GFL Environmental Inc. (GFL): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers GFL Environmental Inc. (GFL) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-07-26.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/GFL

Headline

FieldValue
TickerGFL
CompanyGFL Environmental Inc.
Sector / IndustryIndustrials
Current price$43.50/sh

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)4.6%
Operating margin today10.9%
Margin compression (value-band)-6.3pp
Multiple paid39x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

How unusual the bet is: n/a

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value, while earnings-power lands below the price. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset0.43x4justifies
Earnings4.86x3expensive
Relative1.01x2expensive
Growth0.92x2justifies

Families that justify the price: Asset, Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.5%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=11)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$67.620.64xyesFCF base $1.0B, growth 8% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.5%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$0.00noNegative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0
Relative ValuationRelative$117.180.37xyesP/E 14.29x (blended: static sector reference 20x + trailing (TTM) 6x), scenarios: 11.9x / 14.3x / 16.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$82.020.53xyesBV/sh $14.89, ROE (TTM) 50.9%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$236.920.18xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$36.321.20xyesRev $4.9B, growth 8% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.7x / 3.3x / 3.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAsset$132.960.33xyesBV $14.89 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 50.9% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$50.230.87xyes√(22.5 × EPS $7.53 × BVPS $14.89) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativeno
FCF YieldEarnings$8.954.86xyesFCF $967.6M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$6.316.89xyesEPS $7.53 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelative$26.331.65xyesRevenue $4.86B × sector P/S 2.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$81.400.53xyesEPS $7.53 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$5.3b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)12.86x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)10.16x
Interest coverage1.6x
Share count CAGR (dilution)0.5%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The direction of travel is the argument here, and it can be read in one line of the growth breakdown. Revenue reached 6,615.9 million Canadian dollars in 2025, and stripping out the businesses sold along the way it grew 9.5%. The composition is what matters: 6.1 points came from core pricing, 3.0 from acquisitions completed since the start of 2024, and 0.5 from higher volumes. Almost none of that came from hauling more garbage.

The distinction matters more than it sounds. Waste collection is a route business. The truck drives the same street on the same morning whether the bin is half full or overflowing, so an extra dollar of price falls nearly whole to profit, while an extra dollar of volume drags fuel, labour and disposal costs behind it. A company growing on price is compounding on the part of the business that costs nothing more to serve.

Margins moved the way that mechanic predicts. The Canadian operations closed 2025 with an adjusted operating margin of 31.9% on the company's own reported measure, and the U.S. operations at 35.0%, both improved on the prior year. In the fourth quarter the Canadian figure reached 31.8%, up 170 basis points on the same quarter of 2024, which management attributes to pricing, operating cost efficiencies, cheaper fuel and renegotiated recycling processing contracts.

The balance sheet got the proceeds it was supposed to get. The Environmental Services divestiture closed on 1 March 2025 at an enterprise value of 8.0 billion, and the year's financing activities consumed 5,316.8 million, including 4,818.9 million of borrowings repaid. Operating activities generated 1,316.0 million over the same year while 983.2 million went into acquiring new businesses. GFL also repurchased and cancelled 18,360,127 subordinate voting shares under its normal course issuer bid, against none at all in 2024. A company that sells its fastest-moving division and spends the money on debt and its own equity is not the same company that borrowed its way to scale.

What remains is a route network with a defined footprint: the fourth largest diversified environmental services company in North America, operating throughout Canada and in 18 U.S. states with roughly 15,000 employees at the end of 2025. Density is the only durable advantage in this industry, because whoever already drives the street can serve the next customer on it for almost nothing. The bear will note that today's shares already ask for a great deal more than the business delivered last year, and that is a fair objection to what they cost rather than to the routes themselves.

Bear Case

The competitors are larger and they are pushing on exactly the lever GFL is leaning on. RSG has guided to 2026 revenue between 17.050 billion and 17.150 billion dollars, with growth from average yield on total revenue of 3.2% to 3.7% and roughly a point of volume decline. That revenue base is several times GFL's, produced from denser routes and funded more cheaply. WCN sets out the risk in its own filing without any prompting: From time to time, competitors may reduce the price of their services in an effort to expand their market shares or service areas or to win competitively bid municipal contracts. These practices may cause us to reduce the price of our services or, if we elect not to do so, to lose business. GFL grew its top line last year mainly by raising prices. That is precisely the growth a larger neighbour can compete away when it decides to.

The financial cushion for that fight is thin. Borrowings stood at 7,422.6 million Canadian dollars at 31 December 2025 against a cash balance of 85.6 million. Operating profit covered the interest bill roughly 1.6 times over. And in a year when core pricing ran at 6.1%, profit before tax from continuing operations still came to only 226.9 million Canadian dollars, because the interest bill takes most of what the routes earn before anything reaches a shareholder.

