GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP (GD): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $381.80, GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP (GD) is priced for +8.4% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-26.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/GD

Headline

FieldValue
TickerGD
CompanyGENERAL DYNAMICS CORP
Sector / IndustryIndustrials
Current price$381.80/sh
CompositionAircraft manufacturing 18% / Aircraft services 7% / Nuclear-powered submarines 24% / Surface ships 6% / Repair and other services 2% / Military vehicles 9% / Weapon systems and munitions 6% / Engineering and other services 2% / Information technology (IT) services 17% / C5ISR solutions 8%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)3.4%
Operating margin today10.2%
Margin compression (value-band)-6.8pp
Implied growth8.4%
Multiple paid20x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 8.1% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.58σ
cohort percentile (of 225 peers)50

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.06x5expensive
Earnings1.76x5expensive
Relative1.84x2expensive
Growth0.72x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.8%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$659.790.58xyesFCF base $6.7B, growth 9% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.8%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$533.000.72xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 15.0x / 17.0x / 19.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 22x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 18.2x / 22.0x / 25.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 14x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$173.542.20xyesBV/sh $96.44, ROE (TTM) 16.6%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$229.781.66xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$377.521.01xyesRev $53.8B, growth 9% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.6x / 1.9x / 2.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$190.032.01xyesEPS $15.84, growth 10% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=2.46 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$157.302.43xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $4.65B × (1−18%) / WACC 8.8% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$232.041.65xyesBV $96.44 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 16.6% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$185.362.06xyes√(22.5 × EPS $15.84 × BVPS $96.44) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $6.44B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$225.051.70xyesFCF $6201.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$216.971.76xyesSBC-adj FCF $6.00B (FCF $6.20B − SBC $0.20B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$369.341.03xyesEPS $15.84 × (8.5 + 2×9.7%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$39.639.63xyesBV $96.44 × (ROIC 3.6% / WACC 8.8%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $53.81B × sector P/S 2.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$229.571.66xyesEPS $15.84 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 9.7% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 14.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$171.202.23xyesEPS $15.84 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Aerospaceoperatingenterprise$13.1b$1.7b operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Marine Systemsoperatingenterprise$16.7b$1.2b operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Combat Systemsoperatingenterprise$9.2b$1.3b operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Technologiesoperatingenterprise$13.5b$1.3b operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$6.6b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)1.45x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)1.19x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-0.5%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Everything about this company says mature. It employs more than 110,000 people, it sells to a customer that has existed since the eighteenth century, and its business lines are measured in decades rather than product cycles. Mature industrials are supposed to be read for cash conversion and capital return, with growth treated as a rounding error. General Dynamics is not currently behaving that way. Revenue rose 10.3 percent in the March quarter with all four segments up, and operating earnings rose 12.0 percent. The useful question is not which multiple to apply but why a company this old is compounding at all.

The answer sits underwater. Nuclear-powered submarines are the largest single revenue line in the portfolio, ahead of aircraft manufacturing, and the Marine Systems segment that produces them grew 21.0 percent in the March quarter to 4,343 million dollars of revenue. The annual report describes what backs that up: "The Marine Systems segment's backlog consists of very long-term submarine and surface ship construction programs, as well as numerous engineering and repair contracts." Fourteen Virginia-class boats sit in backlog with deliveries scheduled through 2034, and the Block V configuration adds a hull section the filing says more than triples strike capacity. These are not orders that get cancelled when a quarter disappoints. They are national programs with delivery dates a decade out.

The scale of the commitment is what separates this from an ordinary industrial order book. Total estimated contract value stood at 188.4 billion dollars at the end of the March quarter, made up of 130.8 billion of backlog and 57.6 billion of management's estimate of additional value in unfunded indefinite-delivery contracts and unexercised options. Set the funded portion against trailing revenue of 53.8 billion dollars and the company has already sold something close to two and a half times a year's output. It also added faster than it consumed: 26.6 billion dollars of orders against 13.5 billion of revenue in a single quarter, with the defense segments booking 2.2 dollars of new work for every dollar delivered.

