FormFactor, Inc. (FORM): what the price requires
At today's price, FormFactor, Inc. (FORM) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~29.0 years. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-19 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/FORM
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | FORM |
| Company | FormFactor, Inc. |
| Current price | $110.95/sh |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin today | 6.3% |
| Must persist for | 29.0y |
| Multiple paid | 149x operating income |
Solve inputs: computed at a 12.9% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~3.6 years.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~17.9 years; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: elevated
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +0.47σ |
| sustained it ~10 years at this level | 15% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore requires assumptions beyond what those standard frames encode.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 13.22x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 10.89x | 4 | expensive |
| Relative | 3.40x | 5 | expensive |
| Growth | 1.57x | 3 | expensive |
Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=16)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $11.89 | 9.33x | yes | FCF base $0.0B, growth 11% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.2%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $93.79 | 1.18x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 107.5x / 109.5x / 111.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $41.22 | 2.69x | yes | P/E 48.4x (blended: static sector reference 22x + trailing (TTM) 129x), scenarios: 40.0x / 48.4x / 56.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 35.2x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $9.30 | 11.93x | yes | BV/sh $13.33, ROE (TTM) 6.5%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $7.65 | 14.50x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $70.89 | 1.57x | yes | Rev $0.8B, growth 11% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 6.6x / 8.0x / 9.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $30.45 | 3.64x | yes | EPS $0.87, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=3.68 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $11.11 | 9.99x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.08B × (1−2%) / WACC 9.2% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $7.42 | 14.95x | yes | BV $13.33 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 6.5% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 4.2%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $16.15 | 6.87x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $0.87 × BVPS $13.33) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $17.20 | 6.45x | yes | EBITDA $0.08B × sector EV/EBITDA 16.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $6.13 | 18.10x | yes | FCF $36.6M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $28.07 | 3.95x | yes | EPS $0.87 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $2.43 | 45.66x | yes | BV $13.33 × (ROIC 1.7% / WACC 9.2%) (excluded from median) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $52.87 | 2.10x | yes | Revenue $0.84B × sector P/S 5.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $32.63 | 3.40x | yes | EPS $0.87 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $9.41 | 11.79x | yes | EPS $0.87 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net cash | $291.1m |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | -5.92x (net cash) |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | -5.80x (net cash) |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 0.0% |
| Burning cash | no |
Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
FormFactor's moat is its position as the largest probe-card maker in the world, the company memory and logic chipmakers rely on to test wafers before shipment. The product is custom-engineered to each customer's chip layout, which makes it sticky, and that stickiness is the source of the franchise.
The price near $149.45 is rich on any trailing measure, working out to a very high multiple of operating income because margins are coming off a cyclical low. The inversion reads it as elevated, implying many years of sustained fast growth, far more than most companies deliver.
The offsetting fact is a sharp earnings inflection underway. The latest quarter posted record revenue up about 32% and a gross margin near 49% as high-bandwidth memory testing surged for AI chips. The bet is that the HBM cycle keeps lifting earnings into the multiple; the risk is paying a peak valuation on a cyclical semiconductor supplier.
Bull Case
FormFactor's competitive advantage is structural and shows up in the returns when the cycle cooperates: it is the world's largest manufacturer of probe cards, the specialized fixtures that test semiconductor wafers before the chips are packaged and shipped. The moat is the customization. The filing describes proprietary "probe card design tools and processes" built "to enable the rapid and accurate customization of products required to meet customer requirements," adapting "standard product architectures to meet each customer's specific wafer layouts, chip layouts" [FY2025 10-K, accession 0001039399-26-000009]. A probe card designed into a customer's test flow is hard to displace mid-program, which gives FormFactor pricing power and recurring design wins as chip designs evolve.
The demand inflection is the heart of the current bull case, and it is tied to the most important trend in semiconductors. AI accelerators need high-bandwidth memory, and HBM is complex, high-value, and must be tested rigorously, which plays directly to FormFactor's strength. In the first quarter of 2026 the company posted record revenue of $226.1 million, up about 32% year over year, with non-GAAP gross margin jumping to 49%, well above its own target, and non-GAAP earnings of $0.56 a share, up about 143%. Record DRAM revenue of $82.9 million rose nearly 70% on HBM demand, and probe-card revenue of $198.2 million grew about 45%. The company guided second-quarter revenue to about $240 million and pointed to record DRAM probe-card revenue ahead as HBM demand steps up again, including a second customer adopting its differentiated full-wafer contactor technology.
The balance sheet and market position let it press the advantage. FormFactor carries net cash of roughly $291 million and no funding pressure, so it can invest in next-generation probe architectures ahead of customer adoption, exactly the kind of forward spending the filing describes incurring "in advance of customer adoption" of new semiconductor technologies [FY2025 10-K, accession 0001039399-26-000009]. As a key supplier to the top HBM makers heading into the HBM4 generation, FormFactor is positioned to ride the AI-memory ramp with the leading product, a strong balance sheet, and operating leverage that turns revenue growth into outsized earnings growth.