The retained stake in the divested business deserves more attention than it usually gets. GFL kept about 44% of GFL Environmental Services JV LP at the 1 March 2025 closing, recognised initially at 1.7 billion, with Apollo and BC Partners funds taking roughly 28% each. By 3 September 2025 that holding had fallen to about 34%, not because GFL sold any of it, but because HPS Investment Partners subscribed for roughly 22% of the vehicle in exchange for its paid-in-kind notes. A holder therefore owns a minority position in a private, leveraged entity whose share of it can shrink through decisions made by its lenders. GFL also holds an option to repurchase the balance of that equity within five years of closing, which is an option to undo the transaction it just completed.

Governance is not sending an untroubled signal either. At the annual meeting held on 13 May 2026, the advisory resolution on the company's approach to executive compensation passed with 53.58% of votes in favour and 46.42% against, and several directors drew withheld votes above 29%. Shareholder votes that close are unusual for a company whose operating results are improving.

Against that, what the price asks is not modest. It requires operating profit to compound at roughly 18.7% a year across a five-year stage, discounted at about a 7.3% cost of capital. Only about 42% of comparable fast growers sustained that pace over five years. And the most conservative reading of the business, capitalising the free cash flow it currently generates with no growth credited at all, lands at a small fraction of what the shares cost. The bull case rests on price increases holding while the route network densifies. The bear case is that both of those are contested by companies with more trucks and cheaper money.

Valuation

Start with what the reported bottom line does not tell you. Total profit for 2025 was 3,813.4 million Canadian dollars, and profit before tax from continuing operations was 226.9 million. The gap is the gain on selling the Environmental Services division on 1 March 2025 at an 8.0 billion enterprise value, which sits in discontinued operations. Any earnings multiple built on the headline number is measuring a transaction, not a business, and the same distortion runs through return on equity and book value for the year.

What the price requires is clearer than what the accounts show. It embeds operating profit compounding at roughly 18.7% a year across a five-year stage, discounted at about a 7.3% cost of capital with 4% assumed beyond it. Set that against the business as it actually ran last year: 9.5% growth excluding divestitures, of which 6.1 points was price. The required rate is roughly double the achieved one, and only about 42% of comparable fast growers held such a pace for five years. The requirement is also sensitive to the discount rate in an uncomfortable way, since a single point on the cost of capital shifts the growth demanded by close to ten.

The methods used to triangulate a value disagree, and the most useful of them is the least flattering. Capitalising the free cash flow the business currently produces, crediting no growth whatsoever, lands at a small fraction of the traded price. The methods that reach the price all do so by projecting the recent trajectory forward, and several of the balance-sheet-based readings are distorted this year by the same divestiture gain that distorts earnings. The honest summary is that the price is defended by an expectation about the next five years and by very little that has already been banked.

Solvency is where the case narrows. Borrowings were 7,422.6 million Canadian dollars at 31 December 2025 against 85.6 million of cash, and operating profit covered interest about 1.6 times over. That is a company with room to operate but not much room to be wrong: a route business with high fixed costs and thin coverage converts a modest pricing setback into a large earnings one. The share count has crept up about 0.5% a year over four years despite last year's cancellation of more than eighteen million shares, so the buyback has so far offset issuance rather than reduced the base.

One asset sits outside all of that arithmetic and bounds the downside. GFL's equity-accounted investments stood at 1,782.9 million Canadian dollars in associates at the end of 2025, the bulk of it the retained interest in the divested Environmental Services vehicle. That holding is worth something regardless of what happens to the collection routes, and it is the one part of the story where the operating thesis and the recoverable value come apart.

Catalysts

The share repurchase window has just turned over. GFL's normal course issuer bid ran from 3 March 2025 to 2 March 2026, allowed for up to 28,046,256 subordinate voting shares, and was used for 18,360,127 of them, all cancelled. Whether the company renews it, and at what size, is a direct statement about where management thinks the cash is best spent now that the divestiture proceeds have largely gone to debt.

The retained interest in GFL Environmental Services is the other live item. GFL's holding moved from roughly 44% at the 1 March 2025 closing to about 34% on 3 September 2025 when HPS Investment Partners exchanged paid-in-kind notes for equity in the vehicle. The call option to repurchase the remaining equity runs for five years from closing, which puts a decision point inside the ordinary planning horizon of anyone holding the shares today. Any further conversion by that vehicle's lenders would move the stake again without GFL transacting.

Financing terms have already been reset in the company's favour. The seventh amendment to its credit agreement, dated 29 April 2025, raised the Facility A commitment to 2,000,000,000 Canadian dollars, extended the Facility A and Facility C maturities from 27 September 2026 to 29 April 2030, reduced the margins in the pricing grid and added an accordion allowing a further 1,000,000,000 of commitments. The nearest refinancing wall has moved out several years, which removes the most obvious near-term stress from a balance sheet that carries a great deal.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Core business (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

GFL FY2025 40-F, annual MD&A · GFL FY2025 40-F · Republic Services FY2025 10-K · GFL report of voting results, 13 May 2026 · GFL credit agreement seventh amendment, 29 April 2025, filed as an exhibit to the FY2025 40-F

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