HALLIBURTON COMPANY (HAL): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $36.60, HALLIBURTON COMPANY (HAL) is priced for +0.4% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-24.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/HAL

Headline

FieldValue
TickerHAL
CompanyHALLIBURTON COMPANY
Sector / IndustryEnergy
Current price$36.60/sh
CompositionCompletion and Production 58% / Drilling and Evaluation 42%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)4.1%
Operating margin today11.4%
Margin compression (value-band)-7.3pp
Implied growth0.4%
Multiple paid15x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 8.2% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.04σ
cohort percentile (of 48 peers)63

Valuation X-Ray

Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.76x5expensive
Earnings1.79x4expensive
Relative1.56x2expensive
Growth1.51x3expensive

Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=14)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$20.261.81xyesFCF base $1.7B, growth 1% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.6%, WACC 8.1%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$33.321.10xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 4.8x / 9.8x / 14.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 12.71x (blended: static sector reference 10x + trailing (TTM) 19x), scenarios: 9.5x / 12.7x / 15.3x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 7.15x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$20.791.76xyesBV/sh $13.22, ROE (TTM) 14.6%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$25.781.42xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$24.161.51xyesRev $22.4B, growth 1% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.0x / 1.4x / 1.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 6x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$19.601.87xyesEPS $1.21, growth 16% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.17 (Fair)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$32.241.14xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $3.31B × (1−19%) / WACC 8.1% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$26.531.38xyesBV $13.22 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 14.6% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$18.971.93xyes√(22.5 × EPS $1.21 × BVPS $13.22) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $3.73B × sector EV/EBITDA 6.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$15.002.44xyesFCF $1725.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$39.040.94xyesEPS $1.21 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$5.966.14xyesBV $13.22 × (ROIC 3.7% / WACC 8.1%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $22.37B × sector P/S 1.2x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$29.411.24xyesEPS $1.21 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 16.2% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 24.3x
Earnings YieldEarnings$13.082.80xyesEPS $1.21 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Completion and Productionoperatingenterprise$12.8bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Drilling and Evaluationoperatingenterprise$9.4bwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$5.8b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)2.78x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)2.25x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-2.0%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The turn everyone was waiting on showed up in North America. Revenue there rose 7% sequentially to $2.3 billion in the June quarter on stronger U.S. land stimulation and well construction activity, and management expects incremental improvement through the rest of the year on the strength of recent contract awards. For a business whose North American exposure has been the drag on the story, a quarter of sequential recovery in the highest-beta part of the portfolio changes the direction of the argument.

International did more than hold the line. Revenue outside North America reached $3.4 billion, up 5% sequentially and the strongest second quarter in more than a decade, with Europe and Africa up 19% on activity in the North Sea, Namibia, Egypt and Angola. That is the half of the business that runs on multi-year national oil company programmes rather than on the spot decisions of shale operators, and it is compounding while the domestic market recovers. Total revenue of $5.7 billion and operating income of $778 million both improved on the March quarter's $5.4 billion and $679 million.

Both segments participated. Completion and Production, at 58% of revenue the larger line, generated $3.2 billion with operating income of $474 million, up 8% sequentially, and Drilling and Evaluation added $2.5 billion, up 5%. Completion work is the earlier cyclical signal because it tracks the decision to bring wells online rather than the decision to drill them, so improvement there tends to lead rather than lag.

The cash story is where the bull case gets its ballast. The June quarter produced $824 million from operations and $668 million of free cash flow, against capital spending guided to $1.1 billion for the full year. Roughly $200 million of stock was repurchased in the quarter, with management signalling a return to that quarterly pace, alongside a declared dividend of $0.17 a share. Share count has fallen about 1.8% a year since 2022. An oilfield services business that funds its equipment, pays a dividend and still shrinks its share count through the soft part of the cycle is being run for owners rather than for scale.

The last piece is the one the trailing numbers obscure. Full-year 2025 operating income of $2.3 billion was reduced by impairments and other charges, and excluding them the company reported adjusted operating income of $3.1 billion. Charges of that kind are real cash and real mistakes, but they are also non-recurring by construction. The earnings base the business actually runs on is meaningfully above what the last twelve reported months show, and the bull case is simply that the market is still marking the company against the depressed figure while the operating run rate climbs back toward the other one.

Bear Case

The trouble with valuing this company is that no single year describes it. Operating income was $3.8 billion in 2024 and $2.3 billion in 2025 on revenue that barely moved, $22.9 billion falling to $22.2 billion. A business where profit can fall by two fifths while revenue barely moves is a business with enormous operating leverage running in both directions, and the June quarter's recovery is one data point inside that swing, not an escape from it. Whatever multiple an investor pays today is a multiple on a number that has proven it can halve.

Which is why the price sits where it does relative to every standard frame. Asset-based work lands about 1.68 times below today's price. The methods that capitalise current earnings power land about 2.31 times below. Peer multiples land about 1.76 times below, and even the forward cash-flow methods land about 1.65 times below. Not one family reaches the price. The multiple on trailing operating profit sits at the very top of the oilfield services peer group, above SLB, Baker Hughes, Weatherford and NOV on the same measure. Some of that is the impairment charges compressing the denominator, and the bull is right about that. But a company whose reported profit is regularly compressed by write-downs on equipment and legacy obligations is a company for which those charges are closer to a recurring cost of doing business than the label suggests.

