HASBRO, INC. (HAS): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $94.23, HASBRO, INC. (HAS) is priced for +1.5% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-27.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/HAS

Headline

FieldValue
TickerHAS
CompanyHASBRO, INC.
Current price$94.23/sh
CompositionWizards of the Coast and Digital Gaming 47% / Consumer Products 52% / Entertainment 2%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)11.2%
Operating margin today20.6%
Margin compression (value-band)-9.4pp
Implied growth1.5%
Multiple paid14x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 8.7% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.26σ
cohort percentile (of 212 peers)32

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value, while earnings-power lands below the price. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.23x4expensive
Earnings1.55x5expensive
Relative0.92x2justifies
Growth0.76x4justifies

Families that justify the price: Asset, Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.4%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$343.370.27xyesFCF base $1.3B, growth 16% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.4%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$162.730.58xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 11.3x / 13.3x / 15.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelative——noP/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.4x / 20.0x / 23.6x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13x
Simple DDMGrowth——no—
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$99.670.95xyesStage 1: 20% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$60.871.55xyesBV/sh $5.00, ROE (TTM) 112.6%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$518.750.18xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$91.521.03xyesRev $5.6B, growth 16% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.9x / 2.4x / 2.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$67.321.40xyesEPS $5.61, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=8.37 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowth——no—
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$19.384.86xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.64B × (1−23%) / WACC 7.4% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$103.260.91xyesBV $5.00 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 112.6% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$25.123.75xyes√(22.5 × EPS $5.61 × BVPS $5.00) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative——noEBITDA $1.29B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$65.521.44xyesFCF $1213.6M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$58.201.62xyesSBC-adj FCF $1.12B (FCF $1.21B − SBC $0.10B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$181.020.52xyesEPS $5.61 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$2.8932.61xyesBV $5.00 × (ROIC 4.3% / WACC 7.4%) (excluded from median)
P/Sales SectorRelative——noRevenue $5.63B × sector P/S 1.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$210.370.45xyesEPS $5.61 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$60.651.55xyesEPS $5.61 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelative——no—
Clinical Phase NPVGrowth——no—
MertonAsset——no—
V5 Mechanical———no—

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Wizards of the Coast and Digital Gamingoperatingenterprise$2.4b—withheldunresolved no unit value
Consumer Productsoperatingenterprise$2.7b—withheldunresolved no unit value
Entertainmentoperatingenterprise$125.4m—withheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$2.2b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)2.41x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)1.86x
Interest coverage6.9x
Share count CAGR (dilution)0.7%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The counterintuitive fact about Hasbro is that the most valuable thing it owns is not a toy. Inside a company the market still files under toys sits Wizards of the Coast, the maker of Magic: The Gathering and Dungeons & Dragons, and it behaves like a high-margin software business. In the first quarter Wizards revenue grew 26% to $582 million at a 51.2% segment operating margin, up 140 basis points, with Magic backlist and the collectible Secret Lair line both growing double digits. A 51% operating margin is not toy economics; it is the economics of a beloved intellectual-property franchise with a recurring set-release cadence and a devoted player base that buys every expansion. Lorwyn Eclipsed became the best-selling Magic Premier set ever, and the next set surpassed it again, which is the kind of repeatable hit cadence that compounds.

The digital layer extends that moat beyond cardboard. The 10-K describes "Magic: The Gathering Arena and its related mobile application, both of which complement the Company's direct-to-customer relationships with our new and long-time MAGIC: THE GATHERING fan-base." Selling directly to fans through a digital platform shortens the path between Hasbro and its highest-value customers, raises margins, and generates data on what those fans want next. The company further breaks Wizards into "Tabletop Gaming and Digital and Licensed Gaming," a structure that lets it monetize the same IP across physical and digital channels.

The consolidated results show the games engine carrying the whole company. First-quarter net revenue rose 12.7% to just over $1 billion, operating profit reached $270.3 million at a 27% operating margin, and diluted earnings per share were $1.39. The bull case is a simple reframe: as Wizards grows from roughly half the company toward more, the blended margin and the blended growth rate rise toward the gaming segment's profile, and a market still pricing Hasbro on its toy heritage is underrating the games business it has become.

Bear Case

The bear case is the sector cycle pulling against the gaming story: the larger half of Hasbro is still toys, and toys are a flat, tariff-exposed, retail-dependent business. Consumer Products revenue was essentially flat at $398 million in the first quarter, and it absorbed $8.3 million of incremental tariff costs in the period alone. Toys are discretionary, sold through a concentrated set of large retailers, and manufactured heavily in Asia, so the segment sits at the intersection of three pressures: soft consumer demand, retailer inventory decisions, and trade policy. The 10-K names the supply-chain exposure directly, flagging risk from "closures or reductions in operations at third-party manufacturing facilities across several geographies" and "adverse sales impact due to changes in consumer purchasing behavior and availability of prod[ucts]." A consolidated valuation that prices the whole company off the gaming segment's strength has to keep this segment from deteriorating, and tariffs make that harder.

