HOME DEPOT, INC. (HD): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $330.20, HOME DEPOT, INC. (HD) is priced for +7.2% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-08-06.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/HD

Headline

FieldValue
TickerHD
CompanyHOME DEPOT, INC.
Sector / IndustryConsumer Cyclical
Current price$330.20/sh
CompositionAppliances 8% / Bath 4% / Building Materials 8% / Electrical 5% / Flooring 5% / Hardware 5% / Indoor Garden 6% / Kitchen & Blinds 5% / Lighting 2% / Lumber 7% / Millwork 5% / Outdoor Garden 6% / Paint 7% / Plumbing 8% / Power 8% / Storage & Organization 3% / Other net sales (SRS/GMS) 8%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)6.7%
Operating margin today12.4%
Margin compression (value-band)-5.7pp
Implied growth7.2%
Multiple paid19x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 8.2% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.22σ
cohort percentile (of 212 peers)60

Valuation X-Ray

Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.14x5expensive
Earnings2.16x4expensive
Relative0
Growth1.49x4expensive

Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=13)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$214.241.54xyesFCF base $15.1B, growth 2% (input: historical growth), terminal g 2.4%, WACC 9.0%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$290.121.14xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 11.9x / 13.9x / 15.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.8x / 20.0x / 23.2x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 14x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$120.772.73xyesStage 1: -4% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$154.162.14xyesBV/sh $16.66, ROE (TTM) 85.6%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$842.560.39xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$229.251.44xyesRev $169.2B, growth 2% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.6x / 1.9x / 2.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$172.541.91xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $22.12B × (1−25%) / WACC 9.0% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$258.501.28xyesBV $16.66 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 85.6% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$73.184.51xyes√(22.5 × EPS $14.29 × BVPS $16.66) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $24.64B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$151.752.18xyesFCF $15099.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$145.662.27xyesSBC-adj FCF $14.54B (FCF $15.10B − SBC $0.56B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$11.9827.56xyesEPS $14.29 × (8.5 + 2×-3.9%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$33.569.84xyesBV $16.66 × (ROIC 18.1% / WACC 9.0%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $169.18B × sector P/S 1.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$154.492.14xyesEPS $14.29 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Primary segment (US/Canada/Mexico retail)operatingenterprise$152.0b$20.6b operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Other (SRS non-reportable specialty trade distribution)operatingenterprise$12.7b$316.0m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$56.6b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)3.57x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)2.69x
Interest coverage8.7x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-0.7%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Housing affordability and muted project demand are the obvious objections to owning Home Depot. The latest operating evidence does not remove that risk, but it makes a prolonged retreat harder to assume. The first-quarter filing states that "Net sales for the first quarter of fiscal 2026 were $41.8 billion", up 4.8% from the prior year, while "comparable sales for the first quarter of fiscal 2026 increased 0.6%". Acquisitions supplied much of the difference, yet the core business still grew slightly in a difficult housing backdrop. That is a sturdier starting point than the macro story alone suggests.

The stronger bull argument is that Home Depot is turning a collection of stores and distributors into one operating system for professional customers. The 10-K says its mobile applications and digital tools "can also help serve the needs of Pros, including those working on complex projects". SRS adds roofing, building products, landscape and pool distribution, and the filing says SRS acquired GMS to pursue a "leading, multi-category building materials distributor". This expands the relationship from a remodeler's shopping trip to the purchasing, delivery and trade-credit workflow of a larger job. The benefit is not merely more products. It is a greater share of each project.

The first quarter also showed how the mix is changing: Home Depot's retail operations remain the profit engine, while SRS and GMS broaden the revenue base and deepen access to complex Pro work. A share count declining about 0.9% annually over the four years through May 3, 2026 means each remaining share participates in more of that system. The bull case is therefore less dependent on an immediate housing rebound than it first appears. It requires Home Depot to convert its Pro distribution reach into durable operating-profit growth, and the early sales evidence supports that route without yet proving the five-year outcome priced into the shares.

Bear Case

The narrative dependency is simple: today's price requires operating income to grow about 10.2% a year for five years, a pace slightly above Home Depot's recent average. Management's fiscal 2026 outlook calls for total sales growth of 2.5% to 4.5% and an operating margin of 12.4% to 12.6%. Those ranges leave much of the required operating-profit growth for later years, a stronger revenue recovery, or future margin expansion. Only a little over half of comparable fast-growers sustained a similar pace for roughly five years. The bet is plausible, but it is not forgiving.

