GILAT SATELLITE NETWORKS LTD. (GILT): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $10.05, GILAT SATELLITE NETWORKS LTD. (GILT) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~5.7 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-26.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/GILT

Headline

FieldValue
TickerGILT
CompanyGILAT SATELLITE NETWORKS LTD.
Sector / IndustryTechnology
Current price$10.05/sh
CompositionProducts 73% / Services 27%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)1.9%
Operating margin today5.2%
Margin compression (value-band)-3.3pp
Must persist for5.7y
Multiple paid27x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 9: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.4% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.33σ
cohort percentile (of 190 peers)47

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset3.32x5expensive
Earnings2.73x5expensive
Relative0.82x2justifies
Growth0.92x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$6.911.45xyesFCF base $0.0B, growth 21% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.2%, 7yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$10.970.92xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 10.3x / 12.3x / 14.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 7yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 28x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 22.7x / 28.0x / 33.3x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 20x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$3.033.32xyesBV/sh $6.78, ROE (TTM) 4.1%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$1.955.15xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$11.700.86xyesRev $0.5B, growth 21% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.3x / 1.6x / 2.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$11.900.84xyesEPS $0.34, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.02 (Fair)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$4.312.33xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.02B × (1−21%) / WACC 9.2% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$1.616.24xyesBV $6.78 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 4.1% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 2.7%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$7.201.40xyes√(22.5 × EPS $0.34 × BVPS $6.78) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.05B × sector EV/EBITDA 20.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$3.522.86xyesFCF $9.2M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$2.294.39xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.00B (FCF $0.01B − SBC $0.01B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$10.970.92xyesEPS $0.34 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$4.022.50xyesBV $6.78 × (ROIC 5.5% / WACC 9.2%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $0.45B × sector P/S 6.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$12.750.79xyesEPS $0.34 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$3.682.73xyesEPS $0.34 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Commercialoperatingenterprise$281.4mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Defenseoperatingenterprise$100.4mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Peruoperatingenterprise$69.9mwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net cash$122.7m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)-6.63x (net cash)
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)-5.24x (net cash)
Share count CAGR (dilution)1.7%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The obvious objection comes first. Selling satellite ground equipment while low-orbit constellations rewrite the industry looks like standing in the wrong place, and Gilat's own annual report names the threat without softening it: the anticipated rollout and expansion of Amazon Leo could further intensify the competitive landscape, challenging our customers' ability to retain their market share. If the operators Gilat supplies lose subscribers to vertically integrated constellations that build their own terminals, the vendor underneath them has a problem.

So far the revenue is doing the opposite of what that fear predicts. Gilat took in 451.7 million dollars in 2025 against 305.4 million in 2024, a step up of nearly half in a single year for a company that mostly ships boxes and software licences. The reason is structural rather than lucky. The migration from a single geostationary satellite to a mix of orbits is a ground problem before it is a space problem, and the filing says why: the high-throughput and emerging non-geostationary markets require close alignment between ground equipment and specific satellite technologies, with the result that successful vendors are increasingly those with strong partnerships with satellite operators. Constellations multiply. The number of vendors who can make a terminal talk to several of them at once does not.

Management reorganized around that in January 2025, splitting the company into a Commercial division, a Defense division and a Peru division, and the second of those is where the recent order flow lands. The filing frames defense as a deliberate push rather than an accident of demand, stating that We are increasing our focus on this growing market segment both in the United States and globally and pointing to the DataPath purchase as the first step of it. The orders since then are specific and dated: 43 million dollars of additional Sidewinder electronically steered antenna orders from an in-flight connectivity provider in late June 2026, 11 million dollars of U.S. Department of War awards in early July, and more than 20 million dollars of SkyEdge systems and services from a global satellite operator a week later, with most deliveries expected inside two years. Boeing and Gilat also cleared an in-cabin offerability milestone for the line-fit multi-orbit product in May, which is the step that turns an aftermarket retrofit business into a factory-installed one.

Profitability has started to follow. First-quarter 2026 revenue reached 110.5 million dollars against 92 million a year earlier, and the quarter swung to reported operating income of 4.4 million dollars from a reported operating loss of 2.7 million in the comparable quarter. Management left its full-year outlook unchanged at that print. For a business whose gross profit moves with the completion stage of large contracts, an operating result that flips sign year over year is more informative than any single quarter's revenue line.

