Golar LNG Limited (GLNG): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $52.12, Golar LNG Limited (GLNG) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~7.8 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-27.
Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/GLNG
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | GLNG |
| Company | Golar LNG Limited |
| Current price | $52.12/sh |
| Composition | Liquefaction services revenue 58% / Sales-type lease revenue 23% / Vessel management fees and other revenues 19% / Time and voyage charter revenues 0% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Must persist for | 7.8y |
| Multiple paid | 78x operating income |
Solve inputs: computed at a 7% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling (computed at the 7% minimum rate; the CAPM rate 6.5% sits below it).
How unusual the bet is: n/a
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.23σ |
Valuation X-Ray
Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 8.19x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 3.71x | 4 | expensive |
| Relative | 2.48x | 4 | expensive |
| Growth | 0.58x | 3 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.5%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=16)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $221.77 | 0.24x | yes | FCF base $0.5B, growth 13% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 6.5%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $89.53 | 0.58x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 50.9x / 52.9x / 54.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $21.01 | 2.48x | yes | P/E 40.57x (blended: static sector reference 20x + trailing (TTM) 89x), scenarios: 33.4x / 40.6x / 47.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 24.96x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $6.36 | 8.19x | yes | BV/sh $17.41, ROE (TTM) 3.4%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $3.89 | 13.40x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $40.12 | 1.30x | yes | Rev $0.4B, growth 13% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 9.9x / 12.0x / 14.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $20.99 | 2.48x | yes | EPS $0.60, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=2.53 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $11.01 | 4.73x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.22B × (1−4%) / WACC 6.5% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $2.92 | 17.85x | yes | BV $17.41 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 3.4% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 2.2%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $15.33 | 3.40x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $0.60 × BVPS $17.41) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $0.01 | 5212.00x | yes | EBITDA $0.15B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x (excluded from median) |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $28.47 | 1.83x | yes | FCF $484.6M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $19.35 | 2.69x | yes | EPS $0.60 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $6.41 | 8.13x | yes | BV $17.41 × (ROIC 2.4% / WACC 6.5%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $7.05 | 7.39x | yes | Revenue $0.39B × sector P/S 2.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $22.49 | 2.32x | yes | EPS $0.60 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $6.48 | 8.04x | yes | EPS $0.60 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $2.1b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 21.41x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 20.62x |
| Interest coverage | 3.0x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 0.0% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
Golar's balance sheet tells the story of a company in transition: roughly $1.06 billion of cash, a maintained dividend, and a third floating-LNG unit under construction on time and on budget. Management is building, and it has the cash to do it.
At $49.61 the price implies operating growth held near its self-funding ceiling for about seven years, roughly 69 times current operating income. Only the growth-DCF lens reaches the price; asset, earnings-power, and peer-multiple lenses all say it is rich.
The gap is timing. Current operating income is modest because the fleet is mid-ramp, but management projects a fully-delivered annual EBITDA run rate above $800 million once all three units are live. The bet is that the contracted, long-dated FLNG cash flows arrive as planned.
Bull Case
The clearest read on Golar LNG is its balance sheet, because it reveals a company funding a transformation from a position of strength rather than stretching for it. Golar ended Q1 2026 with about $1.06 billion of cash and restricted cash, maintained a $0.25 per-share dividend, and has its next floating-LNG unit, the MKII, under construction on time and on budget, with the company targeting an order for a fourth FLNG within 2026. A business that can simultaneously pay a dividend, build a new production unit, and plan the one after it is signaling confidence in contracted, visible future cash flows. This is not a speculative builder; it is an operator converting a strong cash position into long-dated, fee-based LNG infrastructure.
The operating inflection is already underway. Q1 2026 net income surged to $101.8 million from $12.9 million a year earlier, and adjusted EBITDA more than doubled to $105.6 million from $40.9 million, on revenue of $138 million that beat expectations. The driver is FLNG Gimi, which began its 20-year lease in mid-2025 and generated $49.98 million of sales-type lease revenue in the quarter while overproducing 19% above its contractual committed volume. FLNG Hilli achieved 100% economic uptime. Golar's revenue mix, 58% liquefaction services, 23% sales-type lease, and 19% vessel management and other, reflects a portfolio shifting toward long-term, contracted liquefaction economics with a 57.5% trailing operating margin, the signature of a high-utilization infrastructure asset.
The forward economics are what the price is paying for, and management has put a number on them. Golar projects a fully-delivered annual EBITDA run rate exceeding $800 million once all three FLNG units are operational, a step-change from the current trailing level. Floating LNG is a scarce, capital-intensive capability: converting stranded gas into liquefied product on a vessel under 20-year contracts is a moat that few competitors can replicate, and the contracts insulate the cash flows from spot-market swings. Against the marine-shipping peer set of Teekay Tankers, Global Ship Lease, Frontline, Navios, and Navigator, Golar is the differentiated FLNG specialist whose contracted backlog and ramping fleet support the durable compounding the price assumes. The implied seven-year runway is demanding, but it is underwritten by signed, long-dated contracts rather than hope.
