GFL Environmental Inc. (GFL): what the price assumes
boothcheck covers GFL Environmental Inc. (GFL) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-07-26.
Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/GFL
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | GFL |
| Company | GFL Environmental Inc. |
| Sector / Industry | Industrials |
| Current price | $43.50/sh |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 4.6% |
| Operating margin today | 10.9% |
| Margin compression (value-band) | -6.3pp |
| Multiple paid | 39x operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
How unusual the bet is: n/a
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value, while earnings-power lands below the price. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 0.43x | 4 | justifies |
| Earnings | 4.86x | 3 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.01x | 2 | expensive |
| Growth | 0.92x | 2 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.5%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=11)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $67.62 | 0.64x | yes | FCF base $1.0B, growth 8% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.5%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0 |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $117.18 | 0.37x | yes | P/E 14.29x (blended: static sector reference 20x + trailing (TTM) 6x), scenarios: 11.9x / 14.3x / 16.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $82.02 | 0.53x | yes | BV/sh $14.89, ROE (TTM) 50.9%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $236.92 | 0.18x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $36.32 | 1.20x | yes | Rev $4.9B, growth 8% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.7x / 3.3x / 3.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Growth-Adjusted P/E | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | $132.96 | 0.33x | yes | BV $14.89 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 50.9% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $50.23 | 0.87x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $7.53 × BVPS $14.89) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $8.95 | 4.86x | yes | FCF $967.6M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $6.31 | 6.89x | yes | EPS $7.53 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $26.33 | 1.65x | yes | Revenue $4.86B × sector P/S 2.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $81.40 | 0.53x | yes | EPS $7.53 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $5.3b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 12.86x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 10.16x |
| Interest coverage | 1.6x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 0.5% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
- Price, not volume, produced the growth: revenue excluding divestitures rose 9.5% in 2025, with 6.1 points of that coming from core pricing, 3.0 from acquisitions and only 0.5 from higher volumes.
- The obligations are the constraint: borrowings stood at 7,422.6 million Canadian dollars against a cash balance of 85.6 million at 31 December 2025, and profit before tax from continuing operations came to 226.9 million for the full year.
- Watch the retained interest in the sold Environmental Services business: GFL kept roughly 44% at the 1 March 2025 closing and held about 34% by 3 September 2025 after a lender swapped notes for equity, with an option to buy the balance back within five years of closing.
Bull Case
The direction of travel is the argument here, and it can be read in one line of the growth breakdown. Revenue reached 6,615.9 million Canadian dollars in 2025, and stripping out the businesses sold along the way it grew 9.5%. The composition is what matters: 6.1 points came from core pricing, 3.0 from acquisitions completed since the start of 2024, and 0.5 from higher volumes. Almost none of that came from hauling more garbage.
The distinction matters more than it sounds. Waste collection is a route business. The truck drives the same street on the same morning whether the bin is half full or overflowing, so an extra dollar of price falls nearly whole to profit, while an extra dollar of volume drags fuel, labour and disposal costs behind it. A company growing on price is compounding on the part of the business that costs nothing more to serve.
Margins moved the way that mechanic predicts. The Canadian operations closed 2025 with an adjusted operating margin of 31.9% on the company's own reported measure, and the U.S. operations at 35.0%, both improved on the prior year. In the fourth quarter the Canadian figure reached 31.8%, up 170 basis points on the same quarter of 2024, which management attributes to pricing, operating cost efficiencies, cheaper fuel and renegotiated recycling processing contracts.
The balance sheet got the proceeds it was supposed to get. The Environmental Services divestiture closed on 1 March 2025 at an enterprise value of 8.0 billion, and the year's financing activities consumed 5,316.8 million, including 4,818.9 million of borrowings repaid. Operating activities generated 1,316.0 million over the same year while 983.2 million went into acquiring new businesses. GFL also repurchased and cancelled 18,360,127 subordinate voting shares under its normal course issuer bid, against none at all in 2024. A company that sells its fastest-moving division and spends the money on debt and its own equity is not the same company that borrowed its way to scale.
What remains is a route network with a defined footprint: the fourth largest diversified environmental services company in North America, operating throughout Canada and in 18 U.S. states with roughly 15,000 employees at the end of 2025. Density is the only durable advantage in this industry, because whoever already drives the street can serve the next customer on it for almost nothing. The bear will note that today's shares already ask for a great deal more than the business delivered last year, and that is a fair objection to what they cost rather than to the routes themselves.
Bear Case
The competitors are larger and they are pushing on exactly the lever GFL is leaning on. RSG has guided to 2026 revenue between 17.050 billion and 17.150 billion dollars, with growth from average yield on total revenue of 3.2% to 3.7% and roughly a point of volume decline. That revenue base is several times GFL's, produced from denser routes and funded more cheaply. WCN sets out the risk in its own filing without any prompting: From time to time, competitors may reduce the price of their services in an effort to expand their market shares or service areas or to win competitively bid municipal contracts. These practices may cause us to reduce the price of our services or, if we elect not to do so, to lose business. GFL grew its top line last year mainly by raising prices. That is precisely the growth a larger neighbour can compete away when it decides to.
