. The catch is the one the credit picture raises: the implied 12% return assumes the net interest margin and the loss rate stay near today's favorable levels.
For a bank, solvency is read through regulatory capital rather than corporate leverage, and here the picture is unusually strong. CET1 of 16.7% and a leverage ratio of 14.3% sit far above what regulators require, giving the bank ample buffer to absorb the recent non-performing-loan increase and still return capital through dividends and buybacks. The valuation, then, is less about whether the bank is sound, it plainly is, than about whether returns this far above the industry can persist. The discounted multiple says the market is skeptical they fully will; the fortress capital position says the downside is well protected either way.
Catalysts
The Q1 2026 report, released in mid-April, showed top-tier profitability holding steady. Net income was $118.2 million with diluted EPS of $0.60, a return on average assets of 2.09%, a net interest margin of 4.51%, and an efficiency ratio of 41.6%, results the company described as consistent with the prior quarter on stable revenue and disciplined expense management. Book value per share rose to $22.15, and total revenue reached $266.7 million. The one blemish was credit: non-performing loans climbed to $182.1 million, the bulk of it a single $92.1 million relationship moved to non-accrual.
The forward agenda has two threads to watch. First, the credit trajectory: whether the large non-accrual resolves cleanly or signals broader stress, and whether the allowance for credit losses needs to build, which would pressure earnings. The bank's heavy capital cushion, CET1 at 16.7%, means it can absorb a setback without threatening its distributions. Second, the company's long-running acquisition strategy, which has expanded the franchise across the Southeast and Texas and is the most likely source of step-change growth. The cleanest checkpoints ahead are the quarterly net interest margin against the current 4.51%, the path of non-performing loans, and any announced deal activity that would deploy the excess capital.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Banking Segment (reported)
- PB (PROSPERITY BANCSHARES, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ABCB (Ameris Bancorp)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CVBF (CVB FINANCIAL CORP.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CATY (Cathay General Bancorp)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- IBOC (INTERNATIONAL BANCSHARES CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CHCO (CITY HOLDING COMPANY)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TCBK (TriCo Bancshares)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- BANR (Banner Corporation)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Q1 2026 earnings release