Hamilton Insurance Group, Ltd. (HG): what the price requires
At today's price, Hamilton Insurance Group, Ltd. (HG) is priced for 8.0% return on equity. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-19 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/HG
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | HG |
| Company | Hamilton Insurance Group, Ltd. |
| Current price | $35.32/sh |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | financials |
| Return on equity needed | 8.0% |
| Return on equity now | 29.8% |
| ROE gap | -21.8pp |
| Price-to-book | 0.86x |
Solve inputs: computed at a 8.7% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage, on common book equity (FY2026); each 1pp of cost of equity moves the implied ROE ~0.9pp.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -1.05σ |
| cohort percentile (of 80 peers) | 9 |
| sustained it ~10 years at this level | 82% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 0.38x | 3 | justifies |
| Earnings | 0.36x | 2 | justifies |
| Relative | 0.42x | 3 | justifies |
| Growth | 0.50x | 2 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=10)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Bank Fair Value (P/TBV) | — | $165.67 | 0.21x | yes | TBVPS $25.92 × 6.39x (ROE (TTM) 32.2% / CoE 9.3%, g=5.0% (sustainable: 65% retention × ROE, 5% cap; not the terminal-growth assumption)) |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $85.04 | 0.42x | yes | P/E 8.24x (blended: static sector reference 11x + trailing (TTM) 4x), scenarios: 6.7x / 8.2x / 9.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 10x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | $277.81 | 0.13x | yes | Stage 1: 20% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $93.01 | 0.38x | yes | BV/sh $26.74, ROE (TTM) 32.2%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $181.53 | 0.19x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $40.41 | 0.87x | yes | Rev $2.9B, growth 21% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.0x / 1.2x / 1.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $73.08 | 0.48x | yes | EPS $6.09, growth 1% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=2.86 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Graham Number | Asset | $60.54 | 0.58x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $6.09 × BVPS $26.74) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $196.50 | 0.18x | yes | EPS $6.09 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $228.38 | 0.15x | yes | EPS $6.09 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $65.84 | 0.54x | yes | EPS $6.09 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -0.4% |
Deposit/float-funded balance sheet: debt is funding, not corporate leverage, and GAAP operating cash flow follows loan flows. Net-debt, interest-coverage, and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The solvency frame for a financial is regulatory capital and payout capacity (CET1, stress buffer, dividends plus buybacks against earnings).
Bullet Takeaways
- Hamilton is a Bermuda-based specialty insurer with an unusual edge: its investment portfolio is run through a dedicated Two Sigma fund that contributed $93.1 million, a 4.3% quarterly return, to Q1 2026 results.
- The biggest risk is that same investment engine: the Two Sigma Hamilton Fund swings the book value, which fell 3.8% in the quarter even as underwriting profits rose.
- Watch the combined ratio and book value together: underwriting improved to a 89.8% combined ratio from 111.6%, and the stock trades below book at roughly 0.8 times.
Bull Case
Hamilton's structural advantage is a two-engine model most insurers cannot replicate. The company describes itself in its filing as operating with "a unique investment management relationship with Two Sigma" alongside underwriting operations in London, Dublin, Bermuda, and across the United States. That is the differentiator: a specialty underwriter whose float is managed by a quantitative investment firm with a long track record, so the company earns money both from disciplined underwriting and from an investment portfolio that has compounded well above a typical insurer's bond book. The Two Sigma Hamilton Fund has delivered roughly a 13% annualized return since its 2014 inception, which is the kind of investment edge that, sustained, can drive returns on equity no plain-vanilla carrier matches.
The underwriting half has turned sharply profitable. In Q1 2026 the combined ratio improved to 89.8% from 111.6% a year earlier, meaning Hamilton kept more than 10 cents of every premium dollar after claims and expenses, helped by no catastrophe losses in the quarter. Net income was $133.5 million and gross premiums written grew 11.5% to $940.1 million, led by 19.7% growth in the International segment and a Bermuda combined ratio that fell to 81.8%. A carrier growing premiums double digits while improving its underwriting margin is firing on the part of the business it controls most directly.
The valuation is where the bull case sharpens. Hamilton has recently been earning a return on equity near 30%, yet the stock trades at about 0.8 times book, below its tangible book value. Every family of valuation method supports the price, none calls it expensive, and the inversion shows the market assuming the return on equity fades all the way to about 7.6%, a fraction of what the company has earned. The investment-driven volatility is real, but a profitable underwriter with a differentiated investment engine, trading below book while compounding both, is the kind of value setup the methods rarely line up behind so uniformly.
