HAEMONETICS CORPORATION (HAE): what the price requires
At today's price, HAEMONETICS CORPORATION (HAE) is priced for +9.7% growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/HAE
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | HAE |
| Company | HAEMONETICS CORPORATION |
| Current price | $77.04/sh |
| Composition | Plasma 39% / Blood Center - Apheresis 17% / Blood Center - Whole Blood 0% / Hospital - Interventional Technologies 18% / Hospital - Blood Management Technologies 27% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Implied growth | 9.7% |
| Multiple paid | 29x operating income |
Solve inputs: computed at a 7% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~9.2pp (computed at the 7% minimum rate; the CAPM rate 6.6% sits below it).
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~5.8 years; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +0.33σ |
| cohort percentile (of 112 peers) | 73 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple; asset-based/earnings-power/growth-DCF land below the price.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 2.98x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 3.03x | 4 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.12x | 3 | expensive |
| Growth | 1.52x | 3 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Relative Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.8%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=14)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $50.62 | 1.52x | yes | FCF base $0.3B, growth -2% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.5%, WACC 7.9%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $79.41 | 0.97x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 15.4x / 17.4x / 19.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $63.20 | 1.22x | yes | P/E 27.96x (blended: static sector reference 24x + trailing (TTM) 37x), scenarios: 23.6x / 28.0x / 32.3x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 16x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $22.39 | 3.44x | yes | BV/sh $16.95, ROE (TTM) 12.2%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $25.57 | 3.01x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $49.40 | 1.56x | yes | Rev $1.3B, growth -2% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.3x / 2.7x / 3.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Growth-Adjusted P/E | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $15.18 | 5.08x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.17B × (1−21%) / WACC 7.9% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $26.22 | 2.94x | yes | BV $16.95 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 12.2% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 7.9%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $27.96 | 2.76x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $2.05 × BVPS $16.95) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $69.08 | 1.12x | yes | EBITDA $0.27B × sector EV/EBITDA 16.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $37.59 | 2.05x | yes | FCF $260.4M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $29.80 | 2.59x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.23B (FCF $0.26B − SBC $0.03B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $1.72 | 44.79x | yes | EPS $2.05 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $113.57 | 0.68x | yes | Revenue $1.33B × sector P/S 4.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $22.16 | 3.48x | yes | EPS $2.05 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $994.4m |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 8.03x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 6.34x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -2.2% |
| Burning cash | no |
Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
- Haemonetics sells the equipment and disposables used to collect plasma and manage blood in hospitals, a razor-and-blade model where the recurring disposable sales follow each installed device.
- The defining event is the loss of a major plasma customer: reported plasma revenue fell 2% for the year, but stripping out that departing customer, the franchise grew about 20%, which is the number that tells you whether the core business is healthy.
- The price embeds about 9% annual operating-profit growth for five years, within what the company has delivered, with the next read coming from whether the ex-customer momentum and hospital growth offset the wind-down.
Bull Case
The moat is in the share gains the headline numbers hide. Haemonetics is winning customers in its core plasma business even as it loses one large account, and that distinction is the whole bull case. Excluding the departing customer, plasma revenue grew about 20% for the full year and 13% in the fourth quarter, and the company's share of U.S. plasma collections rose in the high single digits while Europe posted double-digit growth. A business that is taking share across two continents while absorbing the loss of a major account is structurally healthier than the reported, customer-blended figure suggests. The 10-K frames the demand backdrop as durable: an "aging patient population increase[s] the demand for plasma" and "geographical expansion of biopharmaceuticals also increases demand for plasma." Plasma is the raw material for a growing class of immunoglobulin therapies, and Haemonetics sells the picks and shovels to collect it.
The model itself is the second strength. Haemonetics designs equipment it describes in the 10-K as "durable, dependable, and easy to use" with "comprehensive training and support," then earns recurring revenue on the disposables each device consumes. Once a plasma center or hospital standardizes on Haemonetics equipment, the consumable stream follows for years, which is why new product launches like Persona PLUS matter beyond their first-year sales: they lock in the installed base that drives the annuity. That recurring mix is why the company can grow operating profit even when device placements are lumpy.
The hospital businesses diversify the story and carry higher growth. Beyond plasma, Haemonetics runs interventional technologies and blood-management technologies for hospitals, which together are more than 40% of the company and grow faster than the legacy blood-center work. The fourth quarter delivered total revenue of $346.4 million, up 4.8%, ahead of expectations, and the company guided fiscal 2027 to 4% to 7% reported revenue growth. The share count has been falling about 2% a year through buybacks. The bull case is a share-gaining, recurring-revenue medtech with a structural plasma tailwind, priced as if the customer loss defines it rather than the underlying momentum.
Bear Case
The bear case names the disruption directly: Haemonetics is losing its largest plasma customer, and a customer that big leaving is exactly the kind of event that resets a company's earnings power. Reported plasma revenue fell 2% for the full year even with strong underlying growth, because the departing account was a meaningful slice of the business. The 10-K acknowledges the strategic recalibration, noting the company has "sharpened our focus accordingly on targeted opportunities, particularly in plasma and platelets." The risk is concentration: when one customer can move the whole segment's reported revenue by leaving, the business was more dependent on that relationship than a diversified franchise would be, and the ex-customer growth has to keep running well above the headline just to stand still while the wind-down completes.
