FRESENIUS MEDICAL CARE AG (FMS): what the price requires
The current priced-in claim for FRESENIUS MEDICAL CARE AG (FMS) is temporarily suppressed because the live engine record is unavailable. The dated report remains a snapshot, not a current market read.
Generated: 2026-07-19 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/FMS
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | FMS |
| Company | FRESENIUS MEDICAL CARE AG |
| Current price | $24.45/sh |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 2.8% |
| Operating margin today | 8.8% |
| Margin compression implied | -6.0pp |
| Multiple paid | 10x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 12, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.
Solve inputs: computed at a 7.1% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~-4.6%/yr; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.31σ |
| cohort percentile (of 113 peers) | 6 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.08x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 0.79x | 4 | justifies |
| Relative | 0.43x | 5 | justifies |
| Growth | 0.62x | 3 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.5%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=17)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $109.88 | 0.22x | yes | FCF base $2.9B, growth 2% (input: historical growth), terminal g 1.5%, WACC 5.5%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $39.57 | 0.62x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 4.7x / 6.7x / 8.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $48.73 | 0.50x | yes | P/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 15.3x / 18.0x / 20.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $23.96 | 1.02x | yes | BV/sh $26.57, ROE (TTM) 8.3%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $22.74 | 1.08x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $16.62 | 1.47x | yes | Rev $21.3B, growth 2% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.6x / 0.7x / 0.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $21.91 | 1.12x | yes | EPS $1.83, growth 1% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=7.62 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $26.19 | 0.93x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.73B × (1−21%) / WACC 5.5% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $22.55 | 1.08x | yes | BV $26.57 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 8.3% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 5.4%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $33.04 | 0.74x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $1.83 × BVPS $26.57) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $56.95 | 0.43x | yes | EBITDA $3.58B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $37.41 | 0.65x | yes | FCF $2914.1M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $58.92 | 0.41x | yes | EPS $1.83 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $9.83 | 2.49x | yes | BV $26.57 × (ROIC 2.0% / WACC 5.5%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $91.30 | 0.27x | yes | Revenue $21.33B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $68.48 | 0.36x | yes | EPS $1.83 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $19.74 | 1.24x | yes | EPS $1.83 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $6.5b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 4.24x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 3.36x |
| Interest coverage | 4.4x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -0.1% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
The counterintuitive fact about Fresenius Medical Care is that the world's largest dialysis provider, a business with recurring, medically necessary demand, trades at about 10 times operating income and below its book value of roughly $26.57 a share. The market is pricing a defensive healthcare leader as if it were in decline.
The cash generation does not match that pessimism. The business produces roughly $2.9 billion of free cash flow on a trailing basis, and management just completed a $1 billion buyback, repurchasing about 8.5% of the share count. A company shrinking its share base aggressively from real cash flow is not behaving like one the market should value below book.
The reason for the discount is a sector-cycle worry: GLP-1 weight-loss drugs raise the question of whether future dialysis patient growth slows, and a multi-year restructuring is suppressing reported earnings even as margins improve. The bet is that demand proves durable and the cost program delivers.
Bull Case
The surprising thing about Fresenius Medical Care is the mismatch between what the business is and how it is priced. This is the largest dialysis company in the world, treating hundreds of thousands of patients with end-stage kidney disease who need dialysis multiple times a week to stay alive. That is about as non-discretionary as demand gets. Yet the stock trades at roughly 10 times operating income and below its book value of about $26.57 a share, a valuation the market usually reserves for businesses in structural decline. The priced-in assumption sits below what even a steady decline in operating profit would warrant, which is a low bar for a company with this kind of recurring revenue.
The cash flow confirms the franchise is intact. Fresenius generates around $2.9 billion of free cash flow on a trailing basis, and the X-ray reflects it: the DCF-perpetual-growth and FCF-yield frames land far above the current price, and the relative and earnings-power frames also sit well above it. Management has been returning that cash, completing a €1 billion share buyback in under a year, repurchasing 24.8 million shares, about 8.5% of the share capital, while keeping net leverage at 2.6 times, within its stated 2.5 to 3.0 times target. Buying back a large slice of the company below book value is accretive capital allocation.
The operating turnaround is delivering where it counts. In the first quarter of 2026 the group operating-income margin expanded 70 basis points to about 10.1%, and adjusted earnings per share grew double digits, even as reported revenue declined on currency. The FME25+ efficiency program is the engine: it is incurring restructuring costs now, €166 million in the quarter against €50 million of recurring savings, but the expanded program targets €1.2 billion of cumulative sustainable savings by the end of 2027. As those costs roll off and the savings compound, reported earnings should converge toward the underlying earnings power. New technology, including the rollout of the 5008X high-volume hemodiafiltration system across U.S. clinics, and the value-based-care push through Interwell Health, give the franchise growth avenues beyond the core. A reimbursement tailwind helps too: CMS finalized a 2.2% increase in the base U.S. dialysis rate for 2026.
