FISERV INC (FISV): what the price requires
The current priced-in claim for FISERV INC (FISV) is temporarily suppressed because the live engine record is unavailable. The dated report remains a snapshot, not a current market read.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/FISV
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | FISV |
| Company | FISERV INC |
| Current price | $51.32/sh |
| Composition | Small Business 32% / Enterprise 11% / Processing 5% / Digital Payments 19% / Issuing 16% / Banking 11% / Corporate and Other 7% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 8.5% |
| Operating margin today | 26.0% |
| Margin compression implied | -17.5pp |
| Multiple paid | 11x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 5, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.
Solve inputs: computed at a 7% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage (computed at the 7% minimum rate; the CAPM rate 5.7% sits below it).
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~-2.4%/yr; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -1.74σ |
| cohort percentile (of 210 peers) | 18 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 0.70x | 5 | justifies |
| Earnings | 0.68x | 5 | justifies |
| Relative | 0.68x | 5 | justifies |
| Growth | 0.79x | 3 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.8%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=18)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $96.94 | 0.53x | yes | FCF base $4.1B, growth 2% (input: historical growth), terminal g 1.9%, WACC 9.8%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $65.35 | 0.79x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 4.0x / 5.3x / 7.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $98.81 | 0.52x | yes | P/E 15.44x (blended: static sector reference 20x + trailing (TTM) 9x), scenarios: 13.1x / 15.4x / 17.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 10.5x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $64.61 | 0.79x | yes | BV/sh $48.94, ROE (TTM) 12.2%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $73.77 | 0.70x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $35.49 | 1.45x | yes | Rev $21.1B, growth 2% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.1x / 1.3x / 1.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $70.80 | 0.72x | yes | EPS $5.90, growth 9% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.01 (Fair) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $69.23 | 0.74x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $4.64B × (1−21%) / WACC 9.8% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $75.64 | 0.68x | yes | BV $48.94 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 12.2% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 7.9%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $80.60 | 0.64x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $5.90 × BVPS $48.94) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $138.51 | 0.37x | yes | EBITDA $5.34B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $82.18 | 0.62x | yes | FCF $4127.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $75.09 | 0.68x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $3.78B (FCF $4.13B − SBC $0.35B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $126.21 | 0.41x | yes | EPS $5.90 × (8.5 + 2×8.5%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $13.54 | 3.79x | yes | BV $48.94 × (ROIC 2.7% / WACC 9.8%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $59.09 | 0.87x | yes | Revenue $21.09B × sector P/S 1.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $75.33 | 0.68x | yes | EPS $5.90 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 8.5% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 12.8x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $63.78 | 0.80x | yes | EPS $5.90 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $30.6b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 7.12x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 5.62x |
| Interest coverage | 3.6x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -5.0% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
The price sits below every valuation method, not above them. At $48 the stock trades under the relative-valuation read near $97, the DCF near $96, the earnings-power method near $69, and the FCF-yield method near $82. The inversion implies the market expects operating income to do worse than no growth at all.
That extreme discount follows a sharp derating. After organic revenue fell 4% in Q1 2026 and the adjusted operating margin compressed 810 basis points, the stock has collapsed from north of $200 a year ago to the high $40s.
The live question is competitive: whether Clover and the merchant business can hold their ground against Block, Toast, Stripe, and big-tech payments. Management reaffirmed full-year guidance of $8.00 to $8.30 in adjusted EPS.
Bull Case
Lead with how far the price sits below the methods, because the gap is unusual. Fiserv trades at $48 (June 27, 2026) while almost every valuation family lands far higher: the relative-valuation method at $97, the perpetual-growth DCF at $96, the FCF-yield method at $82, the Graham number at $81, the residual-income method at $76, and the earnings-power method, which assumes no growth at all, at $69. The price does not just sit below fair value; the inversion shows it implies operating income shrinking, a below-floor assumption that the company would have to actively destroy value to deliver. For a business still generating roughly $4.1 billion of free cash flow and guiding to $8.00 to $8.30 of adjusted EPS, that is a severe verdict.
The operating base is more durable than the headline decline suggests. Fiserv runs core processing and payment systems for financial institutions and merchants through a wide web of direct sales, ISVs, ISOs, and bank partnerships (accession 0000798354-26-000009), the kind of embedded, multi-channel distribution that does not evaporate in a quarter. Clover, the merchant point-of-sale platform that worried the market, actually grew 6% in Q1 with stronger underlying growth after stripping nonrecurring items, and management still expects low-double-digit Clover revenue growth for 2026 (accession 0000798354-26-000009). The company is also extending Clover into capital and new geographies, so the growth engine is being widened, not wound down.
Management is leaning on cost and execution to defend the margin. It reaffirmed full-year guidance of 1% to 3% organic growth, about 34% adjusted operating margin, and $8.00 to $8.30 adjusted EPS, backed by the One Fiserv and Project Elevate productivity programs. At roughly six times the midpoint of that EPS guide, the stock is priced as if the business is in terminal decline.