Bear Case
The fragility in Hamilton is on the balance sheet, and it comes from the very feature the bull case celebrates. Most insurers invest their float in high-grade bonds precisely so the asset side stays stable while the underwriting side takes the risk. Hamilton instead runs a large share of its portfolio through the Two Sigma Hamilton Fund, a quantitative strategy valued at about $2.3 billion, and that means the company's book value moves with the fund's performance quarter to quarter. The evidence is in the most recent print: book value per share fell 3.8% in Q1 2026 even though underwriting was profitable, because the investment side did not keep pace. An insurer whose net worth can decline in a quarter of clean underwriting is carrying a kind of risk its peers deliberately avoid.
That investment dependence compounds the inherent volatility of the underwriting itself. The year-ago combined ratio of 111.6% is a reminder that this is a specialty and reinsurance book exposed to catastrophe losses; a single heavy season can swing the underwriting result from this quarter's profit to a loss. When both the underwriting and the investment engines can have a bad period at the same time, the high recent return on equity near 30% is best read as a peak rather than a through-cycle figure, and the market's assumption that it fades toward 7.6% may simply reflect that the two-engine model is more variable than the headline return suggests.
The sub-book valuation is itself a signal worth respecting rather than dismissing. The stock trades at roughly 0.8 times book and sits in the lower half of its peer group's price-to-book, which is the market applying a discount to a relatively young public company with a complex, hedge-fund-linked investment portfolio and a short track record as a listed insurer. A reinsurer that can lose book value in a benign quarter, whose returns depend on a single external investment manager, and whose underwriting carries genuine catastrophe tail risk, is a business the market is pricing cautiously for reasons that are not obviously wrong.
Valuation
An insurer is worth the return it earns on its capital, so the lens is price against book value. At about $31.43 (June 27, 2026) Hamilton trades near 0.8 times book, below its tangible book value, and the price assumes a sustained return on equity of only about 7.6%. The company has recently been earning closer to 29.8%, so the price is not asking the business to improve; it is assuming the high return collapses to a quarter of its recent level. That is an unusually conservative bet, which is why the methods line up the way they do.
Every family of valuation method supports the price. The asset-value and earnings-power approaches, which read the insurer off its book and current returns, land well above today's price; the relative-multiple and growth methods reach it too. No family calls the stock expensive. The peer-multiple read blends a sector earnings multiple near 11 times with a depressed trailing figure, reflecting how lumpy Hamilton's reported earnings can be. The honest framing is that the price is supported on every measure and trades at a discount to book, with the discount reflecting the market's caution about the investment-driven volatility rather than any method judging the underwriting expensive.
Solvency for an insurer is capital adequacy and payout capacity, not corporate leverage; net-debt and coverage math do not apply to a float-funded balance sheet. The relevant facts are the strong underwriting margin on a 89.8% combined ratio, the share count edging slightly lower, and the central swing factor, the Two Sigma Hamilton Fund whose performance moves book value directly. What a buyer underwrites at this price is a profitable specialty insurer trading below book, with a differentiated investment engine that is both the source of its above-average returns and the reason its book value, and therefore its valuation, can move in ways a conventional carrier's would not.
Catalysts
Hamilton's first quarter of 2026 combined strong underwriting with a solid investment quarter. Net income was $133.5 million and operating income $166.7 million on net premiums earned of $570.5 million, with the combined ratio improving sharply to 89.8% from 111.6% a year earlier, helped by the absence of catastrophe losses. Gross premiums written grew 11.5% year over year to $940.1 million, led by 19.7% growth in the International segment and a Bermuda combined ratio that fell to 81.8%.
The investment side, the company's distinguishing feature, contributed net investment results of $177.1 million, including $93.1 million from the Two Sigma Hamilton Fund, which returned 4.3% in the quarter. The fund, valued at about $2.3 billion, has delivered a roughly 13% annualized return since its 2014 inception. Despite the profitable quarter, book value per share declined 3.8% from year-end, though book value plus dividends rose 3.2%, illustrating how the investment portfolio drives the equity base.
The forward catalysts to watch are the upcoming catastrophe season and its effect on the combined ratio, the quarter-to-quarter performance of the Two Sigma Hamilton Fund and its impact on book value, and the continued premium growth in the International and Bermuda segments.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- SPNT (SIRIUSPOINT LTD.)