Bear Case
The bear case is a sector-cycle and demand-trajectory case, and the cycle question hanging over dialysis is whether current earnings are sustainable or a peak before a slowdown. The overhang is GLP-1 weight-loss drugs. Obesity and diabetes are major drivers of chronic kidney disease, and if these drugs reduce the incidence of diabetes-related kidney failure over time, the patient population that feeds dialysis demand grows more slowly than it historically has. The market has been pricing that fear into the entire dialysis sector, and it is the simplest explanation for why a recurring-revenue healthcare leader trades below book. The demand base is not at peak today, but the long-run growth rate that justified premium multiples may be lower than it was.
Reimbursement is the second structural risk, and it cuts directly into a business with little pricing power of its own. A large share of Fresenius's U.S. revenue comes from government payors, principally Medicare, whose rates are set administratively rather than negotiated. The 2026 base-rate increase of 2.2% is below medical-cost inflation in many years, so when input costs rise faster than the reimbursement rate, margin compresses. The mix of commercial versus government patients also matters enormously to profitability, and any policy shift that pushes patients toward government rates would pressure earnings. This is a price-taker in its largest market.
The earnings quality and balance sheet add caveats. Reported operating income is being depressed by the FME25+ restructuring, which makes the trailing numbers look better on margin than on absolute profit, and the program's savings are a forecast, not banked. Net leverage at 2.6 times is manageable but not low, and interest coverage near five leaves less cushion than the cash flow headline suggests. Trailing return on equity around 8.3% sits below the cost of equity, which is why the asset-based methods land close to the price rather than far above it; the company is not yet earning an excess return on its capital. The stock is cheap on cash flow, but cheap on cash flow with a flat-to-uncertain demand trajectory, government-set prices, and an unfinished cost program is the kind of cheapness that can persist.
Valuation
Fresenius Medical Care is valued as a whole company off its operating income, and the read is a bound rather than a clean solve. At about $23.59 (June 27, 2026) the American depositary shares trade at roughly 10 times company-wide operating profit, a multiple so low that the price sits below what even a sustained 5% annual decline in operating profit would warrant. The framework states this as a bound: the price is on the cheap side of what an ordinary decline would justify. For the largest dialysis provider in the world, with recurring demand, that is a notably pessimistic price.
The X-ray is unusually consistent in supporting the price, which is what the characterization captures: asset-based, earnings-power, relative-multiple, and even growth-DCF value all sit above the current price. The DCF-perpetual-growth and FCF-yield frames land far above it on roughly $2.9 billion of free cash flow, the relative frame on a sector multiple lands near $48, and the earnings-power frame lands near $27. The asset frames anchor close to the price, near book value of $26.57, because trailing return on equity around 8.3% is just below the cost of equity. The unusual feature is how far below its own history the priced-in assumption sits, which is the quantitative signature of a stock the market has marked down on a narrative rather than on its current numbers.
The honest synthesis is that this is an asset-supported value name, not a growth bet, and the valuation is cheap if the cash flow holds. The franchise generates substantial cash, returns it through buybacks below book, and is expanding margins through the FME25+ program. The risk is in the trajectory the methods cannot fully price: the GLP-1 demand question and reimbursement pressure could lower the sustainable earnings base, in which case the cash-flow methods that currently sit far above the price would step down. The reaffirmed 2026 guidance of broadly flat revenue and continued margin progress is the near-term test.
Catalysts
The most recent catalyst was the first-quarter 2026 report, which the market took poorly despite operational progress, with the shares falling around 7% on the day. Fresenius reported revenue of €4.61 billion, down about 6% reported but up roughly 4% organically at constant currency, net income attributable to shareholders of €117.5 million and earnings of €0.43, with the group operating-income margin expanding 70 basis points to about 10.1%. Reported operating income was held back by €166 million of FME25+ restructuring costs against €50 million of recurring savings in the quarter. Management reaffirmed full-year 2026 guidance for broadly flat revenue.
The dominant forward driver is the FME25+ efficiency program, now expanded to a cumulative €1.2 billion of sustainable savings targeted by the end of 2027. The pace at which restructuring costs roll off and savings convert to reported earnings is the single biggest swing factor for the profit trajectory. Capital returns are the second lever: the company completed a €1 billion buyback in under a year and kept net leverage within its 2.5 to 3.0 times target, so further buyback authorizations are a possible catalyst.
The structural watch items sit on demand and reimbursement. The GLP-1 question, whether weight-loss drugs slow the long-run growth of the dialysis patient population, remains the overhang on the whole sector, and any data clarifying the patient-volume trajectory would move the stock in either direction. On reimbursement, CMS finalized a 2.2% U.S. base-rate increase for 2026, and future rate decisions, plus the commercial-versus-government payor mix, are recurring catalysts. Operationally, the U.S. rollout of the 5008X hemodiafiltration system and progress in value-based care through Interwell Health are the growth initiatives to track.
