FOX CORPORATION (FOX): what the price requires
At today's price, FOX CORPORATION (FOX) is priced for -4.7% growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/FOX
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | FOX |
| Company | FOX CORPORATION |
| Sector / Industry | Communication Services |
| Current price | $50.36/sh |
| Composition | Cable Network Programming - Affiliate fee 26% / Cable Network Programming - Advertising 9% / Cable Network Programming - Other 7% / Television - Advertising 33% / Television - Affiliate fee 20% / Television - Other 4% / Corporate and Other 2% / Eliminations -1% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 4.0% |
| Operating margin today | 10.6% |
| Margin compression implied | -6.6pp |
| Implied growth | -4.7% |
| Multiple paid | 13x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 12, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 7.8% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~6.2pp.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~4.1%/yr; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -2.24σ |
| cohort percentile (of 32 peers) | 25 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 0.98x | 4 | justifies |
| Earnings | 1.32x | 4 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.07x | 4 | expensive |
| Growth | 0.91x | 3 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.1%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=15)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $65.71 | 0.77x | yes | FCF base $2.1B, growth 1% (input: historical growth), terminal g 1.2%, WACC 7.1%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $55.50 | 0.91x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 71.1x / 73.1x / 75.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $49.20 | 1.02x | yes | P/E 12x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 10.2x / 12.0x / 13.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 17.6x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $43.79 | 1.15x | yes | BV/sh $25.39, ROE (TTM) 16.0%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $56.79 | 0.89x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $33.76 | 1.49x | yes | Rev $16.2B, growth 1% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.1x / 1.3x / 1.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $45.48 | 1.11x | yes | EPS $3.79, growth 5% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=2.50 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | $57.76 | 0.87x | yes | BV $25.39 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 16.0% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $46.53 | 1.08x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $3.79 × BVPS $25.39) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $0.01 | 5036.00x | yes | EBITDA $0.40B × sector EV/EBITDA 8.0x (excluded from median) |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $35.92 | 1.40x | yes | FCF $2136.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $32.72 | 1.54x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $2.01B (FCF $2.14B − SBC $0.13B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $58.61 | 0.86x | yes | EPS $3.79 × (8.5 + 2×5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $56.25 | 0.90x | yes | Revenue $16.20B × sector P/S 1.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $28.29 | 1.78x | yes | EPS $3.79 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 5.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 7.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $40.97 | 1.23x | yes | EPS $3.79 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $6.6b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 4.86x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 3.61x |
| Interest coverage | 4.5x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -6.6% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
Valuing a traditional-media company is hard because the linear pay-TV bundle that funds it is shrinking, so the market discounts the whole sector. Fox breaks the pattern in one important way: its content is overwhelmingly live news and live sports, the two things audiences still watch in real time and advertisers still pay up for.
The price near $46.97 reflects that skepticism. At about 13 times operating income the price sits below what even a steady decline in profit would warrant, a bound that says the market is pricing erosion rather than growth, even as Fox generates over $2 billion of free cash flow.
The company is using that cash aggressively, having bought back about $8.5 billion of stock, while building Tubi and the new Fox One streaming service. The bet is that live content plus streaming and political-ad cycles offset cord-cutting; the risk is that the affiliate-fee base erodes faster than the offsets grow.
Bull Case
Valuing a media company in 2026 is genuinely difficult, because the linear television bundle that has funded the industry for decades is in structural decline, and the market paints every traditional broadcaster with the same cord-cutting brush. Fox breaks that pattern, and the way it breaks it is the bull case. Fox deliberately divested its entertainment studio and cable assets and kept the content that is most resistant to cord-cutting: live news through Fox News and live sports through its broadcast network. People watch news and sports live, which keeps audiences and advertising dollars that scripted entertainment has lost to streaming. The result shows in the returns: a trailing return on equity around 16% and over $2 billion of free cash flow.
The recent quarter demonstrated the resilience. In its fiscal third quarter of 2026 Fox grew adjusted EBITDA about 11% to $954 million and beat handily with adjusted earnings of $1.32 a share, even though reported revenue and advertising declined against a prior-year quarter that included the Super Bowl. Cable network programming revenue, led by Fox News, rose 6% to $1.74 billion on higher distribution and advertising. The streaming pivot is working: Tubi, the ad-supported service, surpassed $1 billion in annual ad revenue, grew revenue about 23%, and reached breakeven, while the new Fox One direct-to-consumer service, launched in August at $19.99 a month, is adding and retaining subscribers ahead of expectations with no evidence yet of cannibalizing the traditional bundle.
Capital allocation is the quiet engine. Fox has repurchased roughly $8.5 billion of stock cumulatively, shrinking the share count meaningfully, which magnifies per-share value from a flat-to-growing cash flow base. The valuation supports it: the X-ray's asset-based, earnings-power, relative, and growth frames all land near or above the price, and the priced-in assumption sits well below the company's own history, which is the signature of a stock the market has marked down on a sector narrative. With the 2026 World Cup and a record midterm political-advertising cycle estimated near $11 billion ahead, Fox has identifiable revenue catalysts that the cheap multiple does not price in.
