GENESIS ENERGY LP (GEL): what the price requires
At today's price, GENESIS ENERGY LP (GEL) is priced for -0.3% growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-19 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/GEL
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | GEL |
| Company | GENESIS ENERGY LP |
| Current price | $14.66/sh |
| Composition | Offshore Pipeline Transportation 33% / Marine Transportation 20% / Onshore Transportation and Services 48% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 8.0% |
| Operating margin today | 15.0% |
| Margin compression implied | -7.0pp |
| Implied growth | -0.3% |
| Multiple paid | 20x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 12, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 7% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~8.1pp (computed at the 7% minimum rate; the CAPM rate 4.4% sits below it).
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~16%/yr; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +0.09σ |
| cohort percentile (of 45 peers) | 67 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple; earnings-power/growth-DCF land below the price.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | — | 0 | — |
| Earnings | 2.93x | 1 | expensive |
| Relative | 0.43x | 3 | justifies |
| Growth | 1.85x | 2 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Relative Families that call it expensive: Earnings, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.5%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=6)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $0.00 | — | no | FCF base $0.2B, growth -10% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.5%, WACC 6.5%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $12.24 | 1.20x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 7.1x / 9.1x / 11.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $34.27 | 0.43x | yes | P/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 2.5x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $5.84 | 2.51x | yes | Rev $1.7B, growth -15% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.9x / 1.1x / 1.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0 |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $5.00 | 2.93x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.25B × (1−1%) / WACC 6.5% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Graham Number | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $27.76 | 0.53x | yes | EBITDA $0.55B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $0.01 | 1465.50x | yes | FCF $178.4M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median) |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $0.01 | 1465.50x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.17B (FCF $0.18B − SBC $0.01B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median) |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $34.27 | 0.43x | yes | Revenue $1.68B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $3.2b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 13.03x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 12.95x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 0.0% |
| Burning cash | no |
Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
- Genesis is a midstream partnership best valued on cash flow, not trailing earnings: Q1 2026 segment margin rose 29% to $156.4 million and adjusted EBITDA reached $140.9 million on stronger offshore pipeline volumes and lower overhead.
- At $14.50 the units trade below the cash-flow-based methods (blended landing near $24, reverse-DCF base near $28), but the discount reflects real risk, not an oversight.
- The binding constraints are leverage and concentration: net debt near 10x operating income, a soft near-term Shenandoah volume outlook (about $12-$15 million less segment margin in 2026), and an earnings-power value near zero that shows how much debt and preferred sit ahead of the common.
Bull Case
Midstream energy partnerships are valued differently from ordinary companies, and Genesis Energy is a textbook case of why. The right lens is not trailing earnings, which the partnership structure and heavy depreciation distort, but the cash the assets throw off and the trajectory of the segment margins. On that basis the picture is improving sharply. Q1 2026 segment margin rose 29% to $156.4 million and adjusted EBITDA reached $140.9 million, with net income attributable to Genesis swinging to $6.8 million from a $469.1 million loss a year earlier, helped by stronger offshore pipeline volumes and sharply lower overhead.
The asset base is the kind that is hard to replicate. Genesis owns offshore crude-oil and natural-gas pipelines in the deepwater Gulf, marine transportation vessels, and onshore transportation and services. The 10-K explains that the offshore pipelines exist so that producers' production can access the markets (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001022321-26-000008), infrastructure that deepwater operators depend on and that carries long-lived, contracted volume economics. Deepwater fields take years to develop and then produce for decades, which gives the pipelines a multi-year tail of fee-based throughput.
The story now is deleveraging and simplification. After divesting its soda-ash business, Genesis has been cutting leverage and reducing its preferred-equity burden, the steps that move value from creditors and preferred holders toward common unitholders. Management expects full-year adjusted EBITDA near the prior midpoint despite some near-term softness at the Shenandoah development. For an investor comfortable with midstream partnership economics, a deleveraging owner of deepwater Gulf infrastructure trading well below its cash-flow-based methods is the setup the bull case rests on.