The balance sheet is the quiet part of the case. Gilat ended 2025 holding 185.3 million dollars of cash and short-term investments against 62.6 million dollars of borrowings, which is why it could sign a purchase agreement in June and pay the balance in cash at closing rather than going to the market for it. Compare that with the cohort it sells alongside. VSAT carries 4.64 billion dollars of revenue and turns 2.3% of it into operating profit; KTOS runs 1.42 billion at 1.7%; MRCY manages 1.0% on 967 million. Ground-segment and defense electronics is not a business where scale alone produces margin, and Gilat is entering it with more liquidity than leverage and a share count that has crept up only about 1.7% a year since 2021.

Bear Case

The methods used to triangulate this company do not agree, and the disagreement is unusually clean. The peer-multiple lens and the cash-flow lens both reach today's quote. The asset-value lens does not come close: the price sits nearly three times above where the asset-value family lands, and about two and a half times above the earnings-power family. Those two are the conservative reads, and on a company like this one they are probably the more honest ones.

Here is why. The earnings-power approach values what the business has actually earned, averaged over several years and stripped of one-off charges, and capitalizes it with no growth at all. On Gilat that produces a number far under the quote, because the earnings base is genuinely small: 2025 revenue of 451.7 million dollars converted into 23.4 million dollars of reported operating income, an operating margin near 5% on the annual report's own figures. The cash-flow method that does reach the quote rests on one assumption doing most of the work: that the enterprise multiple the market pays now is still the multiple it pays at the far end of the forecast period. That is an assumption about sentiment wearing the clothes of an assumption about cash. The peer-multiple lens reaches it by applying an average technology-sector earnings multiple to a company earning a fraction of the sector's typical margin. Neither of those is wrong, exactly. Both simply decline to ask whether the underlying economics support the multiple, which is the question a bear cares about.

What the quote requires, stated plainly: roughly 30 times operating profit, which needs operating profit compounding at the fastest rate the business can fund out of its own cash flow, held there for about six years. Gilat has recently delivered that rate, so the stretch is not the pace. The stretch is the persistence. Of comparable fast-growers, only about 28% held such a pace over a stretch that long.

Three things make persistence harder here than the order announcements suggest. The first is concentration. Revenue depends on a small number of buyers and on very large contracts won in competitive tenders, and the annual report is explicit that the bidding process sometimes requires us to make significant investments upfront, while the final award is not assured. A bidding process that Gilat loses still costs money. The second is how the profit is recognized. The Peru division runs on the PRONATEL regional projects, accounted for on percentage of completion, and the filing warns that any changes to our estimated profits in these projects may cause material fluctuations in our gross profit and gross margin. That is an accounting mechanism that can move a full-year result without any change in the underlying business, and it cuts in both directions. The third is the margin itself. When roughly a nickel of every revenue dollar reaches operating profit, a cost overrun on one large program erases a year of progress. MRCY earns 1.0% at the operating line and KTOS 1.7%; thin is the normal condition of this industry, not a temporary state Gilat is passing through.

Then there is the deal. Gilat agreed in June 2026 to buy Comtech's satellite and space communications segment for 157.5 million dollars, of which 10 million was advanced at signing and 147.5 million falls due in cash at closing. Set that against the 185.3 million dollars of cash and short-term investments on the balance sheet at the end of 2025 and the liquidity cushion largely disappears on the closing date. The agreement also requires U.S. antitrust clearance and approval from the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, and it says that if the agreement terminates because those approvals do not arrive, the sellers are in certain cases not required to return the advance. An Israeli buyer acquiring a U.S. defense communications business is precisely the transaction that review exists to scrutinize.

Currency and location sit underneath all of it. Gilat reports in dollars while A significant portion of our expenses, mainly salaries, are incurred in NIS and other non-U.S. dollar currencies, and its research and manufacturing footprint runs through Bulgaria, Moldova, Poland, Spain and Israel itself. If the shekel strengthens, the margin that is already thin gets thinner, with no change in demand at all.

Valuation

Buying Gilat today means paying roughly 30 times operating profit for a company that converts about a nickel of each revenue dollar into operating profit. That is the whole tension in one sentence, and the rest of this section unpacks it.