International was supposed to be the stable half, and it partly wasn't. Middle East and Asia revenue fell 2% in the quarter as conflict reduced activity in Kuwait, Iraq and Qatar. That region carries the long-cycle national oil company work the whole diversification argument rests on, and it turns out to carry political risk that is not correlated with the oil price at all. Europe and Africa growth covered the gap this quarter. There is no rule that says it does so next quarter.

The balance sheet narrows the margin for error. Net debt stands at $5.8 billion, roughly 2.65 times trailing operating income, and that ratio is calculated on the depressed profit figure precisely when it matters most. Leverage in a cyclical business is a ratchet: it looks modest at mid-cycle and doubles as a multiple of earnings without a dollar of new borrowing, simply because the denominator fell. Add capital spending guided at $1.1 billion for the year and the cash available for buybacks in a genuine downturn is a good deal thinner than the current quarter suggests.

What the price needs is not heroic, and that is the fairest statement of the bear case. Roughly 2.2% annual operating-profit growth is what today's price assumes, against a company whose own recent record averages a similar pace. The requirement is reasonable. The risk is not that the hurdle is too high, it is that oilfield services does not deliver steady low-single-digit progress. It delivers three good years and one bad one, and the price has to survive the bad one.

Valuation

Start with the denominator, because for a cyclical it is the whole problem. At $33.24 on July 24, 2026, the market is paying about 15 times the operating income of the last twelve reported months, and that figure carries the impairment charges taken during 2025. The same period on an adjusted basis produced $3.1 billion of operating income against the $2.3 billion reported. Two multiples, both honest, and a wide gap between them.

What the price actually requires is modest: it implies company-wide operating profit growing about 2.2% a year, which sits inside what the business has recently delivered and inside what the sector can plausibly produce. Measured that way the assumption is unremarkable. Measured against the operating margin the company earns today, around 10%, the price is not asking for a margin transformation either.

The methods used to triangulate all disagree with the price in the same direction, which is the signature of a cyclical measured at a low point rather than of an expensive stock. Asset-based work lands about 1.68 times below the price, peer multiples about 1.76 times below, and the earnings-power lenses about 2.31 times below. Even the forward cash-flow methods land about 1.65 times below, held down because they project forward from a trailing revenue line that declined. The one method that normalises profit across a five-year window, capitalising an average operating profit with one-time charges added back, lands within a few percent of today's price. That single reconciliation carries most of the information in this section: on trough earnings the price looks stretched against everything, and on through-cycle earnings it looks ordinary.

Cohort position sharpens it. Against SLB, Baker Hughes, Weatherford, NOV and the smaller pressure pumpers, the multiple on trailing operating profit sits at the top of the group, which is what happens when a peer set's earnings are depressed by different amounts. The composition matters here too: Completion and Production supplies 58% of revenue and Drilling and Evaluation the remaining 42%, and the completion side is the more volatile of the two because it tracks the decision to bring wells online.

The balance sheet sets the floor and the constraint. Net debt of $5.8 billion runs about 2.65 times trailing operating income, a ratio that flatters at mid-cycle and tightens at the bottom without any new borrowing. Against that sit $668 million of free cash flow in the June quarter and a share count falling about 1.8% a year. The company is deleveraging and buying stock at the same time, which is the correct order of operations at this point in a cycle, and the pace of both depends entirely on whether the North American recovery that started this quarter continues.

Catalysts

North America is the variable to track, and management gave it a direction. After a 7% sequential revenue increase to $2.3 billion in the June quarter, the company said it expects incremental improvement in North America through the remainder of the year, citing recent contract awards and growing service demand. Third-quarter results, due in October, are the first checkpoint on whether that plays out as a trend or a single quarter.

The offsetting item is geopolitical. Middle East and Asia revenue fell 2% in the June quarter because conflict reduced activity in Kuwait, Iraq and Qatar. Europe and Africa grew 19% on North Sea, Namibia, Egypt and Angola work and more than covered the shortfall, but the two are independent, and a second quarter of Middle East softness without the European offset would show up directly in the international line that has been carrying the company.

Capital return has a stated run rate. Roughly $200 million of stock was repurchased in the June quarter and management indicated buybacks return to about that quarterly pace, alongside the declared dividend of $0.17 a share and full-year capital spending guided to $1.1 billion. Free cash flow of $668 million in the quarter funds all of it comfortably at current activity levels, which makes the next two quarterly cash flow figures the practical test of whether the buyback pace holds.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Completion and Production (reported)

Drilling and Evaluation (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Halliburton Q2 2026 results, July 21, 2026 · Halliburton Q2 2026 results and earnings call, July 21, 2026 · Halliburton Q2 2026 earnings call, July 21, 2026 · Halliburton fourth quarter 2025 results

View the full interactive HAL report on boothcheck