Sources: Fresenius Medical Care Q1 2026 results and outlook, StockTitan; FMS stock falls on Q1 2026 earnings, Quiver Quantitative+Stock+Falls+on+Q1+2026+Earnings); FMC Q1 2026 margin expansion amid revenue pressure, Investing.com; Fresenius Q1 EPS ex-items +16% and buyback, StockTitan; Fresenius Medical Care Q1 2026 6-K, SEC.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Segment and corporate information (reported)
- DVA (DAVITA INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …incur significant costs in connection with the growth and development of our international operations, including to start up or acquire new operations, we may not be able to operate them profitably on the anticipated timeline, or at all. If we suffer losses in these operations and such losses are sustained and…
- FY2025 10-K: …professionals who are directly or indirectly involved in the preparation, reporting and fair presentation of our financial statements and Exchange Act reports. The Code of Ethics is posted on our website located at http://www.davita.com . We also maintain a Corporate Code of Conduct that applies to all of our…
- ARDT (Ardent Health, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …and appropriately training our employees and management. However, these rules and regulations are often subject to varying interpretations, in many cases due to their lack of specificity, and, as a result, their application in practice may evolve over time as new guidance is provided by regulatory and governing…
- FY2025 10-K: , and protection of health-related and other personal information. For example, the privacy and security regulations promulgated pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, as amended by the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act of 2009, and regulations…
- THC (TENET HEALTHCARE CORP)
- FY2025 10-K: …and with the participation of management, including our chief executive officer and chief financial officer. Based upon that evaluation, our chief executive officer and chief financial officer concluded that our disclosure controls and procedures are effective as of December 31, 2025 to ensure that material…
- FY2025 10-K: …and is incorporated by reference in accordance with General Instruction G(3) to Form 10-K. Our insider trading policies and procedures are incorporated by reference as Exhibit 19 to this report. ITEM 11. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION The information required by this Item is set forth under the headings "Executive…
- UHS (UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …also "Executive Officers of the Registrant" appearing in Item 1 hereof. ITEM 11. Executi ve Compensation There is hereby incorporated by reference the information to appear under the caption "Executive Compensation" in our Proxy Statement to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission within 120 days after…
- FY2025 10-K: …and procedures as defined in Rule 13a-15(e) or Rule 15d-15(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. Based on this evaluation, the CEO and CFO have concluded that our disclosure controls and procedures are effective to ensure that material information is recorded, processed, summarized and reported by…
- HCA (HCA Healthcare, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: Inspections None. 75 PART III Item 10 . Directors, Executive Officers and Corporate Governance The information required by this Item regarding the identity and business experience of our directors and executive officers is set forth under the heading "Nominees for Election" and "Election of Directors" in the…
- FY2025 10-K: …as well as their own whistleblower provisions under which a private party may file a civil lawsuit in state court. We have adopted and distributed policies pertaining to the FCA and relevant state laws. Health Information Privacy, Security and Interoperability The Administrative Simplification Provisions of the…
- SEM (SELECT MEDICAL HOLDINGS CORP)
- FY2025 10-K: …certifications may cause our revenue and profitability to decline; • the failure of our Medicare-certified long term care hospitals and inpatient rehabilitation facilities operated as "hospitals within hospitals" to qualify as hospitals separate from their host hospitals may cause our revenue and profitability to…
- FY2025 10-K: …information, recognizing different cybersecurity incidents, identifying phishing emails, understanding the appropriate personnel to approach with information or questions, and acceptance of the Company's Information Security Policy. The Company's management is informed of cybersecurity incidents through ongoing…
- OPCH (OPTION CARE HEALTH, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …when the guidance in Topic 270 is applicable, and provides additional guidance on what disclosures should be provided in interim reporting periods. The amendments also require entities to disclose events since the end of the last annual reporting period that have a material impact on the entity. The FASB does not…
- FY2025 10-K: …and state laws also require that the Company follow specific labeling, reporting and record-keeping requirements for controlled substances. The Company maintains federal and state controlled substance registrations for each of its facilities that require such registration and materially follows procedures intended to…
- ENSG (ENSIGN GROUP, INC)
- FY2025 10-K: …to, or otherwise obtained by OHCA, we anticipate that it will be publicly available and could provide competitors with otherwise unavailable data on the financial operations and reimbursement relationships of our independent subsidiaries. 52 Table of Contents We have filed a Petition in the Superior Court of the…
- FY2025 10-K: …transaction or changes in our Board of Directors could cause the market price of our common stock to decline. Item 1B. UNRESOLVED STAFF COMMENTS None. Item 1C. CYBERSECURITY We utilize information technology that enables our operational leaders to access and share with their peers, both clinical and financial…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.