GETTY REALTY CORP. (GTY): what the price requires
The current priced-in claim for GETTY REALTY CORP. (GTY) is temporarily suppressed because the live engine record is unavailable. The dated report remains a snapshot, not a current market read.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/GTY
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | GTY |
| Company | GETTY REALTY CORP. |
| Current price | $34.47/sh |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | reit |
| Price-to-FFO | 14.6x |
| FFO yield | 6.8% |
The price sits below what even a 5%/yr funds-from-operations decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.
Solve inputs: computed at a 8.5% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.73σ |
| cohort percentile (of 88 peers) | 42 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 2.21x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 4.74x | 5 | expensive |
| Relative | 0.85x | 4 | justifies |
| Growth | 1.01x | 5 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.6%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=19)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $65.46 | 0.53x | yes | FCF base $0.1B, growth 10% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 6.6%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $34.00 | 1.01x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 13.2x / 15.2x / 17.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $56.86 | 0.61x | yes | P/E 26.79x (blended: static sector reference 35x + trailing (TTM) 14x), scenarios: 22.3x / 26.8x / 31.2x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 20x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | $241.30 | 0.14x | yes | DPS $1.99, g=8.4% (sustainable: ROE (TTM) × retention; not the terminal-growth assumption), ke=9.3% |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | $29.36 | 1.17x | yes | Stage 1: -1% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $16.43 | 2.10x | yes | BV/sh $18.18, ROE (TTM) 8.4%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $15.61 | 2.21x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $18.56 | 1.86x | yes | Rev $0.2B, growth 10% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 6.7x / 8.0x / 9.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Growth-Adjusted P/E | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $4.37 | 7.89x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.11B × (1−21%) / WACC 6.6% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $15.47 | 2.23x | yes | BV $18.18 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 8.4% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 5.4%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $31.20 | 1.10x | yes | √(22.5 × FFO/share $2.38 × BVPS $18.18) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $50.50 | 0.68x | yes | EBITDA $0.20B × sector EV/EBITDA 20.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $7.27 | 4.74x | yes | FCF $131.9M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $6.13 | 5.62x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.13B (FCF $0.13B − SBC $0.01B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $12.95 | 2.66x | yes | FFO/share $2.38 × (8.5 + 2×-1.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $4.03 | 8.55x | yes | BV $18.18 × (ROIC 1.5% / WACC 6.6%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $22.76 | 1.51x | yes | Revenue $0.23B × sector P/S 6.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $25.73 | 1.34x | yes | FFO/share $2.38 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | $33.75 | 1.02x | yes | FFO/share $2.38 × 14.2x P/FFO (route cohort median, n=85); FFO $0.14B (FFO incl. D&A + impairments, FY2025, companyfacts), shares 60M |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt (REIT basis) | $990.0m |
| Net debt / FFO | 6.94x |
| Fixed-charge coverage (FFO basis) | 4.1x |
| Funds from operations (trailing) | $142.6m |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 6.4% |
| Burning cash | no |
REIT basis: leverage is read against funds from operations (FFO), not depreciation-gutted operating income. The header's implied growth runs on ADJUSTED FFO — FFO minus recurring maintenance capex — so the header's multiple and this leverage ratio use bases that differ by that capex; neither substitutes for the other.
Bullet Takeaways
- Getty Realty owns 1,191 convenience and automotive-retail properties across 45 states and rents them on long net leases, with 99.7% occupancy, a 10.1-year average remaining lease term, and tenants whose store-level profits cover the rent 2.5 times over.
- The price is the bull's friend: at roughly 14 times adjusted funds from operations the stock sits in the lower half of the REIT group and below what even a steady decline in cash earnings would justify.
- The structural question is fuel demand: a large share of Getty's rent comes from gas-station and convenience tenants, so the long-run shift toward electric vehicles is the risk the low multiple is pricing, even as funds from operations grew more than 15% last quarter.
Bull Case
Getty's moat is the lease, not the land, and the lease is structured to compound quietly. These are net leases, meaning the tenant pays the taxes, insurance, and maintenance, so Getty collects rent and passes the operating headaches to the operator. The portfolio runs at 99.7% occupancy across 1,191 properties with a 10.1-year weighted average remaining term, and tenant rent coverage of 2.5 times means the store-level cash flow comfortably exceeds the rent owed. The 10-K describes the REIT discipline plainly, that the company must "derive most of its income from rents from real property" and distribute it, which is exactly the steady, contractual income stream the structure is built to produce.
The second strength is the acquisition engine, which is where a net-lease REIT actually grows. In the first quarter Getty invested $30.3 million across 29 properties at an initial cash yield of 8.0%, and it carries a committed pipeline exceeding $125 million for 43 convenience and automotive properties expected to fund over the coming year. Buying buildings at an 8% initial yield and financing them below that spread is the mechanism that drives funds-from-operations growth, and the company is also funding new auto-service centers and drive-thru quick-service restaurants, which diversifies the rent roll beyond pure fuel retail. The 10-K notes the toolkit extends to "purchase money financing," leasehold loans, and "construction loans or other financing for the development" of properties, giving Getty several ways to deploy capital into its niche.
The results show the engine working. First-quarter adjusted funds from operations rose 15.3% to $0.63 per share, the company raised full-year guidance to $2.50 to $2.52 per share, and it affirmed a quarterly dividend of $0.485. Fixed-charge coverage above four times means the rent stream covers the debt service with room to spare. The bull case is a specialized net-lease REIT growing its cash earnings double digits and trading in the lower half of the REIT group, where the market is paying a discount for the convenience-store label.