- FY2025 10-K: …and Peers The worldwide insurance and reinsurance markets are highly competitive. Competition is influenced by a variety of factors, including prices charged, coverage and other terms and conditions offered, financial strength ratings, prior history and relationships, as well as expertise and claims handling…
- FY2025 10-K: …reinsurance brokers, has experienced significant consolidation over the last several years. These consolidated client and competitor enterprises may try to use their enhanced market power to negotiate price reductions for our products and services and/or obtain a larger market 32 share through increased line sizes.…
- WTM (WHITE MOUNTAINS INSURANCE GROUP, LTD)
- FY2025 10-K: …London market participants and major U.S., Bermuda, European and other international insurance and reinsurance companies. Many of these competitors have greater financial resources, have more established long-term and continuing business relationships throughout the insurance and reinsurance industries and may have…
- FY2025 10-K: …revenues 8.2 5.8 - Total P&C Insurance Distribution revenues 246.3 179.8 - Specialty Insurance Distribution (Distinguished) Commission and fee revenues 56.7 - - Other revenues 1.0 - - Total Specialty Insurance Distribution revenues 57.7 - - Other Operations Earned insurance premiums 22.2 32.7 - Net investment income…
- KNSL (KINSALE CAPITAL GROUP, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …and reinsurance we seek to underwrite. See "Business - Competition." In recent years, the insurance industry has undergone increasing consolidation, which may further increase competition. A number of new, proposed or potential legislative or industry developments could further increase competition in our industry.…
- FY2025 10-K: …with poor loss histories. We target classes of business where our underwriters have extensive experience allowing us to compete effectively and earn attractive returns. Our underwriters specialize in individual lines of business which allows them to develop in-depth knowledge and experience of the risks they…
- RLI (RLI Corp)
- FY2025 10-K: …actions could ultimately impact our overall results. We are vulnerable to the actions of other companies who may seek to write business without the appropriate regard for risk and profitability, especially during periods of intense competition for premium. During these times, it is very difficult to grow or…
- FY2025 10-K: Our primary competitors in the property segment include AmRisc, Arch, Arrowhead, CNA, Golden Bear, Lexington, Liberty Mutual, Markel, Palomar, RSUI, Special Risk Underwriters, Travelers, Velocity and Westchester. Our primary competitors in the surety segment are AIG, Arch, Beazley, Berkley, Chubb, CNA, Great…
- CINF (CINCINNATI FINANCIAL CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: …policyholders • Claims satisfaction and reputation We compete with major U.S., Bermudian, European, and other international insurers and reinsurers and with underwriting syndicates, some of which have greater financial, marketing and management resources than we do. Industry consolidation, including business…
- FY2025 10-K: …each segment. The financial performance of each segment is discussed in Item 7, Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations. Cincinnati Financial Corporation - 2025 10-K - Page 14 Table of Contents Commercial Lines Insurance Segment In 2025, the commercial lines insurance…
- HCI (HCI Group, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …Insurance Operations. The Exzeo segment includes insurance technology and operations solutions for property and casualty insurance carriers. The Reciprocal Exchange Operations segment represents the insurance operations of consolidated reciprocal insurance exchanges that are owned by their policyholders. The Real…
- FY2025 10-K: …Reciprocal Exchange Operations segment represents the insurance operations of consolidated reciprocal insurance exchanges that are owned by their policyholders. The Real Estate segment relates to our commercial real estate group that is primarily engaged in the business of developing and operating commercial…
- ORI (OLD REPUBLIC INTERNATIONAL CORP)
- FY2025 10-K: , driven by lower interest rates and strong commercial business production. Commercial premiums represented 26% of net premiums earned. Title, escrow, and other fees declined 7.1% as a result of the sale of certain technology platforms earlier in the year which was slightly offset by growth in escrow and closing…
- FY2025 10-K: 7.0 % 97.1 % __________ (a) Title loss, expense, and combined ratios are calculated on the basis of combined net premiums and fees earned. Title Insurance experienced premium growth compared to last year, however, an elevated combined ratio reflects difficult market conditions, lower favorable reserve development, a…
- PLMR (Palomar Holdings, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: Some of these competitors also have longer operating history and more market recognition than we do in certain lines of business. In addition, we compete against state or other publicly managed enterprises including the California Earthquake Authority ("CEA"), the National Flood Insurance Program, and the Texas Wind…
- FY2025 10-K: …reform of the insurance industry could increase competition from standard carriers. We may not be able to continue to compete successfully in the insurance markets. Increased competition in these markets could result in a change in the supply and demand for insurance, affect our ability to price our products at…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
HG Q1 2026 results, May 2026 · HG FY2025 10-K · HG Q1 2026 earnings release, May 2026