GoDaddy Inc. (GDDY): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers GoDaddy Inc. (GDDY) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-07-26.

Generated: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/GDDY

Headline

FieldValue
TickerGDDY
CompanyGoDaddy Inc.
Sector / IndustryTechnology
Current price$97.70/sh
CompositionApplications and commerce 38% / Core platform: domains 47% / Core platform: other 15%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)4.3%
Operating margin today24.8%
Margin compression (value-band)-20.5pp
Multiple paid12x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.

Solve inputs: computed at a 8% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-2.74σ
cohort percentile (of 188 peers)10

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset0.72x3justifies
Earnings1.09x5expensive
Relative0.99x2justifies
Growth0.59x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=13)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$461.750.21xyesFCF base $1.8B, growth 7% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.2%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$166.120.59xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 9.9x / 11.9x / 13.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 26.44x (blended: static sector reference 35x + trailing (TTM) 14x), scenarios: 22.0x / 26.4x / 30.9x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 19.77x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$77.701.26xyesBV/sh $0.05, ROE (TTM) 13586.6%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$1954.000.05xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$80.891.21xyesRev $5.1B, growth 7% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.0x / 2.4x / 2.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$82.571.18xyesEPS $4.94, growth 17% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.81 (Undervalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$38.382.55xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.83B × (1−24%) / WACC 7.2% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$136.620.72xyesBV $0.05 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 13586.6% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$2.4240.37xyes√(22.5 × EPS $4.94 × BVPS $0.05) — Graham's conservative floor (excluded from median)
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $1.36B × sector EV/EBITDA 25.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$115.030.85xyesFCF $1702.9M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$89.261.09xyesSBC-adj FCF $1.40B (FCF $1.70B − SBC $0.30B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$159.400.61xyesEPS $4.94 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$0.051954.00xyesBV $0.05 × (ROIC 6.7% / WACC 7.2%) (excluded from median)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $5.10B × sector P/S 8.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$123.850.79xyesEPS $4.94 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 16.7% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 25.1x
Earnings YieldEarnings$53.411.83xyesEPS $4.94 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Applications and Commerce (A&C)operatingenterprise1.9B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value
Core Platformoperatingenterprise3.1B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$2.6b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)2.73x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)2.07x
Interest coverage8.4x
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The oddest number in these accounts is not a number at all. It is a gap between two of them. In the March quarter revenue grew 6.1 percent and operating income grew 25.6 percent, taking the operating margin to 24.5 percent from 20.7 percent a year earlier. Fiscal 2025 did the same thing: revenue up 8.3 percent, operating profit up 26.2 percent. A company whose profit compounds four times faster than its sales for two years running is not riding a cycle. Something in the shape of the business is changing.

The mechanism is mix, and it is almost boringly simple. Applications and Commerce revenue grew 11.6 percent in the quarter to 498.2 million dollars, while Core Platform grew 2.8 percent to 768.7 million. The faster-growing half also earns more: segment EBITDA margin ran 45.2 percent in Applications and Commerce against 33.0 percent in Core Platform. Nobody has to execute brilliantly for the blended margin to rise. It rises because the profitable half keeps getting bigger relative to the other half, quarter after quarter.

None of which would work without the domain business underneath it, which remains the largest single revenue line in the company and the reason anyone shows up in the first place. The 10-K states it plainly: "We are the global leader in domain name registration, with approximately 81 million domains under management as of December 31, 2025." The economics of that product are unusually clean, and the filing describes them precisely: "For each domain registration or renewal, we have one performance obligation consisting of two promises to ensure: (1) the customer has exclusive use of the domain during the applicable registration term and (2) the domain is accessible and appropriately directed to its underlying content." Somebody who has printed a web address on a business card renews it. The company puts the resulting stickiness on the record: "We have 20.4 million paying customers and a customer retention rate of over 85% for the year ended December 31, 2025."