Bear Case
The bear case starts with the macro and commodity variables that sit beneath every LNG cash flow and that Golar cannot control. Floating LNG economics depend on global gas demand, the spread between gas-producing regions and consuming ones, and the long-run willingness of counterparties to pay for liquefaction. A shift in energy policy, a faster-than-expected energy transition away from gas, a collapse in global LNG prices, or a recession that softens industrial demand would all pressure the value of contracted and uncontracted capacity alike. The price embeds roughly seven years of growth at the self-funding ceiling, and history says only about 22% of comparable fast-growers sustain that pace for that long. A business priced for durable compounding in a commodity-exposed industry has little room for the macro to turn.
The second problem is that the current economics do not yet support the price, and the gap rests on execution. At about 69 times trailing operating income, the valuation is extreme, and only the growth-DCF lens reaches the price. Every grounded method says rich: simple excess return lands near $6, two-stage excess return near $4, residual income near $3, relative valuation near $7, all far below the $49.61 quote. The entire valuation depends on the projected $800 million-plus run-rate EBITDA materializing as the fleet fully delivers. That requires the MKII to finish on time and on budget, the units to maintain high uptime, and the counterparties to honor 20-year contracts, a long chain of execution where any broken link repriced the stock against a backdrop where the static methods already consider it wildly overvalued.
The third issue is concentration, counterparty, and balance-sheet risk. Golar's cash flows are concentrated in a small number of large, long-dated FLNG contracts, so the failure, renegotiation, or default of a single counterparty would be material. The company carries net debt of roughly $1.9 billion, net debt to operating income around 2.7 times, taken on to fund a capital-intensive newbuild program, and ordering a fourth FLNG would add to that. Interest coverage is comfortable at about 13 times today, but it leans on the ramping cash flows continuing to arrive. Floating LNG is also operationally complex: these are one-of-a-kind assets where mechanical downtime, weather, or technical failure directly cuts revenue. The balance sheet is a genuine strength, but it does not change the core tension: the price assumes seven years of ceiling-rate growth in a commodity-exposed, concentrated, capital-heavy business, and the cash-flow methods say the present operation is worth a fraction of the quote. The bet is that the contracted backlog converts to cash exactly as planned.
Valuation
The inversion frames an aggressive bet that rests on a coming ramp. At $49.61 the market is paying about 69 times company-wide operating income, which at a 7% cost of capital implies operating growth held near the 25% self-funding ceiling for roughly seven years. Each percentage point of assumed growth moves that implied horizon by about 2.6 years. The priced-in assumption reads as elevated: the near-term pace is within what Golar has recently delivered as Gimi ramped, but only about 22% of comparable fast-growers have sustained it for seven years, so the stretch is in the duration.
The model X-ray shows the signature of an infrastructure asset priced on its future, not its trailing trough. Only the growth-DCF family reaches the price, with the discounted-future-market-cap frame landing near $41, close to the quote. Every other family says rich: asset-based frames near $3 to $7 (residual income near $3, two-stage excess return near $4, simple excess return near $6), the earnings-power frame near $14, and the relative frames scattered (relative valuation near $7). The blended cross-method anchor sits near $6, a small fraction of the price, precisely because the methods read the mid-ramp trailing operating income rather than the contracted run-rate. This is the classic mismatch of a company whose earnings are about to step up as new units come online.
The balance sheet supports the build and is a genuine strength. Golar holds about $1.06 billion of cash against net debt of roughly $1.9 billion, with interest covered around 13 times, comfortable for an infrastructure operator with long-dated contracts. The recent results, net income up to $101.8 million, adjusted EBITDA up to $105.6 million, Gimi overproducing 19% above committed volume, and Hilli at 100% economic uptime, are real and material, and management's projected fully-delivered EBITDA run rate above $800 million is the number the price is underwriting. The reasonable conclusion is that Golar is a differentiated, contract-backed FLNG operator whose price already capitalizes the full delivery of its fleet and seven years of subsequent growth. The contracted backlog gives the bet real footing; the price has already paid for the ramp to complete and the contracts to perform.
Catalysts
The Q1 2026 report on May 20 was the most recent catalyst and a strong one. Net income surged to $101.8 million from $12.9 million a year earlier, adjusted EBITDA more than doubled to $105.6 million from $40.9 million, and revenue of $138 million beat the roughly $128 million forecast. FLNG Gimi, on its 20-year lease since mid-2025, generated $49.98 million of sales-type lease revenue and overproduced 19% above committed volume, while FLNG Hilli held 100% economic uptime. Golar affirmed a $0.25 per-share dividend and ended the quarter with $1.06 billion of cash. (Sources: StockTitan 6-K summary; GlobeNewswire interim results; Investing.com earnings call.)
