GE Vernova Inc. (GEV): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers GE Vernova Inc. (GEV) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-07-24.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Exported: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/GEV

Headline

FieldValue
TickerGEV
CompanyGE Vernova Inc.
Sector / IndustryIndustrials
Current price$914.07/sh
CompositionEquipment revenues 55% / Services revenues 45% / Intersegment revenues 1% / Other revenues and elimination of intersegment revenues -1%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Multiple paid129x operating income

How unusual the bet is: n/a

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset8.90x4expensive
Earnings3.56x3expensive
Relative6.32x2expensive
Growth0.76x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=12)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$1384.060.66xyesFCF base $14.8B, growth 13% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.2%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$1206.920.76xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 97.8x / 99.8x / 101.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 39.6x (blended: static sector reference 18x + trailing (TTM) 113x), scenarios: 32.6x / 39.6x / 46.6x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 26.4x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$87.7110.42xyesBV/sh $44.89, ROE (TTM) 18.1%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$121.067.55xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$871.481.05xyesRev $41.4B, growth 13% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 4.8x / 5.9x / 6.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$95.519.57xyesEPS $7.96, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=56.33 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$19.4247.07xyesNormalized EBIT (3y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.04B × (1−30%) / WACC 9.2% → EPV (no growth) (excluded from median)
Residual IncomeAsset$120.207.60xyesBV $44.89 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 18.1% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$89.6710.19xyes√(22.5 × EPS $7.96 × BVPS $44.89) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $2.47B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$494.381.85xyesFCF $12438.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$256.833.56xyesEPS $7.96 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$15.1860.22xyesBV $44.89 × (ROIC 3.1% / WACC 9.2%) (excluded from median)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $41.37B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$298.483.06xyesEPS $7.96 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$86.0510.62xyesEPS $7.96 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Poweroperatingenterprise$19.8bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Windoperatingenterprise$9.1bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Electrificationoperatingenterprise$9.6bwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net cash$9.9b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)-7.84x (net cash)
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)-5.50x (net cash)
Share count CAGR (buyback)-0.5%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Sell a gas turbine and you have made a sale. Sign the contract to service it for the next several decades and you have made an annuity. That second business is 45% of revenue here, and it is why a company with thin trailing profitability can credibly describe the future the way this one does.

The order book is the evidence. Second-quarter orders reached $24.2 billion, up 88% on the year, and total backlog closed the quarter at $176.3 billion. Split that backlog and the shape gets clearer: $88.5 billion of it is services work, marginally ahead of the $87.8 billion in equipment. Equipment sales seed the installed base. The installed base then pays out for years after the sale is booked.

Power is where that shows up first. The segment shipped 29 heavy-duty gas turbines in the quarter, 38% more than a year earlier, on revenue of $5,477 million at a segment EBITDA margin of 18.8%, an expansion of 320 basis points. Heavy gas turbines are not a growth product in normal times. They are one now because electricity demand is arriving faster than the grid can absorb it, and the list of firms that can build a large frame at scale is short enough to count on one hand.

Electrification is moving faster still. Revenue there rose 68% as reported and 29% organically to $3,637 million, the segment EBITDA margin widened 700 basis points to 18.4%, orders climbed 66% to $6.3 billion, and equipment backlog inside the segment grew 69% to $41 billion. Transformers and switchgear are booked years ahead across the whole industry, which is what lets price hold while volume climbs. For a sense of the headroom left, Eaton ran its Electrical Americas unit at a 25.6% operating margin in the first quarter of 2026, a level this electrification business does not yet reach even measured before depreciation.

Then there is the money. Free cash flow was $5,107 million in the quarter against $194 million a year earlier, and management lifted the full-year free cash flow range to $11.5 billion to $12.5 billion from $6.5 billion to $7.5 billion. Customers fund a great deal of the build: contract liabilities and deferred income stood at $39,944 million at quarter end, and the company still held $13,120 million of cash after paying $5.254 billion for the half of Prolec GE it did not already own. A capital-goods business that collects before it builds is a different animal from one that finances its own working capital.

Wind is the obvious hole in all this, and the bull case does not need it filled. It is the smallest of the three segments, its losses are guided to narrow, and every dollar of loss it stops making lands on the same bottom line the other two are already lifting.

Bear Case

Start with what the buyer is actually paying. At $1,017.77 the shares change hands at roughly 285 times the operating profit the business produced over the trailing year, and a number that size only reconciles if today's economics run at this pace for something like 37 years. Among businesses that have grown that quickly, only about 15% held the pace even a decade. Follow the same path all the way out and this company ends up as something near 78% of its entire addressable market, generously grown. Those are two statements of one objection: the price has borrowed a lot of future.

The distance between that multiple and anything recognisable comes from the earnings base under it. Revenue over the trailing year ran near $39.4 billion and operating profit out of it was $966 million, an operating margin of about 2.7%. That is a company still absorbing losses in one segment while two others carry the weight, and it is the figure the price has to grow away from before the arithmetic gets comfortable.