The second pressure is the durability of the gaming franchise itself, because the bull case leans so heavily on it. Magic's strength rests on a cadence of hit set releases, and hit-driven businesses are inherently lumpier than they look in a strong year. The same release schedule that produced record Premier sets has to keep producing them; a weak set, fan fatigue from over-releasing, or a misstep in the digital products could slow the segment that is carrying the company. The 10-K acknowledges the risk that "acquisitions, licenses, dispositions and other investments we complete may not provide us with the benefits we expect," a reminder that the IP strategy is not guaranteed to keep compounding.

Leverage frames the downside. Net debt of roughly $3.1 billion runs at about four times through-the-cycle operating income, with interest covered around 4.6 times, so the balance sheet has limited slack if the toy cycle worsens or a Magic year disappoints. The trailing operating margin was depressed to around 2% by cycle and charges, which is why the valuation has to use a normalized, through-the-cycle margin to make sense at all, and normalization is an assumption rather than a fact. The bear case is that the price pays for a clean blend of a great gaming business and a recovering toy business, when the toy half is structurally challenged and the gaming half, however excellent, is hit-driven and cannot be assumed to compound forever.

Valuation

Hasbro's valuation requires a step most companies do not: because trailing earnings are depressed by the cycle and one-time charges, the price is measured against the company's own through-the-cycle margins rather than the trough quarter. On that normalized basis, Hasbro trades at about 22 times mid-cycle operating income, which inverts into roughly 14% annual operating-profit growth for five years. That is demanding, and only about 46% of comparable companies sustained that pace even five years, though it is within what Hasbro has delivered when the games engine is firing.

The families of method read the way they do for a business with two very different halves. The asset lens is distorted, reading the price at many times book because the balance sheet carries large intangibles, so it is the wrong tool here. Earnings power and peer multiples both flag the price as expensive against trailing and normalized earnings, and only the forward-growth method reaches it. The pattern says the price is not supported by the static methods; it is a bet on the mix shift toward the high-margin games segment continuing. The right way to value Hasbro is by its parts: Wizards at a 51% operating margin deserves a far higher multiple than a flat, tariff-exposed toy business, and the consolidated multiple is a weighted average of the two. The peer set that matters is the toy comparison for Consumer Products and a games-and-IP frame for Wizards, not a single leisure-products multiple.

Solvency bounds the downside but does not erase the leverage. Net debt of roughly $3.1 billion at about four times through-the-cycle operating income, with interest coverage near 4.6 times, is manageable while the games segment is strong but tightens if the toy cycle worsens. The share count is roughly flat. A buyer at this price is underwriting the continued growth of the Magic and gaming franchise to keep lifting the blended margin and growth rate while the toy business at least stabilizes against tariff and demand pressure, paying a normalized multiple that the trailing earnings do not support and that depends on the mix shift the company is engineering actually playing out.

Catalysts

Hasbro's first quarter of 2026 was carried by gaming. Net revenue rose 12.7% to just over $1 billion, operating profit reached $270.3 million at a 27% margin, and diluted EPS was $1.39, with Wizards of the Coast revenue up 26% to $582 million at a 51.2% segment operating margin. Lorwyn Eclipsed became the best-selling Magic Premier set ever, and the company noted that Secrets of Strixhaven, released in the second quarter, has already surpassed it, signaling continued momentum into the current period.

The set-release cadence and the tariff environment are the catalysts to track. Magic's strength depends on the steady release of expansions that fans buy, so each new set's performance is a discrete event for the most profitable part of the company. On the other side, Consumer Products was flat and absorbed $8.3 million of incremental tariff costs in the quarter, so the trajectory of trade policy and the company's sourcing response directly affect the toy segment's margin.

Management maintained full-year guidance targeting constant-currency revenue growth of 3% to 5% and adjusted EBITDA of $1.40 to $1.45 billion. The variables that move the fundamental story are the durability of the Magic release slate, the pace of any toy-demand recovery, and the tariff and sourcing picture. The next quarterly report will show whether Wizards keeps carrying the company and whether the consumer-products drag is stabilizing or worsening.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Wizards of the Coast and Digital Gaming (reported)

Consumer Products (reported)

Entertainment (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Hasbro Q1 2026 results

View the full interactive HAS report on boothcheck