Bear Case
The previously defensible advantage being chipped away at Fox is the affiliate-fee economics of the pay-TV bundle, and the erosion is visible. A large share of Fox's revenue comes from affiliate fees, the per-subscriber payments that cable and satellite distributors pay to carry Fox News and the broadcast network. Those fees are a function of the pay-TV subscriber base, and that base shrinks every year as households cut the cord. The current erosion rate at third-party distributors runs in the mid-single digits annually, and if it accelerates, the most profitable, most stable part of Fox's revenue declines with it. Affiliate fees have been able to grow because per-subscriber rate increases offset subscriber losses, but that arithmetic only works while rate increases outpace the loss rate, and that margin narrows over time.
Advertising, the other pillar, is cyclical and lumpy, which the recent results show. Fox's advertising revenue fell to $1.56 billion from $2.04 billion a year earlier, driven by the absence of a Super Bowl broadcast and lower political advertising in a non-election period. The filing underscores how much rides on content bets and live events, warning that Fox "must often invest substantial amounts in programming and the acquisition of sports rights before we learn the extent to which the content will earn consumer acceptance," and that outcomes can hinge on which teams reach the postseason [FY2025 10-K, accession 0001628280-25-038077]. Sports rights are the lever here: the foundation of Fox's live-content moat is also its biggest cost, and analysts expect aggressive bidding for NBA and MLB rights, which could pressure margins to defend the very content that differentiates the company.
The streaming transition is unproven at the scale needed to replace the bundle. Tubi reaching breakeven and Fox One launching are real progress, but Fox One is one quarter old, and direct-to-consumer streaming is a brutally competitive market where Fox is a small entrant against giants. If linear erosion accelerates while streaming and political cycles fail to fill the gap, the cash flow that funds the buyback shrinks. The balance sheet adds some constraint, with net debt near five times operating profit. The valuation is cheap, but on the cheapest method the earnings-power frame collapses because normalized operating income is volatile, and the bet requires the live-content moat to hold against both cord-cutting and rising sports-rights costs at the same time.
Valuation
Fox is valued as a whole company off its operating income, and the read is a bound rather than a clean solve. At about $46.97 (June 27, 2026) the price works out to roughly 13 times company-wide operating profit, a multiple so low that the price sits below what even a sustained 5% annual decline in operating profit would warrant. The framework states this as a bound: the price is on the cheap side of what an ordinary decline would justify, and notably the priced-in assumption sits well below Fox's own history, the signature of a sector-driven markdown.
The X-ray is broadly supportive, which the characterization captures: asset-based, earnings-power on cash, relative-multiple, and growth value all land near or above the price. The DCF-perpetual-growth frame lands near $67 on Fox's substantial free cash flow, the FCF-yield frame lands in the mid-$30s, the relative method on a sector earnings multiple lands near $49, close to the price, and the asset-based excess-return and residual-income frames land from the low $40s to high $50s off a book value of $25.39 and a strong 16% return on equity. The one frame that collapses is the GAAP earnings-power method, because normalized operating income is volatile across the sports and election calendar. The honest read is that on cash flow and assets, Fox is inexpensive.
The synthesis is that the valuation prices structural decline, and the question is whether that pessimism is warranted. Fox generates strong free cash flow, earns a high return on equity, and trades below most valuation methods, so if the live-content franchise simply holds, the stock is cheap and the buyback compounds value. The risk the price reflects is that linear affiliate fees and advertising erode faster than Tubi, Fox One, and the election and sports calendars can offset, in which case the cash flow that supports the methods declines.
Catalysts
The most recent catalyst was the fiscal third-quarter 2026 report, which beat and sent the stock higher. Fox reported revenue of $3.99 billion, net income of $175 million, adjusted EBITDA up about 11% to $954 million, and adjusted earnings of $1.32 a share, well above the roughly $0.99 expected. Cable network programming revenue rose 6% to $1.74 billion led by Fox News, while advertising fell against a prior-year quarter that included the Super Bowl. Tubi reached breakeven for a third consecutive quarter with revenue up about 23%, and Fox One completed its first full quarter since its August launch with subscriber adds and retention ahead of plan.
The forward catalysts are unusually concrete because they are tied to the calendar. The 2026 FIFA World Cup is a major live-sports event for Fox's broadcast network, and the 2026 midterm elections bring a political-advertising cycle that third-party estimates put near a record $11 billion, both of which are direct revenue drivers in the coming quarters. The ramp of Fox One subscribers and continued Tubi monetization are the streaming milestones to watch.
The swing factors are the cord-cutting rate, sports-rights costs, and capital returns. The pace of pay-TV subscriber erosion determines the affiliate-fee trajectory, the bedrock of the cable business. Upcoming sports-rights negotiations, including expected aggressive bidding for NBA and MLB packages, could raise costs to defend the live-content moat. On the positive side, the substantial ongoing buyback, about $1.9 billion in nine months and roughly $8.5 billion cumulatively, continues to shrink the share count. Analyst sentiment has improved after the beat, with the World Cup and midterms framed as near-term tailwinds. The watch items are subscriber trends, sports-rights renewals, and the conversion of the streaming and election catalysts into revenue.
Sources: Fox Q3 FY2026 results, StockTitan; Fox Q3 2026 beats expectations, Investing.com; Fox Q3 2026 earnings release, Fox Corporation; Fox surged 7% after Q3 2026, World Cup and midterms, TIKR; Fox One and the future of sports streaming, SportsPro.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Cable Network Programming / Television (reported)
- NFLX (Netflix, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- DIS (WALT DISNEY CO/)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- WBD (Warner Bros. Discovery, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.