Housing is the first dependency. The 10-K says "Our financial performance depends significantly on the stability of the housing and home improvement markets", and first-quarter comparable sales rose only 0.6%. A business can gain distribution breadth while households still defer kitchens, flooring and other large discretionary projects. At the same time, "Prices of certain commodity products, including lumber and other raw materials, are historically volatile", which can move ticket size and gross profit without signaling healthier unit demand. Revenue growth bought through acquisitions is useful, but it does not by itself establish that the existing store base can compound operating income at the rate embedded in the price.

Execution adds a second dependency. Home Depot describes competitors that range from "traditional brick-and-mortar, to multichannel, to exclusively online", and its own filing warns, "We cannot guarantee that our current or future fulfillment options will be maintained and implemented successfully". The Pro strategy asks stores, SRS, GMS, HD Supply, digital tools and delivery assets to behave like one network. If the integration produces organizational complexity faster than customer loyalty, the market will have paid for coordination before it appears in operating profit.

The balance sheet reduces the room for a slow conversion. Net debt is $56.1 billion, equal to about 2.7 times operating income over the reconstructed four-quarter period through May 3, 2026, although that period's operating profit still covered interest about 8.6 times. This is manageable rather than fragile. It is also substantial enough that a miss on the revenue-and-margin path would reach equity holders more directly than it would at a net-cash company.

Valuation

At $353.23, the market is paying for operating income to grow about 10.2% a year for five years. The starting base is $20.7 billion of operating income over the reconstructed four-quarter period through May 3, 2026, and the first-quarter filing reports that "Net sales for the first quarter of fiscal 2026 were $41.8 billion". The required growth rate sits modestly above Home Depot's recent average, while the real demand is persistence: the business must keep compounding through a housing cycle, integration work and normal competitive pressure.

The valuation methods are consistently more restrained than the share price. The cash-flow and forward-growth methods center well below the market, while the earnings-power methods collectively sit lower still. The exit-multiple cash-flow method gets closest because it assumes today's 14.9 times EV/EBITDA relationship still applies at the end of year five. That makes growth and duration do the work. A single retail multiple is not a sound substitute because the operating scope now includes a distinct distribution business; the quarterly filing says "As of May 3, 2026, SRS was organized as four lines of business". The supported valuation read therefore rests on consolidated cash generation and does not assign one blanket multiple across retail and specialty distribution.

The balance sheet sets the downside conditions. The 10-K reported "At February 1, 2026, we had $1.4 billion in cash and cash equivalents"; the current packet carries $56.1 billion of net debt, with operating profit covering interest roughly 8.6 times. Shares outstanding declined about 0.9% annually from May 2022 through May 2026, so capital return is visible in the per-share base. Gross profit also remained substantial in the latest quarter: "Gross profit for the first quarter of fiscal 2026 increased 2.4% to $13.8 billion". The current price combines a durable operating base with a five-year growth requirement that is achievable only if Pro expansion and core home-improvement demand convert into profit together.

Catalysts

The nearest information event is Home Depot's fiscal Q2 earnings release on August 18, 2026, at 9:00 a.m. ET. The useful test is whether comparable sales can improve from the modest first-quarter pace while the company preserves its fiscal 2026 operating-margin guidance of 12.4% to 12.6%. Management also reaffirmed full-year total sales growth of 2.5% to 4.5% and comparable sales growth from flat to 2.0%. That print will show whether acquisition-led growth is being joined by healthier demand in the existing store base.

A July 30 organizational realignment is the next execution marker. Home Depot unified leadership across merchandising, loyalty, financial services, Pro and technology, and created an Office of Pro Acceleration to coordinate Home Depot Pro, HD Supply, SRS and Construction Resources. The company described a Pro addressable market of about $700 billion and an operating network of more than 2,360 stores, 1,300 branches, 325 customer-facing warehouses and roughly 16,000 delivery assets in that release. Subsequent disclosures should reveal whether the reorganization simplifies cross-selling and fulfillment or merely adds another management layer.

SRS completed its acquisition of Mingledorff's on May 11, adding 42 HVAC distribution locations across five southeastern states and a new vertical that Home Depot sizes at about $100 billion. Financial terms were not disclosed. The catalyst is operational: evidence of cross-selling, coordinated fulfillment and profitable growth in SRS would support the Pro thesis, while rising distribution revenue without corresponding operating leverage would weaken it.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Primary segment (US/Canada/Mexico retail) (reported)

Other (SRS non-reportable specialty trade distribution) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Home Depot investor relations announcement, August 4, 2026 · Home Depot Q1 fiscal 2026 earnings release, May 19, 2026 · Home Depot organizational realignment release, July 30, 2026 · Home Depot Mingledorff's completion release, May 11, 2026

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