Five Below, Inc. (FIVE): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $211.16, Five Below, Inc. (FIVE) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~6.2 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-26.

Generated: 2026-07-29 · Exported: 2026-08-01 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/FIVE

Headline

FieldValue
TickerFIVE
CompanyFive Below, Inc.
Sector / IndustryConsumer Defensive
Current price$211.16/sh
CompositionLeisure 44% / Fashion and home 31% / Snack and seasonal 25%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)3.5%
Operating margin today11.0%
Margin compression (value-band)-7.5pp
Must persist for6.2y
Multiple paid23x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 8: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 10.4% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~1.7 years.

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~21.3%/yr; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: elevated

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.15σ
cohort percentile (of 68 peers)60
sustained it ~6.2 years at this level25%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.45x5expensive
Earnings5.01x5expensive
Relative1.23x5expensive
Growth0.69x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.9%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=18)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$464.640.45xyesFCF base $0.6B, growth 25% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.9%, 7yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$307.630.69xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 17.6x / 19.6x / 21.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 7yr
Relative ValuationRelative$171.921.23xyesP/E 22x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 17.6x / 22.0x / 26.4x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 14x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$85.652.47xyesBV/sh $41.59, ROE (TTM) 19.1%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$121.481.74xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$274.890.77xyesRev $5.1B, growth 26% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.9x / 2.3x / 2.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$95.162.22xyesEPS $7.93, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=13.32 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$11.9617.66xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.40B × (1−24%) / WACC 7.9% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$119.081.77xyesBV $41.59 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 19.1% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$86.142.45xyes√(22.5 × EPS $7.93 × BVPS $41.59) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$134.611.57xyesEBITDA $0.76B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$42.135.01xyesFCF $505.3M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$36.305.82xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.48B (FCF $0.51B − SBC $0.03B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$255.870.83xyesEPS $7.93 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$11.2818.72xyesBV $41.59 × (ROIC 2.2% / WACC 7.9%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$182.681.16xyesRevenue $5.08B × sector P/S 2.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$297.380.71xyesEPS $7.93 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$85.732.46xyesEPS $7.93 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Solvency

FieldValue
Net cash$1.1b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)-2.62x (net cash)
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)-1.99x (net cash)
Share count CAGR (buyback)-0.1%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

A store rollout is valued differently from almost anything else, and the reason is mechanical rather than philosophical. Every new store costs money before it earns any: fit-out, inventory, staff, pre-opening marketing. A chain opening stores fast therefore reports earnings that understate the earning power already built, because a meaningful share of the cost base belongs to stores that have not yet had a full year of trading. The right question for a business like this is not what it earned last year but what a mature store earns, how many more can be opened, and whether the stores already open are still getting busier. Five Below currently answers all three well, which is not where it was two years ago.

Take the store base first. The company opened 49 net new stores in the quarter ended 2 May 2026 and finished with 1,970 in 46 states, a store count 7.9% larger than a year earlier, with roughly 150 net openings planned for the full year. The 10-K states the case for the model directly: Our store growth is supported by our new store economics, which we believe to be compelling, built around a format of approximately 9,500 square feet. It also describes a specific opening tactic, clustering multiple store openings in a single market on the same day so that marketing and pre-opening costs are spread across several locations at once and brand awareness arrives all at the same moment.

The second answer is the rarer one. Comparable sales, meaning sales at stores already open a year or more, rose 22.7% in that quarter. Store growth of 7.9% with comparable growth of 22.7% means the existing base contributed roughly three quarters of the 32.5% increase in total sales. New stores are additive; the acceleration is coming from stores that already existed. Operating income rose to 154.2 million dollars from 50.8 million in the year-ago quarter, and net income reached 123.1 million from 41.1 million, or 2.21 dollars per diluted share against 0.75.