The fleet expansion is the catalyst that governs the thesis. MKII construction is on time and on budget, and the company targets an order for a fourth FLNG within 2026. Management projects a fully-delivered annual EBITDA run rate exceeding $800 million once all three units are operational, the number the valuation is underwriting. The signals to watch are MKII delivery progress, uptime and overproduction across the operating units, the timing and terms of any fourth-FLNG order, and contract execution by counterparties. Because the price assumes the ramp completes and growth continues for years, evidence that the units are delivering and the run-rate is building would support the thesis, while any construction delay or contract disruption would expose the gap between the trailing economics and the price. (Sources: Baird Maritime; Simply Wall St; GlobeNewswire.)
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- FLNG (FLEX LNG Ltd.)
- FY2025 20-F: …and depressed freight rates, may severely affect the financial condition of charterers, and their ability to make charter payments, which could result in a material increase in the credit and counterparty risks to which we are exposed to and our ability to re-charter our vessels at competitive rates. If any of our…
- FY2025 20-F: …segment: vessel operations. The vessel operations segment relates to revenue generated from chartering of vessels to customers. Although separate vessel financial information is available, the CODM internally evaluates the performance of the Company as a whole and not on the basis of each vessel or charters. In…
- NVGS (NAVIGATOR HOLDINGS LTD.)
- FY2025 20-F: …the vessels, and lead to the termination of any related charters that may be entered into prior to their delivery; • Our growth depends on our ability to expand relationships with existing customers and obtain new customers, for which we will face substantial competition; • The marine transportation industry is…
- FY2025 20-F: …purchase contracts. As a result, if delivery of a vessel is materially delayed, it could adversely affect our business, financial condition and operating results. Our growth depends on our ability to expand relationships with existing customers and obtain new customers, for which we will face substantial competition.…
- LPG (DORIAN LPG LTD.)
- FY2025 10-K: …as well, and include: ● location of the vessel; ● attractiveness of the contractual terms of the voyage charter agreement; and ● competitiveness of the charter rate offered. 33 Table of Contents VLGCs operate in a highly competitive market and we expect substantial competition for providing transportation…
- FY2025 10-K: …the demand for LPG, LPG shipping or LPG vessels including an increase in available tonnage due to Very Large Ethane Carriers transporting LPG; ● business disruptions, including supply chain issues, due to damage to storage or receiving facilities, or natural disasters; ● greater than anticipated levels of LPG…
- SFL (SFL Corporation Ltd.)
- FY2025 20-F: …are self-propelled, and can therefore easily move between geographic areas. Jack-up drilling rigs are not self-propelled, but it is common to move these assets over long distances on heavy-lift vessels. Therefore, the markets and competition for these rigs are effectively world-wide. Competition for charters in all…
- FY2025 20-F: …the international shipping and offshore drilling industries, types, sizes, sophistication and ages of vessels and drilling rigs, supply and demand for vessels and drilling rigs, availability of or developments in other modes of transportation, competition from other shipping companies, cost of newbuildings,…
- DAC (DANAOS CORPORATION)
- FY2025 20-F: …and Senior Notes and our ability to refinance our financing agreements. In such an event, we could be unable to service our debt and other obligations. We depend upon a limited number of customers for a large part of our revenues. The loss of these customers or further concentration of these customers through…
- FY2025 20-F: …and may reduce the overall demand for chartered-in tonnage. In addition, liner companies have progressively increased the proportion of their total fleet capacity that is directly owned rather than chartered-in from independent tonnage providers. This trend, if it continues, could reduce the pool of available charter…
- GSL (Global Ship Lease, Inc.)
- FY2025 20-F: …presented for each category of participating common shares under the two-class method. (w) Risks Associated with Concentration The Company is exposed to certain concentration risks that may adversely affect the Company's financial position in the near term: (i) The Company derives its revenue from liner companies…
- FY2025 20-F: 4 Table of Contents We will face substantial competition in expanding our business from a number of companies. Many of these competitors may have greater financial resources and a lower cost of capital than us, may operate larger fleets, may have been established for longer, and may be able to offer better charter…
- CMRE (COSTAMARE INC.)
- FY2025 20-F: …can be more difficult to employ them on profitable time charters, particularly during periods of decreased demand in the charter market. Accordingly, we may find it difficult to continue to find profitable employment for our vessels as they age. 15 Table of Contents We face substantial competition from a number of…
- FY2025 20-F: …competition in both sectors. Participants in the container shipping industry include "liner" shipping companies, which operate container shipping services and own containerships, containership owners, often known as "charter owners", who own containerships and charter them out to liner companies, and shippers who…
- INSW (International Seaways, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …and dynamics that have an impact on the Company's financial position and results of operations. ● Results from Vessel Operations. This section provides an analysis of our results of operations presented on a business segment basis. In addition, a brief description of significant transactions and other items that…
- FY2025 10-K: "Business and Segment Reporting," to the Company's consolidated financial statements as set forth in Item 8, "Financial Statements and Supplementary Data," for additional information on the Company's segments, including reconciliations of (i) time charter equivalent revenues to shipping revenues and (ii) adjusted…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.