Global Partners LP (GLP): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers Global Partners LP (GLP) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-07-26.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/GLP

Headline

FieldValue
TickerGLP
CompanyGlobal Partners LP
Sector / IndustryConsumer Cyclical
Current price$52.70/sh
CompositionWholesale 68% / GDSO (Gasoline Distribution & Station Operations) 26% / Commercial 6%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)0.3%
Operating margin today1.5%
Margin compression (value-band)-1.2pp
Multiple paid6x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.8% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.37σ
cohort percentile (of 212 peers)4

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by earnings-power and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset0
Earnings0.85x3justifies
Relative0.50x2justifies
Growth0.41x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Earnings, Relative, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.6%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=8)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$361.930.15xyesFCF base $0.2B, growth 20% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 6.6%, 7yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$127.560.41xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 10.8x / 12.8x / 14.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 7yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 14.6x / 18.0x / 21.4x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAssetno
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAssetno
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$59.240.89xyesRev $21.5B, growth 20% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.1x / 0.1x / 0.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$68.900.76xyesEPS $5.74, growth 1% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=8.64 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$52.291.01xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.30B × (1−7%) / WACC 6.6% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAssetno
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.33B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$0.015270.00xyesFCF $199.4M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median)
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$0.015270.00xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.18B (FCF $0.20B − SBC $0.02B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median)
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$185.280.28xyesEPS $5.74 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $21.46B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$215.330.24xyesEPS $5.74 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$62.080.85xyesEPS $5.74 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Wholesaleoperatingenterprise$12.7bwithheldunresolved no unit value
GDSO (Gasoline Distribution & Station Operations)operatingenterprise$4.8bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Commercialoperatingenterprise$1.1bwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$101.9m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)0.33x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)0.31x
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

All three of Global Partners' segments earned more per unit of product in the first quarter of 2026 than they did a year earlier, and the size of the move is what makes the quarter worth reading twice. Wholesale product margin came in at 154.1 million dollars against 93.6 million. The station business added 199.3 million against 187.9 million. Commercial, the smallest of the three, made 11.7 million against 7.1 million. Gross profit for the partnership was 332.2 million dollars versus 255.2 million, and net income reached 70.1 million versus 18.7 million. Reported operating income for the quarter was 105.7 million dollars against 55.9 million in the first quarter of 2025.

Those figures need one translation to be useful. In fuel distribution the product itself is very nearly a pass-through, so headline sales tell you almost nothing about the business; roughly 5.3 billion dollars of first-quarter sales is mostly the cost of the gasoline moving through. The number that describes the enterprise is the margin left after the product is paid for, and that is what expanded.

Underneath the swing is a retail business that behaves differently from the wholesale one. Product margin from gasoline distribution rose to 136.7 million dollars from 125.8 million on better fuel margins per gallon, while product margin from station operations was 62.6 million against 62.1 million, helped by sundries. The annual report describes the mix directly: station operations cover convenience store and prepared food sales alongside rental income, sitting next to the fuel sold to station operators and sub-jobbers. Coffee, sandwiches and lottery tickets do not move with the crude curve. MUSA, the closest listed operator of company-run fuel and convenience sites, ran a 4.2% operating margin on about 19.7 billion dollars of trailing revenue, which is a reasonable sense of the ceiling a well-run version of this business earns on a revenue line dominated by product cost.

The capital structure is being tidied at the same time. In 2025 the partnership issued 450.0 million dollars of 7.125% senior notes due 2033 and used the proceeds to take out its 7.00% notes due 2027 and pay down revolver borrowings. The credit agreement's maximum borrowing capacity moved from 1.5 billion to 1.8 billion dollars, with 1,129.0 million of that unused at March 31 2026. And on June 29 2026 the partnership issued a notice of full redemption for every one of its 9.50% Series B preferred units, to be retired on July 30 2026 at 25.00 dollars per unit plus accrued distributions. That removes the most expensive layer of claims sitting above the common units.

Which brings the argument to the payout, because that is what people own this for. The board declared 76.5 cents a unit for the first quarter of 2026, up from 76.0 cents for the fourth quarter of 2025, an annualized rate of 3.06 dollars. Operations produced 284.8 million dollars of cash in 2025, which covers that obligation with room left over for maintenance capital. The bull case here is not complicated. Today's price does not ask this partnership to grow. It asks only that the decline it has already priced in does not arrive on schedule, and the most recent quarter went the other direction entirely.

Bear Case

Very little of what happened in the first quarter of 2026 was management's doing in the way a software company's quarter is. Fuel distribution earns on dislocation: cold winters, refinery outages, a blown-out crack spread, a moment when the person holding product in a tank is worth more than the person moving it. When those conditions reverse the same assets earn much less, and the partnership says so plainly in its own risk disclosure, noting that Warmer weather conditions could adversely affect our results of operations and financial condition. A quarter that good is evidence about the environment first and about the business second.

The volume trend is the part that does not reverse. The partnership's stations sold 331.9 million gallons in the first quarter of 2026 against 357.6 million a year earlier. That is a seven percent contraction in the physical thing being sold, absorbed and then some by a higher margin on each gallon. The annual report names why the gallons keep leaking away: Higher prices, new technology and alternative fuels, such as electric, hybrid, battery powered, hydrogen or other alternative fuel-powered motor vehicles, energy efficiency and changing consumer preferences or driving habits could reduce demand for our products. A distributor losing volume every year needs the margin per gallon to keep climbing forever just to stand still, and margin per gallon is the one variable it does not set.

Zoom out from the quarter and the picture flattens. For the full year 2025 the partnership reported operating income of 234.7 million dollars against 251.2 million in 2024, and net income of 98.0 million against 110.3 million. Two consecutive down years on both lines, then one very strong quarter. Anyone underwriting the quarter as the new run rate is extrapolating from a single winter.