The other engine is Gulfstream, and it earns the highest margin in the company. Aerospace produced a 15.0 percent operating margin in the March quarter against 14.3 percent a year earlier, on revenue up 8.4 percent. The strategy behind that is stated plainly in the 10-K: "We believe the key to long-term value creation in the business jet industry is steady development and release of new aircraft models and technologies and in customer service capabilities." A fresh aircraft family sells at better prices and pulls a decades-long service annuity behind it, which is why the segment carries the portfolio's best returns on an eight percent growth rate.

Against its own peer group the growth is genuinely unusual rather than merely respectable. LMT is growing trailing revenue 4.6 percent, NOC 5.0 percent and LHX 4.4 percent, while General Dynamics is running near double that pace. Its trailing operating margin near 10.2 percent sits alongside LHX at 10.2 percent and RTX at 10.9 percent and above LMT at 9.9 percent. Cash conversion closes the argument: 2.2 billion dollars of operating cash flow in the March quarter, 192 percent of net earnings, comfortably covering 405 million of dividends and 203 million of capital spending.

Bear Case

There is a version of success here that leaves shareholders worse off, and it is the version currently happening. The part of General Dynamics growing fastest is the part that earns the least. Marine Systems grew 21.0 percent in the March quarter on a 7.3 percent operating margin. Aerospace grew 8.4 percent on 15.0 percent. Every dollar of mix shift toward shipbuilding pulls the consolidated margin down, and shipbuilding is exactly where the customer's demand is concentrated. For a sense of the ceiling, HII, the closest thing to a pure-play warship builder, runs a 5.1 percent operating margin on trailing revenue of 12,849 million dollars. That is what building warships earns when it is the whole business rather than a segment inside a diversified one.

Work the current quote backwards and it embeds operating profit growing about 10 percent a year over a five-year stage. That is not an outlandish demand. It is almost exactly what the company has been producing: operating earnings up 12.0 percent in the March quarter and 11.7 percent in fiscal 2025. The problem is that it asks for the pace to continue on a mix moving the wrong way for margins, and history is not generous about persistence. Only about half of comparable performers sustained that rate over a comparable stretch. A single percentage point of disappointment in the cost of capital used to discount it moves the required growth rate by more than seven points, which is a polite way of saying this valuation is highly sensitive to the rate environment.

The methods themselves are not comfortable with the price. Only the forward cash-flow approaches reach it. The peer-multiple family sits about 26 percent below the quote and the earnings-power family about 81 percent below it, meaning a calculation that averages five years of operating income and assumes no growth whatsoever supports a small fraction of what the shares cost. Anyone buying here is paying for durability that the static frames structurally cannot see, which is a defensible position and also an act of faith.

The contract mechanics deserve more attention than they usually get. The 10-K states that "Typically, we assume more risk with fixed-price contracts." and explains how progress is measured: "Because costs are used as a measure of progress, year-over-year variances in costs result in corresponding variances in revenue, which we generally refer to as volume." Read those two sentences together and the shipbuilding risk becomes concrete. When labour or supplier costs run above plan on a long fixed-price ship program, the extra cost shows up as revenue growth and margin compression simultaneously. Marine Systems posting 21 percent growth at a 7.3 percent margin is precisely the shape that produces.

The high-margin segment carries its own external exposures. The annual report records that tariffs reduced Aerospace operating margins by 30 basis points in 2025 and that "The ongoing sanctions on Russia have also restricted access to a segment of the market." A business jet is the most discretionary item in the portfolio, sold to buyers whose willingness to spend tracks asset prices and confidence rather than appropriations. The segment least protected by a government contract is the one carrying the most operating profit per dollar of revenue. Meanwhile the balance sheet is not where the danger lies at all: borrowings of 8.0 billion dollars against 3.7 billion of cash at April 5, 2026, on trailing operating profit above 5 billion, is a comfortable position. The exposure in this company is not financial leverage. It is a single customer whose budget runs through Congress.