Only one family of methods reaches today's price at all. Measured against the rest, the price sits at about 10.7 times where the asset-value methods land, about 4.3 times where the earnings-power methods land, and about 3.9 times where peer multiples put it. The forward-growth methods come within about 1.12 times, and the only way they land there is by assuming the cash-flow multiple the market pays right now never compresses across the entire projection. A model that assumes the price is correct is not independent evidence that it is.

Backlog is the bull's best fact and the most misread one. It is contracted revenue rather than earned revenue, it converts over years, and it converts at prices and cost assumptions fixed when each order was signed. The equipment half of it, $87.8 billion, is a capital-goods cycle, and right now one buyer class is setting the pace of that cycle. Data centre construction does not taper politely when financing conditions change; it stops being ordered.

Wind remains a real loss-maker rather than a rounding error. Segment revenue fell to $2,026 million at a segment EBITDA margin of negative 13.6%, a $275 million loss in the quarter, with orders down 40% and management guiding to roughly $400 million of segment EBITDA losses for the year. Offshore is the harder half, where higher project costs have kept appearing, and management declined to call an inflection point in United States onshore orders while permitting and tariff questions stay open.

One more thing the trailing figures obscure. First-half net income attributable to the company was $5,413 million, of which $649 million arrived in the second quarter. A half-year that lopsided does not annualise, and the operating line rather than the reported bottom line is what a multiple of this size has to be built on.

Solvency is not where this breaks. Nothing in the balance sheet suggests strain, and that is precisely the problem for a holder: there is no cheap asset value underneath to catch the stock. What is at risk is the arithmetic. A price underwriting decades of sustained execution reprices fast on a single flat quarter of orders, because every method except one already sits far below it.

Valuation

At $1,017.77, these shares are not priced on last year's profit. They are priced on the order book, and on the belief that the order book keeps refilling. Set the price against trailing operating profit and it works out to roughly 285 times it, an arithmetic that only closes if the current pace of economics runs for something like 37 years. Restated as persistence, it gets uncomfortable: only about 15% of comparably fast growers held their pace even ten years, and the full path would leave this business owning close to 78% of its addressable market.

Valuation approaches for a company built like this one do not converge, and the pattern of the disagreement is the useful part. Asset-value approaches, which read book value and the returns earned on it, leave the price at about 10.7 times what they can support. The earnings-power methods, which capitalise what the company earns today without crediting any growth, leave it about 4.3 times high. Peer multiples put it about 3.9 times above where the cohort trades. Only the forward-growth methods come within about 1.12 times of the price, and how they arrive matters: the multiple the market pays today is carried forward unchanged for the life of the projection. When every static lens sits far below and only the growth lens reaches, the premium is a durability bet, not a valuation the static frames merely got wrong.

What has to be true is legible in the revenue mix. Roughly 55% of revenue is equipment and 45% is services, and those halves behave nothing alike. Equipment is cyclical, competitively bid, and priced when the order was taken. Services attaches to installed machines and recurs as long as those machines run. Today's price treats both halves as if they compound together for decades at a level of profitability the company has not yet shown: operating profit over the trailing year came to about 2.7% of a revenue base near $39.4 billion.

The balance sheet constrains none of this. The company held $13,120 million of cash at quarter end against $2,794 million of long-term borrowings, with $39,944 million of customer prepayments sitting in contract liabilities and deferred income. Working capital funds itself out of customer deposits, which is why an equipment maker with a modest trailing operating line can still generate the cash it does. Share count has drifted down at roughly 0.3% a year since mid-2023, so nothing is being diluted away underneath the story.

What the price is buying, then, is time. Decades of it, at a pace the company is currently delivering and has not yet had to defend through a downturn in the buyer class funding the order book.

Catalysts

The next scheduled information event is the third-quarter earnings webcast on October 28, 2026. Three lines in that print carry more weight than the headline number.

Guidance is the first. Management raised the 2026 outlook alongside second-quarter results: revenue to a $45.5 billion to $46.5 billion range from $44.5 billion to $45.5 billion, free cash flow to $11.5 billion to $12.5 billion from $6.5 billion to $7.5 billion, adjusted EBITDA margin to a 12% to 14% range, and electrification segment revenue to $14.5 billion to $15 billion. A free cash flow raise of that magnitude at the halfway mark is unusual, and October is its first real test.

Wind is the second. The segment is guided to roughly $400 million of EBITDA losses this year, and management has been unwilling to call a turn in United States onshore orders while permitting and tariff questions remain unsettled; offshore progress at Dogger Bank B is the other half of that line.

Backlog is the third. Management has said it expects the total to reach $200 billion during 2027, from $176.3 billion at the close of the second quarter. Order intake rather than revenue is what moves that figure, so the orders line will tell more about the trajectory than the revenue line will.

One accounting note worth carrying into the next print: the purchase of the remaining half of Prolec GE for $5.254 billion in cash, completed in February 2026, now sits inside the electrification results, so reported growth there runs well ahead of organic growth until the deal laps.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Power (reported)

Wind / Electrification (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

GE Vernova Q2 2026 Form 10-Q · GE Vernova Q2 2026 earnings release · GE Vernova investor events calendar and Q2 2026 earnings release · Eaton Q1 2026 earnings release · GE Vernova Q2 2026 earnings call · GE Vernova investor events calendar

View the full interactive GEV report on boothcheck