Bear Case
The thesis that matters is competitive disruption, and it has specific names. Fiserv's Merchant segment, anchored by Clover, competes against a swarm of faster-moving rivals: Block's Square, Toast in restaurants, Stripe in online and embedded payments, and, as the 10-K itself acknowledges, payment networks and large technology, media, and integrated-payments software providers, plus a growing field of local and regional competitors abroad (accession 0000798354-26-000009). These competitors win small-business merchants with slicker software and integrated commerce tools, and they are precisely the customers Clover needs to keep. The Q1 numbers show the pressure leaking through: organic revenue fell 4%, with Merchant Solutions down 1% and Financial Solutions down 6%, and the adjusted operating margin compressed a startling 810 basis points. A processor losing organic revenue while its margin caves is showing the early signature of disruption, not a passing soft patch.
The market has already begun to price that, which is why the stock collapsed from north of $200 to the high $40s, but the bear case is that the derating may not be over. GAAP EPS fell 29% and adjusted EPS fell 16% in the quarter, and management reaffirmed rather than raised guidance, which after a sharp miss reads as defending a number, not beating it. The company carries roughly $31 billion of net debt, so a leveraged business with declining organic revenue has limited room to invest its way out of the competitive hole while also servicing that debt.
The valuation methods that look cheap all rest on the business stabilizing. The earnings-power method at $69 assumes today's earnings simply persist; if Clover decelerates and Financial Solutions keeps shrinking, that floor falls. The ROIC-justified book method already lands at just $13, a reminder that the returns on the company's large acquired-goodwill base are thin. A stock can sit far below every standard method for years when the market believes the earnings stream itself is eroding, and a payments processor facing better-funded, faster software competitors is the textbook case where cheap stays cheap because the denominator keeps falling.
Valuation
Inverting the price produces a striking result. At $48 the implied assumption is below the no-growth floor, meaning the market is pricing operating income to decline rather than hold, which is why the solve is flagged below-floor and the reported band collapses to a single point at the current price. The blended whole-company multiple is only about 10x operating income, low for a business with a 25% operating margin.
The model X-ray is uniformly above the price, an unusual configuration. The relative-valuation method lands at $97, the perpetual-growth DCF at $96, the EV/EBITDA comp at $139, the FCF-yield and SBC-adjusted FCF methods at $82 and $75, the residual-income method at $76, the Graham number at $81, the earnings-power method at $69, and the earnings-yield method at $64. Only the discounted-future-market-cap method, at $33, sits below the price, dragged down by near-flat assumed revenue growth.
The honest reading is that this is either a deep value opportunity or a value trap, and the methods cannot tell you which because they all assume the earnings stream survives. The deciding variable is competitive: if Clover stabilizes and the productivity programs hold the margin near the guided 34%, the methods are right and the stock is cheap; if organic revenue keeps declining and the margin keeps compressing, the no-growth floor itself moves lower and the discount is deserved. The price has bet on the pessimistic case, and the earnings power has to prove it wrong.
Catalysts
Q1 2026 was the most recent data point and it was weak. Total revenue was roughly flat at $5.0 billion, but organic revenue fell 4%, with Merchant Solutions down 1% and Financial Solutions down 6%, GAAP EPS dropped 29% to $1.07, adjusted EPS fell 16% to $1.79, and the adjusted operating margin compressed 810 basis points. The next print is the most important catalyst, because it will show whether the organic decline and margin compression are stabilizing or worsening.
Clover is the swing factor inside the numbers. It grew 6% reported in Q1 with stronger underlying growth, and management still expects low-double-digit Clover growth for 2026, so the trajectory of that single platform against Square, Toast, and Stripe will largely decide the merchant story. The One Fiserv and Project Elevate productivity programs are the offset management is counting on to defend the roughly 34% adjusted operating margin.
Guidance and capital structure round out the watch list. Management reaffirmed full-year 2026 guidance of 1% to 3% organic growth and $8.00 to $8.30 adjusted EPS, so any revision becomes a major catalyst given how far the stock has fallen. With roughly $31 billion of net debt, deleveraging and free-cash-flow conversion also matter. Sentiment has turned sharply negative after the collapse from north of $200, and the debate now is whether the high-$40s price has overshot or is pricing a real, ongoing erosion.
Sources: stocktitan.net (Q1 2026 results), investing.com (Q1 2026 slides), emarketer.com (Clover and One Fiserv detail), finance.yahoo.com (Q1 2026 call summary).
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Merchant (reported)
- GPN (GLOBAL PAYMENTS INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- FOUR (SHIFT4 PAYMENTS, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- XYZ (Block, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TOST (Toast, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- PYPL (PayPal Holdings, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Financial (reported)
- FIS (Fidelity National Information Services, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- JKHY (JACK HENRY & ASSOCIATES, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ACIW (ACI WORLDWIDE, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- EVTC (EVERTEC, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- GPN (GLOBAL PAYMENTS INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.