The second pressure is the competitive and regulatory nature of medical devices. Haemonetics competes on "product quality, safety and cost effectiveness" and on "continual and rigorous documentation of clinical performance," and the 10-K is candid that some competitive factors are "outside of our control," including potential "changes in regulatory s[tandards]." The blood-center side faces a structural headwind the filing states plainly: total demand for blood is expected "to remain stable to slightly declining." So part of the company is tied to a flat-to-shrinking market, and the growth has to come from plasma share gains and the hospital businesses carrying the rest. If a competitor wins a large plasma account or a hospital-product launch disappoints, the growth the price assumes gets harder to reach.
Leverage frames the downside. Net debt sits at roughly $1 billion, about six times operating income, and the 10-K lists total contractual obligations near $1.68 billion including the term loan. That is real leverage for a company with low-double-digit operating margins, and it means the equity is a leveraged claim on the earnings recovering past the customer loss. A buyer at this price is paying about 28 times operating income for roughly 9% annual growth, and the bear case is that the customer departure, the flat blood-collection market, and the debt together make that growth less certain than the multiple assumes, with little cushion if the ex-customer momentum fades before the wind-down finishes.
Valuation
Haemonetics trades at about 28 times company-wide operating income, and inverting that says the market is paying for roughly 9% annual operating-profit growth over five years. The current operating margin near 12% is above the roughly 6% the price strictly requires, so this is a growth bet rather than a margin-recovery bet, and the implied pace is within what the company has delivered, which is why the framework labels the priced-in assumption within range rather than stretched.
The families of method read the way they do for a quality medtech priced at a fair-to-full multiple. Asset value and earnings power both flag the price as expensive, by roughly three times, because they capitalize what the company has earned and owns. Peer multiples, by contrast, place Haemonetics essentially in line with the medical-device cohort, barely above it. Only the forward-growth method clears the price comfortably. The pattern says this is not an outlier valuation; it is a medtech priced about where its peers trade, so the bet is less about a cohort re-rating and more about whether Haemonetics specifically grows into its multiple as the customer loss anniversaries and the share gains compound. The peer comparison is the most useful anchor, and it says the price is reasonable if the underlying franchise momentum is real, which is precisely what the ex-customer growth figures are testing.
Solvency is the constraint that argues for some caution. Net debt of roughly $1 billion at about six times operating income is meaningful leverage for a low-double-digit-margin business, and interest coverage is not cleanly computable from the latest filings, with the 10-K detailing contractual obligations near $1.68 billion. The offsetting positives are the recurring disposable revenue that makes the cash flows predictable and the steady buyback that has cut the share count about 2% a year. A buyer at this price is underwriting Haemonetics to grow operating profit at a high-single-digit rate while it replaces a departed customer with share gains, paying a peer-level multiple, and relying on the recurring-revenue base and the plasma demand tailwind to carry the bet through the wind-down.
Catalysts
Haemonetics closed fiscal 2026 with a beat. Fourth-quarter revenue was $346.4 million, up 4.8% and ahead of the roughly $337 million forecast, and the quarter capped a multi-year transformation plan. The most important catalyst was the underlying plasma trajectory: full-year plasma revenue was down 2% reported but up about 20% excluding the departing customer, exceeding the company's own revised 17% to 19% guidance for that organic measure, with high-single-digit U.S. collection share gains and double-digit European growth.
The forward guidance and product cadence are the catalysts to track. For fiscal 2027 the company guided total revenue growth of 4% to 7% reported and 3% to 6% organic, adjusted for an extra week and currency. New product launches such as Persona PLUS in plasma, and the growth of the hospital interventional and blood-management franchises, are what have to carry the reported numbers as the departing customer's revenue rolls off, so each quarter's ex-customer plasma growth and hospital segment growth are the figures that matter.
The variables that move the fundamental story are the completion of the large customer's wind-down, the pace of U.S. and European plasma share gains, immunoglobulin demand that drives plasma collection, and the growth of the hospital businesses against a stable-to-declining blood-collection market. The next quarterly report will show whether the ex-customer momentum holds and whether the fiscal 2027 guidance is tracking, which is what the valuation depends on.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Plasma (reported)
- TFX (TELEFLEX INCORPORATED)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ICUI (ICU MEDICAL INC/DE)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MMSI (MERIT MEDICAL SYSTEMS INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ATRC (AtriCure, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Blood Center (reported)
- ICUI (ICU MEDICAL INC/DE)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TFX (TELEFLEX INCORPORATED)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MMSI (MERIT MEDICAL SYSTEMS INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- LMAT (LEMAITRE VASCULAR, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ATRC (AtriCure, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Hospital (reported)
- MMSI (MERIT MEDICAL SYSTEMS INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- PEN (Penumbra, Inc)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ATRC (AtriCure, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- GMED (GLOBUS MEDICAL, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TFX (TELEFLEX INCORPORATED)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ICUI (ICU MEDICAL INC/DE)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- LMAT (LEMAITRE VASCULAR, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Haemonetics Q4 FY2026 results