GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY (GE): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $342.91, GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY (GE) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~12.7 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-26.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/GE

Headline

FieldValue
TickerGE
CompanyGENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
Sector / IndustryIndustrials
Current price$342.91/sh
CompositionCommercial Engines & Services 76% / Defense & Propulsion Technologies 24%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Must persist for12.7y
Multiple paid42x operating income

Solve inputs: computed at a 11.2% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling.

How unusual the bet is: elevated (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+1.59σ
cohort percentile (of 225 peers)92

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.97x4expensive
Earnings3.74x3expensive
Relative1.81x2expensive
Growth0.91x2justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=11)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$319.731.07xyesFCF base $9.2B, growth 22% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.2%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$0.00noNegative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 24.5x (blended: static sector reference 18x + trailing (TTM) 40x), scenarios: 19.9x / 24.5x / 29.1x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$93.483.67xyesBV/sh $17.00, ROE (TTM) 50.9%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$269.581.27xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$461.540.74xyesRev $50.6B, growth 22% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 5.7x / 7.0x / 8.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$158.022.17xyesEPS $8.49, growth 19% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=2.13 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAsset$151.522.26xyesBV $17.00 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 50.9% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$56.996.02xyes√(22.5 × EPS $8.49 × BVPS $17.00) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativeno
FCF YieldEarnings$84.524.06xyesFCF $8396.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$273.941.25xyesEPS $8.49 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $50.64B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$237.031.45xyesEPS $8.49 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 18.6% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 27.9x
Earnings YieldEarnings$91.783.74xyesEPS $8.49 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Commercial Engines & Servicesoperatingenterprise$33.3bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Defense & Propulsion Technologiesoperatingenterprise$10.6bwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$13.1b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)1.80x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)1.54x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-1.2%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

For a company whose order book management describes as over 210 billion dollars, GE Aerospace borrows remarkably little. Borrowings stood near 20.3 billion dollars at the end of March against liquid holdings of roughly 11.0 billion. Interest and other financial charges came to 215 million dollars in the June quarter, set against 3,132 million of combined segment profit in the same three months. The share count has been drifting lower by about 1.1% a year since early 2022. Companies that fear the next stretch do not retire stock.

What that balance sheet funds is unusual for a manufacturer. The engine sale is closer to a customer acquisition cost than to the profit event. The profit arrives afterwards, across decades, through the maintenance stream: the 10-K describes the business as "(MRO) of engines and the sale of spare parts, and we offer services under a variety of arrangements such as long-term service agreements, spare parts agreements or time and material contracts." It then puts the weight plainly, noting that "CES was approximately 73% of total GE Aerospace revenue for the year ended December 31, 2025, with services representing 75% of total CES revenue." Sell an engine once, service it for thirty years.

The economics that produces are visible in the segment table. Commercial engines and services turned 9,731 million dollars of June-quarter revenue into 2,657 million of segment profit, a 27.3% margin, while defense and propulsion technologies turned 3,443 million into 475 million, a 13.8% margin. Put that commercial margin next to the cohort it competes in and it stands up: HEI runs a 23.5% operating margin, HON 21.2%, and RTX 10.9%. TDG, at a 46.5% operating margin, shows where pure aftermarket economics can go, which is the direction this mix keeps moving as the installed fleet ages.

The defense side is the quieter argument. A 13.8% segment margin is above what the large primes report on their whole businesses: LMT at 9.9%, GD at 10.2%, NOC at 11.6%, LHX at 10.2%. Engines and propulsion sit at a better point in the defense value chain than airframes and integration, because the same time-on-wing economics apply whether the aircraft is a narrowbody or a trainer.

The forward book keeps refilling. The annual report records that "RPO increased $18.9 billion, or 11%, from December 31, 2024, primarily at Commercial Engines & Services", driven by engines going under long-term service agreements and by orders outrunning revenue recognition. The bear will point out that commercial margins compressed 160 basis points in the June quarter, and that is true. It is also what laying down an annuity looks like: new engines ship at thin margins so that the parts and shop visits arrive later at fat ones. The compression is the investment, showing up where investments show up.

Bear Case

Four families of valuation method get pointed at this company and three of them cannot get near the price. The asset-value methods land at less than a third of it. The earnings-power methods, which capitalize what the business earns now and credit no growth at all, land near a quarter. Peer multiples do better and still leave the price roughly 43% above what that family of method supports. Only the forward-growth methods reach today's level, and they reach it by carrying the recent past forward.

Their mechanics are worth knowing, because they are the same bet stated twice. The cash-flow method that clears the price starts from a free cash flow base near 8.2 billion dollars, compounds it at 22% a year, then settles to 4% forever. The method that clears it most comfortably holds today's price-to-sales multiple flat into its terminal year and lets revenue compound at the same 22%. Neither is unreasonable. Neither is independent evidence, either, because both are extrapolation wearing different clothes.

Read the price backwards and the requirement is specific. Growth pinned at the fastest rate the business can fund out of its own cash flow, roughly 25% a year, has to persist for something like 13 years before the arithmetic meets today's level. The rate is not the stretch. GE Aerospace has recently delivered comparable growth, and the June quarter delivered more. The duration is the stretch: of companies that have grown that fast, roughly 15% sustained the pace even a decade, and the multiple already sits at the very top of its peer group, well beyond the upper quartile.