Valuation

Rebuilt from the filed income statements, the twelve months through April 5, 2026 produced about 5.5 billion dollars of operating profit on 53.8 billion of revenue, a margin near 10.2 percent. Working the current quote backwards, the market is priced for operating profit growth of roughly 10.3% a year across a five-year stage. Read that against the record and the demand is unusually modest: fiscal 2025 operating earnings grew 11.7 percent and the March quarter grew 12.0 percent. The market is not asking this company to become something different. It is asking it to keep doing what it just did.

Where the methods disagree is instructive. The forward cash-flow approaches land above the quote, one of them because it holds the earnings multiple where it stands today, all the way out to its horizon, while compounding free cash flow near nine percent, compressing that multiple in the bear scenario and expanding it in the bull. Every static approach lands underneath. The peer-multiple family sits roughly 26 percent below the quote and the earnings-power family roughly 81 percent below it, the latter because it averages five years of operating income and credits no growth at all. When only the forward frames reach the price, what is being paid for is durability, and durability is precisely the thing a no-growth calculation is built to ignore.

The concrete thing that has to stay true is a margin, not a growth rate. Holding a consolidated operating margin near 10.2 percent while revenue mix shifts toward a segment earning 7.3 percent requires Marine Systems margins to rise as the submarine programs move from early construction into repeat production. That is a specific operational claim about learning curves on Virginia-class and Columbia-class boats, and it is the single assumption on which the arithmetic turns. If Marine margins stay where they are, growth alone does not get the consolidated number there.

Solvency does not bound anything here. Borrowings stood at 8.0 billion dollars against 3.7 billion of cash and equivalents on April 5, 2026, and the quarter alone generated 2.2 billion dollars of operating cash flow, 192 percent of net earnings. The financing line cost 69 million dollars in the quarter, down from 89 million a year earlier. Dividends of 405 million and capital expenditure of 203 million were both funded several times over. The share count is essentially flat, so per-share growth is coming from the business rather than from arithmetic.

Placed against its cohort, the picture is a company growing faster than its peers on similar profitability. LMT carries a 9.9 percent operating margin with trailing revenue growing 4.6 percent; NOC 11.6 percent on 5.0 percent growth; LHX 10.2 percent on 4.4 percent. General Dynamics sits at a comparable margin on roughly double the growth, and on the multiple applied to operating income it sits in the lower half of that same peer range. The premium in the share price is not being charged against the group. It is being charged against what a no-growth reading of the same earnings would support, and the gap between those two is the submarine backlog.

Catalysts

The last full read on this business came on April 29, 2026, and it was strong across the board. First-quarter revenue of 13.5 billion dollars rose 10.3 percent with growth in all four segments, operating earnings reached 1,420 million, and diluted earnings per share of $4.10 rose 12 percent on the year. Operating cash flow of 2.2 billion dollars represented 192 percent of net earnings, which is an unusually clean conversion for a business with this much work in process. Segment margins moved up in three of four lines, with only Technologies slipping, to 9.5 percent from 9.6 percent.

The order data is the forward-looking part. Companywide orders of 26.6 billion dollars produced a two-to-one book-to-bill, split 2.2-to-1 across the defense segments and 1.2-to-1 in Aerospace, and total estimated contract value finished the quarter at 188.4 billion dollars. That builds on a trend already visible in the annual report, which put estimated potential contract value in the defense segments at 59.8 billion dollars on December 31, 2025, up 14.4 percent from 52.2 billion a year earlier. Backlog of this shape converts slowly, so the useful signal is direction rather than level, and the direction has been up for several consecutive reporting periods.

Two external items are worth tracking into the next print. The annual report discloses that tariffs reduced Aerospace operating margins by 30 basis points during 2025 and describes their duration and extent as continuing to evolve, so any further change in trade policy lands directly on the highest-margin segment. Separately, the filing notes that "The ongoing sanctions on Russia have also restricted access to a segment of the market." for business aircraft. Neither is large enough to change the shape of the company, but both sit on the part of it that carries the best returns.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Aerospace (reported)

Marine Systems (reported)

Combat Systems (reported)

Technologies (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 results, April 29, 2026

View the full interactive GD report on boothcheck