FOX CORPORATION (FOXA): what the price requires
At today's price, FOX CORPORATION (FOXA) is priced for -1.9% growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/FOXA
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | FOXA |
| Company | FOX CORPORATION |
| Current price | $55.81/sh |
| Composition | Cable Network Programming - Affiliate fee 26% / Cable Network Programming - Advertising 9% / Cable Network Programming - Other 7% / Television - Advertising 33% / Television - Affiliate fee 20% / Television - Other 4% / Corporate and Other 2% / Eliminations -1% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 4.4% |
| Operating margin today | 10.6% |
| Margin compression implied | -6.2pp |
| Implied growth | -1.9% |
| Multiple paid | 15x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 12, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 7.8% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~6.4pp.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~6.8%/yr; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -1.67σ |
| cohort percentile (of 32 peers) | 31 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.09x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 1.46x | 4 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.18x | 4 | expensive |
| Growth | 0.94x | 3 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.3%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=15)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $63.52 | 0.88x | yes | FCF base $2.1B, growth 1% (input: historical growth), terminal g 1.2%, WACC 7.2%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $59.15 | 0.94x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 77.0x / 79.0x / 81.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $49.20 | 1.13x | yes | P/E 12x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 10.2x / 12.0x / 13.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 17.6x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $43.79 | 1.27x | yes | BV/sh $25.39, ROE (TTM) 16.0%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $56.79 | 0.98x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $37.41 | 1.49x | yes | Rev $16.2B, growth 1% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.3x / 1.5x / 1.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $45.48 | 1.23x | yes | EPS $3.79, growth 5% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=2.77 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | $57.76 | 0.97x | yes | BV $25.39 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 16.0% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $46.53 | 1.20x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $3.79 × BVPS $25.39) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $0.01 | 5580.50x | yes | EBITDA $0.40B × sector EV/EBITDA 8.0x (excluded from median) |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $35.92 | 1.55x | yes | FCF $2136.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $32.72 | 1.71x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $2.01B (FCF $2.14B − SBC $0.13B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $58.61 | 0.95x | yes | EPS $3.79 × (8.5 + 2×5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $56.25 | 0.99x | yes | Revenue $16.20B × sector P/S 1.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $28.29 | 1.97x | yes | EPS $3.79 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 5.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 7.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $40.97 | 1.36x | yes | EPS $3.79 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $6.6b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 4.86x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 3.61x |
| Interest coverage | 4.5x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -6.6% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
- Fox sells live news and live sports, the two things audiences still watch when they air, and the most recent quarter showed the model holding up: adjusted EBITDA rose 11% to $954 million even as total revenue fell to $3.99 billion against a year that carried the Super Bowl.
- The biggest specific risk is the affiliate-fee base, where cord-cutting erodes the subscriber pool Fox bills, and where the 10-K warns that bidding wars are still "driven increases in the cost of such programming" for the sports rights that anchor the lineup.
- Watch the rollout and economics of Fox One, the direct-to-consumer streamer Fox launched after the Venu sports venture was scrapped, since that is the lever that decides whether Fox replaces cable-bundle dollars or merely subsidizes their decline.
Bull Case
One number frames the whole bet: 11.3% operating margin on a business the market is paying for as if margins were headed lower, not higher. Today's price requires the operating economics to do essentially nothing impressive. The implied path embedded in the price is flat-to-shrinking profit, which for a company that just grew adjusted EBITDA 11% in a down-revenue quarter is a low bar. That gap between what the price assumes and what the business is delivering is the bull case in one line.
What Fox actually owns is the live-viewing franchise. News and sports are the genres that resist time-shifting and ad-skipping, because the value is in watching as it happens. Fox monetizes that twice. It sells the advertising time inside the programming, and it collects affiliate and distribution fees from the operators who carry its networks. The 10-K describes the advertising engine plainly: the company "generates advertising revenue from sales of commercial time within the Company's network programming, and from sales of advertising on the Company's owned and operated television stations and various digital properties. The most recent quarter showed distribution revenue up 3%, led by 5% growth at Cable Network Programming, which is the affiliate-fee side proving it can still raise price per subscriber faster than the subscriber count falls.
The profit story is improving for a structural reason, not a cyclical one. Adjusted EBITDA grew $98 million, or 11%, to $954 million, and management attributed it to lower sports programming rights amortization and production costs more than offsetting the advertising decline. Sports rights are the largest controllable cost in this business, and the 10-K notes those costs are "primarily amortized based on the ratio of each contract's current period attributable revenue to the estimated total remaining attributable revenue. When the amortization schedule turns favorable, margin expands without a single new viewer. On top of that, Fox has been shrinking its share count at a 6.6% annual pace, so the same earnings power is spread across fewer shares each year. Adjusted EPS reached $1.32 against $1.10 a year earlier, a 20% gain in a quarter where revenue went the other way.