Work the price backwards and it embeds a specific assumption: operating profit compounding at the fastest rate Gilat can fund from its own cash flow, sustained for about six years. Gilat has recently delivered that rate, so the assumption is not fanciful about the pace. It is demanding about the duration. Roughly 28% of comparable fast-growers held such a pace across a stretch that long, which is a minority but not a rounding error. Against the satellite and defense names it trades among, the multiple sits in the upper half of the range. Small changes matter here: each extra percentage point of growth shortens the required run by close to two years, so the difference between a good year and an ordinary one moves the whole calculation.

The methods split cleanly into two camps. Peer multiples and the cash-flow projections both reach the current quote. The asset-value approaches, which work up from book value and returns on it, land at roughly a third of it, and the earnings-power approaches, which capitalize a normalized profit stream with no growth assumed, land at roughly two-fifths. That spread is the premium, and it has a clear source. Book value and normalized earnings describe what Gilat has already built. The peer and cash-flow methods describe what a company with this revenue trajectory usually gets paid. When only the forward-looking families reach the quote, the buyer is underwriting continuation, not the asset base.

The concrete version of "what has to be true" is the margin. Gilat reported 23.4 million dollars of operating income on 451.7 million dollars of revenue in 2025, an operating margin near 5% on the annual report's own figures. The cohort shows both what that could become and what it usually stays. IRDM converts 25.8% of revenue into operating profit and CW 18.4%, which is what a genuinely defensible position produces; MRCY manages 1.0% and KTOS 1.7%, which is the ordinary condition of a subsystem supplier selling into primes and governments. Gilat currently sits nearer the second group. The bet embedded in the multiple is that it migrates toward the first, and the multi-orbit ground equipment franchise is the reason to think it might.

The balance sheet takes most of the tail risk out of the downside without doing anything for the upside. Gilat closed 2025 with 185.3 million dollars of cash and short-term investments against 62.6 million dollars of borrowings, comfortably net-positive, and it is not consuming cash. That changes on the closing date of the Comtech transaction, where 147.5 million dollars is payable in cash. Post-closing, the cushion that makes today's thin margin survivable is largely spent, and the same operating result has to carry a larger business.

Catalysts

The near-term calendar has one fixed point. Gilat is scheduled to release second-quarter 2026 results on August 5, 2026. The bar it set at the previous print is public: first-quarter revenue of 110.5 million dollars against 92 million a year earlier, reported operating income of 4.4 million dollars against a reported operating loss of 2.7 million, and a full-year 2026 outlook of 500 to 520 million dollars of revenue that management reaffirmed rather than revised. Roughly a fifth of that outlook was booked in the first quarter, so the second print is the first real read on whether the back half is loaded the way management expects.

The larger event is structural. On June 14, 2026, a Gilat subsidiary signed an agreement to buy Comtech's satellite and space communications segment for 157.5 million dollars, with 10 million paid at signing and the balance due in cash at closing. Closing waits on the Hart-Scott-Rodino waiting period and on approval from the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. Either clearance can take months, and the agreement gives the parties a year to complete, extendable by a quarter if they are still waiting on regulators. There is no scheduled date to watch; the signal arrives when a clearance does.

Underneath both, the order announcements have been arriving at a pace worth tracking rather than a pace worth extrapolating. Since late June the company has disclosed 43 million dollars of additional Sidewinder electronically steered antenna orders from an in-flight connectivity provider, 11 million dollars of U.S. Department of War awards, and more than 20 million dollars of SkyEdge systems and services from a global satellite operator, most of it delivering inside two years. In May, Boeing and Gilat cleared an in-cabin offerability milestone for the line-fit multi-orbit aviation product. Individually these are small against a half-billion-dollar revenue base. Collectively they are the evidence that the defense and aviation pivot is converting into contracts rather than press releases.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Commercial (reported)

Defense (reported)

Peru (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

FY2025 annual report on Form 20-F · company Form 6-K, June 15, 2026 · company Form 6-K press releases, June 29, July 7 and July 15, 2026 · company Form 6-K press release, May 19, 2026 · Q1 2026 results release, May 13, 2026 · company Form 6-K press release, July 16, 2026

View the full interactive GILT report on boothcheck