Rolled forward, the trailing picture is now genuinely good rather than merely recovering. Operating profit for the twelve months ended 2 May 2026 was 560.8 million dollars on sales of 5,079 million, built from the 457.4 million the company reported for the year ended 31 January 2026 plus the improvement in the most recent quarter. That is roughly 11 cents of operating profit on the sales dollar. In this group only OLLI comes close, at 11.4 cents, with DLTR at 8.8, DG at 5.3, M at 4.6, KSS at 3.9 and BJ at 3.7. A discount retailer earning double-digit operating margins while growing comparable sales in the twenties is not a common animal.

The balance sheet lets management keep going without asking anyone's permission. There is no funded borrowing at all, and liquid balances stood near 1.1 billion dollars. Capital spending of 230 to 250 million dollars is planned for the year, comfortably inside what the business generates. The 10-K is candid that the value proposition is being defended with price rather than assumed to hold on its own, noting that While we have been able to mitigate this impact to date through our pricing strategies, we are unable to predict how long the current inflationary environment will continue. A retailer whose entire promise is a low price point has to absorb cost inflation somewhere, and so far it has absorbed it in sourcing and mix rather than by breaking the price point.

Bear Case

Follow the money out of this business and it goes to exactly one place: more stores. Capital spending is guided to 230 to 250 million dollars for the current year. Share repurchases were zero across the entire year ended 31 January 2026, against 40.2 million dollars the year before, and the company's own outlook says it excludes the impact of tariff refunds and share repurchases, if any. There is no dividend. So every dollar earned is being reinvested into square footage, and the case for owning the stock is entirely the case that the 150th store opened this year earns what the first thousand do. That is a bet on the runway, and runways get shorter with each year of building.

The reinvestment also arrives with a financing structure that does not appear in the borrowing line. Five Below has no funded borrowing, but it has signed leases on nearly two thousand stores, and the non-current portion of those obligations alone stood at 1,698 million dollars on 2 May 2026. Read on a funded basis the company holds net liquid balances of roughly 1.1 billion dollars; read on a basis that counts the leases, the same balance sheet carries a net obligation of about 1.4 billion. Both readings are true and they describe different risks. Leases are fixed, long-dated and cannot be renegotiated when comparable sales turn.

Turn they might, because the single most important assumption in the outlook is not about retail at all. Guidance reflects tariff rates in place through 24 July 2026 and assumes they revert afterwards to where the year began, and it explicitly excludes any tariff refunds. The 10-K describes the aftermath of the court decision invalidating certain tariffs as leaving significant uncertainty regarding the processes that will govern refund claims related to the invalidated tariffs, the timing of any potential refunds, and the ultimate amounts, if any. For an importer of low-priced discretionary goods, tariffs are not a line item; they are the difference between a five-dollar price point working and not working. A comparable-sales number of 22.7% during a period of trade disruption may partly be customers trading down to this chain from more expensive ones, which is a cyclical gift, not a structural one.

The governance record adds friction rather than comfort. An executive officer's employment ceased on 3 February 2026, with a separation agreement providing a lump-sum payment of 700,000 dollars representing twelve months of base salary, a further 20,000 dollars toward healthcare continuation, additional payments of 22,048 and 10,000 dollars, continued vesting of 3,269 restricted stock units and ninety days of transition advice. Separately, the retention awards granted in fiscal 2024 are still large enough that the company reports its results twice, once including them and once excluding them. Retention packages and severance agreements are what a business pays when continuity is in question, and this one has been paying both.

Set against what the price assumes, the picture tightens. The methods that value this company without projecting growth land nowhere near the current share price: capitalising the average operating profit of the last several years with no growth at all reaches a small fraction of it, and the book-value approaches are not close either. Only the methods that carry the recent growth rate forward, and carry it for a long time, reach the price. That is a coherent position to take. It is also a position that requires the 22.7% comparable-sales quarter to be closer to the new normal than to the top of a cycle, and only about 14% of companies growing at comparable rates have held the pace for a decade.

Valuation

Management has told the market what it expects to earn, which makes the arithmetic unusually clean. Diluted earnings for the year ending January 2027 are guided to 8.62 to 9.02 dollars a share on roughly 55.7 million diluted shares, with net sales of 5.40 to 5.48 billion dollars. The shares trade near 203 dollars. Against the midpoint of that guided range the price sits a little above twenty-two times a year that has not finished yet, and that year already assumes comparable sales up 6% to 8% and about 150 new stores. The price is therefore paying a growth multiple on a growth year, not on a trailing one.