The financial cushion for that fight is thin. Borrowings stood at 7,422.6 million Canadian dollars at 31 December 2025 against a cash balance of 85.6 million. Operating profit covered the interest bill roughly 1.6 times over. And in a year when core pricing ran at 6.1%, profit before tax from continuing operations still came to only 226.9 million Canadian dollars, because the interest bill takes most of what the routes earn before anything reaches a shareholder.
The retained stake in the divested business deserves more attention than it usually gets. GFL kept about 44% of GFL Environmental Services JV LP at the 1 March 2025 closing, recognised initially at 1.7 billion, with Apollo and BC Partners funds taking roughly 28% each. By 3 September 2025 that holding had fallen to about 34%, not because GFL sold any of it, but because HPS Investment Partners subscribed for roughly 22% of the vehicle in exchange for its paid-in-kind notes. A holder therefore owns a minority position in a private, leveraged entity whose share of it can shrink through decisions made by its lenders. GFL also holds an option to repurchase the balance of that equity within five years of closing, which is an option to undo the transaction it just completed.
Governance is not sending an untroubled signal either. At the annual meeting held on 13 May 2026, the advisory resolution on the company's approach to executive compensation passed with 53.58% of votes in favour and 46.42% against, and several directors drew withheld votes above 29%. Shareholder votes that close are unusual for a company whose operating results are improving.
Against that, what the price asks is not modest. It requires operating profit to compound at roughly 18.7% a year across a five-year stage, discounted at about a 7.3% cost of capital. Only about 42% of comparable fast growers sustained that pace over five years. And the most conservative reading of the business, capitalising the free cash flow it currently generates with no growth credited at all, lands at a small fraction of what the shares cost. The bull case rests on price increases holding while the route network densifies. The bear case is that both of those are contested by companies with more trucks and cheaper money.
Valuation
Start with what the reported bottom line does not tell you. Total profit for 2025 was 3,813.4 million Canadian dollars, and profit before tax from continuing operations was 226.9 million. The gap is the gain on selling the Environmental Services division on 1 March 2025 at an 8.0 billion enterprise value, which sits in discontinued operations. Any earnings multiple built on the headline number is measuring a transaction, not a business, and the same distortion runs through return on equity and book value for the year.
What the price requires is clearer than what the accounts show. It embeds operating profit compounding at roughly 18.7% a year across a five-year stage, discounted at about a 7.3% cost of capital with 4% assumed beyond it. Set that against the business as it actually ran last year: 9.5% growth excluding divestitures, of which 6.1 points was price. The required rate is roughly double the achieved one, and only about 42% of comparable fast growers held such a pace for five years. The requirement is also sensitive to the discount rate in an uncomfortable way, since a single point on the cost of capital shifts the growth demanded by close to ten.
The methods used to triangulate a value disagree, and the most useful of them is the least flattering. Capitalising the free cash flow the business currently produces, crediting no growth whatsoever, lands at a small fraction of the traded price. The methods that reach the price all do so by projecting the recent trajectory forward, and several of the balance-sheet-based readings are distorted this year by the same divestiture gain that distorts earnings. The honest summary is that the price is defended by an expectation about the next five years and by very little that has already been banked.
Solvency is where the case narrows. Borrowings were 7,422.6 million Canadian dollars at 31 December 2025 against 85.6 million of cash, and operating profit covered interest about 1.6 times over. That is a company with room to operate but not much room to be wrong: a route business with high fixed costs and thin coverage converts a modest pricing setback into a large earnings one. The share count has crept up about 0.5% a year over four years despite last year's cancellation of more than eighteen million shares, so the buyback has so far offset issuance rather than reduced the base.
One asset sits outside all of that arithmetic and bounds the downside. GFL's equity-accounted investments stood at 1,782.9 million Canadian dollars in associates at the end of 2025, the bulk of it the retained interest in the divested Environmental Services vehicle. That holding is worth something regardless of what happens to the collection routes, and it is the one part of the story where the operating thesis and the recoverable value come apart.
Catalysts
The share repurchase window has just turned over. GFL's normal course issuer bid ran from 3 March 2025 to 2 March 2026, allowed for up to 28,046,256 subordinate voting shares, and was used for 18,360,127 of them, all cancelled. Whether the company renews it, and at what size, is a direct statement about where management thinks the cash is best spent now that the divestiture proceeds have largely gone to debt.
The retained interest in GFL Environmental Services is the other live item. GFL's holding moved from roughly 44% at the 1 March 2025 closing to about 34% on 3 September 2025 when HPS Investment Partners exchanged paid-in-kind notes for equity in the vehicle. The call option to repurchase the remaining equity runs for five years from closing, which puts a decision point inside the ordinary planning horizon of anyone holding the shares today. Any further conversion by that vehicle's lenders would move the stake again without GFL transacting.