Bear Case
The qualitative problem comes first: Genesis is a leveraged, complex partnership whose fortunes are tied to a single deepwater basin and a handful of producer customers, and the gap between its $14.50 price and its cash-flow-based valuations exists for reasons, not by oversight. The offshore pipelines depend on a small number of large Gulf producers continuing to develop and produce fields on schedule. When a project slips, as management flagged with lower near-term Shenandoah volumes costing roughly $12 million to $15 million of segment margin in 2026, the revenue does not simply defer; it exposes how concentrated and timing-dependent the throughput really is. A business this reliant on a few customers' capital decisions carries fragility that the headline EBITDA recovery does not erase.
The balance sheet is the second hard fact. Net debt sits near $3.2 billion against trailing operating income of about $313 million, roughly 10x, an elevated load even by midstream standards. The deleveraging story is real, but it is a slow grind, and a partnership carrying that much debt has little room for a volume disappointment or a refinancing at higher rates. The earnings-power frame, which capitalizes normalized operating income at no growth, lands near $0.87, a stark signal that on a no-growth basis the equity is worth almost nothing after the debt and preferred claims, the partnership has to grow into its capital structure for the common to be worth the price.
The numbers underline the qualitative caution. Q1 2026 reported EPS of negative $0.06, missing the $0.16 estimate, and the marine segment carries dry-docking and timing effects that make quarterly cash flow lumpy. The commodity and demand cycle sits on top of all of it: a sustained drop in Gulf production economics, whether from lower oil prices or slower deepwater development, would cut throughput on the very pipelines the valuation depends on. A complex, levered partnership with customer concentration, a soft near-term volume outlook, and an earnings-power value near zero is cheap on the cash-flow methods precisely because the equity sits behind a large debt and preferred stack with real timing and commodity risk.
Valuation
Genesis is a midstream partnership, so the inversion and several models are distorted by the structure: negative book equity, heavy depreciation, and the preferred stack make the asset-based and earnings-based frames unreliable, and the engine notes the price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF while earnings-power says expensive. Inverting the $14.50 price implies essentially flat operating-income growth (about negative 0.4%) with a price-implied margin near 7.8% against a current margin near 18.6%, a conservative read that the market is already discounting the cash-flow profile.
The usable model X-ray is thin but consistent. The perpetual-growth DCF lands near $24, the exit-multiple DCF near $14 right at the price, the relative and P/S-sector methods near $34, and the EV/EBITDA-relative method near $28. The blended landing across applicable methods is near $24. Against those, the earnings-power frame collapses to near $0.87 and the FCF-yield frames to near zero, both because the partnership's reported earnings and free cash flow, after the heavy depreciation and the debt-and-preferred burden, leave little for the common on a no-growth basis. Those readings should be treated as a warning about the capital structure rather than a literal value.
The characterization is that the cash-flow and relative frames support a value above the price while the earnings-power frame says expensive, a reflection of how much sits between the assets and the common unitholder. The peer set the model returned, UPS and FDX, is logistics rather than a clean midstream comparable, so peer multiples carry little weight; Genesis is better judged against its EBITDA, its leverage path, and the deepwater Gulf throughput outlook. The investable question is whether the deleveraging and EBITDA recovery proceed fast enough to move value to the common before a volume or commodity disappointment intervenes. At roughly 10x net-debt-to-operating-income, the balance sheet is the binding variable, and the gap to the cash-flow methods is the reward for taking that structural risk.
Catalysts
Genesis Energy reported Q1 2026 on April 30, with revenue of $446.6 million, segment margin up 29% to $156.4 million, adjusted EBITDA of $140.9 million, and net income attributable to Genesis of $6.8 million (versus a $469.1 million loss a year earlier), though reported EPS of negative $0.06 missed the $0.16 estimate. Management cited timing and dry-docking effects and lower near-term Shenandoah volumes (roughly $12 million to $15 million less segment margin in 2026), and still expects full-year adjusted EBITDA near the prior midpoint. The next print is expected July 30.
The central catalysts are deleveraging and offshore volume ramps. The data points to watch are the leverage trajectory and any further reduction in the preferred-equity burden, since those move value toward common unitholders, and the offshore pipeline throughput as deepwater developments come online. The Shenandoah timing and broader Gulf production economics are the swing factors on near-term segment margin. Oil prices and deepwater development pace are the macro variables that govern the fee-based throughput the valuation depends on, and any refinancing of the debt stack at prevailing rates is a key item given the leverage.
Sources: Genesis Energy Q1 2026 results (StockTitan, MarketBeat, stockanalysis.com, 2026); FY2025 10-K (accession 0001022321-26-000008).