The methods disagree along a clean fault line, and the fault line is growth. The approaches that project the recent expansion forward and discount it back land above the current price, in one case well above. The peer-multiple approaches land close to it, slightly under. The approaches that assume no growth at all, capitalising the last several years' average operating profit or valuing the equity off book value plus profitability, land far below it. Nothing here is contradictory. It is the standard signature of a company whose value is mostly in what it has not built yet, and it means the entire premium above the peer-multiple read is the durability of the expansion.

The most concrete "what has to be true" is a store number rather than a margin. The company finished the quarter ended 2 May 2026 with 1,970 stores and intends to add roughly 150 this year, funded by 230 to 250 million dollars of gross capital spending. For the price to work, those additions have to earn something close to what the existing base earns, and the existing base has to keep improving. Both conditions were met in the most recent quarter: operating profit for the twelve months ended 2 May 2026 reached 560.8 million dollars on sales of 5,079 million, which works out near 11 cents of operating profit per sales dollar. Against the value-retail group that is at the top: OLLI at 11.4 cents, DLTR at 8.8, DG at 5.3, PSMT at 4.5, BJ at 3.7.

Solvency barely constrains anything here, which is itself the point. There is no funded borrowing, and liquid balances of roughly 1.1 billion dollars sit against a capital programme of a quarter of that size. On a lease-inclusive view the picture is different in character rather than in danger: the non-current portion of operating lease liabilities was 1,698 million dollars on 2 May 2026, which is what a two-thousand-store estate costs to commit to. The company can fund its own expansion and does not need markets to be open to do it. The trade-off it accepts is a fixed occupancy cost that does not shrink if the comparable-sales trend does.

Two facts sit uncomfortably together and are worth leaving with the reader rather than resolving. The trailing operating profit is the best in this peer group by margin, and the growth rate that produced it came during a period of tariff disruption the company's own guidance treats as temporary. The price reflects the first. What happens to the second is not visible from this data.

Catalysts

The first-quarter report on 3 June 2026 reset expectations upward. Net sales rose 32.5% to 1,285.6 million dollars against 970.5 million a year earlier, comparable sales rose 22.7%, operating income reached 154.2 million dollars against 50.8 million, and diluted earnings per share were 2.21 dollars against 0.75. The company opened 49 net new stores in the quarter, ending with 1,970 in 46 states, and raised its full-year sales and earnings outlook alongside the print.

The guidance itself carries a dated assumption that is the most consequential thing in this section. The outlook reflects tariff rates in place through 24 July 2026 and assumes rates thereafter return to those in place at the start of the fiscal year, and it excludes any tariff refunds and any share repurchases. For the second quarter the company guided net sales of 1.18 to 1.20 billion dollars on comparable sales up 7% to 9% with about 50 new stores, and diluted earnings of 1.15 to 1.27 dollars a share. That second-quarter print is the first look at whether the comparable-sales pace holds as the comparisons get harder.

One recent operational event is worth noting because it is disclosed and dated. On 15 July 2026 the company identified anomalous activity on an employee's company-issued computer; the investigation determined that on 14 July 2026 a threat actor used social engineering to gain unauthorised access to that machine and exfiltrated a number of files. The company states that its response contained and terminated the access, that the incident was limited to that employee's environment, that no personally identifiable information was accessed, and that it does not believe the incident is reasonably likely to have a material impact. That assessment is the company's own and rests on information available at the filing date, which is the usual caveat with these disclosures and the reason the next quarterly filing is where the matter is confirmed or revised.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Five Below (consolidated value retail) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

FY2026 Form 10-K filed 19 March 2026 and Q1 Form 10-Q filed 4 June 2026 · company 8-K, 9 February 2026 · Q1 fiscal 2026 results release, 3 June 2026 · company 8-K, 22 July 2026

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