Financing terms have already been reset in the company's favour. The seventh amendment to its credit agreement, dated 29 April 2025, raised the Facility A commitment to 2,000,000,000 Canadian dollars, extended the Facility A and Facility C maturities from 27 September 2026 to 29 April 2030, reduced the margins in the pricing grid and added an accordion allowing a further 1,000,000,000 of commitments. The nearest refinancing wall has moved out several years, which removes the most obvious near-term stress from a balance sheet that carries a great deal.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- WFRD (Weatherford International plc)
- FY2025 10-K: …in line with the decrease in activity. However, the rate of decrease in direct costs and other expense was lower than the rate of decrease in revenue, contributing to the decrease in margin. WCC Results 2025 vs 2024 Twelve Months Ended Variance ($ in Millions) Dec 31, 2025 Dec 31, 2024 $ % or bps Revenue $ 1,875 $…
- FY2025 10-K: …a number of global and regional competitors. Our principal competitors include SLB, Halliburton, Baker Hughes and Expro Group Holdings. We also compete with various other suppliers who provide products and services within a smaller cross section of our product line portfolio either locally, regionally, or globally.…
- TKR (TIMKEN CO)
- FY2025 10-K: Industrial Corp. The e-business service focuses on information and business services for authorized distributors. Timken has entered into individually negotiated contracts with some of its customers. These contracts may extend for one or more years and, if a price is fixed for any period extending beyond current…
- FY2025 10-K: …condition or results of operations could be negatively affected. Risk Relating to our Business The bearing and industrial motion industries are highly competitive, and this competition results in significant pricing pressure for our products that could affect our revenues and profitability. The global bearing…
- TTC (THE TORO COMPANY)
- FY2025 10-K: …competitors that have substantially larger operations and financial resources than we do and some that have smaller operations offering various capabilities to customers. We also experience a certain level of competition among our own brands within certain industries and end markets. Because of the diversity of our…
- FY2025 10-K: …factors in our industries and markets include product innovation; quality and reliability; pricing and sales promotion and incentive programs; product support and customer service; warranty; brand awareness; reputation; distribution, shelf space, and product placement and availability; and financing options. Some of…
- FLS (FLOWSERVE CORP)
- FY2025 10-K: …Company's products and services are based on technological advances. In addition, the Company will need to compete for talent that is familiar with such technologies, including upskilling its workforce. There can be no assurance that the Company will continue to compete effectively with its industry peers as new…
- FY2025 10-K: …this Annual Report. Business Functions Our business segments share a focus on industrial flow control technology and have a number of common customers. These segments also have complementary product offerings and technologies that are often combined in applications that provide us a net competitive advantage. Our…
- LII (LENNOX INTERNATIONAL INC)
- FY2025 10-K: …decision to explore strategic alternatives for our European commercial HVAC and refrigeration businesses. We continue to invest in our Heatcraft Worldwide Refrigeration business which is included in the Building Climate Solutions segment. The consolidation of our Heatcraft business within the Building Climate…
- FY2025 10-K: …to establish and maintain intellectual property rights in the products we sell. Our intellectual property rights could be challenged, invalidated, infringed, circumvented, or be insufficient to permit us to take advantage of current market trends or to otherwise provide competitive advantages. Further, the laws of…
- SNA (Snap-on Inc)
- FY2025 10-K: 2024, respectively. Operating earnings of $1,327.7 million in 2025 compared to $1,345.7 million in 2024. As a percentage of revenues (net sales plus financial services revenue), operating earnings were 25.8% compared to 26.3% last year. 2025 ANNUAL REPORT 29 Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition…
- FY2025 10-K: …(gross profit as a percentage of net sales) decreased 20 basis points (100 basis points ("bps") equals 1.0 percent) from 2024 reflecting 20 bps of unfavorable foreign currency effects. The impact of tariffs in 2025 was largely offset by benefits from the company's RCI initiatives. Operating expenses of $1,339.5…
- LECO (LINCOLN ELECTRIC HOLDINGS INC)
- FY2025 10-K: …direct correlation of leading indicators which can provide a forward-looking view of demand levels in the markets which ultimately use the Company's welding products. Key financial measures utilized by the Company's executive management and operating units in order to evaluate the results of its business and in…
- FY2025 10-K: Company believes its significant investment in research and development, its highly trained technical sales force and its extensive distributor network provide a competitive advantage in the marketplace. The Company's products are sold globally through industrial distributors, direct to end users, retailers and…
- GNRC (GENERAC HOLDINGS INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …sales mix, higher input costs, and operating deleverage on lower sales volumes, partially offset by increased price cost realization. 33 Table of Contents Adjusted EBITDA margins for the international segment, before deducting for non-controlling interests, for the year ended December 31, 2025 were 15.1% of…
- FY2025 10-K: …power outage environment together with a strong prior year comparison which included multiple major landed hurricanes. This was partially offset by robust growth in residential energy technology sales, revenue from products sold to data center customers, and higher shipments of C&I products to the industrial…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
GFL FY2025 40-F, annual MD&A · GFL FY2025 40-F · Republic Services FY2025 10-K · GFL report of voting results, 13 May 2026 · GFL credit agreement seventh amendment, 29 April 2025, filed as an exhibit to the FY2025 40-F