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Offshore Pipeline Transportation / Marine Transportation / Onshore Transportation and Services (reported)
- WMB (WILLIAMS COMPANIES, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …gas gathering lines to report incidents and file annual reports. The final rule also established a new Type C regulated gathering line and now requires Type C gathering lines to comply with specifically identified PHMSA regulations in 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 192. Since the rule was published, Williams has…
- FY2025 10-K: …in Other. 112 Table of Contents Notes (Continued) Transmission, Power & Gulf is comprised of interstate natural gas pipelines and their related natural gas storage facilities including Transco, NWP, and MountainWest Pipelines Holding LLC (MountainWest) and a 50 percent equity-method investment in Gulfstream Natural…
- OKE (ONEOK INC /NEW/)
- FY2025 10-K: . See further discussion in the "Regulatory, Environmental and Safety Matters" section. Natural Gas Pipelines Overview of Operations - In our Natural Gas Pipelines segment, we receive residue natural gas from third parties and our own natural gas processing plants and interconnecting pipelines. Residue natural gas is…
- FY2025 10-K: …areas in Canada and the United States via our interstate and intrastate natural gas pipelines, Northern Border and Matterhorn, which enables us to provide essential natural gas transportation and storage services. Growing demand from data centers and continued demand from local distribution companies,…
- KMI (KINDER MORGAN, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …and governmental regulations, the ability to convert to alternative fuels, and weather. 9 Products Pipelines Our Products Pipelines business segment consists of our refined petroleum products, crude oil, and condensate pipelines, and associated terminals, our condensate processing facility, and our transmix…
- FY2025 10-K: …income, and cash flows from our businesses that produce, process, or purchase and sell crude oil, NGL, or natural gas, and could have a material adverse effect on the carrying value (which includes assigned goodwill) of our CO 2 business segment's proved reserves, and to a lesser extent, certain assets in certain…
- TRGP (TARGA RESOURCES CORP.)
- FY2025 10-K: …perform receipt, delivery and transportation services in order to meet refinery demand. Commercial Transportation Our NGL transportation and distribution infrastructure includes a wide range of assets supporting both third-party customers and the delivery requirements of our marketing and asset management business.…
- FY2025 10-K: …wildfires and wintry conditions and could have an adverse effect on our infrastructure or continued operations as well as the operations of our oil and gas exploration and production customers that deliver natural gas to us for processing and throughput, our third party vendors that supply us with goods, utilities…
- ET (ENERGY TRANSFER LP)
- FY2025 10-K: …based on the actual throughput of natural gas by the customer, (iii) fuel retention based on a percentage of gas transported on the pipeline or (iv) a combination of the three, generally payable monthly. We also generate revenues and margin from the sale of natural gas to electric utilities, independent power plants,…
- FY2025 10-K: …Energy Transfer operates one of the largest intrastate pipeline systems in the United States, which provides energy logistics to major trading hubs and industrial consumption areas throughout the country. In Texas, our intrastate transportation and storage segment provides transportation of natural gas to major…
- EPD (ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS PARTNERS L.P.)
- FY2025 10-K: …service in the first half of 2026. Crude Oil Pipelines & Services This business segment includes our crude oil pipelines, crude oil storage and marine terminals, and related crude oil marketing activities. Crude oil pipelines We have crude oil gathering and transportation pipelines located in Oklahoma, New Mexico and…
- FY2025 10-K: …based on either tariffs regulated by governmental agencies or contractual arrangements. Under certain agreements, customers are required to ship a minimum volume over an agreed-upon period, with make-up rights. Revenue attributable to such agreements is initially deferred and subsequently recognized at the earlier of…
- PAA (PLAINS ALL AMERICAN PIPELINE LP)
- FY2025 10-K: …facilities. We also generate significant revenue through a variety of commercial and merchant activities that often result in increased utilization of our transportation and storage assets. Crude Oil Segment Assets Overview As of December 31, 2025, the assets utilized in our Crude Oil segment included the following:…
- FY2025 10-K: …users. Although new pipeline projects represent a source of competition for our business, existing third-party owned pipelines with excess capacity in the vicinity of our operations also expose us to significant competition based on the relatively low operating cost associated with moving an incremental barrel of…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.