What could interrupt it is written in the company's own risk section. Supply is the first constraint, and it is structural rather than cyclical: "Some of our suppliers or their sub-suppliers are limited- or sole-source suppliers", which means a single vendor's quality problem becomes GE's delivery problem. The ramp itself is the second, and the filing does not soften it: "the anticipated significant growth of the LEAP installed base and services in the coming years will require considerable effort". Then there is the demand side, which no amount of execution controls. The 10-K notes that "The airline industry has historically been highly cyclical, and sustained economic growth and political stability in both developed and emerging markets are principal factors underlying long-term air traffic growth". Thirteen years of compounding requires roughly thirteen years without an air-traffic recession, and the industry has not previously managed that.

Cost pressure is already showing. Commercial margins compressed 160 basis points in the June quarter on new-engine mix, investment and inflation, and on tariffs the company says it is "taking measures to control cost and implementing pricing actions to primarily mitigate the remaining impact." Mitigate is the operative word. Price increases into airline customers who are themselves margin-constrained is not a lever that pulls indefinitely.

There is also a piece of this company that has nothing to do with engines. A legacy insurance book of long-term care policies and structured settlement annuities still sits inside the reporting entity, producing 715 million dollars of revenue against 544 million of associated costs in the June quarter. It is small, it is running off, and it is the last piece of the old conglomerate still attached.

The fall would not be unbounded. Roughly 9.1 billion dollars of equity holdings sit outside the operating businesses, a little over 2% of the company's market value, and those survive any operating disappointment. That bounds the downside. It does not begin to cover the premium.

Valuation

Today's price works out to roughly 40 times a year's operating income. That figure only means something once you invert it, and the inversion is unusually concrete here. Hold growth at the fastest rate the business can fund from its own cash flow, about 25% a year, and the price needs that rate to persist for something like 13 years before the numbers meet. Shave a percentage point off the growth assumption and the required horizon stretches by more than two years. The bet is not that GE Aerospace grows fast. It is that it grows fast for a very long time.

The methods split cleanly on whether that is credible. Asset-value approaches land at under a third of the price, and earnings-power approaches, which capitalize current profit without crediting any growth, land near a quarter of it. Peer multiples close most of the gap and still leave the price about 43% above where that family of method sits. Only the forward-growth methods reach the price at all, which makes this a durability premium rather than an earnings premium: the static frames are not disagreeing about the quality of the business, they are structurally unable to price a service annuity that has not been billed yet.

The two methods that do reach it get there in related ways. One starts from a free cash flow base near 8.2 billion dollars, compounds at 22% before fading to 4% in perpetuity, and discounts at 9.2%. The other holds today's price-to-sales multiple unchanged into its terminal year while revenue compounds. The peer-multiple approach, by contrast, blends a static sector reference with the company's own trailing multiple, and because the sector reference is less than half of what this company trades on, that blend lands well under the price by construction.

The cohort makes the same point from the other direction. On filed segment figures, commercial engines and services earned a 27.3% margin in the June quarter and defense and propulsion technologies 13.8%, against total revenue of 45,855 million dollars for the 2025 year. HEI carries a 23.5% operating margin and HON 21.2%, so the commercial segment is genuinely at the top of its cohort on profitability. The multiple, though, is not near the top of the cohort. It is beyond it, past the upper quartile of the peer distribution, which is what the demanding read reflects.

None of this is a balance-sheet story, which is the point worth ending on. Borrowings near 20.3 billion dollars sat against liquid holdings around 11.0 billion at the end of March, interest charges ran 215 million dollars in the June quarter against 3,132 million of combined segment profit, operations generated 3,258 million dollars of cash in that same quarter, and the share count keeps falling. If this investment disappoints, it will not be because the company ran out of money. It will be because the thirteenth year of compounding never arrived.

Catalysts

The most recent information event was July 16, 2026, and it was a good one. Second-quarter revenue came in at 13,349 million dollars, up 21% on the year, with reported profit of 2,801 million, up 17%, and continuing earnings per share of 2.30 dollars, up 23%. Cash from operating activities reached 3,258 million dollars, up 39%. Orders totalled 16.5 billion dollars, up 17%.

Management raised full-year 2026 guidance across every line it guides. The commercial segment is now expected to grow revenue around 20% for the year, up from a prior mid-teens expectation, with services growth revised to the low 20s. Segment operating profit guidance for that business moved to a range of 10.25 to 10.35 billion dollars from a prior 9.6 to 9.9 billion. For a company whose valuation rests on duration rather than rate, a guidance raise of that shape matters less for the incremental dollars than for what it says about visibility into the back half.

The operating detail underneath is where the constraint sits. Total engine deliveries rose 31% in the first half with LEAP deliveries up 41%, and management attributed that to material input from priority suppliers rising double digits both sequentially and year on year. Commercial wins in the quarter included an agreement with Copa Airlines for up to 120 LEAP-1B engines, an F404 award from Turkish Aerospace for its advanced jet trainer programme, and CT7 engines for Leonardo Helicopters. Each new engine placed is a service stream that starts billing years later, which is why order announcements read as revenue events at this company long before they are.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Commercial Engines & Services (reported)

Defense & Propulsion Technologies (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

GE Aerospace second quarter 2026 earnings release, July 16, 2026 · GE Aerospace quarterly report for the period ended March 31, 2026 · GE Aerospace quarterly report for the period ended June 30, 2026 · GE Aerospace annual report for the year ended December 31, 2025

View the full interactive GE report on boothcheck