What the company does with that captive audience is sell it more. Average revenue per user reached $246 in the March quarter against $225 a year earlier, up 9.3 percent, and annualised recurring revenue reached 4,288.4 million dollars. A small business that already buys a domain, and then buys email, and then buys a store, is a customer whose value rises without any acquisition spending attached to it. That is why the margin can expand while the marketing line does not.

The cash arriving at the bottom is what makes the whole thing tangible. Operating activities produced 471.5 million dollars in the March quarter, up 16.5 percent, and management reaffirmed a full-year free cash flow target of approximately 1.8 billion dollars against 1.6 billion generated in 2025. Set that against a market value near 12.5 billion dollars and the yield is substantial. In the quarter alone the company bought back 3.0 million shares for 279.7 million dollars, comfortably more than the stock compensation issued over the same stretch, so the count is genuinely falling rather than treading water.

Among the peers whose figures can be read on the same basis, the profitability stands out. AKAM runs a 12.3 percent operating margin on trailing revenue of 4,266.6 million dollars growing 6.2 percent, and NET runs a negative operating margin on 2,328.6 million growing 31.6 percent. GoDaddy's trailing operating margin sits near 23.7 percent on comparable revenue growth to AKAM. It is the rare mature software business that converted maturity into margin rather than into decline.

Bear Case

The moat here was never the software, and the software was never hard to copy. The moat was twenty million small businesses that had already put an address on a business card, and the mild annual inconvenience of moving. That base has stopped growing and begun to shrink. Paying customers finished 2025 at 20,422 thousand, against 20,511 at the end of 2024 and 21,026 at the end of 2023. Domains under management went from 83,554 thousand to 81,013 to 80,793 across the same three year-ends. Two consecutive years of decline on both counts, disclosed in the company's own MD&A table. Revenue rose regardless, because average revenue per user went from $203 to $220 to $242. Strip the pricing away and the business is smaller than it was.

The forward guidance says this continues. Full-year 2026 revenue is guided to a range of 5.195 to 5.275 billion dollars, roughly 6 percent growth at the midpoint, with Applications and Commerce in the low double digits and Core Platform, the larger half, in the low single digits. More telling is the leading indicator. Bookings grew 2.7 percent in the March quarter against reported revenue growth of 6.1 percent. For a subscription business, bookings are what revenue becomes; a bookings line running at less than half the revenue line is the recognition of past pricing catching up with a present that is slower.

Competition is arriving from a direction the company cannot buy its way out of. Its own risk factors are titled "We face significant competition for our products, which we expect will continue to intensify, and we may not be able to maintain or improve our competitive position or market share." and note that "In addition, we and our competitors continue to invest in AI and integrate AI capabilities into products, services and internal operations." The bundle GoDaddy sells a microbusiness, a site plus email plus a payment page, is precisely what a general-purpose assistant now assembles on request. Management's answer is Airo AI Builder, which it describes as reaching a multi-million-dollar annualised bookings run rate within weeks of its beta launch. Held against quarterly bookings of 1,455.3 million dollars, that is not yet a business.

Then there is the question of what the cash flow actually means, which is the crux of the valuation rather than a footnote to it. Capitalise the reported free cash flow at a required return and the calculation comfortably clears the current quote. Subtract the roughly 310 million dollars a year of stock-based compensation that the free cash flow measure does not charge against itself, and the price sits about 19 percent above the same calculation. Those are not two views. They are the same arithmetic run on two definitions of what the owner receives, and the whole case turns on which one is honest.

The balance sheet leaves less room than the cash generation implies. The company reported total cash and cash equivalents of 1.3 billion dollars, total debt of 3.8 billion and net debt of 2.6 billion as of March 31, 2026. Book equity is close to nothing, because a decade of repurchases has consumed it, which means there is no asset cushion under the shares at all. Trailing operating profit covers the financing cost several times over and none of this is distress. But it does mean that if free cash flow disappoints, the buyback is the first thing that has to give, and the buyback is currently doing a meaningful share of the work in per-share growth.