Bear Case
FormFactor's balance sheet is strong, with net cash and no leverage, so the fragility is not financial; it is the operating-leverage and cyclicality profile that sits beneath a very high valuation. The same operating leverage that makes earnings soar when demand is strong makes them collapse when it is weak. Probe-card demand is a function of semiconductor capital spending and new chip introductions, both of which are famously cyclical. FormFactor spends ahead of the cycle, the filing noting that expenses for new architectures "are often incurred in advance of customer adoption" [FY2025 10-K, accession 0001039399-26-000009], so in a downturn costs stay while revenue falls, and margins compress fast. The trailing earnings the valuation is measured against reflect how thin margins can get; the recent surge is the up-leg of that same lever, and up-legs do not last forever in semiconductors.
Customer concentration sharpens the cyclicality into single-point risk. FormFactor sells to a small number of large chipmakers, and the filing discloses that one customer represented a double-digit share of revenue, anticipating that "sales of our products to a relatively small number of customer" will continue to dominate [FY2025 10-K, accession 0001039399-26-000009]. The HBM boom is concentrated among a handful of memory makers, so the same names driving the upside are the ones whose order pauses would drive the downside. A single large customer adjusting its HBM capacity plans, or a digestion phase in AI-memory buildout, would hit FormFactor disproportionately.
The valuation leaves no room for any of that. At about $149.45 (June 27, 2026) no valuation family reaches the price: on trailing numbers the multiple of operating income is extraordinarily high, and the inversion implies the company must sustain fast growth for decades, a pace only a small fraction of companies achieve. Even on the inflected, post-HBM run-rate, the price embeds a P/E that analysts have flagged as rich, with the consensus price target sitting below the current price. The conservative methods anchor near a book value of $13.33 and a normalized earnings power far below the price. The bear case is straightforward: this is a cyclical semiconductor supplier priced for a permanent boom, and if the HBM cycle cools or a key customer pauses, the gap between the price and every fundamental anchor would close downward.
Valuation
FormFactor is valued as a whole company off its operating income, and on the trailing numbers the read is extreme. At about $149.45 the price works out to roughly 202 times company-wide operating profit, because margins were coming off a cyclical low, which inverts to an assumption that the company sustains growth near its self-funding ceiling for about thirty-four years. That is a single solve under a 13.3% cost of capital, so it is approximate and the reliability is flagged as low, but the direction is unambiguous: the priced-in assumption is elevated, far beyond what most companies deliver, with only about 15% of comparable fast-growers sustaining such a pace for even a decade.
The X-ray confirms that no valuation family reaches the price. The asset-based methods anchor near a book value of $13.33 with a trailing return on equity of 6.5%, landing in the high single digits, the earnings-power frame lands near $11 on depressed normalized operating income, and even the relative and forward-growth frames sit well below the price. The one frame that approaches it, the DCF-exit-multiple, requires an enormous exit multiple to get there. The characterization is direct: the price is rich on assets, earnings power, peers, and even forward growth, a bet beyond what any standard frame supports.
The fair reconciliation is that the trailing methods are measuring a trough that the business has already begun to exit. The recent quarter's revenue surge and 49% gross margin show earnings inflecting hard on the HBM cycle, so the forward earnings base is meaningfully higher than the trailing one the inversion uses. But even crediting the inflection, the valuation is demanding: on the higher run-rate the multiple is still rich, and analysts' price targets sit below the current price. The honest read is that this is a high-quality cyclical priced for the up-cycle to be both large and durable, with the burden of proof on the HBM ramp continuing through HBM4 and beyond.
Catalysts
The most recent catalyst was the first-quarter 2026 report, which was a record. FormFactor delivered revenue of $226.1 million, up about 32% year over year, non-GAAP gross margin of 49% well above its target, and non-GAAP earnings of $0.56 a share, up about 143% and ahead of estimates. Record DRAM revenue of $82.9 million rose nearly 70% on HBM demand, and the company guided second-quarter revenue to about $240 million with non-GAAP earnings around $0.61. Each quarterly print is the key gauge of whether the HBM-driven inflection is sustaining.
The dominant forward catalyst is the high-bandwidth-memory ramp for AI. FormFactor pointed to record DRAM probe-card revenue ahead, driven by another step-up in HBM demand and a second customer adopting its full-wafer contactor technology, and the industry transition to HBM4 mass production is the multi-quarter tailwind. New design wins in foundry and logic, including probe cards for networking applications, broaden the growth beyond memory.
The swing factors are the cycle and concentration. Semiconductor capital spending and the pace of AI-memory buildout drive probe-card demand, so any digestion phase or capacity-plan change at a major HBM maker is the key risk, amplified by FormFactor's customer concentration. Valuation is itself a catalyst risk: the stock trades at a rich multiple, the analyst consensus rating is positive but the average price target sits below the current price, and the stock has been volatile around earnings, so any growth disappointment against the high expectations embedded in the price could be punished. The watch items are HBM order trends, gross-margin direction, and customer concentration.