Then the balance sheet, which is where a partnership of this shape usually gets into trouble. The annual report is unambiguous: As of December 31, 2025, our total debt, including amounts outstanding under our credit agreement and senior notes, was approximately $1.56 billion. Cash on the balance sheet at that same date was 12.2 million dollars, because a wholesaler's liquidity lives in receivables and inventory and in an undrawn revolver rather than in a deposit account. Interest expense for 2025 was 137.2 million dollars against that 234.7 million of operating income, so well over half of the operating profit was spent servicing lenders before a unitholder saw anything. Total contractual obligations at year end came to 2.86 billion dollars, of which 1.83 billion is principal and interest on the senior notes.

That arithmetic makes the distribution the binding constraint rather than a reward. Common unitholders are paid last, after interest, after maintenance capital, after the preferred units. In a weak margin year, the same integrated platform that produced a spectacular first quarter produces a payout the partnership must choose whether to defend by borrowing. The indentures and credit agreement already limit distributions in certain circumstances, and the credit facility can be closed off by borrowing base and covenant tests exactly when the operating environment is worst. Distribution cuts are what reprice a partnership, not multiple compression.

Finally, the downside boundary is thinner than the diversified structure suggests. Outside the three operating segments the partnership carries roughly 116 million dollars of investment holdings, about 7% of the market value of the common units. That is a real floor and it is a small one set against the debt figure quoted above.

Valuation

The most useful thing to say about this price is what it does not require. Global Partners trades at roughly seven times its company-wide operating income, a multiple low enough that the price sits below what even a steady five-percent annual decline in operating profit would warrant, computed at a 9.9% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth. That is a bound rather than a solved forecast, and it is worth stating as one. The market is not asking this partnership to expand. It has already assumed contraction and then priced in a margin beyond that.

Set against the filed record, the assumption is not obviously wrong and not obviously right. On roughly 19.3 billion dollars of 2025 sales the partnership reported operating income of 234.7 million dollars, down from 251.2 million in 2024, and net income of 98.0 million. Trailing operating income through the first quarter of 2026 runs near 283 million dollars, because the March quarter alone contributed 105.7 million against 55.9 million a year earlier. Two years of decline, then a quarter that recovered a large part of it. Both facts are in the same twelve months.

The valuation methods split in a way that is unusual and worth naming. Nothing anchored on assets applies at all here, because a partnership that has distributed most of its earnings for two decades carries a book value that describes almost nothing; partners' capital stood at 675.5 million dollars at the end of 2025 against debt several times that. The methods that capitalize current earnings power land essentially where the price already is, within a handful of percent. The discounted cash-flow methods land above it. Not one approach in the set reads the price as expensive, which for a business this exposed to commodity spreads is itself the finding: the market is not disputing the earnings, it is disputing their durability.

Read the multiple-based methods with more suspicion than the others. Several reach far above the price by capitalizing a historical earnings growth rate off a cyclical trough, and a business whose profit swings with the winter does not compound the way that arithmetic assumes. Against its own history the current pace is within what the partnership has delivered before, and against its sector the multiple sits in the lower half of the peer range. Neither reading suggests a mispricing so much as a market applying a cyclical discount.

What has to be true, then, is inverted from the usual case. Most companies must reach a margin they have not shown. Global Partners must merely avoid deteriorating as fast as its price assumes, on a whole-company operating margin of about 1.5% where two thirds of what it sells is wholesale fuel and product cost swamps everything. MUSA, by comparison, converts about 4.2% of a similarly sized revenue line into operating profit, which is the shape of a business weighted to retail sites rather than to the wholesale rack. The balance sheet is what decides whether the assumption gets tested gently or violently: 1,129.0 million dollars of unused credit capacity at the end of March buys considerable time, and 137.2 million dollars of annual interest against operating income of that size leaves little margin if a bad spread year arrives before the retail mix grows.

Catalysts

The May 8 2026 results are the anchor. First-quarter net income of 70.1 million dollars, or 1.85 dollars per diluted common unit, compared with 18.7 million and 0.36 dollars a year earlier, and gross profit of 332.2 million against 255.2 million. Product margin rose in all three segments, led by wholesale at 154.1 million dollars against 93.6 million, with gasoline and blendstocks contributing 101.2 million against 57.1 million on what management described as more favorable market conditions. Total volume was 2.1 billion gallons against 1.9 billion, though the station network's own gallons fell to 331.9 million from 357.6 million.

The payout moved up alongside the results. On April 30 2026 the board of the general partner declared a quarterly cash distribution of 76.5 cents per common unit, 3.06 dollars on an annual basis, covering January through March 2026 and paid on May 15 2026 to holders of record on May 11. That followed 76.0 cents declared on January 30 2026 for the final quarter of 2025.

The capital structure changes twice more this summer. On June 29 2026 the partnership issued a notice of full redemption covering all of its 9.50% Series B preferred units, which will be retired on July 30 2026 at 25.00 dollars per unit plus accrued and unpaid distributions, after which they stop trading on the New York Stock Exchange. Separately, the maximum borrowing capacity under the credit agreement rose to 1.8 billion dollars as of March 31 2026 from 1.5 billion at year end, with 1,129.0 million unused. Both moves lower the cost and raise the flexibility of the structure sitting above the common units, and both land before the second-quarter results.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Wholesale (reported)

GDSO (Gasoline Distribution & Station Operations) (reported)

Commercial (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 results release, May 8 2026 · reports on Form 8-K, April 30 and June 29 2026 · Q1 2026 Form 10-Q · FY2025 annual report on Form 10-K · report on Form 8-K, June 29 2026 · reports on Form 8-K, January 30 and April 30 2026 · report on Form 8-K, April 30 2026

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