Valuation

Rebuilt from the filed income statements, the twelve months through March 31, 2026 produced about 1.19 billion dollars of operating profit on 5.02 billion of revenue, an operating margin near 23.7 percent. Work the current quote backwards and the market is priced for operating profit growth of roughly -3.2% a year across a five-year stage. That is the striking part. The quote embeds a business whose profit slowly shrinks, at a moment when operating profit grew 26.2 percent in fiscal 2025 and 25.6 percent in the March quarter.

Not one family of method finds the shares expensive, but the families are not equally trustworthy here. Anything built off book value per share is unusable, because a decade of repurchases has left almost no book equity to divide by, and calculations anchored on it swing wildly in both directions. Peer multiples land well above the quote, though they get there using generic technology-sector reference multiples rather than anything drawn from domain registrars, which flatters the reading. The forward cash-flow work also lands above the quote, one method holding today's earnings multiple where it stands out to a six-year horizon, compressing it in the bear scenario and expanding it in the bull. The no-growth earnings-power calculation is the one dissenter of substance: averaging five years of operating income and crediting no growth at all, it lands far under the quote, which is what happens when a company's recent profit is much larger than its five-year average.

The decisive question is narrower than the method spread suggests. It is what free cash flow means. Capitalise the reported figure at a required return and the result sits above where the shares change hands. Subtract the roughly 310 million dollars a year of stock-based compensation, and the price sits about 19 percent above the same calculation. Against that, the company repurchased 3.0 million shares for 279.7 million dollars in the March quarter, more than covering the compensation issued, so the dilution is being paid for in cash rather than tolerated.

The obligations are visible and manageable. The company reported total cash and cash equivalents of 1.3 billion dollars, total debt of 3.8 billion and net debt of 2.6 billion as of March 31, 2026. Against roughly 1.19 billion dollars of trailing operating profit and a reaffirmed 2026 free cash flow target near 1.8 billion, servicing that is not in question. What it does constrain is optionality: with no asset cushion under the equity, the buyback is the shock absorber, and it is the first thing to be cut if the cash target slips.

Placed against the peers that can be read on the same basis, GoDaddy converts a similar growth rate into roughly double the profit. AKAM earns a 12.3 percent operating margin on trailing revenue of 4,266.6 million dollars growing 6.2 percent. GoDaddy's near 23.7 percent comes on comparable growth, and on the multiple applied to operating income the shares sit in the lower half of that peer range. The market is pricing a gradual erosion of the profit line while the accounts are recording a sharp expansion of it. The customer table, not the margin table, is where that argument gets settled.

Catalysts

The last full read arrived on April 30, 2026 and it was a strong one. March-quarter revenue of 1,266.9 million dollars rose 6.1 percent, Applications and Commerce revenue rose 11.6 percent to 498.2 million, and operating income of 310.5 million rose 25.6 percent, widening the operating margin by 380 basis points to 24.5 percent. Operating cash flow reached 471.5 million dollars, up 16.5 percent. Guidance for the June quarter puts revenue between 1.285 and 1.305 billion dollars, and the full-year range was reaffirmed at 5.195 to 5.275 billion, both around 6 percent growth at the midpoint.

The product news is where the next few quarters get decided. Management reported that Airo AI Builder, the company's internally built AI-native site creation experience, reached a multi-million-dollar annualised bookings run rate within weeks of its beta launch. In April the company announced partnerships with LegalZoom and Cloudflare to advance its Agent Name Service, which extends the domain-identity franchise into machine-to-machine use, and said non-GoDaddy agents registered on that service now number in the thousands. Whether either becomes material revenue rather than an announcement is the open question, and the bookings line is where it would show first.

Two financial markers frame the rest of the year. The full-year free cash flow target of approximately 1.8 billion dollars was reaffirmed against 1.6 billion generated in 2025, as was a full-year normalised margin commitment above 33 percent. Repurchases ran at 3.0 million shares for 279.7 million dollars in the March quarter. Those three items move together: the cash target funds the buyback, and the margin commitment is what makes the cash target credible.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Applications and Commerce (A&C) (reported)

Core Platform (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 results, April 30, 2026

View the full interactive GDDY report on boothcheck