Sources: FormFactor Q1 2026 record revenue and margins, StockTitan; FORM Q1 earnings beat, revenues rise, Yahoo Finance; AI and HBM demand lift FormFactor Q1 2026, StockTitan; FormFactor HBM4 earnings inflection, Seeking Alpha; FormFactor analyst ratings and targets, Benzinga.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- ICHR (Ichor Holdings, Ltd.)
- FY2025 10-K: …support future growth. In addition to providing high quality and reliable fluid delivery subsystems and components, one of our principal strategies is delivering lead-times that provide our customers with the required flexibility needed in their production processes. We have accomplished this by investing in scalable…
- FY2025 10-K: …devote greater resources to the development, promotion, sale and support of their products and services, and reduce prices to increase market share. In addition to organic growth by our competitors, there may be merger and acquisition activity among our competitors and potential competitors that may provide our…
- AEIS (ADVANCED ENERGY INDUSTRIES INC)
- FY2025 10-K: …operations, before income tax 168.7 9.4 52.4 3.5 Income tax provision (benefit) 19.4 1.1 (3.9) (0.3) Income from continuing operations $ 149.3 8.3 % $ 56.3 3.8 % 36 Table of Contents Revenue The following tables summarize net revenue and percentages of revenue by markets: …
- FY2025 10-K: …risks related to our reliance on our intellectual property. 8 Table of Contents Competition The markets we serve are highly competitive and characterized by rapid technological development and changing customer requirements. We face a wide variety of competitors, and no single company dominates any of our markets.…
- PLAB (PHOTRONICS, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …financial performance and business prospects. Competition The photomask industry is highly competitive, and most of our customers utilize multiple photomask suppliers. Our ability to compete depends primarily upon the consistency of our product quality, timeliness of delivery, competitive pricing, technical…
- FY2025 10-K: …customers accounted for an aggregate of 29%, 27% and 27%, respectively, of our revenue. Our five largest customers accounted for an aggregate of 50%, 50% and 51% of our revenue in 2025, 2024 and 2023, respectively. The loss of a significant customer, a significant reduction or delay in orders from any significant…
- OSIS (OSI SYSTEMS, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …trust. 14. SEGMENT INFORMATION We operate in three identifiable industry segments: (a) security and inspection systems (Security division), (b) optoelectronic devices and manufacturing (Optoelectronics and Manufacturing division) and (c) medical monitoring systems (Healthcare division). Factors used to identify our…
- FY2025 10-K: …decision maker ("CODM"). Our Chief Executive Officer serves as the CODM. The CODM uses segment assets and segment income (loss) from operations, as well as the expenses within each segment including cost of sales, selling, general and administrative expenses and research and development expenses, to allocate…
- IPGP (IPG PHOTONICS CORP)
- FY2025 10-K: …harm our business. " and " Risk Factors - Our inability to protect our intellectual property and proprietary technologies could result in the unauthorized use of our technologies by third parties, hurt our competitive position and adversely affect our operating results ." Manufacturing Vertical integration is one of…
- FY2025 10-K: …and photovoltaic industries. Approximately 86% of our revenues in 2025 were from customers in the materials processing market. Although applications in this market are broad, sales for these applications are cyclical and have historically experienced sudden and severe downturns and periods of oversupply, resulting in…
- MRCY (MERCURY SYSTEMS, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: 2024, we halted production for months on multiple secure computing programs due to a root cause analysis, materially affecting financial results and customer confidence. These challenges could recur in the future on other programs. Competition from existing or new companies could cause us to experience downward…
- FY2025 10-K: …product, where the customer evaluates alternative technologies and design approaches. We work with defense prime contractors as well as directly with the DoD. We help drive subsystem development and deployment in both classified and unclassified environments. The principal competitive factors in our market are…
- CRUS (Cirrus Logic, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …deposits or if a depository institution is subject to other adverse conditions in the financial or credit markets, there is no guarantee that we have access to such uninsured deposits, which could restrict access to our cash or cash equivalents and could adversely impact our operating liquidity, financial condition,…
- FY2025 10-K: …ability to compete effectively and to expand our business will depend on our ability to continue to recruit key engineering talent, execute on new product developments, partner with customers to create compelling products for their applications and provide cost efficient versions of existing products. We compete with…
- SWKS (SKYWORKS SOLUTIONS, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …Also, this competition has resulted in, and is expected to continue to result in, declining average selling prices for many of our products and increased challenges in maintaining or increasing revenue, gross margin, and market share. Furthermore, additional competitors may enter our markets as a result of growth…
- FY2025 10-K: …future business activities. Uncertainty and economic weakness could result in a market contraction and, as a result, our business, results of operations, and financial condition would likely be materially and adversely affected. Such periods of industry downturn are characterized by diminished product demand and…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.