Bear Case
The bear case names a specific disruption and the specific competitors that drive it: the long migration away from gasoline, and the electric-vehicle charging and big-box convenience formats that are reshaping where drivers stop. Getty's rent roll is concentrated in convenience and automotive properties, and the 10-K is direct that a "portion of our revenues depend on the economic success of the petroleum marketing industry, and any factors that adversely affect that industry, such as disruption in the supply of petroleum or a dec[line]" in fuel demand, flow through to the landlord. As electric vehicles take share, the per-site economics of the fuel-and-convenience format face a slow structural headwind, and a net-lease landlord cannot easily re-tenant a gas station into a different use. That is the risk a low multiple is pricing, and it is a real one rather than a sentiment discount.
The second pressure is concentration, which the filing flags as "concentration of certain tenants in similar industries or concentration of our owned and leased properties in certain geographic location[s]." A net-lease REIT's strength, the long contractual leases, is also its rigidity: if a major tenant's industry deteriorates, the leases lock Getty to that exposure for years, and the 10.1-year average term cuts both ways. There is also environmental liability that is specific to fuel sites: the 10-K warns about "properties upon which others have engaged or may in the future engage in activities that may release petroleum products or other hazardous or toxic substances," a clean-up risk most retail REITs do not carry.
The third pressure is the one every REIT shares, sharpened by leverage. Net debt sits at roughly 6.9 times funds from operations, and a REIT funds its growth by issuing equity and debt, with the share count rising more than 6% a year to pay for acquisitions. When interest rates are high, two things happen at once: the cost of the debt that funds new deals rises, compressing the spread between the 8% acquisition yield and the financing cost, and the dividend yield has to compete with risk-free bonds, which pressures the stock price. The bear case is not that Getty is poorly run; it is that a fuel-exposed, moderately levered net-lease REIT faces a structural demand question and a rate-sensitivity question at the same time, and the market is right to hold money back for both.
Valuation
A net-lease REIT is valued on its adjusted funds from operations, the cash earnings after the recurring maintenance spending that keeps its buildings leasable, not on an operating multiple that depreciation would distort. On that basis Getty trades at about 14 times adjusted funds from operations, a multiple low enough that the price sits below what even a steady 5%-a-year decline in cash earnings would warrant. Against the company's own record the implied pace is undemanding, and against peers the stock sits in the lower half of the REIT group's price-to-adjusted-funds-from-operations. The price is not betting on acceleration; it is pricing in a fade that the recent results have not delivered.
The families of method that the engine runs are the wrong lens for a REIT and should be read accordingly. The asset-value and earnings-power methods flag the price as expensive, but for a real-estate trust those methods are distorted by property depreciation, which is a non-cash charge that understates a REIT's true earning power. The methods that fit, the funds-from-operations multiple and the peer comparison, both place Getty below where comparable REITs trade. The honest read is that on the metric that governs the sector, Getty is inexpensive, and the discount reflects the convenience-and-fuel tenant mix rather than any weakness in the cash flows themselves. The peer comparison is the most useful anchor, and it says the market is assigning Getty a structural discount its current results do not justify.
Leverage is read on the REIT basis, against the cash the properties produce. Net debt of roughly 6.9 times funds from operations is within the normal range for a net-lease REIT, and fixed-charge coverage above four times means the rent comfortably covers interest and preferred obligations. The downside here is not a coverage scare; it is the interaction of rate sensitivity and the secular fuel-demand question, which together could compress the acquisition spread that drives growth. A buyer at this price is collecting a dividend yield near 6% while underwriting the bet that the convenience-and-automotive net-lease model stays durable through the electric-vehicle transition, paying a below-peer multiple for a portfolio with high occupancy and strong rent coverage today.
Catalysts
Getty's first quarter of 2026 was a beat that prompted a guidance raise. Adjusted funds from operations rose 15.3% to $0.63 per share, revenue was $57.84 million, net income was $26.63 million, and the company affirmed its $0.485 quarterly dividend. Management lifted full-year 2026 AFFO guidance to $2.50 to $2.52 per share, citing first-quarter outperformance and the absence of realized credit losses, which is the cleanest signal that the rent roll is holding.
The acquisition pipeline is the catalyst that drives the next year's growth. Getty deployed $30.3 million in the quarter at an 8.0% initial cash yield and carries a committed pipeline above $125 million for 43 convenience and automotive properties, most expected to fund over the next three to twelve months. The pace and the yield at which that pipeline funds, against the company's cost of capital, will determine how much of it flows through to funds-from-operations growth, so the spread between acquisition yields and financing costs is the number to watch.
The variables that move the longer-term story are interest rates, which set both the cost of acquisition financing and the competitiveness of the dividend yield, and the trajectory of fuel demand as electric-vehicle adoption advances. The diversification into auto-service centers and drive-thru quick-service restaurants is the early hedge against the fuel-format risk, and its growth is worth tracking. The next quarterly report will show whether the acquisition spread holds and whether occupancy and rent coverage stay at today's strong levels.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Net lease real estate (single tenant retail) (reported)
- O (REALTY INCOME CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- NNN (NNN REIT, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ADC (Agree Realty Corporation)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- EPRT (Essential Properties Realty Trust, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- FCPT (Four Corners Property Trust, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- NTST (NETSTREIT Corp.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- PECO (PHILLIPS EDISON & COMPANY, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- SKT (TANGER INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Getty Q1 2026 results