Bear Case
The uncomfortable observation comes first, before any multiple: Fox is collecting a growing fee from a shrinking audience. Affiliate revenue rises because Fox keeps negotiating higher per-subscriber rates from cable and satellite operators, but the pool of subscribers those operators serve is draining year after year as households cut the cord. That arithmetic works until it doesn't. At some point the rate increases cannot outrun the subscriber losses, and the distribution line, which carried the most recent quarter with 3% growth, flips. The price does not appear to be charging much for that risk. The relative-multiple and asset-based methods both sit right around today's price, meaning the market is valuing Fox as a stable, fairly-priced cash machine rather than a business with a structural countdown running underneath its best segment.
Sports rights are the second pressure point, and they cut both ways. The 10-K is direct that competition for content is the problem: securing popular sports programming is "complicated by the intensity of competition for these rights, and "an increasing number of companies bidding for sports programming in recent years has also driven increases in the cost of such programming. The favorable amortization that lifted this quarter's margin is a timing benefit, not a permanent one. When the next round of NFL and other rights renewals lands, the cost curve resets higher, and the same mechanism that helped EBITDA this year works against it. The filing adds a demand-side caveat too: weak fan enthusiasm or a smaller-market team in the postseason "could result in lower advertising revenues for the Company. Fox's profit is leveraged to the popularity of leagues it does not control.
The streaming pivot is where the bet on the future actually lives, and it is unproven. Fox spent years building toward the Venu sports joint venture with Disney and Warner Bros. Discovery, then watched it collapse before launch, with the partners agreeing to pay Fubo $220 million to settle the litigation. Fox One, the standalone streamer that replaced it, is early. Direct-to-consumer streaming carries customer-acquisition costs and churn that the cable bundle never imposed, and there is no guarantee the unit economics replace the high-margin affiliate dollars they are meant to defend. The earnings-power lens, which values the business on its demonstrated cash generation rather than on a streaming story, sits well below the price, a reminder that the optimistic read leans on a transition that has not yet been earned.
Valuation
Start with what the price is actually betting, because it is unusual for a media stock. At $52.16 (June 27, 2026), the price embeds essentially no growth in operating profit. The implied path is flat to slightly negative, which is the market saying it does not need Fox to expand to justify the current quote, only to hold roughly steady. For a company that just grew adjusted EBITDA 11% to $954 million, that is a forgiving assumption.
The methods we use to triangulate mostly agree, which is rare. Peer multiples land close to today's price, with the relative lens built on a 12x sector P/E. The asset-based methods, anchored on book value of about $25 per share and a trailing return on equity near 16%, cluster around the price as well. The discounted cash-flow methods sit slightly above it, reaching the quote by holding today's cash generation roughly flat. The one method that screams is earnings power valued with no growth at all, which collapses to almost nothing, but that reflects a five-year average operating income depressed by one-time charges rather than the business as it runs today; it is the outlier, not the signal. The pattern across the rest is coherent: this is a value-and-asset-supported name, not a growth bet. Several families converge near the price, which is the opposite of the typical media setup where only an aggressive forward-growth assumption can reach the quote.
Solvency is the part that keeps the value read honest. Fox carries net debt of about $6.6 billion against trailing operating income of $1.8 billion, leaving leverage near 3.6 times operating profit and interest coverage of roughly 4.6 times. That is real debt but comfortably serviced, and the steady 6.6% annual reduction in share count shows management is returning capital rather than hoarding it. Wall Street's median target sits at $58, modestly above the current price, which is consistent with a business the market treats as fully but not extravagantly valued. The whole picture rests on one question the methods cannot settle: how long the affiliate-fee base holds before cord-cutting forces the distribution line lower.
Catalysts
Fox reported fiscal third-quarter 2026 results in May, posting revenue of $3.99 billion against $4.37 billion a year earlier, with the decline driven by the absence of the prior-year Super Bowl broadcast. Net income was $175 million and adjusted EBITDA rose 11% to $954 million, helped by lower sports programming rights amortization and production costs. Advertising revenue fell to $1.56 billion from $2.04 billion, again primarily the Super Bowl comparison, partially offset by an additional NFL Wild Card game and continued digital growth led by the Tubi free ad-supported streaming service. Adjusted EPS came in at $1.32 versus $1.10. The next earnings print is the cleaner read, since it will lap a quarter without the Super Bowl distortion in either direction.
The strategic story centers on streaming. Venu Sports, the joint venture with Disney and Warner Bros. Discovery, was discontinued before launch, with the partners agreeing to pay Fubo $220 million and Disney extending a $145 million loan to Fubo to settle the related litigation. Fox responded by launching Fox One, its own direct-to-consumer streamer, which is the development most directly tied to the long-term fundamental story; its subscriber traction and economics are what investors will weigh next.
Analyst sentiment has firmed alongside the EBITDA growth. Recent coverage points to a median price target near $58, with one firm raising its target to $68 on advertising momentum, durable live-sports ratings, and improved governance visibility. The rating mix remains balanced rather than uniformly bullish, with buys, holds, and a small number of sells, consistent with a stock the street sees as reasonably valued rather than mispriced.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Cable Network Programming / Television (reported)
- NFLX (Netflix, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- DIS (WALT DISNEY CO/)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- WBD (Warner Bros. Discovery, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
company and partner statements, January 2025 · analyst consensus compiled June 2026 · Q3 FY2026 earnings release, May 2026 · partner statements, January 2025 · analyst notes compiled June 2026